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This thesis investigates British media representations of the conflict in Northern Ireland between 1973 
and 1997, and how these affected the lived experiences of the Irish in Britain over this period. The 
‘Troubles’ dominated headlines from the outbreak of communal violence in 1968. As the main source 
of information on Northern Ireland for most British people, the press and broadcast media were central 
to how the conflict was reported on and understood in Britain. The British press and broadcast media 
offered multifaceted and detailed coverage of the conflict in Northern Ireland, contrary to the 
assumptions made by various scholars, and the belief of many Irish people living in Britain at the time. 
The prevailing view amongst the Irish in Britain was that the media merely regurgitated the official line, 
producing one-dimensional coverage of Northern Ireland. Irish political and community activists in 
Britain from the 1980s campaigned against the media’s allegedly oversimplified and biased reporting, 
which they believed played a significant role in the discrimination and harassment experienced by the 
Irish, especially as a result of the IRA bombing campaign in English cities. These activists were correct 
in maintaining that the media contributed to the hostile environment experienced by many Irish people 
living in Britain throughout the ‘Troubles’. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the press and 
broadcasting bodies failed to engage with the complexities of the conflict in Northern Ireland or indeed 
provide a critical view of the role of the British state. This thesis presents the findings of an in-depth 
analysis of a broad and representative range of newspapers and television current affairs programmes. 
Far from simply parroting the official line, the media resisted efforts by the state to dictate how the 
‘Troubles’ were reported. The media provided far more nuanced, independent-minded and analytical 

















This thesis investigates how the British media represented the conflict in Northern Ireland between 1973 
and 1997, and the affect this had on Irish people living in Britain over this period. The ‘Troubles’ 
dominated headlines from the outbreak of violence in 1968. The majority of people in Britain were 
reliant on newspapers and television programmes for news and interpretations of the conflict, so the 
press and broadcast media were central to how events in Northern Ireland were understood elsewhere 
in the United Kingdom.  
The prevailing view amongst scholars of the ‘Troubles’ has been that the British media provided one-
dimensional coverage of the conflict in Northern Ireland, which merely repeated the official line. This 
view emerged originally as a result of Irish community activists campaigning against media bias and 
anti-Irish prejudice in the 1980s. They argued that the British media distorted and suppressed news 
about Northern Ireland and believed that this led to the discrimination and harassment experienced by 
many Irish people in Britain. These views were absorbed into a collective narrative of the Irish 
experience of living in Britain during the ‘Troubles’, which in turn greatly influenced scholarly work 
on the media’s role in the conflict. 
This thesis however, demonstrates that the British media’s coverage of events in Northern Ireland were 
much more complex. By analysing a broad range of newspapers and television programmes, it shows 
that the print and broadcast media provided multifaceted and detailed coverage of the conflict in 
Northern Ireland, which engaged with a wide variety of perspectives. It recognises that Irish activists 
were correct in maintaining that the media contributed to the hostile environment experienced by many 
Irish people living in Britain throughout the ‘Troubles’, but argues that this did not mean that the press 
and broadcasting bodies failed to engage with the complexities of the conflict in Northern Ireland or to 
offer a critical view of the role of the British state. Far from simply regurgitating the official line, the 
media resisted efforts by the state to influence how the ‘Troubles’ were reported. The media provided 
far more nuanced, independent-minded and analytical coverage of the conflict than has previously been 
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On 5 October 1968 civil rights marchers in Duke Street, Derry were met with unrestrained violence 
from the police. Such attacks were nothing new in Northern Ireland. As Martin Cowley, former London 
editor of the Irish Times, recounted, ‘the north of Ireland had seen street violence before, and it had 
hardly raised an eyebrow elsewhere… What set Duke Street apart was that this time the whole spectacle 
was caught ‘on tape’, up close and very personal’.1 Worldwide, shocking images of baton-wielding 
policemen attacking unarmed protestors were transmitted into people’s living rooms. The day after, 
newspapers described in graphic detail the violence. For the next thirty years the conflict in Northern 
Ireland was never far from the headlines in Britain, Ireland and internationally. The media was regarded 
as a crucial element in the struggle for power and legitimacy by all sides. Participants vied for influence, 
seeking to shape how the conflict in Northern Ireland was presented so as to encourage support and 
further their position. As David Miller has observed, alongside the bombs and shootings another war 
was being waged ‘from the offices of the Irish Times in Dublin, and in The Times in London, to the New 
York Times in the USA’.2 In this very modern conflict, the press and broadcast media were significant 
weapons. As the principal source of information on Northern Ireland for most British people, the media 
was central to how the conflict was understood elsewhere in the United Kingdom. This thesis explores 
British media representations of the Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’ between 1973 and 1997, and how these 
affected the lived experiences of the Irish in Britain over this period.  
The media’s coverage of the Northern Ireland conflict was both nuanced and detailed; however, 
scholarly treatment of this subject has tended to be overly simplistic. The prevailing view amongst 
scholars of the ‘Troubles’, and the contemporaries who lived through them, is that the British media 
provided one-dimensional coverage of the conflict in Northern Ireland. They argue that newspapers and 
television programmes regurgitated the state’s line that the conflict was a straightforward struggle 
against terrorism and Britain an altruistic presence caught between two warring factions. This was the 
belief of Irish community activists in Britain during the 1980s, who campaigned against the media’s 
allegedly oversimplified and biased reporting. These activists believed that by routinely distorting the 
facts about Northern Ireland, the British media inflamed the hostility and prejudice experienced by the 
Irish as a result of the IRA bombing campaign in England.  
Historian and Irish activist Liz Curtis consolidated this view in her 1984 book Ireland and the 
Propaganda War, in which she contended that the British media reported on the ‘Troubles’ ‘in an 
inadequate and partial way’.3 The press and broadcast media, she asserts, concentrated on violence 
without providing explanation or context, presenting it as the exclusive preserve of the IRA and ignoring 
Britain’s responsibility and role in the conflict. Curtis argues that the limitations of the media’s coverage 
 
1 Martin Cowley, ‘Duke Street, Derry, 5 October 1968’ in Reporting the Troubles: Journalists tell their stories of the 
Northern Ireland conflict, comp. Deric Henderson and Ivan Little (Newtownards: Blackstaff Press, 2018), 1.  
2 David Miller, Don’t Mention the War: Northern Ireland, Propaganda and the Media (London: Pluto Press, 1994), 12.  




prevented the British public from engaging in ‘rational discussion about how to resolve the situation’, 
thereby prolonging the conflict. This analysis, however, is based on a very limited sample of the vast 
quantity of media coverage generated throughout the ‘Troubles’. Curtis was directly involved in Irish 
activism in the 1980s and campaigned against anti-Irish bias in the media. Ireland and the Propaganda 
War is, in part, an extension of this activism, and is underpinned by an overtly nationalist bias. In her 
conclusion, she calls for readers to pressurise broadcasters and editors to provide more thorough and 
searching coverage of Northern Ireland.4 Though Curtis makes no secret of her nationalist politics, she 
presents her work as a corrective of the misleading information offered by the media. For these reasons 
her analysis needs to be considered with great caution.  
Curtis’s arguments were heavily influenced by the work of contemporary social scientists and 
media scholars, including Philip Elliott, whose survey, published in the late 1970s, investigates British 
news media coverage of Northern Ireland.5 Elliott argues that the media was preoccupied with stories 
of violence, reported without explanation or context, often to the exclusion of politics and other stories 
from the province. Elliott also asserts that the British media paid considerably more attention to 
incidents which occurred in Britain. He argues that the news media kept stories of bomb attacks in 
England alive, each day applying ‘a new dressing to the wound society has suffered’, to show Britain 
united against, and expiating, the IRA threat.6 Curtis also makes extensive use of Philip Schlesinger 
research into the BBC’s coverage of the ‘Troubles’. Schlesinger asserts that British broadcasting failed 
to offer more than a one-dimensional picture of the ‘Troubles’. He argues that in general, the BBC 
presented audiences with de-contextualised reports, which pre-eminently focused on violence, and 
failed to ‘analyse and re-analyse the historical roots of the Irish conflict’, contributing to the British 
public’s view of the ‘Troubles’ as incomprehensible and irrational.7 Both scholars, however, writing in 
the late 1970s when the conflict was still at its height, neglect to consider the nuance ways in which the 
media evolved over time. 
More recently, Greg Scott Campbell has argued that the BBC’s coverage of the conflict was 
‘dominated by generic media templates, the rhetoric of euphemism, a concerted lack of 
contextualisation, and empty symbolism of the absent image’. In his doctoral thesis, Campbell explores 
visual representations of Northern Ireland and domestic terrorism by the BBC during the ‘Troubles’. 
Whilst acknowledging that the BBC’s earliest footage revealed to news audiences the true nature and 
human cost of the violence, he asserts that broadcast journalists failed to provide adequate analysis of 
the background cases to the disturbances. He argues that as, over the course of the conflict, the 
 
4 Curtis, Ireland The Propaganda War, 276-8. 
5 Philip Elliot, ‘Reporting Northern Ireland: A study of news in Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland’, in Ethnicity and the media: An analysis of media reporting in the United Kingdom, Canada and Ireland 
(UNESCO, 1977), 295-9; Philip Elliot, ‘Misreporting Ulster: News as a Field-Dressing’, New Society (1976), 398-401. 
6 Philip Elliot, ‘Reporting Northern Ireland: A study of news in Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland’, in Ethnicity and the media: An analysis of media reporting in the United Kingdom, Canada and Ireland 
(UNESCO, 1977), 295-9; Philip Elliot, ‘Misreporting Ulster: News as a Field-Dressing’, New Society (1976), 398-401. 
7 Philip Schlesinger, Putting ‘Reality’ Together: BBC News (London: Methuen & Co, 1987), 205-243; Philip 
Schlesinger, ‘The BBC and Northern Ireland’, The British Media and Ireland: Truth: the first casualty (The Campaign 
for Free Speech in Ireland, 1979), 10. 
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Corporation was subject to greater public and political pressure to report the violence in a way that was 
favourable to the British government, broadcasters self-censored their reports by reducing the visual 
coverage of the conflict to a series of meaningless symbols. Campbell contends that, with a few notable 
exceptions, the bodies and bloody consequences of the ‘Troubles’ were erased from the BBC news, to 
be replaced with generic tropes, such as burning vehicles, which ‘abbreviated and condemned the 
complexity’ of the conflict.8 Campbell, however, makes a limited effort to analyse the extent to which 
content and background was provided in the accompanying commentary instead. Curiously, he also 
made no use of the BBC archives, which offers important detail about the editorial practices that shaped 
the production of television programmes about Northern Ireland, including the visual framing of events.  
Perceptions of a simplistic and biased British media are by no means confined to work on 
republican violence. Historian Alan Parkinson examination of media perceptions of Ulster loyalism also 
argues that the press and broadcast media’s coverage was simplistic and devoid of any explanation of 
the rationale behind paramilitary violence. He contends that this lack of contextual information resulted 
in the British public predominantly dismissing the conflict as sheer irrationality on the part of the two 
communities, as well as fostering a general apathy towards events in Northern Ireland. Parkinson argues 
further that the loyalist perspective on the ‘Troubles’ was often overlooked, with loyalist concerns about 
the deteriorating security situation or border violence relegated to the peripheries of the national media. 
He suggests that the media tended to focus on the negative association of loyalism with bigotry, 
intransigence and anachronistic behaviour. As a result, loyalists were often blamed by the media for the 
failure of political initiatives in Northern Ireland.9 
Other scholars, however, paint a more complex picture. Political sociologist and media studies 
scholar David Miller, for example, has argued that whilst it was susceptible to exploitation by the British 
state for propaganda purposes, the media was never simply an instrument of the government. Miller 
argues that a complex mixture of restrictions was imposed on both the press and broadcast media by the 
government and state organisations such as the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) and the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC). These included economic considerations, direct and self-censorship, legal 
pressure and intimidation. He contends that journalists tended to mistake authority for credibility, which 
meant that they often favoured the view put forward by the state. Nevertheless, ‘a significant public 
service ethos remains in broadcasting and that the ideology of the “fourth estate” remains in parts of the 
press’, proving at times an important check on the government in Northern Ireland.10 The extent to 
which the media was able to challenge the government and other state agencies was dependent on 
various factors, above all on the balance of political power. The weaker the government, the easier it 
was for journalists to challenge its authority. Despite this, the press and television offered important 
criticism of successive British governments, complicating news coverage of the ‘Troubles’.11 
 
8 Greg Scott Campbell, ‘The BBC and the Troubles: 1968-1998’, (PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2016), 5; 79. 
9 Alan Parkinson, Ulster Loyalism and the British Media (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1998).  
10 Miller, Don’t Mention the War, 275. 
11 Ibid, 273-83. 
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Journalists have themselves produced numerous accounts drawing on their experiences 
reporting the ‘Troubles’, which demonstrates their desire to investigate beyond the information given 
to them by state organisations to explore different perspective and engage with the complexities of the 
conflict. In his recent autobiography for example, Jeremy Paxman, describes his experiences as a 
reporter covering the Northern Ireland conflict, first for BBC Northern Ireland’s Spotlight and later 
Tonight and Panorama. He explores the ‘Troubles’ within their historic context and passes comment 
on the dilemma of trying to report political violence without giving terrorists a propaganda platform.12 
Similarly, RTÉ and the Observer journalist, Kevin Myers’ 2006 memoir Watching the Door offers an 
autobiographical account of Northern Ireland in the 1970s.13 Veteran Northern Ireland correspondent 
Peter Taylor has produce numerous books on the conflict including his Northern Ireland trilogy, which 
explores the ‘Troubles’ from the perspectives of the three key participants: Provos: The IRA and Sinn 
Féin, Loyalists, and Brits: The War against the IRA.14 Others have focused on specific events or key 
figures in the conflict, perhaps the most noteworthy example of this is Guardian journalist David 
Beresford’s Ten Men Dead, which chronicles the 1981 Hunger Strikes. 15  Most recently, Deric 
Henderson and Ivan Little have compiled a collection of stories from sixty-eight newspaper and 
television journalists, recounting their experiences of working in Northern Ireland during the conflict.16     
Academics have also carried out research on specific areas of the media during the ‘Troubles’. 
This includes the work of Jean Seaton, Aogán Mulcahy, Kirsten Sparre and Graham Spencer. 
Collectively, these scholars have argued that the British media offered a more critical view of the 
conflict than has previously been recognised. Seaton for example, has demonstrated how the BBC 
resisted efforts by the British government to impose direct censorship on the broadcast media. 17 
Mulcahy has shown that newspapers offered a critical view of the government’s criminalisation policy 
in their coverage of the hunger strikes.18 Furthermore, Sparre and Spencer have argued that the media 
played a central role in the peace process, between 1994 and 1998, acting as a conduit for negotiations 
when face-to-face discussion was not possible.19 
 
12 Jeremy Paxman, A Life in Questions (London: William Collins, 2016).  
13 Kevin Meyers, Watching the Door: A Memoir 1972 – 1978 (Dublin: Lilliput Press, 2006). 
14 Peter Taylor, Loyalists: Ulster’s protestant paramilitaries, (London: Bloomsbury, 1999); Peter Taylor, Provos: the 
IRA and Sinn Fein (London: Bloomsbury, 1998); Peter Taylor, Brits: The War against the IRA (London: Bloomsbury, 
2002).  
15 David Beresford, Ten Men Dead: The Story of the 1981 Irish hunger strike (London: HarperCollinsPublishers, 1994).  
16 Henderson and Little, Reporting the Troubles. Other books and memoirs on the ‘Troubles’ by journalists include: 
Robert Fisk, Point of No Return: Strike which broke the British in Ulster (London: André Deutsch, 1975); David 
McKittrick and David McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles: A History of the Northern Ireland Conflict (London: 
Viking, 2012); David McKittrick, Seamus Kelters, Brian Feeney and Chris Thornton (eds.), Lost Lives: The stories of 
the men, women and children who died as a result of the Northern Ireland troubles, (Edinburgh: Mainstream 
Publishing, 1999); Martin Dillon, The Enemy Within: IRA inside the United Kingdom (London: Doubleday, 1994). 
17 Jean Seaton, ‘The BBC and the ‘Hidden Wiring’ of the British Constitution: The Imposition of the Broadcasting Ban 
in 1988’, Twentieth Century British History, 24, 3 (2013), 448-471. 
18 Aogán Mulcahy, ‘Claims-Making and the Construction of Legitimacy: Press Coverage of the 1981 Northern Irish 
Hunger Strike’, Social Problems, 42, 4 (1995), 449-467. 
19 Kirsten Sparre, ‘Megaphone Diplomacy in the Northern Irish Peace Process: Squaring the Circle by Talking to 
Terrorists through Journalists’, The International Journal of Press/ Politics, 6, 1 (2001), 88-104; Graham Spencer, ‘The 
impact of television news on the Northern Ireland peace negotiations’, Media, Culture and Society, 26, 5 (2004), 603-




 Most recently, historian Robert Savage has challenged the belief that the British government 
dictated how the broadcast media covered the conflict. Focusing on the BBC, Savage considers how 
broadcasters questioned the decisions, policies and tactics of consecutive British governments in 
Northern Ireland. He argues that over the thirty years of violence the BBC provided insightful and 
critical commentary, becoming an ‘integral part of the long and harrowing conflict’. Savage describes 
the mounting pressure brought to bear on broadcasters by successive governments and argues that, 
despite efforts to silence them, senior officials at the BBC produced informed and challenging coverage 
‘critical to comprehending and eventually resolving a long and bloody conflict’.20  Savage’s work 
represents a growing appreciation that the media played a more complex role in the ‘Troubles’ than has 
previously been acknowledged.  
Despite these developments towards an understanding that the media had provided a more 
nuanced multi-dimensional approach, Curtis’s thesis that the British media was merely a puppet of the 
state providing one-sided, over-simplistic coverage of events in Northern Ireland continues to be applied 
without question by many scholars of the ‘Troubles’ and related subjects. This is particularly apparent 
in the literature on the Irish in contemporary Britain. Sociologists in particular have carried out 
significant work on the Irish in Britain in the second half of the twentieth century. They have tended, 
however, to concentrate on the Irish experience of discrimination and invisibility. Sociologist Mary 
Hickman in particular has argued extensively that the Irish were subject to racial discrimination and that 
the media were in part responsible for this. Also involved in Irish activism during the 1980s, Hickman’s 
conclusions align closely with the views of organisations such as the Irish in Britain Representation 
Group (IBRG), which campaigned extensively for ethnic recognition and against perceived anti-Irish 
discrimination. She disregards the view, held by many historians and sociologists writing in the 1980s 
and 1990s, that by the mid-twentieth century the Irish had assimilated into British society. Rather, 
Hickman argues that the Irish became an invisible ethnic group in Britain due to the masking effects of 
what she terms the ‘myth of white homogeneity’ constructed by the British state and race relations 
industry.21 She contends that the Irish were subsumed into a white racial group, and labelled as no 
different from the white British population, as ‘the dominant paradigm for understanding racism in 
Britain has been constructed on the basis of a black-white dichotomy’, the Irish were therefore denied 
recognition of the discrimination they felt they suffered.22 Maírtin Mac an Ghaill similarly argued that 
by ‘over-racialising’ non-white ethnicities, academics in particular, have denied the possibility of white 
groups being considered as racialised minorities.23  
 
20 Robert Savage, The BBC’s Irish troubles: Television, conflict and Northern Ireland (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2015), 2-3. 
21 Mary J. Hickman and Bronwen Walter, ‘Deconstructing Whiteness: Irish Women in Britain’, Feminist Review, 50 
(1995), 5-19. 
22 Mary J. Hickman, ‘Reconstructing deconstructing ‘race’: British political discourses about the Irish in Britain’, Ethnic 
and Racial Studies, 21, 2 (1998), 289; 298-9.  
23 Máirtín Mac an Ghaill, ‘The Irish in Britain: The invisibility of ethnicity and anti-Irish racism’, Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies, 26, 1 (2000), 137-47. 
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Since the 1990s, this notion of Irish invisibility has characterised the academic literature. 
Scholars from a range of disciplines have investigated the experiences of the Irish in Britain with the 
aim of making them visible again. Research has been carried out on Irish experiences of health care, the 
criminal justice system, employment and so forth. 24  Much of this focuses on disadvantage and 
discrimination. Perhaps the most comprehensive of these studies has been Hickman, and fellow social 
scientist Bronwen Walter’s report, Discrimination and the Irish Community in Britain, commissioned 
in 1994 by the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE).25 These studies have provided a wealth of oral 
testimony about the experiences of the Irish in Britain during the latter half of the twentieth century, 
shedding light on a vast range of subjects, not least the effects of the ‘Troubles’ on Britain’s Irish 
population. As historian, Barry Hazley has argued, however, there is a tendency amongst scholars to 
treat these accounts as ‘objective’ fact and accept them at face value. In practice, a complex mixture of 
subjectivity, influenced by collective memory as well as personal experience, informs such testimony. 
Interrogating these subjectivities can reveal how individuals negotiate and reconstruct their experiences 
through the prism of a collective narrative.26 This is particularly relevant to understanding how the 
‘Troubles’ were recalled, a period when individuals might have formed or repressed certain memories 
in order to deal with a time of crisis. 
The impact of the ‘Troubles’ has been a prominent theme in the literature on the Irish in Britain. 
Most scholars have rightly argued that the ‘Troubles’ marked a period when the Irish were once again 
imagined as a subversive threat within Britain. Paddy Hillyard’s examination of experiences of anti-
terrorism legislation in Britain, demonstrates how the association of terrorism with the Irish resulted in 
Irish people in Britain being constructed as a suspect community. 27  Hazley, on the other hand, 
investigates how Irish migrants recall and negotiate their experiences of the Manchester bombing in 
June 1996. He argues that the suspicion experienced by the Irish produced distinct forms of Irish migrant 
subjectivity, shaping the way in which individuals comprehended their memories of the ‘Troubles’.28 
Graham Dawson, Jo Dover and Stephen Hopkins’ edited volume explores the response to, engagement 
with, and memories of the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’ in Britain through the experiences of different 
groups, including Irish communities, families and individuals subject to anti-terrorism legislation, 
miscarriages of justice and associated anti-Irish racism.29 Most recently, Sarah O’Brien, Gavin Schaffer 
 
24See amongst others Liam Greenslade, Maggie Pearson and Moss Madden, Generations of an Invisible Minority: The 
Health and Well Being of the Irish in Britain (Institute of Irish Studies: University of Liverpool, 1992); P.J. Bracken and 
P. O’Sullivan, ‘The Invisibility of Irish Migrants in British Health Research’, Irish Studies Review, 9, 1 (2001), 41-51; 
Paddy Hillyard, Suspect Communities People’s Experience of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain, (London: 
Pluto Press, 1993); Patricia Walls and Rory Williams, ‘Sectarianism at work: accounts of employment discrimination 
against Irish Catholics in Scotland’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 26, 4 (2003), 631-661; Bronwen Walter, Outsiders 
inside: whiteness, place and Irish women (New York: Routledge, 2001).   
25 Mary Hickman and Bronwen Walter, Discrimination and the Irish Community in Britain (London: Commission for 
Racial Equality, 1997). 
26 Barry Hazley, ‘Re/negotiating “suspicion”: exploring the construction of self in Irish migrants’ memories of the 1996 
Manchester bomb’, Irish Studies Review, 21, 3 (2013), 327. 
27 Hillyard, Suspect Communities. 
28 Hazley, ‘Re/negotiating “suspicion”, 327. 
29 Graham Dawson, Jo Dover and Stephen Hopkins (eds.), The Northern Ireland Troubles in Britain: Impacts, 
engagements, legacies and memories (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017). 
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and Saima Nasar have examined the Irish experience of hostility after the Birmingham pub bombings 
in 1974. Whilst O’Brien explores the strategies employed by the Irish in Birmingham to deal with the 
effects of the bombings, Schaffer and Nasar consider the extent to which Irish migrants were victims of 
racism in the aftermath of the attacks.30  
Much of the scholarship on the Irish in Britain includes references to the British media and its 
role in amplifying the hostility experienced by many Irish people during the ‘Troubles’. These studies 
assume that the media was prejudicial and routinely misrepresented events in Northern Ireland, 
provoking public anger towards the Irish in Britain, without properly examining the content of the 
media’s coverage of the conflict. They frequently cite Curtis without question or comment, failing to 
engage with the broader discussion of the media and its role in the ‘Troubles’. Surprisingly, absolutely 
no reference is made in the existing literature to her activism, or indeed that of other scholars who have 
written extensively on this topic and who also campaigned on Irish issues in the 1980s, let alone any 
consideration of how this might have influenced her views. As this thesis argues, the reality of the 
media’s coverage was far more complex. To fully understand how the media contributed to the lived 
experiences of the Irish in Britain during the late twentieth century, a more thorough examination is 
needed of a broader spectrum of media coverage of the ‘Troubles’, and the way in which Britain’s Irish 
responded to it.  
Sociologists Henri Nickels, Lyn Thomas, Mary Hickman and Sara Silvestri have gone some 
way to addressing this gap in two studies which explore the British newspaper coverage of the Irish and 
Muslim communities between 1974 and 2007.31 They argue that Irish and Muslim communities were 
constructed as ‘suspect’ by the press, asserting that newspapers placed an onus on both communities to 
stand against extremism and defend so-called ‘British values’, positioning them simultaneously inside 
and outside of Britishness. In her doctoral thesis, Sarah Morgan explores the racialisation of the Irish 
by newspapers and television programmes and how this affected the lived experiences of the Irish in 
Britain, paying particular attention to the impact of media coverage of the ‘Troubles’. Morgan argues 
that the press and broadcast media used trait-laden, symbolic stereotypes to portray the Irish, which 
essentialised them as ‘other’ and reinforced racialised understanding of Irish people and Ireland within 
British society. She argues that Irish people living in Britain were aware of, and rejected, the way in 
which the media portrayed them and believed it informed their interactions with the British.32  
 
30 Sarah O’Brien, ‘Negotiations of Irish identity in the wake of terrorism: the case of the Irish in Birmingham 1973-74’, 
Irish Studies Review, 25, 3 (2017), 372-394; Gavin Schaffer and Saima Nasar, ‘The white essential subject: race, 
ethnicity, and the Irish in post-war Britain’, Contemporary British History, 31, 2 (2018), 209-230. 
31 Henri C. Nickels, Lyn Thomas, Mary J. Hickman and Sara Silvestri, ‘Constructing ‘suspect’ communities and 
Britishness: Mapping British press coverage of Irish and Muslim communities, 1974-2007’, European Journal of 
Communication, 27, 2 (2012), 135-151; Henri C. Nickels, Lyn Thomas, Mary J. Hickman and Sara Silvestri, 
‘De/Constructing “Suspect” Communities: A critical discourse analysis of British newspaper coverage of Irish and 
Muslim communities, 1974-2007’, Journalism Studies, 13, 3 (2012), 340-355. 
32 Sarah Morgan, ‘The Contemporary Racialization of the Irish in Britain: an investigation into media representations 
and the everyday experience of being Irish in Britain’ (PhD thesis, University of North London, 1997).  
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 These studies have provided valuable insights into media representations of the ‘Troubles’; 
however, they focus on a limited sample of the vast amount of media coverage on the conflict. Morgan 
based her research on sampling newspapers from every second month of 1992, as well as carrying out 
a limited survey of television dramas broadcast between September and December 1993. Consequently, 
she could only provide a snapshot of the media’s coverage in the early 1990s. During this period, 
political initiatives in Northern Ireland were starting to indicate progress. There was also an emerging 
shift in British attitudes towards the Irish at this time. The Irish were increasingly viewed in a more 
positive light by the media. As a result, the way the media reported on Northern Ireland was becoming 
markedly different from coverage in the 1970s and 1980s. Morgan’s methodological approach does not 
allow for any consideration of how coverage might change over time. Neither does it allow her to 
examine the media’s response to key incidents, for example the hunger strikes or the Birmingham pub 
bombings, which were essential to how many British people understood the ‘Troubles’. Nickels et al., 
on the other hand, focused solely on high-profile incidents, such as the shooting of IRA volunteer 
Diarmuid O’Neill in 1996. The events they chose took place almost exclusively in Britain, and so do 
not offer a sense of how coverage of what was happening in Northern Ireland itself affected the Irish in 
Britain. They also fail to contextualise their findings by considering media representations during 
periods of relative calm. This prevents them from establishing the significance of the media response to 
these incidents, whether newspapers were reacting in a knee-jerk manner to serious and often harrowing 
events, or whether their response was representative of coverage of the ‘Troubles’ in general. To 
ascertain more fully how the British media presented the ‘Troubles’, and its part in fostering suspicion 
and hostility towards the Irish living in Britain, a much wider sample is required.  
 As we have seen, few historians have ventured to study the media during the ‘Troubles’. The 
vast majority of the scholarly work on the Irish in Britain during this period and the media’s coverage 
of the conflict has been produced instead by social scientists and political activists. They have tended 
to concentrate on controversial incidents without providing context or considering the extent to which 
these represent coverage of the conflict overall. This thesis offers a much-needed historical perspective, 
locating the media’s coverage of the ‘Troubles’ within its wider political milieu and within the context 
of broader Anglo-Irish interactions over two centuries. This approach allows due attention to be given 
not only to key episodes in the conflict, but also to the range of social, cultural and political factors that 
influenced them and how they were reported by the press and broadcast media. Rather than simply 
concentrating on events in isolation or fixating on acts of particular violence, this methodology ensures 
consideration of the conflict as a whole and will therefore achieve a more representative picture of how 
the media covered events in Northern Ireland at this time. It will also allow for the identification of both 
continuity and change in the media’s coverage of the ‘Troubles’ and take into account the evolution of 
the media landscape during this period. In a similar manner, the thesis will endeavour to place its 
analysis of the experiences of the Irish in Britain during the conflict within the wider context of Irish 
settlement in Britain since the nineteenth century. This historical approach allows for consideration of 
continuity in the Irish experience, and thereby contributes to our understanding of constructions of 
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Irishness within Britain. This range of chronological contexts will facilitate a more informed historical 
assessment than is evident in much of the social science accounts of the ‘Troubles’, which inevitably 
start in 1968. 
 This thesis will demonstrate that the British media reported the conflict in Northern Ireland in 
a multifaceted and detailed manner, and that far from simply parroting the official line, the press and 
broadcast media resisted efforts by the state and others to dictate how the ‘Troubles’ were reported. 
Naturally, the opinions and motives of elements of the media and the state would on occasion coincide. 
Newspapers and television programmes, however, explored the violence from a variety of angles, both 
engaging with the complexities of the conflict and challenging the policies and decisions of the British 
government. At times this included calls from some quarters within the media for the government to 
adopt a harder line on Northern Ireland. Though pressure from the government and controversy could 
hinder the media’s efforts to provide the public with accurate and impartial reports on what was 
happening in the province, both the press and broadcast media endeavoured to produce informed 
coverage throughout the ‘Troubles’.  
 The prevailing view amongst the Irish in Britain was that the media recapitulated the 
government line, producing one-dimensional, distorted coverage of events in Northern Ireland. As 
observed, this was disseminated by Irish community activists in the 1980s, who believed that the media 
played a significant role in the discrimination and harassment experienced by the Irish in Britain. It will 
be argued here that these activists were correct in maintaining that the media contributed to the hostile 
environment experienced by many Irish people living in Britain during the ‘Troubles’. The tabloid press 
in particular played an important role in constructing a link in the public mind between the IRA and the 
Irish in Britain. This association meant that the Irish became scapegoats on whom the public could vent 
their fear and anger. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the press and broadcasting bodies failed to 
engage with the complexities of the conflict or to provide a critical view of the role of the British state. 
This interpretation has, however, become ingrained in the collective narrative of the Irish experience in 
Britain. The thesis will explore how this view informed the way individuals have comprehended their 
personal experiences and coloured the way in which many Irish people perceived the media. It will 
argue that these stereotyped impressions of the media have subsequently held sway over public 
discourse, political discussion and academic debate, preventing a full understanding of the nuances of 
its coverage of Northern Ireland. 
 The thesis is based on a systematic analysis of the British press and television coverage 
throughout the ‘Troubles’. For many people in Britain, the media was their primary source of 
information on Northern Ireland, and so newspapers and television programmes were crucial in the 
formation of public opinion. This was understood by all sides who sought to influence how the media 
presented the conflict in an effort to further their position. Examining the print and broadcast media’s 
coverage therefore casts light on events in Northern Ireland, how they were understood in Britain, and 
consequently how the British state responded to the escalating crisis. To date, however, no scholar has 
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embarked on a thorough survey of both the newspaper and television coverage over the course of the 
entire conflict. This thesis, in examining the two medias, will explore how the ‘Troubles’ were presented 
across different platforms, which will offer a more complete picture of how the media framed events in 
Northern Ireland. Furthermore, by exploring archival material and oral histories on the Irish in Britain, 
the thesis explores their lived experiences during the ‘Troubles’ and what influence media 
representations of the conflict had on their daily lives.  
Given the sheer volume of media coverage generated by thirty years of conflict, it is impossible 
to cover every individual news story. Consequently, the thesis focuses on six key years: 1973-4, 1980-
1 and 1995-6. In doing so, it covers the full breadth of the ‘Troubles’, examining many of the important 
incidents in the conflict, including the bombing campaign in England, the hunger strikes and the peace 
process. This approach allows for an examination of media coverage during periods of relative calm, as 
well as heightened political violence, to gain a fuller understanding of how the print and broadcast media 
represented the conflict, and crucially to track change over time.   
The analysis of print media is based on a detailed examination of four of the most popular 
British daily newspapers: The Sun, The Guardian, Daily Mirror and Daily Telegraph. These represent 
the different ownership, styles, political opinions and readership that characterised the British press 
during the latter half of the twentieth century. The Daily Mirror until the late 1970s was the highest-
selling national newspaper in Britain. In 1975, the paper circulated on average 3,968,000 copies daily. 
Although this figure declined slightly, in 1988 the paper still circulated an average of 3,157,000 copies 
a day.33 Owned by publishers Reed International, the tabloid was sold in 1984 to former Labour MP 
Robert Maxwell. Maxwell was succeeded on his death in 1991 by David Montgomery, himself a 
Northern Irishman from a conservative Presbyterian background. Despite Montgomery’s personal 
politics, the Mirror continued to take a left-wing position throughout this period.34 In 1978, the Sun 
overtook the Mirror as the nation’s best-selling newspaper, circulating on average 3,741,000 copies 
daily. By 1988, this figure had risen to 4,219,000. The paper was bought in 1969 by Rupert Murdoch, 
who relaunched it as a tabloid targeted towards a mass working-class market.35 Though it claimed to be 
non-partisan, throughout the 1970s, the Sun became closely associated with right-wing politics, 
consolidating its Tory-turn by endorsing Margaret Thatcher’s election campaign in 1979.36 The Daily 
Telegraph on the other hand, was the highest-selling British broadsheet, circulating on average 
1,433,000 copies a day at its peak in 1980. The paper traditionally positioned itself as unapologetically 
Conservative. It was bought in 1985 from the Berry family by Canadian businessman Conrad Black. 
Finally, owned by the Scott Trust, the Guardian represented the centre-left. At its height in 1985, the 
 
33 All readership figures are taken from Audit Bureau of Circulations, Press Council Annual Reports cited in Colin 
Seymour-Ure, The British Press and Broadcasting since 1945 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 28-9. 
34 Chris Horrie, Tabloid Nation: From the Birth of the Daily Mirror to the Death of the Tabloid (London: André 
Deutsch Ltd, 2003). 
35 James Curran and Jean Seaton, Power without Responsibility: The Press and Broadcasting in Britain (London: 
Routledge, 1997), 93. 
36 Peter Chippindale and Chris Horrie, Stick It Up Your Punter!: The Uncut Story of The Sun Newspaper (London: Faber 
and Faber LtD, 2013), 57-74. 
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paper averaged a circulation of 487,000 copies daily. A close and critical reading of these titles will 
allow for comparison between the approaches and perspectives of different newspapers, providing a 
detailed, representative understanding of how the British press presented the Northern Ireland 
‘Troubles’.  
The thesis also investigates the BBC, ITV and Channel 4’s current affairs coverage of the 
conflict. Since it was established in 1922, the BBC has become central to the media ecology of the 
United Kingdom and subsequently in the formation of public opinion. Throughout the ‘Troubles’ it 
played an important role in disseminating and shaping news about Northern Ireland. The BBC’s status 
as a publicly funded body, however, meant it was vulnerable to government pressure, which 
complicated the broadcaster’s efforts to reliably inform viewers of events taking place in Northern 
Ireland. ITV on the other hand, was established in 1959 as a commercial service, and consisted of a 
network of separate regional television channels run by different franchise companies. Though ITV was 
not reliant on public funding, the British government did have the ability to refuse to renew a company’s 
franchise. Legal pressure and intimidation were also used in efforts to influence how ITV presented the 
conflict. Caught between the government and a desire to maintain journalistic integrity television 
programmes offer an interesting opportunity to explore the relationship between the state and the media 
during this period. Detailed analysis of the content of television programmes will enable the thesis to 
ascertain whether claims to editorial independence and integrity were put into practice. The thesis also 
explores the coverage by Channel 4, which was established in 1982 to challenge the duopoly of the 
BBC and ITV. It was intended that the new channel would free broadcasters from the constraints of 
impartiality and allow them to produce programmes for diverse audiences that would address difficult 
and controversial topics.37 No other scholar has conducted an investigation into the coverage of all three 
broadcasting bodies during the ‘Troubles’. A detailed examination of the reportage of Channel 4, as 
well as ITV and the BBC not only ensures full representation of how the conflict was presented by the 
media but allows for a comparison of the range of approaches to broadcasting the ‘Troubles’.  
 In the case of television broadcasts, the thesis focuses on current affairs programmes; unlike 
news bulletins with restricted time slots, this format allowed broadcasters the space to explore the 
situation in Northern Ireland in detail. Current affairs programmes are a platform that allows for 
perceptions of recent events to be developed, providing a more fully formed assessment of the violence 
and the context in which it occurred. Miller has also argued that television current affairs broadcasting 
was favoured by the NIO who permitted journalists working on such programmes access to exclusive 
information. Whilst this aided investigative reporting, it also meant current affairs broadcasting was 
vulnerable to attempts by the state to control how information was used and interpreted. 38  An 
exploration of other television genres and representations of the conflict, though potentially illuminating, 
 
37 John Ellis, ‘What did Channel 4 do for us? Reassessing the early years’, Screen, 49, 3 (2008), 331-3. 
38 Miller, Don’t Mention the War, 107-8. 
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was too ambitious for a project this size. Nonetheless, this thesis will provide a strong platform for a 
future comparative study of this nature.  
The incomplete nature of the BBC, ITV and Channel 4 archives means that it is not possible 
to carry out an exhaustive investigation into all current affairs programmes produced on Northern 
Ireland. A number of programmes identified have not survived or have not been made accessible to 
researchers. As such this study will draw on the sample of programmes about Northern Ireland held by 
the British Film Institute (BFI), supplemented by programmes from the Peter Heathwood Collection 
and material available online through video-sharing websites such as Youtube and the BBC iPlayer. 
Relevant programmes were identified using television guides and databases, including BBC Genome, 
the BFI and the Television and Radio Index for Learning and Teaching. Additionally, CAIN (Conflict 
Archive on the Internet) has a useful, though by no means complete, list of television programmes about 
the conflict broadcast in the 1970s.39 Television guides do not always advertise the content of individual 
episodes in series such as Newsnight or Weekend World, nor is this information always provided in film 
databases; as a result, some programmes may have been overlooked. Nevertheless, the thesis draws on 
a comprehensive and extensive sample of programmes, which cover a broad range of subjects relating 
to the conflict and provide a clear indication of how the broadcast media presented the ‘Troubles’. 
Whilst there is a surfeit of media content, it can be extremely difficult to access evidence of 
how newspapers and television programmes were received by their respective audiences. It is 
particularly hard to establish readers’ reactions to specific articles or aspects of a programme. The 
general response to different newspapers can be gauged using readership figures, however, these do not 
indicate what aspects of the newspaper readers were responding to. Similarly, the Broadcasting 
Audience Research Board (BARB) provides viewing figures, which can give an indication as to how 
popular any given television programme was. A programme’s placing on the viewing schedule can also 
indicate its popularity. Television programmes on Northern Ireland were routinely scheduled during 
prime time, which, at the very least, reveals that broadcasters viewed it as important that audiences were 
informed about the conflict. Again, this does not indicate what aspects of the coverage were responsible 
for provoking the strongest reaction from audiences.  
With newspapers, a more detailed picture of how readers reacted to content can be gained 
through published letters. As Adrian Bingham warns, however, letters to the editor can be doctored, 
even invented, and there is no guarantee that they reflect a balance of all letters received. Even so, they 
can provide some useful insights; if nothing else the fact that newspapers received hundreds of letters 
testifies to their important in the lives of their readers.40  In the case of television broadcasts, there are 
more detailed surveys of viewers’ responses to particular programmes, but these are extremely rare.41 
 
39 ‘A List of British Television Programmes about the Conflict (1968 to 1978)’, CAIN Web Service, 
https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/othelem/media/tv10yrs.htm [accessed 15 October 2019}. 
40 Adrian Bingham, Family Newspapers?: Sex, Private Life, and the British Popular Press 1918-1978 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 9. 
41 One example is J. Mallory Wober ‘Effects of Perceptions from seeing a Drama Documenary: The case of Who 
Bombed Birmingham’ (London: International Broadcasting Authority, 1990). Wober surveyed the responses of 2,500 
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The thesis, therefore, also makes use of archival research undertaken at the BBC and ITV to gain a sense 
of the British public’s response to the television coverage of Northern Ireland.42 Letters, telephone logs 
and the minutes of management meetings all provide vital clues as to the viewers’ response. They also 
give insight into how the government reacted to the broadcast media reports on the ‘Troubles’ and in 
turn how broadcasters negotiated the pressure brought to bear on them by politicians. Indeed, the rich 
range of internal documents and external correspondence allow the thesis to develop a picture of 
editorial strategies and attitudes that shaped the production of television programmes on Northern 
Ireland.  
The analysis of the experience of the Irish in Britain also provides critical context. This study 
draws on literature by various Irish organisations in Britain held in the National Archives of Ireland and 
the Irish in Britain archives. It also makes use of archived interviews in which Irish people detail their 
experience of living in Britain during the ‘Troubles’, carried out as part of various community projects, 
and published interviews including those conducted by scholars Mary Hickman, Bronwen Walter, Sarah 
O’Brien and Marc Scully. This material provides insights into Irish perceptions of and responses to 
representations of the ‘Troubles’ in the media. It also allows for an examination of the Irish in Britain 
throughout the thirty-year conflict and the effect of the media on their daily lives. Hitherto, there has 
been little examination of the media and its impact on Britain’s Irish population, the exploration of 
which can provide useful insights into constructions of Irish identities in Britain during the late twentieth 
century. As the thesis observes, however, the literature of Irish activist organisations such as the IBRG 
has dominated the archives. Their view that the British media covered Northern Ireland in a biased 
manner has greatly influenced the narrative of the Irish experience of living in Britain at this time, 
shaping the way people understood, and have remembered, newspaper and television reportage. The 
prevalence of these groups, despite only representing a section of the diverse Irish population in Britain, 
has resulted in the simplistic view that the media’s coverage was one-dimensional being regularly 
repeated verbatim in academic literature. This is not to suggest that the views of the IBRG and other 
organisations had no merit; however, greater scrutiny of these organisations and their influence on the 
collective narrative of the Irish in Britain will allow for a fuller understanding of the nuances of, and 
reactions to media representations of the ‘Troubles’.    
To best explore these themes and capture the changing landscapes, the shifting context and the 
diversity of coverage, the thesis is organised chronologically with alternating chapters dedicated to the 
press and television coverage during each decade, as well as two chapters examining the Irish 
experience in Britain. Chapters one and two will investigate newspaper and television coverage during 
the early 1970s. Chapter one focuses on the press coverage of the bombing campaign in England, 
exploring the way the press renegotiated Irish and British identities in view of the IRA threat. It 
examines how newspapers used established national symbols and references to a shared history to evoke 
 
members of the Broadcaster’s Audience Research Board to Granada’s programme Who Bombed Birmingham, 
broadcast on 28 March 1990.    
42 Sadly,  
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a sense of national defiance, reinforcing concepts of a British identity. It also charts the resurrection of 
traditional racialised stereotypes of the Irish by the press, which contributed to the construction of the 
Irish living in Britain as ‘other’. The chapter, investigates the role that newspapers played in creating a 
link between the IRA and the Irish within the British public’s imagination, leading all Irish people living 
in Britain to be reimagined as a potential threat. Chapter two on the other hand, analyses television 
coverage of the conflict in Northern Ireland during the early 1970s. It discusses the pressure brought to 
bear on the broadcast media to support the government in its coverage and the efforts of broadcasters 
to resist these attempts to dictate the way the ‘Troubles’ were reported. The chapter demonstrates that 
the broadcast media was capable of placing the conflict within its broader historic and socio-economic 
context and of raising serious questions about the British government and security forces’ actions in 
Northern Ireland. It also scrutinises the construction of Northern Ireland in the media as a place set apart 
from the rest of the United Kingdom by violence.  
 Chapters three and four both focus on the press and broadcast media coverage of the hunger 
strikes in 1980 and 1981. Chapter three examines the press coverage of the prison protests, 
acknowledging that most newspapers adhered to the official narrative, presenting the IRA hunger 
strikers as criminals. The chapter observes, however, that the press also presented the prisoners as 
victims, both of the conflict and of the IRA, raising important questions concerning the government’s 
criminalisation policy. The chapter explores the newspapers reactions to the Anti-H Block campaign’s 
electoral successes and to international condemnation of the handling of the hunger strikes. It also 
analyses press attitudes to political policies in Northern Ireland, in particular the government’s pursuit 
of devolution and its efforts to improve Anglo-Irish relations. Chapter four surveys television coverage 
of the hunger strikes. It starts, however, by discussing the challenges of broadcasting under the 
premiership of Margaret Thatcher. The chapter then examines the way current affairs programmes 
presented the hunger strikes. It observes how broadcasters contextualised the strikes within the history 
of prison protests in Northern Ireland and examines grassroots nationalist support for the prisoners. It 
also looks at how television programmes addressed the impact of the hunger strikes on the Republic of 
Ireland and on Anglo-Irish relations. Finally, the chapter investigates television coverage of loyalist 
paramilitary activity during this period, demonstrating that broadcasters were capable of providing 
important analysis into the loyalist psyche.  
 Chapter five is concerned with the lived experiences of the Irish in Britain and how the media 
influenced their daily lives in the 1970s and 1980s. It begins by exploring the hostility and long-standing 
anti-Irish prejudices, which re-emerged during the IRA bombing campaign, and asks to what extent the 
media contributed to the resurgence in anti-Irish feeling. The chapter investigates how the Irish living 
in Britain responded to increased hostility and what this meant for Irish identities in Britain. It then 
explores the rise in Irish political and cultural activism in the 1980s. New Irish organisations such as 
the Irish in Britain Representation Group (IBRG) emerged during this period and campaigned 
extensively to obtain the status of a separate ethnic group and with it recognition of the discrimination 
the Irish experienced. The chapter examines the campaign against anti-Irish racism, for which many 
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organisations held the British media responsible, especially in its coverage of events in Northern Ireland. 
It also investigates how the views put forward by the IBRG and other Irish activist organisations have 
informed how Irish people interpret their personal experiences of living in Britain and how scholars 
have since understood both the experiences of the Irish in Britain and media representations of the Irish 
and Irish affairs, not least the ‘Troubles’.   
Both chapters six and seven focus on media coverage of the Northern Ireland peace process. 
Chapter six surveys press coverage of the negotiations, focusing in particular on the disputes 
surrounding the decommissioning of weapons. It explores press presentations of key participants in the 
process, especially the US government. The chapter also investigates the role of the press in facilitating 
the entry of militant republican party Sinn Féin into peace talks. Finally, it will examine press coverage 
of bomb attacks in English cities, which resumed in February 1996 with the collapse of the IRA ceasefire. 
Chapter seven examines television current affairs coverage of the peace talks. The chapter examines the 
broadcasting ban, its implications for reporting on Northern Ireland and the efforts broadcasters made 
to resist censorship. It then investigates the re-introduction of the IRA and Sinn Féin to the screen, and 
the role of the broadcast media in transforming Sinn Féin from terrorists into legitimate politicians. The 
chapter also explores how current affairs programmes presented and challenged other key participants 
in the peace process, in particular unionists, and their behaviour during the Drumcree standoff in 1996. 
Finally, chapter eight looks at the lived experiences of the Irish in Britain during the 1990s. It 
begins by exploring how Riverdance and musicians like The Pogues revitalised Irish culture in the 
1980s and 1990s to popular appeal, and how this made being Irish hip. It did not, however, prevent the 
Irish from being subject to hostility and surveillance as a reaction to IRA violence in England during 
the mid-1990s. The chapter examines the nature of the backlash experienced by the Irish following 
attacks, and the media’s role in perpetuating the belief that all Irish people were potential terrorists.  
The media was a valuable and powerful tool in the Northern Ireland conflict, and played a 
central role in shaping the ways in which events in the province were interpreted across Britain. Scrutiny 
of the newspaper and television coverage from this period reveals a wide range of viewpoints 
propagated across the media, and the emergence of a critical voice willing to engage with the 
complexities of the conflict. By exploring the nuances of the British media, its coverage of the violence 
and the effect this had on contemporaries, especially the Irish in Britain, this study contributes to a more 












Chapter One: Newspaper coverage of early 1970s.1 
The early 1970s saw the violence in Belfast transferred to the streets of English cities. On 8 March 1973, 
two IRA car bombs exploded, one outside the Old Bailey and the other outside the Ministry of 
Agriculture in Whitehall. The bombs, which killed one and injured more than two hundred people, 
marked the start of a twenty-five-year campaign of violence in England.2 Throughout the ‘Troubles’, 
bomb attacks in English cities dominated the media’s coverage of the conflict, almost completely 
eclipsing events in Northern Ireland. As one IRA spokesperson observed ‘in publicity terms one bomb 
in Oxford Street is worth ten in Belfast’.3 British newspapers produced extensive, nuanced coverage of 
the campaign in England, designed to maintain morale and minimise the IRA threat. Using established 
symbols of Britishness and referencing a shared history, they sought to evoke a sense of national 
defiance and reinforce concepts of British identity.  
  In contrast with the press coverage at the time, which gave precedence to incidents in England, 
there is little scholarship on the IRA’s campaign outside Northern Ireland. Graham Dawson, Jo Dover 
and Stephen Hopkins’ recent edited collection examines the effects and legacies of the ‘Troubles’ in 
Britain, although it tends to focus on events in the province and their impact on the experiences of the 
British public.4 Gary McGladdery offers the only comprehensive chronology of the IRA’s activities in 
England between 1973 and 1997, exploring the impact on British policy towards Northern Ireland. His 
research also includes a limited television survey. He correctly observes the ‘lopsided’ nature of the 
media’s coverage, which tended to prioritise less serious incidents in England.5 McGladdery does not, 
however, examine the reasons for this imbalance. The undue attention given to bomb attacks in English 
cities was influenced by several considerations, preeminent amongst which was commercial necessity, 
as newspapers concentrated on stories that were of paramount interest to their readers.  
 More recently, sociologists Henri Nickels, Lyn Thomas, Mary Hickman and Sara Silvestri 
have turned their attention to the media’s coverage of the England bombing campaign. They map the 
national and diasporic press coverage of political violence as part of a wider project comparing the 
experiences of the Irish and Muslim communities between 1974 and 2007.6 They argue that the press 
participated in the construction of these communities as ‘suspect’, representing the Irish as a threat to 
the British state. Their research, however, focuses on high-profile events such as the Birmingham pub 
bombings and the introduction of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in 1974, which they identified 
as catalysts for the emergence of a discourse relating to the perceived threat of the Irish in Britain. It is 
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unsurprising therefore that their findings show that coverage of the role newspapers played in fostering 
an attitude of suspicion towards the Irish living in Britain, a wider sample of press articles is required, 
which is not limited to high-profile incidents. 
 This chapter builds on the work of Nickels et al., carrying out more detailed historical analysis 
of the press and the IRA’s campaign in England. It establishes a clearer picture of the complexities that 
characterised the newspaper coverage during this period and seeks to situate it within the context of the 
wider conflict. In particular, it examines newspapers’ active participation in the renegotiation of Irish 
and British identities. The bombing campaign in England during the early 1970s will be the key focus. 
Drawing on a systematic analysis of the Sun, Guardian, Daily Mirror and the Daily Telegraph, the 
chapter examines how the print media reported on IRA activity in England. It argues that the press 
responded to the bombings by evoking traditional stereotypes of British fortitude. Newspapers 
(re)constructed tropes of Britishness, drawing on Second World War iconography and national motifs, 
the use of which was intended to diminish the IRA threat and reassure, whilst allowing newspapers to 
target a national readership. In doing so, the chapter will contribute to our broader understanding of 
constructions of British identities, especially during times of crisis. At the same time, it explores how 
newspapers renegotiated Irish identity in Britain. The chapter observes how, in the light of the IRA 
bombing campaign, long-standing Irish stereotypes resurfaced contributing to the representation of Irish 
people in Britain as an internal ‘other’. It investigates the role newspapers played in perpetuating the 
notion that all Irish people were ‘suspect’, contributing to a resurgence of anti-Irish prejudice in the 
early 1970s. 
In the early 1970s, England experienced one of the most intense periods of IRA violence. 
Between March 1973 and 1976 the IRA carried out eighty-six attacks resulting in death or injury; in 
this period alone fifty-eight people died, and 916 were injured.7 British newspapers, outraged by the 
attacks on English cities, responded with defiance. The Daily Telegraph declared that ‘the IRA is sadly 
ill-informed if it believes that the population of London is liable to succumb to a campaign of terror 
bombing and demand the withdrawal of British troops from Northern Ireland’.8 To begin with, the 
Telegraph argued that the bombings in England were a last desperate effort to intimidate Britain out of 
Northern Ireland by an IRA in retreat. The paper commended the public’s composure in response to the 
bombings, ‘One is tempted to say that there has been no public reaction, so phlegmatic have been the 
inconvenienced crowds at Lord’s and Euston, so unterrorised the shoppers still flock to Oxford Street’; 
and confidently predicted that ‘A terror campaign in London could therefore be little more than a short, 
ineffective and bloody postscript to the battle for Northern Ireland’.9 
 In response to the bombings, all four newspapers evoked the trope of the ‘British’ as a stoic 
people facing down the IRA threat. By representing the public as strong-willed and resilient, the press 
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endeavoured to reassure readers and sustain morale. Most newspapers also sought to encourage support 
for Britain’s military and political efforts within Northern Ireland. At the same time, the use of this 
stereotype served to reinforce an idea of Britishness, cultivated by newspapers in order to create and 
maintain an imagined national community of readers.10 The invocation of ‘Britishness’ to make news 
stories relevant to all potential readers is a tool used extensively by the press to market itself at a national 
level.11 National identity is never a fixed notion and is continuously renegotiated, with the press playing 
a leading role in its construction. Benedict Anderson argued that the print media facilitates shared 
identities and a common language amongst a group of people, allowing individuals to share the same 
experience, and thereby feel part of the same community.12 Following the Second World War, the 
decline of Britain as a world power and high levels of immigration, especially from the New 
Commonwealth, brought into question ideas of what it meant to be British. In the early 1970s, economic 
crisis, frequent industrial action and a quick succession of governments created instability, which eroded 
any sense of national cohesion. Against this backdrop, the IRA bombing campaign was used to help 
reconfigure a British national identity. As Linda Colley has observed, the construction of Britishness 
has relied on the presence of an, often hostile, ‘other’.13 Chris Waters has argued that post-war, black 
migrants were constructed as ‘dark strangers’ and contrasted with the white British population, 
redefining the boundaries of national belonging.14 It can be argued that during the 1970s, the IRA were 
constructed as ‘other’ and contrasted with their victims in a similar manner, in order to bolster what it 
meant to be British. The close association of the IRA with the Irish living in Britain meant that they too 
were cast as an internal ‘other’.  
 To (re)construct a sense of British identity, newspapers used various discursive strategies, 
drawing on national stereotypes, symbols and a shared national history to create the impression of 
unified public defiance. The Daily Mirror in particular, made use of popular memories of the Second 
World War.15 As media scholar Martin Conboy has observed, the Blitz in particular has become a 
‘routine trope of audience-identification’ in Britain, and as a result, almost all national crises have been 
viewed through this filter; the IRA’s campaign in the early 1970s was no exception.16 In the aftermath 
of the Old Bailey bombings, for example, the Mirror remarked that, ‘The London, that took the blitz, 
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and made cups of tea and jokes, is not going to have its nerve shattered by bombs’.17 The paper drew 
on the myth that the British public responded unanimously to Germany’s aerial bombardment in 1940 
with defiance and resilience, in order to summon a similar strength of character in the face of the IRA 
threat.18 It used the idea of the ‘Blitz spirit’ to encourage the population to show stoicism in defiance of 
the IRA by reminding the nation of its capabilities. In this example, the Mirror drew on the idea of the 
British ability to respond to crisis with humour, which is also tied to the Blitz myth. The paper suggests 
that on coming face-to-face with the IRA, Londoners had recaptured the wartime humour with which 
their predecessors had responded to German bombing raids.19 That the IRA had chosen to target London, 
which was at the heart of the Blitz narrative, only served to enhance this parallel. Accordingly, the 
Britishness being constructed by newspapers reflected a London-centric view of the population.20 As 
the Blitz myth necessarily suppressed diversity in order to construct ideas of consensus and unity during 
the Second World War, the resurrection of this myth in response to the IRA attacks necessitated a 
deliberate failure to acknowledge that ‘the British’ are an amorphous group. The Blitz myth nevertheless 
allowed the paper to draw a connection across the generations that suggested a ‘hereditary defiance’ in 
the face of adversity.21 It also served to place the IRA’s campaign within a long history of suffering 
which London, and by extension Britain, had endured with characteristic resilience.  
 By directly linking the bombings with the Blitz, the newspaper deftly equated the IRA with 
the Nazis and Hitler made frequent appearances. Following a spate of bombings in September 1973, the 
Mirror observed that, ‘The terrorists will not break the nerve- or even start to break the nerve- of a 
nation that stood up to the weight of Hitler’s bombs’.22 Similarly, Figure 1 shows Hitler telling the IRA 
that ‘Bombing doesn’t work around here’. 23  Published in the aftermath of the Birmingham pub 
bombings which occurred on 21 November 1974, killing twenty-one people, cartoonist Keith Waite 
used the image of Hitler to reinforce the Mirror’s editorial line, striving to minimise the perceived IRA 
threat and reassure readers by reminding them of a time when Britain had been victorious against a far 
greater enemy. The paper also intended to encourage support for Britain’s military and political efforts 
within Northern Ireland. In its use of Second World War analogies, the Mirror presented the IRA 
unequivocally as the aggressors, and Britain as their intended victim. 
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 The primary purpose of the Nazi comparison, however, was to revile the paramilitaries and 
reinforce the fact that the bombers were nothing more than brutal murderers. As Mark Connelly has 
pointed out, after the Second World War, Hitler became a touchstone to measure evil by.24 Figure 2 
features Hitler offering the IRA the podium for ‘the most odious murderers in history’, whilst Stalin, 
Emperor Nero, Genghis Khan and Attila the Hun step down. Produced in the Sun by political cartoonist 
Stanley Franklin after the Birmingham bombings, it connects the IRA with the history of brutality, 
suggesting that the republican paramilitaries had surpassed all five tyrants in cruelty. The cartoon 
reflects how newspapers interpreted the IRA campaign in terms of a classic fight between good and evil. 
By reducing the bombings to this simple binary, the newspapers avoided penetrating discussion of the 
motivations which lay behind the IRA’s actions, and crucially evaded any examination of the extent to 
which Britain might share some culpability in bringing about a situation whereby these attacks could 
take place.25 Such a myopic approach, sought to justify retaliatory action on the part of the British state 
without addressing the question as to whether or not this was appropriate. It is also interesting to note 
that the Guardian was the only paper not to immediately assume that the IRA were behind the bomb 
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Figure 1: Keith Waite, "Bombing doesn't work around 
here- I've tried it", Daily Mirror, 27 November 1974. 
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attacks prior to them claiming responsibility.26 The comparison made between the IRA and the Nazis 
served to transform what was essentially domestic terrorism into a foreign threat, contributing to the 
idea of the Irish as ‘other’ and Northern Ireland as ‘a place apart’.27 
 
There were those who questioned the appropriateness of evoking Blitz mythology. Following 
the Old Bailey bombings, Sun columnist Jon Akass refuted claims that London had responded to the 
attack with ‘Blitz spirit’: ‘I imagine there will be much talk now about the spirit of London under the 
Blitz but the mood was nothing like that. The mood of London yesterday had more of exasperation in 
it than anger’.28 It could be argued that Akass played down the Blitz comparison fearing it would lend 
undue legitimacy to the IRA. The Sun, nonetheless, sought to foster a sense of Britishness and British 
stoicism, using national motifs instead of Blitz imagery. That the IRA targeted buildings of national and 
historic importance provided a wealth of iconic symbols on which to draw.  
Following the Old Bailey bombings, the Sun published a cartoon of the statue of Lady Justice 
situated on top of the Central Criminal Court, with her left hand, which hold the scales of justice, severed 
(Figure 3). By featuring this metaphoric symbol of two concepts seen as integral to Britishness, law and 
justice, cartoonist Paul Rigby suggested that the attack on the capital, and its judicial system, had 
signified an attack on Britain and core British values. The statue’s intact sword arm, however, indicates 
that Britain and justice would prevail and promises swift retribution against IRA savagery. This is 
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Figure 2: Stanley Franklin, "It's All Yours", The Sun, 23 November 1974. 
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reinforced by the caption, taken from the eighteenth-century poet laureate John Dryden’s The Cock and 
the Fox, which assures the reader that ‘tardy Justice will o’ertake the crime’. Dryden’s poem is an 
adaptation of Chaucer’s The Tale of the Nun’s Priest. This nod to Britain’s literary traditions served to 
buttress notions of a Britishness deeply rooted in history.       
 
Born in Australia, Rigby had migrated to London in 1969 to help Rupert Murdoch relaunch 
the paper and worked as the Sun’s editorial cartoonist until November 1974.29 Interestingly, the Daily 
Mirror’s cartoonist, Keith Waite, was not British either, hailing from New Zealand.30 Their cartoons, 
however, played an important role in the newspapers’ reconstruction of Britishness during the first 
months of the IRA’s bombing campaign. Pictorial representations are an important part of the 
construction of national identities in the press. In order for a cartoon to be effective the reader must be 
able to interpret the message or joke being conveyed. The cartoonist, therefore, draws on easily 
recognised motifs of a shared culture. The reader’s ability to interpret these helps reinforce notions of a 
shared identity; in much the same way as emphasising a shared history can promote common 
affiliations.31 The humour inherent in cartoons also enables them to address ideas not as easily expressed 
in written reportage. This makes them valuable sources for establishing attitudes towards current 
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Figure 3: Paul Rigby, "Murder may pass unpunish'd For a time, But tardy Justice will o'ertake the 
crime", The Sun, 9 March 1973. 
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events.32 Rigby and Waite’s antipodean background is interesting given their role in the tabloids’ 
reconfiguration of British identities during the early 1970s. Arguably their background allowed them to 
reflect more clearly on British characteristics and traits. As Krishan Kumar has argued, the observations 
of ‘“outsiders and émigrés” help… to see more clearly what is not always obvious to the native 
themselves’.33 That said, it is also important to note that both cartoonists would produce several drafts 
from which the next day’s cartoon would be selected by the editor. Waite acknowledged that his 
cartoons were often rejected ‘because they did not conform with the newspaper’s point of view’.34 The 
published work of both cartoonists, represented their respective newspaper’s editorial line as much as 
their own opinions and prejudices. 
 
 Following the Westminster Palace bombing on 17 June 1974, which injured six people, Rigby 
again evoked ideas of Britishness in an effort to reassure readers. Figure 4 depicts a monstrous creature, 
labelled violence, about to destroy two of the central pillars of British society, law and democracy.35 In 
the background, used detonators stand beside fragmented columns, suggesting that the IRA had already 
succeeded in destabilising the foundations of British society. Two remaining pillars, civilisation and 
decency have yet to be primed; Rigby warns that if the IRA are allowed to continue, these would be 
next. In attacking Westminster, a symbol of law and democracy and fundamental British values, the 
bombers posed a threat to the British way of life. On the horizon, however, Big Ben rises from the 
smoke in defiance of the IRA’s attack. Rigby uses the image of the clock tower not only to signify the 
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Figure 4: Paul Rigby, '... Five, four, three, two, one', The Sun, 18 June 1974. 
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bomb’s location, but also to represent British resilience and courage. He draws Big Ben undamaged and 
operational indicating that despite the bomb, the British government and the values it stood for would 
endure.         
 
On 17 July 1974, the IRA detonated a bomb at the Tower of London, another historic landmark, 
killing one woman and injuring forty-two others.36 The attack caused particular outrage as many of 
those injured were children visiting the popular tourist attraction on the first day of the school holidays. 
Rigby’s cartoon published the following day emphasised the pointlessness and brutality of the bombing, 
as well as the dignity and defiance of Britain’s response (Figure 5). Drawing on another trope of British 
identity, the cartoon portrays a Beefeater, resembling a Marvel comic superhero, carrying the inert body 
of a young woman, simply captioned ‘Satisfied?’. The Beefeaters, whose history can be traced back to 
the Norman Conquest, have traditionally been used to represent ‘a sense of “national” permanence’.37 
As historian Paul Ward has argued, they emerged in the nineteenth century as a symbol of historical 
continuity in response to challenges to the state from the Luddite and Chartist movements. Since then, 
they have frequently been used to construct a sense of national identity associated with stability and 
longevity in response to national crises. That the Beefeaters are appointed from non-commissioned 
officers in the British Army, means that they have become a symbol that transcends class and therefore 
have come to represent national and class unity. In his use of the Beefeater motif, Rigby sought to 
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Figure 5: Paul Rigby, 'Satisfied?', The Sun, 19 July 1974. 
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harness concepts of British endurance and togetherness in order to reassure readers that Britain had 
withstood greater perils.38 
 Rigby further elevates the British character by contrasting it with the heinous nature of the IRA. 
The woman pictured in the cartoon is forty-seven-year-old Dorothy Household who died in the attack. 
Throughout the ‘Troubles’, newspapers were to focus on the plight of women and children caught up 
in the violence to emphasise the horror of the conflict and elicit a more powerful reaction from readers. 
Characterised as ‘innocent’ victims, their mutilation or death is seen as especially horrifying and the 
perpetrators of such violence beyond contempt.39 The press, in common with the broadcast media, 
regularly employed the association between child- and female-victims and innocence to spotlight the 
contemptuousness of IRA bombers. The tabloids in particular, presented the IRA’s female-victims as 
young, beautiful and by implication innocent, regardless of their true age or physical attributes, for 
example Rigby’s depiction of Dorothy Household is of a significantly younger-looking woman.  
 Ironically, the Sun also concentrated on the youth and beauty of female bombers, Dolours and 
Marian Price. Journalist John Hiscock described the sisters as the ‘pretty, mini-skirted leaders’ of the 
IRA unit responsible for carry out the Old Bailey attack.40 British newspapers frequently focused on the 
appearance of the Price sisters and other female Irish paramilitaries in coverage of the ‘Troubles’. As 
linguist Jayne Steel has argued there was an expectation, even a demand, that female terrorists be young, 
beautiful and sexy.41 It was often the case that they were presented as such, but as Figure 6 illustrates, 
just as often newspapers portrayed female republicans as monstrous harpies. The sexualisation of female 
terrorists allowed newspapers to deflect attention away from scrutinising the rationale behind the 
violence. This discourse operated on two levels, first by suggesting that the capacity of Irish 
republicanism for corroding something so beautiful accentuated the destructive nature of the movement 
(the paper failed to entertain the thought that these women could have consciously chosen to engage in 
political violence).42 Second, it served to denigrate the bombers, dehumanising them by fetishisation, 
their sexiness presented as further indication of their perversity. 43  Steel argues that the media’s 
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representations of female paramilitaries was reminiscent of ‘the seductive and deadly qualities of Gothic 
vampires, draining the will and feeding off the blood of British soldiers and citizens’.44 
 Some newspapers made the link with vampires more explicit. On 3 April 1972, for example, 
female supporters of the IRA hijacked a meeting of the Women’s Together peace movement and 
accused the attendees of being traitors.45 Daily Express cartoonist Michael Cummings depicted the 
incident in Figure 6 and presents the women as vampires. Dehumanising political figures by portraying 
them as vampires or other monsters was a common trope in cartoons on Ireland dating back to 
nineteenth-century editions of Punch. One of the best known examples of this is ‘The Irish “Vampire”’, 
published on 24 October 1885, which featured the founder of the Irish National Land League, Charles 
Stewart Parnell, as a vampire bat hovering over the prostrate body of Erin (the female personification 
of Ireland). The cartoon suggested that Parnell and his supporters preyed on their fellow Irishmen, 
leeching the country’s lifeblood.46 In a similar manner, in Figure 6 Cummings denigrated the republican 
movement by portraying these women as vampires. The vampire was not the only Victorian character 
to be resurrected in the early 1970s with the purpose of ridiculing republican figures. Bernadette Devlin, 
the MP for Mid-Ulster and a prominent republican politician, though never a member of the IRA, was 
often depicted as either a monster or a petulant child.47  
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In fact, the petulant child was used to represent Northern Ireland in general. On 21 May 1974, 
the Guardian published Figure 7 in response to the Ulster Worker’s Council (UWC) Strike. The strike 
took place between 15 May and 28 May 1974 to protest against the Sunningdale Agreement, which 
attempted to introduce a power-sharing Executive in Northern Ireland. The strikers brought the province 
to a standstill, bringing power-sharing in Northern Ireland to an end.48 Figure 7 illustrates the frustration 
felt within the press towards the strike. It shows Ulster represented as a child having a tantrum, 
threatening to ‘stop breathing and die’ because his parents, the Irish and British governments 
(represented by Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave and the newly-elected Harold Wilson) had asked him to do 
something he didn’t want to. The cartoon indicated the inability of the child to perceive the 
reasonableness of the parent’s request. It suggests that the Northern Irish were acting like petulant, spoilt 
children who lacked political maturity. Moreover, that they were engaging in wilful self-destruction by 
undermining the power-sharing initiative. Since the mid-nineteenth century Ireland has often been 
portrayed as an impetuous child in need of assistance, guidance and discipline from Britain, and in this 
manner cartoonists have sought to indicate Ireland’s alleged inferiority.49 Michael de Nie has observed 
that during the Home Rule Crises in the late nineteenth century, the Irish child was a popular theme, 
used to affirm the social and political immaturity of the Irish people, but also to consciously deny them 
the prospect of self-government. By drawing the Irish as children, cartoonists argued that Britain could 
not grant Ireland Home Rule any more than a parent could leave an infant to fend for itself.50  Similarly, 
Gibbard suggested that the Northern Irish were proving themselves too childish to govern themselves, 
and that they continued to need the guidance of their political parents the British and Irish governments. 
The cartoon also suggested that Wilson and Cosgrave, cringing in the background, were being too soft 
touch with the strikers. 
In the early 1970s, cartoonists drew on a host of long-established symbols of Ireland and the 
Irish in an effort to undermine the IRA threat. Scholars and activists, including Liz Curtis and John 
Kirkaldy, have pointed to the resurrection of the simian and monstrous Irishmen by the tabloids in their 
coverage of the ‘Troubles’. 51  Figure 2 is a prime example, featuring a simianised IRA bomber 
recognisable by his black beret, sunglasses and monkey’s tail. By portraying him as ape-like, cartoonist 
Keith Waite sought to signify the debased and inhuman nature of the bombers. Similarly, following the 
Westminster bombing, Rigby depicted the IRA as a hunched-back, Frankenstein-esq monster primed to 
blow up the British establishment (Figure 3). Other cartoonists also utilised the simian Irishman, 
Cummings and the Evening Standard’s cartoonist Jak specialised in drawing the Irish as ape-like, 
violent figures that bore a strong resemblance to the bestial ‘Paddy’ of Victorian caricatures.52 
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 The tradition of portraying the ‘enemy’ as ape- or animal-like dates back to the late eighteenth 
century and continues to the present day.53 In the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, the 
simianised caricature came to be closely associated with the Irish. The Fenian movement saw the 
popularisation of images of the Irish as inhuman and violent. To underline the dangers of Fenianism, 
many cartoonists depicted the Fenian ‘Paddy’ as ape-like monsters.54 What these cartoons reveal about 
the nature of nineteenth-century British attitudes towards the Irish has been the subject of much debate. 
L. Perry Curtis was first to suggest that the simian ‘Paddy’ reflected an increasingly racialised view of 
the Irish.55 His arguments, however, have received significant criticism, most notably from Sheridan 
Gilley and Roy Foster. Gilley has refuted Curtis’ claims that stereotypes of the Irish were necessarily 
racial, asserting that the Irish ‘Paddy’ was as much an Irish as a British creation. He argues that 
nineteenth-century attitudes towards the Irish were inconsistent and social commentators were as likely 
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to be pro-Irish.56 Foster concurred, arguing that the bestial ‘Paddy’ was only one of a variety of ways in 
which nineteenth-century cartoonists drew the Irish.57 Both Gilley and Foster suggest that religion, class 
and political violence played a more significant role in shaping British prejudices towards the Irish than 
ideas of race. More recently, Michael de Nie has argued that in the nineteenth century race was used ‘as 
a vehicle for expressing multiple anxieties and preconceptions, among them class concerns and sectarian 
prejudices’. Furthermore, for de Nie, conceptions of Irish identity were informed by a combination of 
ethnicity, religion and class: ‘In British eyes the eternal Paddy was forever a Celt, a Catholic, and a 
peasant’. 58  Curtis’s thesis, however, continues to be applied without question by many scholars, 
regardless of this on-going debate. For both Liz Curtis and John Kirkaldy, the resurrection of Victorian, 
simianised images of the Irish during the ‘Troubles’ is evidence of continued racism.59 
 The correlation between the ape-like, monstrous IRA featured in cartoons of the early 1970s 
and those of the Fenian era, certainly suggest that anti-Irish stereotypes persisted into the late twentieth 
century. As de Nie has argued however, in the nineteenth century simianised representations of the Irish 
were in the minority. The cartoons of Punch were populated by a host of other characters (mostly 
negative) which were used to represent Ireland and the Irish people, including ‘Erin’, the ‘Irish child’ 
and ‘pig’.60 The cartoon coverage in the early 1970s presents a similar diversity of characters. In 
addition to the ape-like ‘Paddy’, cartoonists employed a range of motifs common to Victorian cartoons. 
In Figure 4, for example, the image of Dorothy Household being carried from the Tower of London is 
distinctly reminiscent of nineteenth-century depictions of Erin, who was commonly featured in need of 
saving from the violent ‘Paddy’. Her champion was usually Britannia or St George, both potent symbols 
of British- and Englishness.61 In this instance, the Beefeater, another trope of British identity, is cast as 
the saviour. Nineteenth-century caricatures of the Irish persisted into the latter half of the twentieth 
century in more variety than Curtis and Kirkaldy have suggested.   
 Another established figure of nineteenth-century caricatures was Guy Fawkes.62 There are 
several Irish cartoons of this period that allude to the Gunpowder Plot in 1605, the best-known example 
being John Tenniel’s ‘The Fenian Guy Fawkes’, published on 28 December 1867. Following the 
Westminster attack on 17 June 1974, Daily Mirror cartoonist Keith Waite resurrected the Fawkes motif. 
In Figure 8 Waite depicted children collecting pennies for a Guy dressed in IRA uniform from Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson. By drawing parallels to the Gunpowder Plot, Waite underlined the 
destabilising effect of the IRA on the British state. In focusing on the custom of burning the Guy, 
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however, he reminds his readers that Fawkes had failed in his attempts to blow up Parliament; Waite 
asserts that the IRA would also fail to bring down the state. The IRA’s targeting of the Houses of 
Parliament ensured that the link to Fawkes and the Gunpowder Plot was the obvious connection to make. 
William Jones’ (Jon) also referred to the Plot in his cartoon published in the Daily Mail on 18 June, 
which featured a policeman questioning a construction worker who identifies himself as ‘Seamus 
O’Fawkes, sorr’ (Figure 9). The Guy Fawkes motif was also employed in coverage of the Birmingham 
bombings, the Sunday Telegraph’s cartoonist John Jensen reproduced Tenniel’s nineteenth-century 
cartoon, ‘The Fenian Guy Fawkes’, superimposed onto a photograph of inert bodies lying in the rubble 
of the Mulberry Bush pub (Figure 10). The image is captioned ‘A century of progress!’. By republishing 
the nineteenth-century caricature, Jensen drew attention to a long history of republican violence in 
England. He suggests that nothing has changed, reinforcing the traditional stereotype that the Irish are 
backwards-looking and inherently violent. Jensen was a regular contributor to Punch and so would have 
been acquainted with the magazine’s back-catalogue, however, his use of Tenniel’s cartoon is evidence 
that there was a general awareness amongst cartoonists of nineteenth-century caricatures of the Irish.  
 
Figure 8: Keith Waite, Daily Mirror, 18 June 
1974. 
Figure 9: William Jones (Jon), 'Seamus 




 Guy Fawkes cartoons traditionally played on well-established anti-Catholic prejudices. 
Historically, Catholicism had been regarded as an internal threat to a British identity which centred on 
Protestantism.63 The foiling of the Gunpowder Plot was often utilised as a symbol of British resistance 
to a Catholic peril. In the mid-nineteenth century cartoonists reacted to the perceived threat of Fenianism 
and Irish Catholic immigration by evoking Guy Fawkes.64 Some scholars have argued, however, that 
with the growth of secularism in the twentieth century, anti-Catholicism was rendered negligible; 
certainly that it no longer played a role in British attitudes towards the Irish.65 Kirkaldy explicitly states 
that anti-Catholicism did not play a major part in cartoons during the ‘Troubles’, that they were 
exclusively informed by racial stereotypes.66 The inclusion of Fawkes in cartoon coverage of the IRA’s 
bombing campaign in the early 1970s, however, suggest the opposite, that in fact sectarian prejudices 
continued to inform British conceptions of Irish identities. Nonetheless, Kirkaldy is correct in his 
argument that racial stereotypes played an important part in coverage of the ‘Troubles’, contributing in 
the early 1970s to the on-going construction of the Irish in Britain as ‘other’.  
 
63 Colley, ‘Britishness and Otherness’, 320. 
64 de Nie, The External Paddy, 13-7. 
65 Colin Holmes, A Tolerant Country?: Immigrants, Refugees and Minorities in Britain (London: Routledge, 2015), 50. 
66 Kirkaldy, ‘English Cartoonists’, 42. 
Figure 10: John Jensen, 'A century of progress! - with Jensen's acknowledgements to Tenniel, Sunday 
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 The debate over the extent to which hostility towards the Irish can be described as racism raises 
questions about the assimilation of Irish migrants into British society in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Few historians would deny that nineteenth-century Irish migrants were subject to 
widespread discrimination and hostility. Many have argued, however, that by the mid-twentieth century 
the Irish had become assimilated into British society, evidenced by high rates of social mobility, inter-
marriage, wealth and education.67 Since the 1980s, however, the ‘assimilationist’ argument has come 
increasingly under attack. Sociologist Mary Hickman in particular has argued that hostility towards the 
Irish continued throughout the late twentieth century. 68  She contends that the discrimination and 
disadvantage experienced by many Irish people at work, in access to housing, and in their treatment by 
the police and public has been rendered invisible due to the Irish being absorbed into a homogenous 
white racial group.69 There is evidence of greater integration by the late twentieth century, especially 
amongst the Irish middle-class. Sociologist Liam Ryan, in an ethnographic study compiled in the early 
1970s, found that the Irish had achieved a high degree of integration within British society, particularly 
those in non-manual occupations.70 Nonetheless, the status of the Irish in Britain remained precarious, 
as became apparent following the commencement of the IRA’s campaign of violence in England.71 
 The presence of a supposedly integrated Irish population exacerbated fears that the IRA had 
infiltrated Britain. Following the Westminster bombing, Rigby published a cartoon criticising the 
security services for failing to prevent the attack (Figure 11). The cartoon, which showed three men in 
IRA uniforms scaling Big Ben as the police struggled to reach them, reflected a general anxiety at the 
relative ease with which the IRA had succeeded in bringing violence to the heart of the British 
establishment. As an essential symbol of Britishness, the attack on Westminster signified an attack on 
Britain and British identity. The IRA men are drawn climbing all over Big Ben, which suggests that the 
bombers had free rein to operate within Britain.   
 It was widely believed that the IRA had been able to plant the bomb by posing as construction 
workers. Some newspapers even speculated that the bomber had been one of the Irishmen employed on 
the Commons car-park site.72 They implied that the IRA were able to move freely into and around 
Britain by mingling with the rest of the Irish population. The fact that the Irish were not readily 
identifiable and could assimilate allowed the IRA to ‘disappear’ into British society.73 
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This idea that the enemy could be ‘in our midst’ preoccupied the press. In an editorial, 
published on 11 September 1973, the Daily Telegraph speculated that ‘No doubt many Irish 
revolutionaries are lawfully equipped with British passports and permanently based in Britain’.74 The 
Telegraph referred to the fact that many IRA volunteers, as Northern Irish, were British citizens despite 
wishing to be otherwise. For the paper, this seemingly accentuated the corrupting and dangerous 
influence of Irish republicanism, that it was coming from within and turning ‘our own’ citizens into an 
internal threat. The tabloids on the other hand, honed in on the fact that many of the bombers were 
established members of the Irish migrant population. The Sun in its coverage of the trial of six men 
(wrongly) accused of the Birmingham bombings noted that all the defendants had lived in Britain since 
the early 1950s, bar William Power who had migrated in 1968.75 The Daily Mirror covering the death 
of IRA hunger striker Michael Gaughan on 3 June 1974 also noted that he had joined the IRA after 
migrating to Manchester in 1966.76 The Sunday Mirror observed, that one of the IRA men at the striker’s 
funeral, distinguishable in black beret and roll-neck pullover, had also worn a London Transport bus 
conductor’s badge, and argued that this was inescapable evidence that members of the IRA had 
infiltrated Britain and were passing themselves off as respectable members of British society. 77 
Similarly, the Mirror, covering the death of James McDade, who died on 14 November 1974 after the 
bomb he planted had exploded prematurely, focused on the extent to which he had integrated into British 
society. The paper reported with surprise that McDade had been married to an Englishwoman, though 
it went to great lengths to stress that she had no knowledge of his IRA activities.78 The widow was 
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Figure 11: Paul Rigby, 'Shure an' we're just good honest destruction workers, or somet'ing loike dat', 
The Sun, 19 June 1974. 
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presented as symbolic of the British population in general, unable to identify the IRA living and 
operating amongst them. 
 Reporting on McDade’s funeral, the Mirror observed that ‘hundreds of Irish sympathisers in 
Britain are planning to give a “martyrs farewell”’ before his body returned to Belfast.79 The paper 
claimed that the IRA presence in Britain was significant. The word ‘Irish’ rather than the phrase ‘IRA’ 
sympathisers implies that hundreds of Irish people living in Britain were in some way complicit in 
republican violence. The looseness of the newspapers’ phrasing inevitably meant that the IRA became 
closely associated with the Irish as a whole. Throughout the ‘Troubles’, constant references to the 
ethnicity of the IRA reinforced the link between the paramilitaries and the Irish, especially the Irish in 
Britain, as illustrated in Figure 11. The cartoon’s caption is written phonetically to convey the Irish 
accents of the IRA men scaling Big Ben. It is worth noting, however, that the accent being replicated is 
a Southern rather than a Northern Irish accent, demonstrating the indiscriminate way in which 
newspapers associated all Irish people with the IRA, regardless of whether they were Northern or 
Southern, Catholic or Protestant. Accent was often the only means by which the Irish - including IRA 
suspects - could be identified. As sociologist Sarah Morgan has argued, ‘accent became the prime 
signifier of both Irishness and potential IRA membership’.80 An Irish accent was often enough to attract 
abuse and suspicion, leading many Irish people living in Britain to modify or hide their accents.81  
 Not only did they suggest that the Irish in Britain were unwittingly harbouring the IRA, 
newspapers accused some Irish people of wilfully sheltering terrorists. The Daily Telegraph, 
complaining about the difficulty in rounding up suspects, remarked that ‘the bombers are operating from 
reasonably safe bases. They may well be long-term residents in Britain who are familiar figures in their 
own neighbourhoods or they may enjoy the protection of such people’.82 Similarly, the Guardian, in an 
editorial entitled ‘Those who harbour terrorists’, noted that the bombers do not ‘bring their murderous 
tools with them: those are provided by sympathisers here’.83 The Daily Mirror speculated that the 
bombers ‘stay with Irish people who have lived in London for many years’.84 As social scientist Paddy 
Hillyard has argued, this association of terrorism with the Irish living in Britain ‘perpetuate[d] the 
impression that the whole of the Irish community… [was] suspect’. 85  Accordingly, the press re-
imagined long-established Irish residents as a potential threat. 
 Newspapers did recognise that not all Irish people supported the IRA, that some had even been 
victims of the bombs themselves. In cases where the victims of the bombs were Irish, newspapers used 
their injuries to emphasise the heinous, internecine nature of the IRA, which was willing to target its 
own. On 18 December 1973, the IRA exploded a series of bombs; sixty people were injured in three 
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separate incidents across London. The Daily Mirror focused on Rosina Harrington, who had suffered 
severe shrapnel wounds in a car bomb in Westminster, because she was second-generation Irish 
Catholic.86 Similarly, in the aftermath of the Birmingham bombings the Sun paid particular attention to 
brothers Desmond and Eugene Reilly, killed in the Tavern in the Town explosion, whose parents were 
both from Donegal.87 Though newspapers made half-hearted attempts at objectivity in their attitude to 
the Irish, at best they were presenting readers with mixed messages. The impression that the Irish were 
all suspect dominated the discourse. 
In its coverage of the Reilly brothers’ funeral, the Daily Mirror described how ‘Englishmen 
and Irishmen knelt together… to mourn’, noting that the majority of Irish people shared the grief and 
shock felt following the attack.88 The press went to considerable pains to distinguish the law-abiding 
Irish from the violent minority. In an editorial, published on 22 August 1974, the Daily Telegraph 
argued that ‘the Irish community in Britain is in general respectable, hard-working and loyal to the 
institutions of its adopted country. Only a few self-exiled nationalist fanatics, anxious to purge with 
other people’s blood the guilt of deserting Ireland, would be prepared to help urban guerrillas’.89 
Similarly, after the Birmingham bombings the Guardian remarked that ‘terrorism is condoned, not of 
course by the mass of Irishmen, at home and abroad, to whom it is utterly repugnant, but by a number 
large enough to make it possible’.90 Though both papers assert that the majority of Irish people were 
‘innocent’, they qualify this by pointing out that a small deadly minority were not. Rather than remove 
suspicion, comments like this served to underline the idea that the Irish in Britain were all potential 
members of the IRA. They also reinforced the notion that the very existence of an Irish ‘community’ in 
Britain provided cover for republican paramilitaries. As Nickels et al., have argued, the concept of the 
‘innocent Irish’ constructed the Irish as a potential threat, as by definition for there to be ‘innocent Irish’, 
there also had to be ‘guilty Irish’.91 The idea of the ‘innocent Irish’ itself, relies on a purely negative 
definition, one which Alessandro Portelli contends confers a sense of ‘harmlessness’. Portelli argues, to 
be innocent does not necessarily exclude responsibility: ‘having done nothing wrong is one thing, but 
having done nothing against wrong is another’.92 The onus was placed on the Irish in Britain to assert 
their innocence and prove themselves by publicly disassociating from the IRA and defending ‘British 
values’.  
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  IRA violence in English cities in the early 1970 aroused outrage and suspicion. Not only had 
conflict spilt onto British soil for the first time since the Second World War, but the enemy was 
indistinguishable from the rest of the Irish population living and working in Britain. Bomb attacks 
dominated the headlines, often at the expense of more serious incidents in Northern Ireland.  
 British newspapers responded to the violence on English streets by re-emphasising conceptions 
of Britishness. The IRA were used as bogeymen in order to help foster a sense of togetherness during a 
period of instability, providing a common enemy against which the nation could unite. The press evoked 
the stereotype of the British as a stoic people facing down adversity by using memories of the Second 
World War and national motifs to symbolise British resilience and courage. In doing so, they sought to 
reassure readers and encourage support for Britain’s political and military efforts in Northern Ireland. 
The manner in which the British response to IRA violence was presented, however, was driven as much 
by the commercial interests of the newspapers as it was by patriotism. As this chapter has shown, by 
fostering the concept of a national community united against an IRA threat, newspaper editors sought 
to increase their appeal to a wider audience. 
 To underline the heinous nature of republican paramilitaries, a wide range of long-established 
stereotypes of the Irish were resurrected. This is particularly apparent in the cartoon coverage of bomb 
attacks in England. It has been observed that the violent simian Paddy of nineteenth-century cartoons 
re-emerged in the early 1970s, however, this chapter also demonstrates that a wider variety of motifs 
common to Victorian caricatures of the Irish were recycled by the press in the early 1970s.93 These 
highlight the complex range of well-established and enduring racial and religious stereotypes, which 
resurfaced in response to the IRA terror threat. 
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 The close association made by the press between the IRA and Irish people living in Britain 
meant that all Irish people were vulnerable to being cast as the ‘other’. Newspapers stoked feelings of 
suspicion by presenting the Irish as harbourers of terrorists. The existence of an Irish population 
unwittingly providing cover to IRA activists operating in England exacerbated fears that the IRA had 
infiltrated and contaminated British society. The ambiguity over which elements of the Irish population 
supported the IRA allowed blame to be applied to any Irish person and accordingly Irish people in 
Britain were reimagined as ‘suspect’. 
 The early 1970s, were crucial in shaping the way in which the ‘Troubles’ came to be interpreted 
in Britain. By building on existing national tropes, the newspaper coverage offers an insight into the 
construction of Britishness as well as an Irish ‘other’. Following attacks in London and Manchester 
motivated by Islamic extremism in 2017, the British media were to employ similar methods. Not only 
did journalists revert once more to seeing crises through a filter of Second World War images, they also 
evoked memories of the IRA attacks in order to exalt notions of British fortitude. As Figure 12 indicates, 
the IRA bombing campaign in England has become part of the range of stock motifs to be drawn upon 
in response to the threat of violence and used to shore up national identity in times of uncertainty. Then 





Chapter Two: Television coverage of the early 1970s. 
Throughout the early 1970s, Northern Ireland was never far from British television screens. The 
violence in the province made headlines nightly. The immediacy and potency of television images 
meant that for many in Britain television provided an important window onto the conflict in Northern 
Ireland. As the BBC Northern Ireland Controller, Richard Francis, noted, the broadcasting authorities 
saw it as their responsibility to ‘assist[…] people elsewhere in the United Kingdom to a better 
understanding of the Irish impasse’.1 All sides, however, sought to place pressure on broadcasters in a 
bid to shape how the conflict in Northern Ireland was presented, believing that by doing so they would 
encourage support and sympathy for their position. Incessant wrangling between the broadcasting 
authorities, successive British governments, and state organisations, such as the NIO and the RUC, 
threatened to hamper efforts to provide the British public with accurate information on events in the 
province. Nonetheless, both the BBC and ITV withstood efforts to dictate what should, or should not, 
be reported on and in the process produced compelling programmes on Northern Ireland. In this very 
modern conflict television was a significant weapon.  
There has been considerable analysis of the role television played in reporting the conflict, 
including the work of Liz Curtis, David Miller, Orla Lafferty, Jean Seaton and Rex Cathcart.2 Their 
scholarship has produced a detailed and valuable picture of the environment in which broadcasters 
reporting on Northern Ireland operated, yet it also reveals differences of opinion as to the level of 
autonomy broadcasters enjoyed, and the extent to which the British state influenced television coverage 
of the ‘Troubles’. British broadcasters are legally obliged to ensure balance and impartiality in all their 
coverage. At the BBC this was traditionally the responsibility of the Board of Governors, a body made 
up of senior figures from a variety of social and political backgrounds. The Governors were accountable 
for all the Corporation’s activities but had no direct role in programming; this has always been the 
prerogative of the Director-General and the Board of Management.3 Commercial television on the other 
hand, was regulated by a government-appointed body, the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), 
formerly the Independent Television Authority (ITA), which was responsible for ensuring balance and 
impartiality across the ITV network, and later Channel 4. The IBA had the power to determine the 
 
1 Richard Francis, ‘Terrorists on Television’, a speech to the Broadcasting Press Guild, 12 July 1979, quoted in Rex 
Cathcart, The Most Contrary Region: The BBC in Northern Ireland, 1924-1984 (Belfast: The Blackstaff Press, 1984), 
230.  
2 Curtis, Ireland The Propaganda War; Miller, Don’t Mention the War; Orla Lafferty, ‘From ‘Fun Factory’ to Current 
Affairs Machine’: Coping with the Outbreak of the Troubles at Ulster Television 1968-70’, Irish Communication 
Review (2014); Orla Lafferty ‘UTV, The Network Relationship and Reporting the ‘Troubles’, Journal of the MeCCSA 
Postgraduate Network, 3, 2 (2010); Cathcart, The Most Contrary Region; Seaton, ‘The BBC and the ‘Hidden Wiring’ of 
the British Constitution.’, 448-71; See also: Martin McLoone, Broadcasting in a Divided Community: Seventy Years of 
the BBC in Northern Ireland (Belfast: Institute of Irish Studies, 1996); John Hill, ‘“The Troubles we’ve seen”: film, 
television drama and Northern Irish conflict in Britain’, in The Northern Ireland Troubles in Britain: Impacts, 
engagements, legacies and memories, (eds.) Graham Dawson, Jo Dover and Stephen Hopkins, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2017), 243-260; Bill Rolston and David Miller, War and Words: The Northern Ireland Media Reader 
(Belfast: Beyond the Pale, 1996); Parkinson, Ulster Loyalism; Johnathan Bardon, Beyond the Studio: A History of BBC 
Northern Ireland (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 2000); Gary Edgerton, ‘Quelling the “Oxygen of Publicity”: British 
Broadcasting and “The Troubles During the Thatcher Years’, Journal of Popular Culture, 30, 1 (1996) 115-131.  
3 The BBC Board of Management comprised of the Director-General, Deputy Director-General, Advisor to the Director-
General, Chief Executive, the Managing Directors and Directors.  
40 
broadcasting schedule, to prohibit the transmission of programmes and even to revoke a company’s 
franchise. This pursuit of balance and impartiality, difficult enough under normal circumstances, proved 
an immense challenge for broadcasters covering the ‘Troubles’.  
 Historian and Irish activist Liz Curtis has echoed Irish republican perspectives in arguing that 
broadcasters ‘hang[…] on the coat-tails of the establishment’.4 Whilst acknowledging that television 
had occasionally raised challenging questions about Britain’s role in Northern Ireland, Curtis argues 
that, in the main, the broadcasting authorities bowed to government pressure, censoring television 
coverage of the conflict to exclude republicans from the airwaves. Curtis highlights numerous examples 
of programmes that were censored, including ‘South of the Border’, banned in November 1971.5 The 
programme examined how the ‘Troubles’ affected the Republic of Ireland and included interviews with 
Provisional Sinn Féin President, Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, and IRA Chief of Staff, Seán MacStíofáin.6 The 
justification given by the ITA was that ‘the subject would not be helpful in the current situation’. It was 
the inclusion of these interviews, however, which had led the programme to be censored. Curtis argues 
that as a result of this sort of suppression a distorted picture of the ‘Troubles’ was produced, presenting 
the IRA as solely responsible for the conflict, whilst sanitising Britain’s role.7 Without access to the 
BBC and ITV archives, however, Curtis was unable to fully analyse the broadcasting authorities’ 
response to this pressure. Many commentators have nevertheless accepted her arguments at face value 
and assume that the broadcast media adopted a stance favourable to the British government.  
 Contrastingly, in his review of the history of the BBC in Northern Ireland, Rex Cathcart, 
former ITA Regional Officer for Northern Ireland, argued that the Corporation attracted criticism from 
several quarters.8 He points to the pressure placed on broadcasters by both communities in Northern 
Ireland to reflect their position. Cathcart argues that in response the BBC sought to represent the whole 
of society, an approach guaranteed to satisfy no one. Similarly, media studies scholar David Miller 
argues that a complex mixture of constraints was imposed on broadcasters by participants. 9  He 
challenges the assumption that the broadcast media was merely a conduit for state views, noting how 
divisions within and between different state organisations prevented the government from exerting full 
control. Nonetheless, Miller fails to consider the individual agency of broadcasters and journalists, 
seeing the broadcast media as a tool to be manipulated by other actors, whether the British government 
or the IRA. Various other academics, such as Jean Seaton, have also carried out research on specific 
aspects of British broadcasting, such as the broadcasting ban, contributing to our understanding of the 
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television coverage of Northern Ireland.10 Increasingly, these scholars have argued that broadcasters 
resisted efforts, principally by the British state, to influence how they reported on Northern Ireland.  
 More recently, the availability of new archival material from the broadcasting authorities has 
offered fresh insight into the motivations behind news broadcasting during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Historian Robert Savage’s examination of the BBC’s role in Northern Ireland challenged the common 
misconception that the British government dictated how the broadcasting body covered the conflict.11 
Drawing on a rich range of internal documents and external correspondence from the BBC, Savage 
explores the relationship between broadcasters and the state, from the origins of the BBC in Northern 
Ireland to the introduction of the broadcasting ban in 1988. He argues that far from simply chronicling 
the ‘Troubles’, the Corporation became a critical voice and therefore an integral part of the conflict 
itself. Savage describes the mounting pressure placed on broadcasters throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
by successive British governments trying to shape the way in which television depicted paramilitaries 
but argues that senior management at the BBC resisted efforts to silence them. Whilst feuds between 
the broadcasting authorities, politicians, civil servants and military officials endangered the ability of 
journalists to provide audiences with an accurate picture of what was happening in Northern Ireland, 
Savage concludes that the BBC produced critical and informative coverage, which regularly questioned 
the decisions, policies and tactics of successive governments regarding the province.12  
 This chapter builds on Savage’s premise that broadcasters resisted attempts by the state to 
control the narrative of Northern Ireland. Unlike Savage’s research, however, it will engage in detailed 
analysis of the content of current affairs programmes produced by both the BBC and the ITV network 
during the early 1970s.13 This approach provides a highly original way of ascertaining whether claims 
by the broadcasting authorities of editorial independence and integrity were put into practice. It will 
enable the investigation of the way the conflict was portrayed on television and the extent to which the 
broadcast media engaged with the complexities of the ‘Troubles’. The chapter argues that by resisting 
pressure from the state and other participants in the conflict, programme producers provided a nuanced 
view of the Northern Ireland conflict. Analysing programme content demonstrates how broadcasters 
often challenged an official narrative, presenting the conflict as a struggle against terrorism and 
portrayed the British Army as a peace-keeping force caught between two warring factions. It argues 
that current affairs programming sought to place the violence in its broader historical and socio-
economic context, questioning Britain’s activities in Northern Ireland, as much as those of the IRA. The 
chapter will also investigate how programme producers represented Northern Ireland. In particular, it 
will explore how the television coverage fixated on violence, representing it as un-British and 
incomprehensible to British audiences. It will argue that these programmes served to differentiate 
 
10 The Broadcasting Ban introduced in 1988, restricted the voices of representatives of proscribed organisations from 
being broadcast on television or radio. Seaton, ‘The BBC and the ‘Hidden Wiring’ of the British Constitution.’, 448-71. 
11 Savage, The BBC’s Irish troubles. 
12 Ibid. 
13 ITV was a network made up of separate regional television companies, including Granada, London Weekend 
Television, Thames Television and Yorkshire Television. The network was regulated and monitored by the Independent 
Broadcasting Authority, formerly the Independent Television Authority.   
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Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK by characterising it as a place set apart. By exploring the 
television coverage of the ‘Troubles’ during the early 1970s, this chapter will further contribute to our 
broader understanding of the constructions of Britishness within a multinational state. 
 The chapter focuses on television programmes broadcast between 1973 and 1974. It draws on 
a sample of twenty programmes, broadcast by the BBC and ITV and chosen to ensure coverage of a 
broad range of subjects relating to the ‘Troubles’. By concentrating on these two years, it covers many 
of the key developments in the early stages of the conflict, including the Sunningdale Agreement, the 
Ulster Workers’ Council (UWC) Strike and the commencement of the bombing campaign in England.  
 
Table 1: List of Television Programmes, 1973-1974 
Programme Series Channel Date Shown Number of 
Viewers (in 
millions)14 
‘No Title’ Weekend World ITV (London 
Weekend World) 
11 February 1973 0.35 
The Irish Problem Firing Line BBC 25 February 
197315 
0.45 
‘No Title’ Weekend World ITV (London 
Weekend World) 
11 March 1973 0.45 
The Question of 
Ulster: The Way 
Forward 
 BBC 13 March 1973 Part 1: 3.9 
Part 2: 3.2 
‘No Title’ Midweek: Special BBC 20 March 1973 1.56 
‘No Title’ Weekend World ITV (London 
Weekend World) 
25 March 1973 0.8 
Life in the RUC Panorama BBC 25 June 1973 1.9 
A Question of 
Intelligence 
World in Action ITV (Granada) 10 September 
1973 
5.2 









BBC 4 December 1973 5.2 
Northern Ireland 
Executive 
Midweek BBC 29 January 1974 1.25 
 
14 BBC WAC, ‘Series R9: TV Viewing Barometers/BARB TV Audience Figures’, 1973-1974. 
15 Firing Line was an American television series founded and hosted by right-wing commentator William F. Buckley. In 







BBC 12 March 1974 4.54 
‘No Title’ Weekend World ITV (London 
Weekend World) 
7 April 1974 0.4 
Remember 
Strabane16 
This Week ITV (Thames 
Television) 
11 April 1974 5.8 
Five Long Years This Week ITV (Thames 
Television) 
7 August 1974 N/A 







In Vision BBC 4 October 1974 0.35 
‘No Title’ Weekend World ITV (London 
Weekend World) 
20 October 1974 0.5 




BBC 29 October 1974 7.5 
Dealing with the 
Terrorists 






 On 4 October 1974, BBC’s In Vision broadcast an episode attempting to communicate to 
British audiences the unique problems facing broadcasters in Northern Ireland. As the host, William 
Hardcastle, explained, the pitfalls were many: ‘a simple piece of music can be taken by many listeners 
as an act of provocation, coverage of a sport like Gaelic football as an act of sectarian controversy. 
Indeed, the tensions of the province reach into nearly every field of human activity’.17 The programme 
looked at day-to-day broadcasting in Belfast, as well as the challenges faced by all journalists covering 
Northern Ireland. As it noted, accessing basic facts was difficult, as the Army and police often refused 
to provide information such as the religion, name and addresses of victims caught up in the violence.18 
The media’s reliance on the authorities for details about incidents meant that broadcaster’s efforts to 
provide impartial coverage of the conflict was hampered by the ability of the government and security 
forces to withhold information. The programme also discussed accusations, made by republicans in 
particular, that the BBC showed too much reverence to the authorities. Northern Ireland correspondent 
for The Times, Robert Fisk, who appeared on the programme, argued that this might initially have been 
the case, but since Bloody Sunday (30 January 1972) when British soldiers shot twenty-eight unarmed 
 
16 Only twelve and a half minutes of this footage was available to the author, however, this was enough to gain some 
sense of the programme and its content.   
17 ‘Broadcasting in Northern Ireland’, In Vision, BBC, 4 October 1974. 
18 The Army and NIO repeatedly asked the BBC to refrain from identifying the religion of victims of violence in the 
province. The broadcasting body, however, maintained that it had a responsibility to report on events in full and that 
mention of the victim’s religion was unavoidable. (Savage, The BBC’s Irish troubles, 120; 142-3). 
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protesters, reporters in Northern Ireland had been ‘much more reluctant to accept, at face value, official 
statements, including statements from the government’. Rex Cathcart, concurred, stating that ‘the 
growth of news operation in both concerns has been remarkable and this has made it possible for a 
greater reluctance to accept official statements’.19 Although both the BBC and ITV came under pressure 
from the government over their coverage of the conflict both strove to remain impartial and produce 
challenging programmes on Northern Ireland.  
 Throughout the ‘Troubles’, the British media, and particularly the broadcast media, attracted 
criticism from all quarters for its handling of the conflict. The BBC had traditionally been viewed by 
the majority of Catholics in Northern Ireland as a unionist puppet.20 Certainly, up until the late 1950s, 
the Corporation had been reluctant to challenge the Stormont government and made little effort to 
produce programmes that engaged with the minority community.21 From the 1960s onwards, however, 
the Corporation increasingly questioned the actions of the Stormont government, provoking the ire of 
the Protestant population.22 Following the outbreak of the conflict, each community continued to view 
themselves as marginalised by the BBC, criticising the broadcasters for providing the other with a 
propaganda platform.  
 ITV fared only slightly better. Its Northern Ireland franchise, UTV, was regarded, as far more 
responsible than the BBC in its attitude to reporting on the violence.23 In March 1972, the RUC attacked 
a BBC film crew covering the aftermath of a police shooting. The BBC’s solicitors were warned that 
they would receive little sympathy from the authorities if they filed a formal complaint, as ‘there is 
undoubtedly a fairly wide feeling here that the television news as dealt with by UTV, particularly in 
their local programmes, are superior to that of the BBC’.24 At a meeting in December 1975, the BBC’s 
Northern Ireland News Editor, Robin Walsh, drew attention to an erroneous report by ITN that the 
IRA’s ceasefire had ended. There had been little reaction to the mistake and Walsh complained that this 
would not have been the case had the error been the BBC’s.25 Nonetheless, ITV also received heavy 
criticism from both communities for its coverage of events in Northern Ireland. As the IBA summarised:   
The sad fact is… that both parties of the Northern Ireland crisis 
believe that the other side has a monopoly of what each describes as 
the propaganda machine of press, television and radio. Almost any 
expression on television of the opposing point of view is regarded 
by people committed to one side of the other as an example of wilful 
propaganda whereas it is in fact simply an attempt to show that more 
than one point of view does exist and has to be considered.26 
 
19 ‘Broadcasting in Northern Ireland’, 4 October 1974. 
20 Savage, The BBC’s Irish troubles, 7. 
21 Ibid, 13. 
22 Ibid, 13- 45. 
23 ‘Broadcasting in Northern Ireland’; Savage, The BBC’s Irish troubles, 162. 
24 BBC WAC, R78/699/1, letter from Davey to Marshall, 21 April 1972 quoted by Savage, The BBC’s Irish troubles, 
98. 
25 BBC WAC, R78/700/1, Northern Ireland Civil Disturbances, Minutes of a Meeting, 5 December 1975. 
26 ITA/IBA Cable Authority Archive, Northern Ireland Troubles General Volume 2 January 1972- December 1973, 
Memo regarding a letter to Leslie Collins, 1972. 
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 The heaviest criticism levelled at broadcasters, however, came from the British establishment. 
Politicians from across the political spectrum expressed fears that by reporting on political violence, the 
media, would inadvertently lend terrorists legitimacy through ‘the oxygen of publicity’.27 Conservative 
MPs, among them Airey Neave, John Biggs-Davison and Edward du Cann, placed continual pressure 
on broadcasters to refrain from reporting on IRA activities altogether.28  
 The visual character of television can lend the medium more potency than the press or radio. 
As cultural theorist Stuart Hall argued, television can ‘reproduce the actual trace of reality in the images 
they transmit’, and are often considered to be resistant to coding, selection and arrangement by 
broadcasters. The reality, Hall argued is that because they are based on a combination of the visual and 
verbal, television messages require a more elaborate procedure of coding on the part of the producer to 
create a narrative that makes sense to the audience.29 This explains why broadcasters were the target of 
such ire from politicians and the public during the ‘Troubles’. Since it ‘came of age’ in the 1960s and 
1970s, television has been recognised as a powerful tool in shaping public opinion. 30  Politicians, 
throughout the latter half of the twentieth century were extremely anxious about its ability to sway the 
public. British governments sought to control the messages about Northern Ireland presented by 
television programmes, believing broadcasts to have a direct impact on public opinion concerning the 
conflict. Broadcasters were also aware of their potential to influence audiences, as this IBA report from 
1977 indicates: 
There is admittedly difficulties [sic] in the impact and reach of a 
television programme shown in peak-time as compared to 
newspapers. We have always accepted, for instance, that an 
interview or an extract from a speech of a member of the IRA or 
other paramilitary organization advocating the use of violence is in 
terms of its impact and possible incitement much stronger than a 
report of the same speech or interview on the printed page. 31   
The report highlights the different attitude of politicians, and to some extent the public, towards a story 
reported on television and the same story in the press. Despite the obvious potency of television images, 
as Hall argued, audiences are not passive recipients of whatever message broadcasters might wish to 
relay, rather they make their own meaning from what they see on television.32 Although it is of course 
important to problematise the idea of television’s ability to influence audiences, as historian Gavin 
Schaffer has argued ‘it has become all too easy to dismiss contemporary anxieties about the medium’s 
impact as hyperbole and naïve. But failing to take these concerns seriously risks a teleological failure 
 
27 Morgan, ‘The Contemporary Racialization of the Irish in Britain’, 47. 
28 Curtis, Ireland The Propaganda War, 141. 
29 Stuart Hall, ‘The rediscovery of ‘ideology’: return of the repressed in media studies’, in Culture, Society and the 
Media, (eds.) Michael Gurevitch, Tony Bennett, James Curran and Janet Woollacott (London: Routledge, 1982), 76. 
30 Curran and Seaton, Power without Responsibility, 195. 
31 ITA/IBA Cable Authority Archive, A/X/0016/1, ‘This Week’ Coverage of Ulster, ‘Programmes on the Administration 
of Justice in Northern Ireland Part II: The Wider Issues’, 27 October 1977.  
32 Stuart Hall, ‘Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse’, Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies 
Occasional Paper, September 1973. 
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to understand the social and political history of Britain during this period’.33 It was the belief that 
broadcasts could influence audiences, which led successive British governments to attempt to control 
the television narrative with regards to the IRA. Politicians feared that by providing a platform, 
television coverage could incite violence or encourage support for the paramilitaries.      
 There was also pressure to censor coverage of overt paramilitary activity by Loyalist groups 
such as the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). During the UWC Strike (May 1974), the BBC in 
particular was accused of having allowed itself to become a mouthpiece of the UWC and loyalist 
paramilitaries.34 Critics, including Times journalist Robert Fisk, argued that the BBC’s coverage had 
undermined the power of the newly formed Northern Ireland Executive and enabled the strike to gain 
momentum. Northern Ireland Controller, Richard Francis, however, defended his team, arguing that it 
was their duty to provide up-to-date information on the strike, especially when information had not been 
forthcoming from the Executive or the NIO. 35  Overall, Loyalist organisations seem to have been 
considered less of a concern than the IRA. Arguments against paramilitaries on television for the most 
part focused on the IRA. Critics from within the British establishment argued that coverage of the 
paramilitaries’ campaign helped generate support for the IRA and served to escalate the conflict. Some 
even suggested that the media were responsible for the IRA’s continued existence. Interviewed in 1974, 
Frank King, General Officer Commanding of the British Army in Northern Ireland, remarked that ‘It 
would be interesting to know if the IRA would be alive today if it had been ignored, I doubt it’.36 
Broadcasters retorted that by providing accurate information on the IRA, news and current affairs 
programmes helped prevent violence. In 1975, Richard Francis, dismissed accusations that the BBC’s 
cameras exacerbated the situation on the ground, arguing that:  
permitting rumour to spread unchecked was more dangerous… if 
people had been killed or hurt it was better to say so because rumour 
would only multiply the number of those hurt or killed and possibly 
provoke retaliatory action on an even greater scale.37   
Broadcasters maintained that if the media did not report on paramilitary activities then the IRA would 
simply redouble their efforts and the violence would worsen.38  
 
33 Gavin Schaffer, The Vision of a Nation: Making Multiculturalism on British Television, 1960-80 (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014), 5. 
34 In March 1973, the British government had proposed the setting up of a new Northern Ireland Assembly, elected by 
proportional representation and headed by a power-sharing Executive. There was also to be a Council of Ireland 
composed of members of both Irish governments with executive functions, and it was intended that the Council would 
eventually administer some public services. The commitment to all-Ireland co-operation was formalised in December 
1973 with the signing of the Sunningdale Agreement, and on 1 January 1974 the power-sharing Executive took office, 
only for direct rule to be re-introduce less than five months later when the Sunningdale Agreement collapsed in the face 
of a loyalist strike organised by the Ulster Workers Council 
35 Savage, The BBC’s Irish troubles, 127-37. 
36 Robert Fisk, ‘Censor’s pen cannot write off Ulster terrorists’, The Times, 3 December 1974. 
37 BBC WAC, R78/700/1, Northern Ireland Civil Disturbances, Minutes of Meeting with Officials of the Northern 
Ireland region of the British Broadcasting Corporation, 7 November 1975. 
38 For example, at a lecture given in 1977, Richard Francis argued that ‘if we don’t seek, with suitable safeguards, to 
report and to expose the words of terrorist front organisations, we may well be encouraging them to speak more and 
more with violence’. (Richard Francis, ‘Broadcasting to a community in conflict- the experience in Northern Ireland’, 
lecture given at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, 22 February 1977, London: BBC 
quoted in Curtis, Ireland The Propaganda War, 147.) 
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 British politicians on both sides expected the BBC and ITV, at the very least, to stick to the 
official line and present the conflict in terms of moral absolutes with the government and security forces 
playing the role of the ‘goodies’, and the IRA the ‘baddies’. The putative failure of broadcasters to do 
so, led to accusations that they were pro-IRA and pro-nationalist. Once again, ITV was viewed in a 
more positive light than the BBC. During a dinner at the Culloden Hotel (Belfast) hosted by the BBC 
in November 1976, newly appointed Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Roy Mason, launched a 
tirade against the BBC, accusing the Corporation of ‘stirring up’ trouble and likening their coverage to 
that of The Sun and the Daily Mirror.39 By contrast, Mason praised the work of UTV, noting that it was 
widely respected by the local community: ‘The BBC was the divider, not the healer, compared with 
UTV’.40 As NIO civil servant, Peter Bell, pointed out, however, UTV’s reliance on commercial revenue 
meant that the company, unwilling to alienate their predominantly unionist advertisers, were more likely 
to be sympathetic to the authorities.41 Orla Lafferty has argued that UTV’s dependency on advertisers 
and reluctance to alienate any section of its audience led the franchise to focus on the human-interest 
angle for fear of providing the terrorists with a platform. 42  As this demonstrates, economic 
considerations as well as political pressure played a significant role in shaping how broadcasters 
reported on Northern Ireland. However, whilst UTV was able to self-censor its own output, it was 
limited in its ability to influence material aired on the national network.43 Other ITV franchises were 
supposed to inform UTV if they were making a programme in Northern Ireland, but they were under 
no obligation to consult them on content.44  Throughout the 1970s, ITV increasingly developed current 
affairs programmes on the ‘Troubles’ that deviated from the government line, attracting widespread 
criticism. One of the most notable examples was Weekend World’s interview with IRA Chief of Staff, 
David O’Connell (Dáithí Ó Conaill) in November 1974. 
 The government’s preoccupation with keeping terrorists off-screen manifested itself in a 
fixation with the appearance of members of the IRA in interviews on television. Politicians accused the 
BBC and ITV of unwittingly providing terrorists with a propaganda platform by allowing their 
representatives to appear on television. Broadcasters were well aware of efforts by the paramilitaries to 
use interviews as a propaganda tool.45 Journalists were repeatedly warned by senior management to be 
vigilant against attempts by the IRA and other paramilitary organisations to use interviews as a 
 
39 BBC WAC, R78/1, 407/1, Northern Ireland civil disturbances, note of after-dinner discussion at Culloden Hotel, 
Belfast, 4 November 1976, by Richard Francis quoted by Savage, The BBC’s Irish troubles, 156. 
40 Ibid. 
41 TNA, NIO, CJ4/1961, memo from P.N. Bell to Wilson, NIO, 25 March 1977 quoted by Savage, The BBC’s Irish 
troubles, 162. 
42 Lafferty, ‘From ‘Fun Factory’ to Current Affairs Machine’, 62; Orla Lafferty, ‘Reporting the ‘Troubles’ at Ulster 
Television: An archival exploration from 1968-1998’ (PhD, University of Ulster, 2013), 251. 
43 Jeremy Potter, Independent Television Broadcasting Volume 4: Companies and Programmes 1968-80, (Basingstoke: 
MacMillan, 1990), 201. 
44 ITA/IBA Cable Authority Archive, ‘Programmes on the Administration of Justice in Northern Ireland Part II’. 
45 BBC WAC, R78/700/1, Northern Ireland Civil Disturbances, Any Answers, 11 June 1974; ITA/IBA Cable Authority 
Archive, Northern Ireland Troubles General Volume 3 January 1974- December 1977, IBA Paper 277 (74) 
‘Programmes Featuring Members of the IRA and Similar Bodies: Memorandum by the Staff’, 2 December 1974. 
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platform.46 At the same time, broadcasters were also wary of becoming a platform for the authorities. 
In December 1974, the BBC’s Editor of News and Current Affairs, Desmond Taylor, urged colleagues 
to take care in reporting police statements about persons who had been arrested in relation to acts of 
terrorism, noting that some such statements had ‘implied the guilt of persons at present in custody’. 
Taylor warned that ‘the BBC must be very careful in such cases and must not let itself be used by the 
police in a war of nerves against the I.R.A.’.47 Both the BBC and IBA had strict rules in place for 
interviewing members of paramilitary organisations and prior permission was required from the 
Director-General of the BBC, or in the case of ITV productions, the IBA. As a result, interviews with 
members of the IRA or other paramilitary organisations were a rarity, a point that broadcasters had been 
quick to highlight.48 
 The BBC and IBA defended their decision to allow, where appropriate, interviews with 
paramilitaries to be broadcast, arguing that it was their duty to report on all aspects of the conflict. As 
the IBA asserted:  
The fact that assorted groups and individuals choose to act outside 
the proper constituted democratic machinery does not in itself 
render their case unworthy of attention however horrifying their 
actions may become. It cannot be denied that the IRA and the UDA 
are factors in the Northern Ireland situation just as much as the 
Social Democratic and Labour Party and the Ulster Unionists. An 
understanding of why they act in this way is essential to any attempt 
to report and explain the Northern Ireland crisis.49 
Both broadcasting bodies maintained that through interviews they had shown the British public the 
murderous nature of the IRA.50 It was argued that the intense bombing in England during the 1970s 
meant that this was no longer necessary; however, broadcasters reasoned that occasionally it was in the 
public interest to be reminded of what the enemy was.51 Above all, broadcasters stressed the importance 
of understanding the motives behind the IRA’s actions.52 As the BBC’s Midweek presenter Jackie Gillot 
remarked, however ‘obscene, irrational, unpardonable’ the IRA’s activities might seem ‘we have got to 
try and understand what it is that moves their minds’.53 Regardless of political pressure, in the early 
1970s both ITV and the BBC produced a number of programmes, which included interviews with 
members of the IRA, providing audiences with an insight into the organisation’s position.  
 
46 BBC WAC, R78/700/1, Northern Ireland civil disturbances, Minutes of a Meeting, 10 June 1974; BBC WAC, Any 
Answers; ITA/IBA Cable Authority Archive, IBA Paper 277 (74). 
47 BBC WAC, R78/700/1, Northern Ireland civil disturbances, Extract from Minutes of a Meeting, 6 December 1974. 
48 Defending the BBC against criticism following the broadcast of an interview with David O’Connell on Midweek in 
June 1974, the Director-General, Charles Curran, noted that since 1971 the BBC had only shown two interviews with 
the IRA. (BBC WAC, Any Answers). 
49 Programme Policy Committee Paper 3 (73), ‘Programmes about Criminals’, quoted in ITA/IBA Cable Authority 
Archive, IBA Paper 277 (74). 
50 ITA/IBA Cable Authority Archive, 5095/2/10/1, Weekend World-David O’Connell, Letter from Lord Aylesbury 
(Chairman of the IBA) to Paul Hawkins (MP), 12 February 1973. 
51 Speech to the Broadcasting Press Guild, 12 July 1979, quoted in The Listener, 19 July 1979 quoted in Curtis, Ireland 
The Propaganda War, 147. 
52 BBC WAC, R78/700/1, Northern Ireland Civil Disturbances, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting, 2 December 
1974. 
53 BBC WAC, Any Answers. 
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 The most controversial of these was with David O’Connell, on London Weekend Television’s 
(LWT) Weekend World programme transmitted on 17 November 1974. The programme primarily 
focused on the increase of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland, and the purpose of the O’Connell 
interview was to clarify the IRA’s position in the face of the mounting number of sectarian killings. The 
interview was carried out by Mary Holland, one of the first British journalists to provide substantial 
coverage of the conflict. During the 1970s, she had become an increasingly prominent commentator on 
Northern Ireland. Her unwillingness to self-censor reports on the ‘Troubles’ gained her a reputation for 
being sympathetic to the republican movement.54 In the course of the interview, Holland brought the 
conversation onto the campaign of violence in English cities seeking to establish who the IRA’s 
intended targets were. She noted that the IRA had repeatedly stated that they had no quarrel with the 
British people, but pointing to the M62 bombing on 4 February 1974, which had killed twelve people 
including two young children, she asked: ‘Do you see that to British people that looks like a campaign 
on ordinary British people?’. O’Connell, however, insisted that the coach had been a legitimate target 
because it was carrying British military personnel: ‘The facts are that the coach that was struck on the 
particular journey was a military coach… They [the IRA] warned civilians not to frequent places where 
military personnel are known to have established haunts’.55 O’Connell warned that over the following 
months the IRA planned an escalation of the campaign in England: 
For five years the British government has had its forces waging a 
campaign of terror- not just on the IRA, but on the people of 
Ireland… What have we got from the British people? Total 
indifference. They have washed their hands. We said last week in a 
statement that the British government and the British people must 
realise that because of the terrible [war] in Ireland, they will suffer 
the consequences.56  
The main thrust of the interview, however, was to explore the IRA’s terms for calling off the campaign 
and their vision for an independent Northern Ireland. Holland turned her questioning to the likelihood 
of the conflict descending into civil war if Britain withdrew from the province and asked whether this 
would be of benefit to the IRA.57 It was O’Connell’s comments regarding the escalation of the bombing 
campaign in England, however, which critics concentrated on and which led to accusations that LWT 
had allowed the IRA a platform.   
 Initially, the interview attracted little response. Directly after the broadcast, the leader of the 
DUP, Ian Paisley, had called for an emergency debate in the House of Commons, but was refused.58 
LWT reported only receiving sixty phone calls and fifteen letters regarding the programme, the majority 
of which had been positive. The IBA had received less than a dozen phone calls about the interview and 
 
54 Anne McHardy, ‘Obituary: Mary Holland’, Guardian, 9 June 2004.  
55 BBC WAC, R78/700/1, Northern Ireland Civil Disturbances, Transcript of Weekend World, London Weekend 
Television interview with Dáithi Ó Conaill, 17 November 1974. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 ‘Protest at IRA man on TV’, The Times, 19 November 1974; Curtis, Ireland The Propaganda War, 160.  
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the number of letters in response to it were equally low.59 Four days after the programme aired, however, 
two bombs exploded in pubs in Birmingham city centre, killing twenty-one people in the deadliest act 
of terrorism to occur in England since the Second World War. In the aftermath, the O’Connell interview 
attracted widespread criticism in the press and from politicians who concentrated on O’Connell’s 
comments regarding the England campaign. Conservative MP, Sir Patrick Cormack, complained that 
‘nothing had been more nauseating or offensive to British people than the sight and sound from time to 
time of these blackguards, villains and murderers appearing on television screens or being interviewed 
on the radio’.60 Similarly, Edward du Cann told the Commons that ‘It is a gross affront to us to have a 
known terrorist allowed to flaunt his views on TV or any other way’.61 Some politicians even accused 
Holland of inciting violence by asking O’Connell whether the IRA were prepared to escalate their 
activities to include assassinations.62 The leader of the SDLP, Gerry Fitt, went further suggesting that 
the interview had indirectly led to the Birmingham bombings.63  
 As the IBA pointed out, most complaints did not relate to the content of the interview per se, 
but were ‘against the very fact that a proclaimed enemy of Britain was allowed the privilege of an 
appearance on “our” television’.64 Certainly, of the complaints the IBA received most demanded that 
the IRA be denied any airtime, and protested the fact that O’Connell had been allowed to issue threats 
against the British people.65  The IBA, however, defended its decision to broadcast the interview, 
stressing the fact that Holland had adopted a tough stance and had succeeded in obtaining valuable 
information, which would help the British public better understand the conflict. 66  The BBC 
management’s view was that Holland had been ‘quite tough and realistic’.67  
 An examination of the programme’s transcript shows that Holland’s questioning was robust 
pushing O’Connell to take responsibility for a recent spate of bomb attacks on train stations in London 
amongst other things.68 As noted, contrary to criticism, the interview’s primary focus was to establish 
the reasons behind continuing sectarian violence in Northern Ireland. The interview format allowed 
Holland to force O’Connell to justify the IRA’s actions and therefore offer audiences insights into the 
paramilitaries’ mind-set other than those provided by their prepared statements. Holland pushed 
O’Connell to clarify the IRA’s position and justify recent assassinations, particularly those of judges 
Rory Conaghan and Martin McBurney, whose deaths had sparked a surge in tit-for-tat killings in Belfast 
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during October and November of 1974. By exploring these issues through the O’Connell interview, the 
programme’s producers evaluated the IRA’s position without allowing itself to become a platform. 
 The programme had undergone rigorous scrutiny before making it to the screen. Consistent 
with the Authority’s policy regarding any programme featuring criminals, producers first had to acquire 
the approval of the IBA. In response to the resulting criticism, the Authority noted that it had paid 
particular attention to the extent the O’Connell interview could be held in violation of the Independent 
Broadcasting Authority Act (1973) by ‘encourag[ing] or incit[ing] to crime or to lead[ing] to disorder 
or to be offensive to public feeling’.69 On both accounts, the Authority had concluded that the value of 
the information that would be brought to the public’s attention by the broadcast outweighed the risk.70 
It was agreed that LWT would be allowed to proceed with the interview, subject to assurances that the 
questioning would be ‘tough’. In addition, the IBA also requested that they preview the unedited film 
before giving the final go-ahead.71 According to the magazine Broadcast, a ten-man team from the IBA 
were ‘incarcerated at LWT’s South Bank headquarters until 4 a.m. on the Sunday morning of 
transmission. Their arguments and advice obviously vitally affected the nature and form of the final 
programme.’.72  
 The IBA had been particularly careful following extensive criticism received after the 
broadcast of a similar interview in January 1973.73 This programme also produced by LWT had sought 
to explore the IRA’s proposal for a nine-county Ulster political unit. It also included an interview with 
O’Connell, carried out by Mary Holland, in which he claimed that the IRA was growing in strength and 
defended the shooting of members of the British Army and RUC.74 Whilst viewers seemed unperturbed 
by O’Connell’s appearance - the IBA only received nine complaints - there was outrage among some 
politicians and the right-wing press.75 The Daily Telegraph likened the programme to ‘a BBC interview 
on Germany’s war aims with Dr Goebbels’, and claimed that it had led to an escalation in violence as 
the IRA sought to live up to O’Connell’s promises that they would intensify their campaign. 76 
Conservative MP and staunch Unionist, John Biggs-Davison called for an emergency debate, stating 
that ‘The programme was clearly offensive to public feeling, particularly among those who have served 
or suffered in Northern Ireland’.77 The IBA conceded that Holland had been ‘“too soft”’ and had 
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allowed O’Connell to make ‘unsupported claims of high morale and undepleted strength’. 78 
Nevertheless, it argued that the programme had shed important light on contemporary politics in 
Northern Ireland, leaving ‘no doubt in viewers’ minds of the nature of the enemy which the people of 
both Ireland and the United Kingdom are facing’.79     
 The Weekend World interviews with David O’Connell led to renewed calls for tighter legal 
controls when covering terrorism. Northern Irish legislation already placed legal restrictions on how the 
conflict was reported. Under the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967, broadcasters were obliged 
to give any information, which could assist in securing persons who had committed an arrestable offence, 
to the police. The IBA also had to take into consideration restrictions under the IBA Act (1973), 
forbidding material that ‘offends against good taste or decency or is likely to encourage or incite to 
crime or to lead to disorder or to be offensive to public feeling’.80 Some MPs petitioned for restrictions 
specific to the media to be included in the PTA, the counter-terrorism legislation introduced in 
November 1974. Wyn Roberts (Conservative MP for Conwy) moved to include a provision that any 
person who arranged ‘a broadcast, newspaper article, or other publicity knowing that the purpose or 
consequence might reasonably be suspected to support, sustain or further the activities of a proscribed 
organisation’ would be liable to up to three months imprisonment or a fine of £400.81 The government, 
however, was reluctant to encroach on the freedom of the media. As a Home Office policy document 
from 1974 noted ‘Censorship of any kind is out. No Government would have it in the Northern Ireland 
situation’.82 Having acquired reassurances from both the BBC and IBA that they would re-evaluate their 
policy on Northern Ireland in view of the proscription of the IRA, the government continued to rely on 
the voluntary co-operation of broadcasters.83 A formal ban restricting the broadcasting of interviews 
with proscribed organisations would not be enforced in the UK until 1988. 
 Nonetheless, the PTA made covering the conflict, and in particular interviewing the IRA, all 
the more difficult. Under the Act, to arrange or assist in the arrangement of any meeting between three 
or more persons known to belong to a proscribed organisation was outlawed. Similarly, anyone who 
knowingly contributed monetarily, or otherwise, to the resources of a proscribed organisation could be 
prosecuted.84 In 1976, the addition of Section 11 made it an offence not to report information on any 
future act of terrorism or about people involved in terrorism.85 Yet, as the Head of Current Affairs Radio, 
Martin Wallace, observed at a meeting in February 1975, in reality the provisions outlined in the PTA 
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added little to the BBC’s own editorial guidelines.86 Similarly, the IBA concluded that ‘in the strict legal 
sense the position of the broadcasters would seem to have been left relatively unchanged. While creating 
a new offence, the Act seems of itself to offer no obvious pointer towards fundamental change in our 
policy’.87 Nevertheless, both broadcasting bodies undertook to remind their news and current affairs 
staff of the rules regarding contact with the IRA and other paramilitary organisations.88 Director-
General of the BBC, Charles Curran, promised that he would personally review all requests, whilst the 
IBA agreed that approval on programmes that explored the views of people who within the British Isles 
use or advocate criminal measures for political ends would only be given after consultation with all its 
members.89 Both the BBC and IBA maintained that there would be no outright ban on interviews with 
the IRA. 
 All the same, there were no further interviews with members of any republican group until 
1979.90  Rex Cathcart has argued that the PTA was in effect the equivalent of Section 31 of Ireland’s 
Broadcasting Act (1960), which allowed the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs to issue ministerial 
orders prohibiting the broadcast of any material specified in the order. In 1976, Conor Cruise O’Brien 
issued an order prohibiting RTÉ from broadcasting spokespersons from various organisations, including 
Sinn Féin.91  In Britain, coverage of the IRA was muted following the introduction of the PTA, and 
whilst increased political pressure played a significant role in restricting coverage, other factors, 
particularly commercial interests, also influenced how paramilitaries were presented. Like their 
counterparts in the press, neither broadcasting body was immune to market pressures. Even though the 
BBC did not need to attract advertisers, it was important that it maintain its share of the audience in 
order to justify the licencing fee. 92  As Miller observes, the need to secure audiences ‘limits the 
production of innovative or risky programmes’.93  Reporting on Northern Ireland was already risky, as 
This Week director David Elstein told film-maker Alan Rosenthal, ratings dipped every time the series 
broadcast a programmes about Northern Ireland, because ‘the British audience is not interested’.94 The 
monotony of violence and political stalemate did elicit a general fatigue towards Northern Ireland 
amongst much of the British public. Bernadette Hayes and Ian McAllister have pointed out that opinion 
polls called consistently for political and military withdrawal from Northern Ireland and argued that this 
was evidence that the majority of British citizens viewed the conflict as ‘an unwelcome historical 
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anachronism’.95 As a result, the BBC and ITV could be reluctant to chance programmes on Northern 
Ireland, let alone the IRA, which might invoke public anger and endanger their viewing figures. They 
therefore, tailored their coverage according to the strength of public anger towards the IRA, which 
changed depending on the magnitude of violence, especially in England. Following the Birmingham 
bombing, for example, the BBC Director-General remarked that ‘at this moment the emotional 
resistance to the sight and sound of an IRA spokesman made it impractical even to contemplate such an 
interview’.96 Similarly, the IBA noted that had ‘The O’Connell interview […been] shown on the Sunday 
before the Birmingham bomb outrage. It would [… have been] unthinkable on the Sunday following, 
precisely because of the effect of that event on public attitudes’.97 
 On 22 December 1974, the IRA announced a cessation of violence; though this was short lived, 
it was immediately followed by a second ceasefire, which lasted until September 1975. The truce 
prompted the BBC to consider allowing interviews with Sinn Féin representatives. In light of this, Stan 
Taylor (Deputy Editor, Radio News) asked if it might now be permissible to interview persons such as 
O’Connell. The Director-General conceded that it was ‘certainly worth considering. The situation had 
changed in the last month, but it was still very tricky’.98 This respite did little to relieve the pressure 
exerted on the broadcast media. As Robert Savage has argued, as soon as the violence resumed the BBC 
faced renewed complaints, this time for reporting the religion of victims, complainants feared that doing 
so encouraged retaliation. Robin Walsh, the BBC’s News Editor in Northern Ireland, dismissed the 
criticism, arguing that broadcasters had a duty to inform audiences as to the extent of sectarian 
violence.99 Regardless of pressure from the RUC and NIO, both the BBC and ITV continued to report 
on Northern Ireland as they had previously, providing the names and religion of those caught up in the 
violence. 
 Throughout the ‘Troubles’, broadcasters resisted the efforts of the government, and others, to 
censor television coverage of the conflict. Accordingly, broadcasters presented a more complex picture 
than that which the authorities wished to encourage of good versus evil; law and order versus terrorism. 
As an examination of the contents of current affairs programmes produced during the early 1970s shows, 
the images of Northern Ireland transmitted to television screens across Britain were much more nuanced 
than broadcasters have been given credit for and provided a variety of perspectives on the conflict.      
 In contrast with the press coverage of the early 1970s, current affairs programming focused 
more on events in Northern Ireland than IRA activities in English cities. This is clearly indicated in 
LWT’s Weekend World programme transmitted on 17 November 1974. The programme was to become 
infamous because of the interview it featured with O’Connell, discussed above. The focus, however, 
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was on sectarian murder, and although the programme acknowledged mounting IRA violence in English 
cities, the inference was that Northern Ireland was at the root of the problem. As presenter Peter Jay 
noted in the programme’s introduction: 
Over the past year, the violence taken over-all has in fact been 
ebbing… But nonetheless, there are ominous signs that this may be 
changing and that things are getting worse, and that Northern 
Ireland is sliding irresistibly into anarchy. An anarchy into which, 
on the evidence of over two hundred bombs in the last 18 months, 
the rest of Britain too is being drawn. But horrific… as that bombing 
campaign is, the situation as ever is far worse in the streets of 
Northern Ireland.100 
The programme examined the effect of sectarian violence on the people of Northern Ireland. Holland 
noted that the arbitrary nature of these killings had given rise to fears even within battle-hardened 
Belfast. The programme described the death of a 26-year-old Catholic teacher, Michael Brennan, shot 
when gunmen opened fire on a Youth Club, and emphasised the randomness of the attack. Holland 
acknowledged that the Protestant community had also been the target of sectarian killings but argued 
that Catholics had suffered the most in recent months. She noted that the Catholic community felt that 
the Army would not defend them from Loyalist violence, a feeling exacerbated by internment.101 The 
programme argued that the growing anger and isolation felt in Catholic areas provided ‘the most fertile 
ground for the extremists’. Ultimately, it held the IRA as responsible for the upsurge in sectarian 
violence, claiming that many people in Northern Ireland believed that if the IRA called off its campaign 
then the killings would stop. The programme investigated the likelihood of the conflict descending into 
civil war if Britain withdraw from Northern Ireland and asked whether this would benefit the IRA.102 
 Even when programmes examined bomb attacks in England, broadcasters made a point of 
placing the events within a Northern Ireland context. This is in part because in order to fill a whole 
programme, producers had to do more than factually report incidents. They had to examine the 
background and significance of events; therefore, it was natural that coverage of IRA violence in 
English cities would be rooted in events in Northern Ireland. Following the Old Bailey bombing on 8 
March 1973, LWT’s Weekend World broadcast a special on the attack, opening with a discussion of the 
IRA’s internal divisions over the question of a widespread campaign in England. Mary Holland and 
fellow journalist, John Fielding, had talked with senior members of the IRA in Dublin and Belfast and 
noted that it was generally agreed that the Provisional IRA’s Andersontown Brigade had carried out the 
attack. Holland, however, observed the reluctance of the leadership in Dublin to engage in a sustained 
bombing campaign in England, which had been disastrous for the IRA when, in 1939-40, they had 
embarked on a similar campaign in England in an effort to end partition.103   
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 The programme also featured a live audience discussion broadcast from Belfast, aimed at 
establishing Northern Ireland’s reaction to the attack. Weekend World regularly included audience 
discussions in its programmes about Northern Ireland, providing an opportunity for people from the 
province to recount their everyday experiences. This produced a Northern Irish voice that was largely 
absent from general coverage. Asked how they felt upon hearing about the explosion in London the 
majority of the audience conveyed sympathy for those caught in the blast, but agreed that Londoners 
would never fully understand what the people of Belfast had gone through since the beginning of the 
‘Troubles’ in 1968. The programme noted the ‘total unpreparedness of Londoners in this situation’. A 
significant portion of the programme was dedicated to scrutinising their response to the attack and 
criticising the delay in evacuating the area around the Old Bailey.104 
 Interestingly, this episode included a second audience discussion broadcast from London. This 
audience consisted solely of Irish people living in the city. It is the only programme in the sample, which 
included members of Britain’s Irish population, and is significant because the opinions and reactions of 
the Irish in Britain were rarely included in either the broadcast media or the press’s coverage of Northern 
Ireland at this time. The audience were asked to what extent they felt a sense of divided loyalty in the 
wake of the bombing and how much support - financial or otherwise - Irish people were expected to 
give to the broader Republican movement. Presenter, Peter Jay, attempted to moderate the implications 
of the last question by saying that he did not include the men of violence in his definition of the 
Republican movement. Nonetheless, these were loaded questions, which presupposed that all Irish 
people living in Britain were sympathetic to the Republican cause. The programme presents the Irish 
population of Britain as a potential threat to the rest of the populace. This presumption was one shared 
by the early 1970s press. Newspapers such as the Daily Mirror and The Sun frequently implied that 
Irish people in Britain were sheltering the terrorists.105 It could be argued that there was a consensus 
amongst a significant portion of the British media in their construction of the Irish as an enemy-within 
and their willingness to associate all Irish with the Republican movement. The Weekend World 
programme took this a step further, in his introduction to the segment, Jay suggested that not only might 
the Irish be harbouring the terrorists, they might also be potential recruits: 
Well over two hundred Londoners were injured on Thursday, and 
London’s multi-million population includes many Irish men. Most 
of them retain strong links with the mother country, and some strong 
ideas about it, but they have not, up ‘til now, been confronted with 
the kind of practical decisions, which every Ulsterman has to make 
about the methods of political objectives which should and should 
not be pursued. It is even possible that some of the London Irish 
may be called to convert habitual republican sentiment into hard 
practical support for IRA activists this side of the Irish Sea.106  
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 Some of the London-Irish audience’s responses seemed to confirm this impression. For 
example, journalist, Gary Lawless, remarked that: ‘I don’t believe in individual terrorism… [but] I am 
willing to support, and defend the rights of any section of the Irish people to engage in guerrilla warfare 
against British imperialism’.107 Similarly, Paddy Prendeville, later to become editor of the Irish satirical 
magazine The Phoenix, emphasised the need to place the violence in London within the context of 
British violence in Northern Ireland and the empire, referring to Aden, Cyprus and Kenya. Jay 
responded by accusing Prendeville of attempting to justify the attack by dressing it as context. What is 
notable is the extent to which many of those participating in the discussion felt able to be open about 
their republican sympathies. In response to Jay’s question regarding the extent of Irish support for the 
Republican movement for example, Thomas Beamish (Chairman of the Executive Committee for Irish 
Civil Rights in Britain) asked ‘why is it wrong in Britain for Irish people to want their country united’.108 
Breda Gray has noted that by the 1970s ‘a more self-conscious and coordinated Irish identity’ had 
developed in Britain.109 The confidence of audience members in stating their views speaks to this sense 
of identity 
 The audience, however, was not representative as a cross-section of the Irish population in 
Britain and consisted predominantly of political activists. Several members of the audience in both 
London and Belfast noting this, questioned if the producers had purposely loaded the audience with 
left-wing republicans and asserted that Lawless and Prendeville were atypical of the Irish in general. 
Peter Jay denied these accusations, pointing out that the programme was not trying to present a 
representative sample of Irish community opinion, nor had it advertised the discussion as such. 
Nonetheless, the inclusion of outspoken and republican London-Irish within the Weekend World 
programme may have been designed to highlight the potential threat of the Irish in Britain, rather than 
providing them with a voice. Most of the studio audience stressed that Irish people in Britain 
disapproved of violence and expressed concern that if the bomb was found to have been planted by the 
IRA it could lead to a backlash against them.110  
 For the most part, the broadcast media looked more at what was happening in Northern Ireland 
than England. Curtis asserts that British television in particular focused almost exclusively on violence 
without providing context.111 She observes that as early as 1971, media theorist Jay Blumler had 
criticised television news bulletins for failing to explain what was happening in Northern Ireland, noting 
that analysis of news stories was ‘treated as the preserve of current affairs programmes’.112 This is 
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unsurprising, as news bulletins lack the space to provide more than a factual report of events. Current 
affairs programmes are often used to supply the context and depth of analysis that news programmes 
lack. The BBC and ITV’s current affairs programmes in the early 1970s often incorporated an 
explanation of recent political and military developments in Northern Ireland. Both broadcasting bodies 
also frequently produced television specials surveying the conflict to date. In 1974, both ITV and the 
BBC produced programmes that reflected on five years since the deployment of British troops in 
1969.113 Due to the incomplete nature of the BBC’s film archive, only ITV’s ‘Five Long Years’ is 
included in this sample.  
 The hour-and-a-half long This Week special was intended to provide a retrospective on the 
conflict, placing individual incidents into context and exploring the complexities that characterised the 
situation in Northern Ireland. As the programme’s director, David Elstein, remarked, previously current 
affairs programmes had focused on specific, narrow issues: ‘When you actually see it in some sort of 
context it is astonishing and revelatory’.114 The programme traced the development of the conflict from 
the Civil Rights movement onwards, though reporter Peter Taylor, noted that the violence was rooted 
in more than three hundred years of history. Drawing on a wide range of interviews with British, Irish 
and Northern Irish politicians, as well as political activists, members of the security forces and 
paramilitaries from both sides of the sectarian divide, the programme explained to audiences the origins 
of the Civil Rights movement, and its escalation into violence.115 It then examined the role of the British 
Army in Northern Ireland, tracking the rise of the IRA and the UDA. Taylor challenged the 
misconception that responsibility for the conflict lay solely with the IRA, reminding viewers that the 
Army’s first gun battles had been with Loyalist paramilitaries. Finally, the programme explored the 
Sunningdale Agreement and the events leading to the collapse of the Northern Ireland executive in May 
1974.116 Writing in the Daily Mail, television critic Shaun Usher remarked of ‘Five Long Years’: ‘A 
cheap and easy comment would be that this careful survey told us more than we wanted to know. Not 
more than we needed to know however…’.117   
 Curtis, rightly, observes that violence dominated coverage provided by television 
programmes.118 In his study of the media’s coverage of Northern Ireland carried out between 1974 and 
1975, social scientist, Philip Elliott, found that two-thirds of news stories in the British media, 
particularly in the national television news bulletins, dealt with conflict.119 Current affairs programmes 
were also reduced to a catalogue of deaths and explosions, frequently begining with a summary of recent 
incidents, accompanied by a montage of bomb explosions, sectarian graffiti, rioting and army patrols. 
Even stories from Northern Ireland unconnected to the ‘Troubles’ were reported through the prism of 
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the conflict. For example, in a segment on BBC’s Nationwide about Manchester United uber-fan, Harry 
McKitterick, the feature starts with shots of tanks, soldiers and barbed wire.120  
 The fact that Northern Ireland was characterised by violence is best illustrated in ‘Remember 
Strabane’.121 Broadcast on 11 April 1974 by Thames Television as part of the This Week series, it 
examined the human and material cost of the ‘Troubles’ for the Northern Irish border town. Given its 
location close to the Irish border, Strabane had suffered particularly high levels of violence and was a 
hotspot for IRA activity. Although the programme explored the relationship between economic hardship 
and the rise in paramilitary activity, its primary focus was the violence endured by the people of 
Northern Ireland. In one sequence, the camera panned over bombsite after bombsite, as Peter Taylor 
listed the buildings and businesses that had been destroyed:  
This used to be the main hotel, the Abercorn; this was the other hotel, 
the Commercial; this was the biggest and cheapest supermarket in 
Strabane; this was the next biggest supermarket. The customs post 
has been attacked by the bombers eight times; the police station has 
been shot at, rocketed and bombed from the air; the Labour 
Exchange has been bombed and re-built four times; nine of 
Strabane’s ten petrol stations have been blown up. There used to be 
two banks on this corner; and this used to be Strabane’s biggest 
building, the Town Hall, it was firebombed and burnt out. The only 
cinema closed down two years ago; the golf club has been bombed 
three times.122         
As Taylor lists the businesses affected, the camera focuses on the destruction. The immediacy of such 
images allowed viewers to experience first-hand the violence in Northern Ireland with the intention of 
fostering sympathy for its people. Taylor concludes the programme by appealing to British audiences 
for patience: 
So far, almost a thousand people have died in the Troubles of 
Northern Ireland, and there will be more. If that’s a figure that you 
find difficult to grasp and if your patience sometimes wears a little 
thin with the constant stream of bad news from Northern Ireland, 
remember the human cost, remember Strabane.123   
Taylor identifies a growing frustration amongst sections of the British public with the conflict. 
Throughout the ‘Troubles’ opinion polls consistently indicated that the majority supported withdrawing 
troops from Northern Ireland.124 There are some exceptions to this pattern, as David Miller points out, 
following periods of widespread violence. Polls carried out in the wake of high-profile IRA attacks 
showed a notable rise in support for maintaining a military presence in Northern Ireland After Bloody 
Friday, when on 21 July 1972 more than twenty bombs exploded in Belfast killing eleven people, 
opinion polls indicated that support for withdrawal dropped to 34 per cent from 59 per cent in 1971. 
Miller argues that in these instances media coverage played an important role in allowing British people 
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to identify with victims of violence, resulting in a decrease in the number of people in favour of British 
withdrawal.125 It could be argued that Taylor’s emphasis on violence in the province encourages support 
for this viewpoint, whether or not this was his intention, it gave the impression of a place defined by 
conflict.  
 Nonetheless, Taylor also provides some social context and by doing so provides a more 
nuanced perspective. At the start of the film, he discusses the town’s economic decline prior to the 
‘Troubles’, drawing a connection between the high rate of unemployment (25 per cent) and the strength 
of the IRA in Strabane: ‘For years Strabane had been a forgotten town, old industries had died, there 
was no work. …when the IRA re-opened their campaign of violence, the ranks of the unemployed 
provided them with ready recruits’.126 He fails, however, to explore the issue in any depth, a problem 
typical of current affairs programming during the early 1970s. Journalists were capable however of 
engaging with the wider socio-economic factors in which the violence was rooted. ‘Children in 
Crossfire’, broadcast on 12 March 1974, also draws parallels between violence, unemployment, poor 
housing and the lack of adequate facilities on Northern Ireland’s housing estates: ‘One set of shops, one 
factory, virtually no entertainment. Any sociologist could spot a classic environment for vandalism and 
violence’.127 Once again, however, the programme missed an opportunity to explore in depth the causes 
rather than the symptoms of the ‘Troubles’.  
The excessive focus on violence in the television coverage of the conflict helped (re)construct 
the perception of Northern Ireland as a place apart. Although territorially part of the UK, Northern 
Ireland has often been viewed as historically and culturally different from the rest of Britain. As social 
scientists Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd have argued, it is seen as ‘a place where things are done 
differently, one to which the (more sensible and rational) British way cannot easily be exported’.128 The 
perception of Northern Ireland as different, or un-British, is evident in the attitudes of the political and 
military elite as seen in television interviews during the early 1970s. In ‘Five Long Years’, Ian Freeland 
(General Officer Commanding of the British Army in Northern Ireland from 1969 to 1972) responded 
to questions about Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling’s apparent ignorance of the situation in 
Northern Ireland by asking ‘What Englishman does understand the scene?’.129 The conflation of British 
and English compounded this sense of the province as a place apart. Whilst Northern Ireland could lay 
claim to a British identity, it was definitely not English. The view of Northern Ireland as 
incomprehensible to British or English minds was propagated by the broadcast media. John Hill has 
discussed how the idea of Northern Ireland as ‘alien’ might be seen to have been implicit in films and 
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plays that dealt with the ‘Troubles’.130 The perception of Northern Ireland as separate or ‘different’ was 
certainly evident in current affairs programmes during this period.   
 These programmes repeatedly stressed that it was Northern Ireland’s (supposed) inclination 
towards violence that marked it out as different, and indeed un-British. Reporters repeatedly foreground 
the violence and the distinctiveness of Northern Ireland by drawing comparisons between the province 
and the rest of the UK. A clear example of this can be found in ‘Children in Crossfire’. 131  The 
programme explores the lasting impact of the violence on young people and expresses particular 
concern at how children growing up in the province’s most troubled areas copied the violence around 
them. In one scene, the camera panned over a group of five-year-olds playing with guns built from 
wooden blocks. Narrator, Ian Holm, remarked that ‘Small boys and girls in any part of Britain play with 
toy guns, but not like this, this is obsession. Try and take a gun away from one of these children and 
you have a screaming fit on your hands?’.132 Holm proffers the British child as the idealised norm, in 
contrast, he suggests that these children have a natural inclination towards violence, as evidenced by 
their obsession with toy guns.133 The programme vocalised fears that the children of Northern Ireland 
were destined to become a new generation of terrorists; as it pointed out many already played an active 
role in the conflict throwing stones at soldiers and acting as runners for the IRA. The title sequence 
showed children from the Creggan estate (Derry) playing with wooden guns; these images were 
juxtaposed with similar footage of British troops on patrol implying that they were mimicking the 
soldiers. The documentary goes on to suggest that it was the IRA, however, that the children aspired to 
emulate. As Holm remarked for these children the IRA gunmen were heroes, an observation Peter 
Taylor later made in ‘Remember Strabane’.134  
 ‘Last Night Another Soldier’, broadcast by the BBC on 4 December 1973, also draws 
comparisons between Northern Ireland and Britain. The programme shadows eight ordinary soldiers as 
they embark on a tour of duty in Northern Ireland. As they alight in Belfast, the soldiers are filmed 
discussing the difficulties in adapting to their new surrounds. One of the officers observes that 
‘compared with a theatre of war such as the Far East, this is very much an English and British urban 
environment, which is something they know well and yet it is totally strange at the same time from the 
urban environment that they know’.135 Again, it is violence that singles the streets of Belfast out as 
different. The physical similarities between Belfast and some British cities throws this difference into 
 
130 Hill, ‘“The Troubles we’ve seen”’, 245. 
131 It is worth noting that the transmission of ‘Children in Crossfire’ was postponed a number of times by the BBC’s 
Northern Ireland Controller, Richard Francis, because of concerns ‘at the highest political level’ that the programme 
focused too heavily on the violence, ignoring the recent progress made by the new power-sharing Executive. Francis 
complained that the film failed to include ‘a single reference to the new executive and the remarkable effects of having 
Catholic Ministers, Community Relations, etc.’. Though the programme was finally broadcast in its original format on 
12 March 1974, it was prefaced with a one-minute statement by Francis which declared that since the programme had 
been made the new executive had been formed and as a result there were more jobs, less tension and less violence in 
Northern Ireland. (Curtis, Ireland The Propaganda War, 187; ‘Children in Crossfire’, 12 March 1974). 
132 ‘Children in Crossfire’, 12 March 1974. 
133 Brocklehurst, Who’s Afraid of Children?, 101. 
134 ‘Children in Crossfire’, 12 March 1974; ‘Remember Strabane’, 11 April 1974. 
135 ‘Last Night Another Soldier’, Tuesday Documentary, BBC, 4 December 1973. 
62 
relief. An inclination towards violence was presented as fundamentally at odds with common 
perceptions of what it meant to be British, a concept centred on perceived values of fair play, tolerance 
and decency.136 The persistent emphasis on violence by programme producers reveals as much about 
what they considered it meant to be British, as what they considered it meant to be Northern Irish. In 
‘Life in the RUC’, broadcast on 25 June 1973, reporter Alan Hart goes one-step further, declaring that 
events in Northern Ireland were incomprehensible to the British. The programme shows footage of a 
police band playing outside the City Hall, as the camera pans out viewers see a commotion across the 
street, followed by a small explosion. Hart remarks: ‘What follows is difficult for an Englishman to 
believe even with the evidence of his own eyes and it could only happen in Ireland. One hundred and 
fifty yards from where the band plays on, there’s a bomb alert and the area is being cleared’. Once again, 
the implication is that Englishness/ Britishness with its values of rationality and non-violence is 
incapable of understanding the seemingly irrational violence of Northern Ireland. This is paradoxical, 
given that the primary aim of current affairs programmes was to educate the British public about the 
conflict, rather than re-emphasising commonly held views about British national identity.   
 Bombs on the streets of Belfast posed a considerable challenge to traditional ideas of 
Britishness. The fact that part of the United Kingdom was engaged in conflict seemed to contradict the 
self-image of Britain as a moderate and peaceful society that would not tolerate political violence.137 
One way of avoiding this issue was to emphasise the unique position of Northern Ireland within the UK. 
As John Hill argues, distancing Northern Ireland from the rest of the United Kingdom, allowed the 
conflict to be viewed as specific to the province, and the British state to be regarded as ‘outside of’ or 
‘above’ the conflict.138 Though they attempted to give British people an insight into Northern Ireland, 
ultimately it could be argued that by presenting Northern Ireland as a ‘place apart’ these programmes 
also served to safeguard established ideas of British society as peaceable, and violence as somehow 
uniquely un-British.  
 A few programmes did try to challenge the notion of Northern Ireland as a place of violence, 
seeking to bridge the gap between images seen in news bulletins and reality. On 1 September 1974, Rap, 
a discussion programme for teenagers produced by Yorkshire Television, was broadcast from Belfast. 
The programme featured a panel of four English teenagers asking questions of an audience made up of 
teens recruited from youth clubs in Protestant, Catholic and mixed areas across Northern Ireland. The 
programme explored the effects of the ‘Troubles’ from the perspective of young people growing up in 
the province, introducing a variety of Northern Irish voices rarely heard on British television. The local 
teens strongly objected to the image portrayed in the media of Northern Ireland as a war-savaged 
country, seeking to place the violence in perspective. They stressed the fact that, contrary to common 
belief, the ‘Troubles’ were largely concentrated in small areas of Belfast, Derry and along the border. 
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Outside of these places, bombs and bullets were as much a rarity as anywhere in Britain. One boy 
observed that in Bangor, a seaside resort northeast of Belfast, ‘you really don’t realise you’re in the 
Troubles at all’. Similarly, another boy argued that an armed presence on the streets of his village would 
have been cause for comment: ‘if you stayed a week, you’d swear nothing was happening at all’. 
Throughout the programme, the Northern Irish participants emphasise that they were perfectly normal 
teenagers. Their efforts were somewhat frustrated, however, by the way in which the discussion was 
prefaced. The programme started with footage of Belfast, including shots of an army checkpoint. As the 
camera focuses on soldiers carrying out searches, presenter, Mike Dornan comments: ‘For teenagers 
here it’s normal, it’s the only life they know’.139 This introduction had the effect of undermining any 
attempt by the teenagers to question the image of Northern Ireland as a militarised zone. Nonetheless, 
the programme went some way to offering a different viewpoint and challenging established 
understandings of the violence.            
  It is unsurprising that much of the coverage focused on attacks carried out by the IRA. 
Nonetheless, both broadcasting bodies were capable of a more nuanced approach. In ‘Remember 
Strabane’, for example, Taylor explores some of the motivation behind the rise in republican violence, 
noting how the death of 28-year-old Eamonn McDavitt, shot by British soldiers following a Civil Rights 
march in 1971, had reinforced local hostility towards the security forces. McDavitt, who was deaf and 
mute, was unarmed, although he had been playing with a rubber bullet at the time.140 Broadcasters 
reported violence carried out by the security forces, although it wasn’t until the early 1990s that their 
actions were widely discussed in a critical manner on television. In 1969, images of the leader of the 
SDLP, Gerry Fitt, being attacked by baton-wielding policemen at a Civil Rights march had been 
transmitted into living rooms across Britain, bringing home to many the seriousness of the situation in 
Northern Ireland. This footage would become a stock image re-used by programmes throughout the 
‘Troubles’.141 In ‘Five Long Years’, programme producers showed footage of three British soldiers 
attacking an unarmed man, suspected of being a member of the IRA, and throwing him to the ground. 
Commenting on this footage, Taylor, remarked: ‘it was not always easy to identify the IRA, Catholics 
in whose midst they move suffered in the process. Scenes like this left young Catholics in no mood for 
any kind of politics’.142 The programme explored the Army’s role in the escalation of the conflict during 
the early 1970s, and the rise of the IRA. It argues that the use of CS gas and violence during the Falls 
Road curfew in July 1970 had embittered the Catholic community against the Army prompting a surge 
in support for the IRA, which until then had been practically non-existent.143  As the programme 
observes, in the months that followed further abuse and harassment by soldiers persuaded the Catholic 
community to view the Army as an oppressor. Rather than defending Catholics against Loyalist 
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extremism, the Army found itself fighting a guerrilla war against the IRA.144 In presenting the Army as 
at least in part responsible for the increase in violence, the programme offered audiences a more 
complicated view of the origins of the ‘Troubles’ and British intervention in Northern Ireland.  
  ‘Five Long Years’ also attempted to understand the motivations behind the Army’s actions, 
as it had the actions of the IRA, again demonstrating efforts to provide a nuanced outlook. It 
acknowledged the difficulties soldiers faced in Northern Ireland, as they carried out their jobs without 
proper resources and often in the face of hostility from a population that resented their presence. In one 
sequence soldiers armed with batons, confront a group of young Catholic women who were shouting 
abuse at them. The camera focuses in on one woman being held back as she attempts to launch herself 
at the soldiers.145 Similar scenes in ‘Last Night Another Soldier’ showed women and children verbally 
abusing a patrol before cutting to footage of two soldiers in their barracks. One of the soldiers, visibly 
angry and upset, exclaims ‘That woman, I could have killed her’.146 These images portray the soldiers’ 
reactions in such situations as an objectionable but understandable human response to provocation. 
Later, ‘Five Long Years’ featured footage of soldiers sheltering under riot shields from bricks and other 
missiles. Taylor asks ‘In situations like this what could the Army do? They could fire rubber bullets and 
CS gas. If they fired real bullets, they risk killing innocent civilians’. He notes that in one riot in Derry, 
two young men, Seamus Cusack and Desmond Beattie, had been shot dead by the Army, further 
boosting recruitment to the IRA.147 The image of the security forces presented in these programmes 
conveys the convolutions of the ‘Troubles’. They challenge representations of the Army as either 
protector or oppressor, presenting instead a multi-dimensional view of the security forces. By examining 
the Army’s part in the violence, and the motivations behind their actions broadcasters added nuance to 
its coverage.    
 During the early 1970s, the BBC and ITV produced several current affairs programmes on the 
British Army in Northern Ireland. To improve their media image, in 1971 the Army had relaxed 
restrictions on soldiers talking to journalists and began training officers on how to conduct themselves 
in television interviews.148 This resulted in a spate of programmes, exploring the everyday experiences 
and opinions of ordinary servicemen in Northern Ireland. ‘The Bomb Disposal Men’, broadcast as part 
of the Tuesday Documentary series by the BBC on 29 October 1974, shadowed three British Army 
Ammunition Technical Officers during training and their first tour of duty in Belfast. The programme 
followed the three men as they dealt with hoaxes, booby-traps and hair-triggers, and described some of 
the methods used to defuse the IRA’s bombs. At its climax, the programme showed Captain Nigel 
Thorne enter a Belfast shop to defuse a bomb planted in its storeroom. The programme emphasised the 
danger faced by Thorne and his colleagues and celebrated their bravery. As it observed, by 1974 twelve 
bomb disposal men had been killed in the conflict. The three men talk candidly about their dead 
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colleagues and their own fears of being killed or injured. Nevertheless, they argued that the situation in 
Northern Ireland justified the risk in order to protect lives and property. Whilst the programme portrayed 
the bomb disposal men as heroes, it also stressed their ordinariness, by highlighting that the men were 
fathers and husbands. Reporter Jack Prizzy interviewed the spouses of all three men about the impact 
of their husbands’ occupation on family life. By presenting them as ordinary people taking substantial 
risks, the programme underlines their heroism.149 It might be argued that in doing so programmes such 
as ‘The Bomb Disposal Men’ sought to encourage public support for the Army in Northern Ireland.   
 Current affairs coverage generally presented soldiers as ordinary people, living in fear of being 
injured or killed in a conflict they did not necessarily understand.150 ‘Last Night Another Soldier’, 
referenced above, followed eight men as they embarked on a four-month tour of duty. The aim of 
director, Eric Davidson, was to show what Northern Ireland had come to mean to the rank-and-file on 
the streets of Belfast. Spoken commentary is minimal, the programme revolves instead around a series 
of interviews with the soldiers. The programme opens with shots of the men as they carry out training 
manoeuvres followed by footage in which two of the soldiers discuss having been injured on a previous 
tour. Although they make a show of bravado in front of their colleagues, when interviewed alone, the 
soldiers admit that they were afraid of returning to the province: ‘I’m terrified, but I don’t like to show 
it. You think you might get shot, but you don’t actually think you’ll be killed. If I die, I die - the only 
thing that worries me is to be turned into a cabbage’. Filming continues in Northern Ireland itself, 
shadowing the soldiers as they go about their operational duties with particular emphasis on everyday 
problems such as boredom. One black soldier discusses the racial abuse he has experienced whilst on 
patrol. Once again, by focusing on the emotions and difficulties experienced by these individuals, the 
programme portrays them as human and encourages audiences to empathise with them. ‘Last Night 
Another Soldier’ was to receive widespread acclaim for its representation of the realities of the Northern 
Ireland conflict.151 As the Daily Mail’s TV critic, Shaun Usher remarked ‘few documentaries give one 
the sense of being granted an insight on the way things really are. So Eric Davidson… and his 
cameraman, Nick Gifford, can be proud of illuminating a subject so grim, exhaustively reported, and 
long-established that it is taken for granted’.152 This approach differentiates individual soldiers from the 
Army as an institution, presenting them as victims in much the same way as ordinary Catholics or 
Protestants, eliciting sympathy from the audience.   
 BBC Panorama programme ‘Life in the RUC’, broadcast on 25 June 1973, takes a similar 
approach, exploring the experiences and opinions of members of the police in Northern Ireland. The 
programme investigates the role of the RUC, following officers as they respond to numerous incidents. 
Again, the programme emphasised the dangers faced daily by the security forces. It opens with footage 
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of the RUC dealing with an unexploded bomb in a residential neighbourhood, as reporter, Alan Hart, 
states:  
In Northern Ireland today, three people died in an explosion in 
Tyrone, there was a rocket attack on a police station and every one 
of the four and a half thousand men of the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary had to live through another day in which they didn’t 
know if it would end with a bomb or a bullet.153  
As the programme noted, by 1973 one in every four victims of the ‘Troubles’ had been police officers. 
Hart draws particular attention to the cost of the conflict on their wives and children. By highlighting 
the fact that the police were also husbands and fathers in a similar manner to ‘The Bomb Disposal Men’, 
the programme portrays them as ordinary people. This is contrary to how many in Northern Ireland saw 
the RUC. The predominantly Protestant police force was generally considered to be decidedly anti-
Catholic. The aim of the programme was to investigate whether the police could maintain law and order 
effectively if the British Army withdrew from the province. To this end, it explores the extent to which 
the RUC supported both communities in Northern Ireland. In 1969, reforms introduced in response to 
the use of police violence during rioting in Derry saw the reorganisation of the RUC in a bid to build 
better relations between the police and the Catholic community. This included the disbanding of the 
(wholly Protestant) Ulster Special Constabulary, commonly known as the B-Specials, a quasi-military 
auxiliary police force which was notoriously sectarian. ‘Life in the RUC’ discussed the police’s on-
going efforts to ingratiate itself with the Catholic community. The programme shows footage of one 
such initiative, a cross-community children’s disco. Hart notes that many of the children had asked for 
their faces not to be shown having received threats from loyalist and republican paramilitaries. Twenty 
minutes after the disco ended, the building was wrecked by an Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) bomb. 
The programme observes that the reforms had led to an increase in loyalist violence as hard-liners tried 
to score points against the RUC and reinsert Protestant dominance. The RUC therefore avoided 
confrontation with the Protestant community, which led many Catholics to argue that the police 
continued to discriminate against them. The programme on the other hand, argues that ‘the charge 
sheets… show that the RUC is pursuing terrorists and extremists on both sides’, however, it criticises 
the force for failing to attract Catholic recruits.154  
 The image of the police presented in ‘Life in the RUC’ is relatively positive, however, current 
affairs programmes were also capable of a more critical view of the security forces. In ‘A Question of 
Intelligence’, broadcast on 10 September 1973 as part of Granada’s World in Action series, reporters 
Sue Moodford and David Boulton investigated the murky issue of Britain’s intelligence war against the 
IRA. The programme raised serious questions about the methods used by Special Branch and British 
Army intelligence in Ireland. In August 1973, brothers Kenneth and Keith Littlejohn were convicted by 
a Dublin court of armed bank robbery. Both claimed that they were spies and that British Intelligence 
had engineered the raid in December 1972 in a bid to encourage the introduction of internment in Ireland. 
 




The British government categorically denied any involvement in the robbery, although it later admitted 
that Defence Under-Secretary, Geoffrey Johnson Smith, had met the brothers who claimed to have 
information on the IRA. Although never proven, the implication that MI6 were operating in the Republic 
of Ireland undermined Dublin’s trust in the British government.155 As Sue Moodford told the camera, 
‘if true it would mean that agents of the British government authorised actions that go far beyond the 
acceptable limits of normal intelligence’. The programme questioned Britain’s role in the Littlejohn 
affair, presenting the British government as at best dupes. Whilst they conclude that there was no 
evidence to support Littlejohn’s claims, both journalists criticised the government for becoming 
involved with such unsavoury characters. Moodford remarks ‘if Littlejohn is a liar and a conman, 
perhaps grossly exaggerating the role he played in British Intelligence, the inescapable conclusion is 
that while spying for Britain, he also robbed banks to line his own pockets’. Similarly, Boulton claimed 
that ‘he [Littlejohn] took British Intelligence and two ministers of the crown for a ride and if he could 
do it, how do we know that other agents are not doing the same thing’.156  
 The programme also reported on the activities of the Army’s Mobile Reaction Force (MRF), 
a covert intelligence unit, accused of carrying out attacks on innocent civilians. Whilst, the programme 
dismissed the majority of the allegations against the MRF as malicious, it noted that incidents, such as 
the fatal shooting of Patrick McVeigh (12 May 1972), indicated that some units were ‘acting beyond 
their orders’. McVeigh was killed when undercover soldiers fired on a checkpoint manned by the 
Catholic Ex-Servicemen’s Association, an unarmed vigilante group set up by local residents to protect 
Catholic areas. According to witnesses, McVeigh was not a member of the group but had stopped to 
talk to friends when a vehicle drew up and opened fire. The soldiers later claimed that the group had 
been armed, but the programme notes that the police forensic report had shown this to be otherwise.157 
Predictably, the programme caused outrage. The Daily Mail reported that hundreds of angry viewers 
had jammed ITV’s switchboards with complaints that the programme was biased against the Army and 
in favour of the IRA.158 In reality, the programme offered a critical investigation into the machinations 
of the security forces, challenging the notion of the British Army as arbitrators in the conflict. It 
demonstrates a willingness to hold to account the Army rather than simply panegyrise them.         
  ‘A Question of Intelligence’ was one of several programmes during the 1970s, which brought 
the transgressions of the security forces and other representatives of the British state to the attention of 
the public. Perhaps the most controversial was the BBC’s Tonight broadcast on 2 March 1977. The 
programme featured an extended interview with Bernard O’Connor, a schoolteacher from Enniskillen, 
in which he alleged to have suffered abuse whilst in police custody.159 Typically, the programme 
prompted furious protests from politicians and the security forces who subscribed to the RUC’s 
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allegations that O’Connor was an IRA ‘godfather’. Despite extensive research, the Tonight team had 
found no evidence to suggest that O’Connor had any connection with the IRA. The programme 
prompted an internal inquiry, but as might be expected the Director of Public Prosecutions declined to 
press charges. Eventually, O’Connor did win compensation, but only after filing a civil suit against the 
Chief Constable of the RUC. Following the Tonight broadcast, further stories of police brutality in 
Northern Ireland emerged. Television programmes, such as Thames Television’s This Week’s ‘Inhuman 
and Degrading Treatment’ (26 October 1977), which explored the interrogation methods of the RUC, 
kept the issue of police brutality to the fore, prompting an Amnesty International investigation.160 Not 
only did such programmes provide a critical voice, which challenged Britain’s actions in Northern 
Ireland, they also instigated investigations into allegations of misconduct.  
 For the remainder of the 1970s, relations between security forces and broadcasters steadily 
deteriorated. Both the Army and the RUC felt that in questioning their work, the media undermined 
their position in Northern Ireland. The security forces became increasingly disinclined to co-operate 
with the media, and so it became harder for the BBC and ITV to represent their viewpoints. In particular, 
this meant the experiences of ordinary soldiers rarely found expression on television. In his final 
meeting as the Controller Northern Ireland in 1977, Richard Francis told the Advisory Council that he 
regretted that the deterioration of the BBC’s relationship with the armed forces had resulted in this 
aspect of the ‘Troubles’ going under-reported.161 The BBC and ITV, however, continued to produce 
programmes, which scrutinised the actions of the security forces in Northern Ireland.   
 Critics of the BBC and ITV have argued that broadcasters were too reverential towards the 
authorities in their coverage of Northern Ireland during the early 1970s. They argue that the British 
broadcast media depicted the conflict in simplistic terms, reducing it to a skirmish between warring 
tribes and presenting the British state and security forces as mere arbitrators.162 Certainly, Northern 
Ireland posed a serious problem for broadcasters as they tried to navigate the expectations of all sides, 
most often pleasing nobody. Despite pressure from all quarters to report on incidents in a way that would 
justify their standpoint in the increasingly violent conflict, both broadcasting bodies maintained that it 
was their responsibility to report the news fully and impartially, however unpalatable. Broadcasters 
argued that by covering the activities of the IRA and other paramilitary groups, far from providing them 
with a propaganda platform as many politicians feared, they offered British audiences a valuable insight 
into the situation in Northern Ireland.  
 Both the BBC and ITV frequently challenged the official narrative, in particular the notion that 
the British Army was simply a peacekeeping force. Whilst a transparent examination of the security 
forces’ actions was difficult to carry out in the early 1970s, current affairs programmes reported on 
instances of violence instigated by the Army and RUC. This raised serious questions about the methods 
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used by the British state in Northern Ireland. At the same time, programme producers portrayed British 
soldiers as themselves victims of the conflict. By exploring the experiences and opinions of soldiers on 
the ground, current affairs programmes offered a full picture of the ‘Troubles’, representing a range of 
different perspectives. 
 In effect, both broadcasting bodies strove to scrutinise all aspects of, and actors in the 
‘Troubles’. They not only offered British audiences a detailed examination of the different facets of the 
conflict, they also provided historical background and sought to engage with the broader social-
economic context. Nonetheless, violence did dominate television current affairs coverage, and it was 
this focus that contributed to long-standing perceptions of Northern Ireland as ‘a place apart’ from the 
rest of the UK. Current affairs programmes argued that the perceived predisposition towards violence 
marked Northern Ireland out as different and un-British. Many television programmes of the early 1970s 
presented Northern Ireland as incomprehensible to British audiences because of the violence. This sheds 
much needed light on what many producers understood it meant to be British, and what it meant to be 
Northern Irish.  
 Television programmes were of vital importance to how the conflict was interpreted in Britain, 
as most of the British population accessed news about Northern Ireland through media sources. Despite 
efforts to dictate the way in which they reported on unfolding events, the broadcasting authorities were 
determined to examine every possible insight into the conflict, providing a fully rounded version of 
events. In doing so, the BBC and ITV succeeded in producing engaging, analytical current affairs 
programming, offering British audiences a nuanced and complex perspective on the conflict. The 
current affairs coverage of the early 1970s would provide a firm basis for the development of a critical 








Chapter Three: Newspaper coverage of the early 1980s.1 
Ten men willing to starve themselves to death in the Maze prison in the early 1980s made headlines 
worldwide. The hunger strikers’ passive resistance to the criminalisation of paramilitary prisoners 
captured the interest of people around the world, evoking outrage and sympathy for the republican cause 
in a way that the indiscriminate violence of the armed struggle never could. The majority of British 
newspapers, along with the government, argued that the strikers’ claims to political status were 
illegitimate, and that the government was right not to negotiate with the prisoners. At the same time, 
however, newspapers raised important questions about how the efforts to resolve the hunger strikes 
were being handled. They also sought to explore the strikers’ backgrounds, and understand their 
motivations for engaging in political violence, presenting them as much victims of the ‘Troubles’ as 
perpetrators. Accordingly, the newspapers provided their readers with nuanced, multi-faceted coverage 
of events in Northern Ireland during this period. 
 As historian Erika Hanna has argued, the hunger strikes were a media event, their momentum 
and meaning sustained through the mobilisation of public opinion via newspapers and television.2 
Despite their importance as a conduit for interpreting the strikes, nevertheless, little scholarship has 
been carried out on either the press or broadcast media’s coverage of the prison protests or Northern 
Ireland in the early 1980s. Liz Curtis has argued that the British media ‘treated the hunger strike as if it 
was concocted out of thin air by the IRA’. She contends that the press and broadcast media supported 
the government’s stance unquestioningly, presenting the hunger strikers as violent criminals and their 
protest as an IRA propaganda exercise.3 Her arguments, however, are based on an extremely limited 
survey of the vast amount of press and television coverage of the prison protests. Her examination of 
the print media is particularly narrow, concentrating on the right-wing tabloids, and failing to consider 
the range of opinions and complexity present in the British newspapers’ reportage during the early 
1980s.  
 Aogán Mulcahy has shown British newspapers provided more nuanced coverage than Curtis 
concedes, and were capable of challenging the government’s criminalisation policy. 4  Mulcahy’s 
research into the press coverage of the 1981 hunger strikes focuses on how the prisoners’ claims to 
legitimacy were treated in the Irish Times, New York Times, and British centre-right broadsheet, the 
Times. He acknowledges that the Times adhered to the British government’s account of the prison 
protests, characterising the prisoners in one-dimensional violent terms, as terrorists bearing sole 
responsibility for the conflict. Nevertheless, he argues that the paper offered a critical view on the 
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validity of the criminalisation policy, particularly in its coverage of the election of hunger striker Bobby 
Sands to Westminster in April 1981. Mulcahy observed that the paper highlighted how his election 
undermined the government’s claims that the hunger strikers, and the paramilitary organisations they 
represented, lacked popular support.5  
 Whilst Mulcahy is correct in his observations, his investigation is also limited, focusing on the 
Times alone. It cannot be seen therefore, to provide a comprehensive view of the British press coverage 
of the hunger strikes. By examining a wider range of newspapers, namely the Sun, Guardian, Daily 
Mirror and the Daily Telegraph, this chapter aims to broaden the number of titles sampled in order to 
represent the differences in style, political opinion and readership which characterised the British press 
during the 1980s. In doing so, it aims to provide a more nuanced and complex picture of how newspapers 
reported events in Northern Ireland. 
 The hunger strikes in 1980 and 1981 will be one of the key subjects covered in this chapter. It 
will acknowledge that most British newspapers followed the government’s lead, presenting the prison 
protests as an IRA publicity stunt and the hunger strikers as little more than criminals. By analysing a 
broader range of newspaper sources, however, it also demonstrates that the coverage of the hunger 
strikes in the British press went further than this, providing a complex, and multi-dimensional narrative. 
The chapter argues that the newspapers presented the hunger strikers as simultaneously criminals and 
victims, both of the IRA and the conflict itself. It will also examine the varied reactions of the 
newspapers to the Anti-H Block electoral successes, and shows how the Guardian in particular, reported 
that the election debunked the government’s claims that the prisoners’ lacked support, demonstrating 
an ability within the British press to challenge the party line. The chapter will then explore the 
newspapers’ response to international condemnation of the handling of the hunger strikes, before finally 
examining the way in which newspapers raised significant questions about the government’s 
management of the protests. The chapter demonstrates that though the newspapers argued that 
paramilitary prisoners were not entitled to political status this did not mean they were willing to accept 
the government’s handling of the protests without criticism. The chapter begins, however, by analysing 
coverage of political policy on Northern Ireland during the early 1980s. It focuses on the newspapers’ 
attitudes towards devolution and developments in Anglo-Irish relations, and how this led, the 
broadsheets in particular, to attempt to engage constructively with British policy and the conflict, raising 
concerns, suggesting solutions, and consequently producing nuanced, varied coverage.  
 On 4 May 1979, the election of Margaret Thatcher marked a significant shift in Britain’s 
political landscape. Breaking from the ‘consensus’ style politics that had characterised the post-war 
period, Thatcher promised a fresh, dynamic and determined approach to government. 6  Moreover, 
having won a majority of forty-three seats she was in a position to deliver. It was expected that this new 
era of Conservative rule would also lead to new initiatives in Northern Ireland. The Conservative Party 
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had pledged that the government would make every effort to combat terrorism and re-establish law and 
order in the province. Writing in the Daily Telegraph on 11 February 1980, however, High Tory 
journalist Thomas Utley remarked that ‘In Ulster as elsewhere the question remains: has Mrs Thatcher 
inaugurated a new era of strong government- or an era of sound and fury signifying surrender?’.7 There 
was a sense that Thatcher was untested in government, and, more pertinently, untested in Northern 
Ireland.  
 The British press speculated on what the new Prime Minister’s approach to the province might 
be. As a result of their uncertainty, newspapers, in particular the broadsheets, felt obliged to offer their 
own detailed views on how the conflict should be managed. These were diverse, but they clearly reflect 
that newspapers sought to engage constructively with Northern Ireland, challenging the British 
government over policy and offering solutions, albeit not always practical or sensitive ones. That they 
did so, however, further supports the thesis that the British press produced far more nuanced and 
complex coverage than it has previously been given credit for. 
 On coming to power, the Conservatives quickly jettisoned their manifesto promise of further 
integrating Northern Ireland into the United Kingdom.8 Instead, as Paul Dixon has argued, the Thatcher 
administration adopted a policy reminiscent of that pursued by Conservatives between 1972 and 1974: 
‘power-sharing with an Irish dimension’.9 Whilst on the one hand striving for devolution, Thatcher’s 
government simultaneously sought to promote Anglo-Irish relations, engaging in talks with Dublin from 
1980 onward. Picking up where the Sunningdale Agreement had left off, Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland, Humphrey Atkins, announced plans for a constitutional conference to discuss the future of the 
province, inviting Northern Ireland’s four main political parties, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) - who 
declined to attend, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the Social Democratic and Labour Party 
(SDLP) and the Alliance Party. In a White Paper, published as part of this initiative, Atkins outlined his 
intention to pursue devolution, stating that direct rule was ‘not satisfactory as a continuing basis for the 
government of the Province’.10 The conference, which ran from 7 January to 24 March 1980, however, 
failed to achieve any consensus between parties. 
 The Daily Telegraph, involving itself in searching for solutions, opposed outright any idea of 
devolution and argued instead that Britain should maintain direct rule, encouraging the government to 
fulfil its election promises and set up local government institutions in Northern Ireland.11 The paper 
contended that any power-sharing executive would be no more than a ‘talking shop’. It also expressed 
concern that it could become a rallying point for those Protestants calling for independence, the result 
of which would be an upsurge in loyalist paramilitary violence. The Telegraph noted that there had 
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already been a rise in Protestant militancy. Britain’s closening relationship with Dublin, exacerbated 
the feeling amongst loyalists that they were being outmanoeuvred by republicans. In a show of strength, 
designed to impress upon both the British and Irish governments that loyalists could, and would, defend 
their right to remain in the UK, Ian Paisley orchestrated a series of rallies protesting against the Anglo-
Irish talks and demanding increased border security.12 The Daily Telegraph argued that this rising 
loyalist threat could be effectively countered through properly integrating Northern Ireland. The paper 
asserted that if the government committed to governing Northern Ireland as an essential part of the UK, 
it would alleviate unionist fears that they were being sold down the river and render loyalist 
paramilitarism unnecessary. Without the threat of loyalist violence, the government could then 
concentrate all its efforts on tackling the IRA.13 
 The Daily Telegraph made frequent calls for the government to emphasise that Northern 
Ireland was an integral part of the UK. The paper observed that British politicians had become 
increasingly disengaged from the province. In an editorial published on 25 June 1980, the Telegraph 
noted that ‘Today many feel that Ulster has become a peripheral matter in British politics- a cross to be 
borne dutifully and expensively but without any hope or enthusiasm’.14 The paper censured politicians 
for their indifference:  
The alleged life style and habits of these beings makes them envied 
and mistrusted: their splendid houses, their separation and danger 
allowances; their flying in on Monday or Tuesday, out on 
Wednesday or Thursday; their ignorance of and distaste for its 
inhabitants.15    
The Telegraph insinuated that it was this disconnect which led many in Northern Ireland to feel 
abandoned and turn to the paramilitaries. It implied that some British politicians encouraged violence, 
believing that if Northern Ireland continued to be ungovernable, public outcry would be such that the 
government would be forced to withdraw completely. The Telegraph argued, however, that for the most 
part the paralysis exhibited by politicians resulted from a lack of incentive to prioritise the province. As 
it remarked on 10 February 1981, ‘Ulster’s future is no longer seen to be a major issue in British politics. 
There are few votes to be won or lost, it is thought, by being firm or weak. This reasoning is 
misguided’. 16  Similarly, the Guardian stressed the disconnect felt by the British public towards 
Northern Ireland. It noted that British voters ‘are bored and angered by Northern Ireland, which is for 
them a country more foreign than America or West Germany’.17 Both papers accused politicians of 
becoming preoccupied by economic crisis and civil unrest elsewhere in Britain and neglecting the 
province as a result. The Telegraph pointed out that if the government was unable to effectively manage 
the situation in Northern Ireland, how could it expect to manage the civil disturbances which broke out 
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in inner-city areas in the early 1980s.18 By highlighting the apparent apathy demonstrated by the 
government towards Northern Ireland, both papers sought to hold politicians accountable for their lack 
of engagement and shame them into a more proactive approach. 
 In marked contrast to the Telegraph, the Guardian championed political devolution. The paper 
took the view that the establishment of a regional legislative body in Northern Ireland could restore 
political vigour to the province, a vital first step towards finding a permanent solution to the conflict. 
The newspaper voiced particular support for the idea of ‘rolling devolution’. 19  Put forward by 
Conservative MP for Peterborough, and Belfast-native, Dr Brian Mawhinney, this scheme entailed a 
new assembly, which would gradually acquire legislative and executive powers over policy areas as it 
achieved the agreement of a qualified majority. If the assembly found that it could not agree on a given 
policy area, then that power would be returned to the Secretary of State.20 This would ensure both 
communities had influence and that no legislative decision could be made on sectarian lines. The 
Guardian argued that Mawhinney’s suggestion offered the best possibility of realising consensus 
amongst Northern Ireland’s political parties, nevertheless, the paper believed that if a lasting settlement 
was to be achieved devolution was just the beginning.21  
 Alongside Atkins’ initiative, Thatcher began to pursue a closer relationship with the Republic 
of Ireland. By the early 1980s, the British government had come to recognise the necessity of Irish 
involvement in any Northern Ireland settlement.22 In May 1980, Thatcher met with Taoiseach Charles 
Haughey to discuss increased co-operation between the two governments. At a further meeting, held in 
Dublin on 8 December 1980, the two governments agreed to a series of joint studies which would 
consider a range of issues, including citizens’ rights, security matters, economic co-operation and the 
possibility of new institutional structures.  
 The press in general supported efforts to improve relations between London and Dublin; 
although newspapers were apprehensive that unionists, fearful that Northern Ireland’s constitutional 
status was under threat, would resort to violence.23 The Guardian was particularly enthusiastic at the 
prospect of greater Anglo-Irish collaboration, having long argued that the conflict was rooted not just 
in the province, but in the dysfunctional relationship between London, Belfast and Dublin. The paper 
contended that only by straightening all three sides of this ‘lopsided triangle’ could a resolution be 
found.24 Keen to also engage with discussions on how the Northern Ireland crisis should be broached, 
the Guardian advocated a federal Ireland within a confederal British Isles or within an Islands of the 
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North Atlantic. This was the brainchild of Geoffrey Taylor, who was the Guardian’s leader writer on 
Ireland until 1988 and therefore greatly influenced the paper’s editorial position regarding the 
‘Troubles’.25 He envisaged a confederacy organised on similar lines to the Nordic Council, whereby 
each unit would retain its own sovereignty, but intergovernmental institutions would allow for close co-
operation on areas such as economics or foreign policy. The Guardian argued that by allowing for a 
relationship with both Dublin and London, this framework had the potential to overcome the sectarian 
and ethnic divides which lay at the heart of the Northern Irish conflict.  
 The Daily Telegraph and the Guardian’s coverage shows a variety of responses to the political 
situation in Northern Ireland. Although there was little coherence amongst newspapers regarding what 
a political settlement in the province should look like, the way in which both newspapers reported on 
the conflict in the early 1980s demonstrates a willingness to challenge the status quo and look at how 
the situation in Northern Ireland might be resolved. Throughout the early 1980s the British government 
continued to pursue a better relationship with Ireland. This resulted in signing the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement in 1985, which officially recognised the Irish government’s consultative role in the 
governance of Northern Ireland, progress was however to be hindered by the hunger strikes in 1980 and 
1981. 
In the latter half of the 1970s, the British government adopted a strategy of criminalisation in 
response to the violence in Northern Ireland. As part of these new measures, ‘special category status’ 
for prisoners convicted of terrorism offences was abolished; removing the distinction between 
paramilitaries and common criminals. 26  In 1976, Kieran Nugent became the first prisoner to be 
convicted under the new regime. Upon arriving at Long Kesh/ the Maze, he refused to wear the prison 
uniform, instead wrapping himself in a blanket.27 Nugent was to be joined ‘on the blanket’ by other 
newly convicted prisoners protesting their lack of political status. In 1978, the blanket protests escalated 
into a no-wash protest, which escalated further into a dirty protest, whereby prisoners refused to leave 
their cells, smearing the walls with their own excrement. By 1980, of the 834 republican prisoners in 
the Maze, 341 were participating in the dirty protest. 28 Finally, in October 1980, seven prisoners 
embarked on hunger strike. They listed five demands: the right to free association, access to recreational 
and educational facilities; the right to wear civilian clothing; access to weekly visits, letters and parcels; 
the right to abstain from prison work; and the restoration of full remissions.  
This first hunger strike came to an end on 19 December 1980, after the British government 
allegedly conceded on the essence of the five demands. In actuality, the government argued that it had 
only agreed to supply prisoners with ‘civilian-type clothing’ and to allow free association in the 
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evenings and at weekends. When it became apparent that the prisoners’ demands had not been 
satisfactorily met, a second and ultimately more divisive hunger strike began on 1 March 1981. Initially, 
this protest received little attention as it was widely believed that it too would collapse. On 9 April, the 
unexpected death of Frank Maguire, MP for Fermanagh and South Tyrone, occasioned a by-election, 
won by hunger striker Bobby Sands, with 30,492 votes to 29,046.29 Despite this victory, and the copious 
media attention consequently generated by the hunger strikes, the British government continued to 
refuse to grant the strikers any form of political status. As a result, ten men starved themselves to death 
before the strike was finally called off on 3 October 1981.30     
The majority of the British press showed limited compassion towards those whom Daily 
Telegraph journalists Colin Brady and Paul Potts termed ‘H-Block terrorists’.31 The newspapers, for 
the most part, subscribed to the British government’s arguments that paramilitary prisoners were 
ordinary criminals. In an editorial, published a few days before his death, the Sun described the hunger 
striker Bobby Sands as nothing more than ‘a common criminal who is being treated better than he 
deserves’.32 The Daily Mirror, paraphrasing Thatcher, demanded that the British government stand firm 
against the hunger strikers, as ‘a criminal is still a criminal, a murderer is still a murderer and a terrorist 
is still a terrorist’.33 Even the Guardian, which tended to be more sympathetic towards the nationalist 
position, argued that:  
Sands and the three remaining hunger-strikers, like the dirty 
protesters before them, demand that members of the Provisional 
IRA should be absolved from the normal punishment for crimes of 
violence on the ground that they are political fighters for a socialist 
federal Ireland. …Who kills or maims for the IRA does not redeem 
the action in the smallest degree.34  
 In order to establish the prisoners’ criminality, newspapers drew attention to the violent pasts 
of the hunger strikers. These details had been made readily available by the NIO, which produced ‘fact 
files’ on each hunger striker as part of their counter-propaganda campaign.35 Aogán Mulcahy has shown 
how the Times drew heavily on this information in its coverage of the hunger strikes, foregrounding the 
violence committed by each prisoner, to underline their status as criminals.36 This technique was also 
used extensively by other British newspapers; in the Daily Telegraph’s coverage of Francis Hughes, for 
example, the paper made it clear that he was extremely dangerous: ‘Of all the hunger strikers, Hughes 
was the most violent according to his record’. The paper went on to outline Hughes’ criminal history, 
noting that he had been found guilty on six counts, including the murder of a British soldier and the 
attempted murder of another, the attempted murder of a police detective and possession of a gun. The 
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same article provided a potted history of the criminal careers of hunger strikers Patsy O’Hara, who had 
been convicted in 1979 for possession of a hand grenade, and Raymond McCreesh, who had been jailed 
on five counts, including conspiracy to murder and possession of firearms.37 
 The press also drew on the violence happening outside the prison, which had been exacerbated 
by the protests, to undermine the prisoners’ claims to political status. Considerable emphasis was put 
on the riots that broke out in Belfast and Derry following the death of each hunger striker. These were 
presented as evidence of the criminal essence of the republican movement. Similarly, newspapers paid 
particular attention to the death of twenty-five-year-old census enumerator Joanne Mathers, who was 
shot on 7 April 1981 as she collected census forms in Derry. 38  The IRA had initially denied 
responsibility for Mathers’ death, claiming that it was a ‘sinister attempt’ to discredit Bobby Sands’ 
election campaign, and the prison protests generally.39 The press presented her murder as further proof 
that the IRA were criminals. The Guardian, for example, in its editorial on 14 May, used the tragedy to 
argue that paramilitary prisoners should be denied political status: ‘To licence [the] killing of passers-
by and census makers as well as of soldiers and policemen is to give every criminal with a passing 
political excuse free licence within the realm’.40 
 Concentrating on violence was intended to offset any sympathy the reader might feel for the 
prisoners. All four newspapers treated the protests as IRA propaganda and widely described the death 
of the hunger strikers as suicide. Echoing sentiments expressed by Thatcher and unionist politicians, 
they argued that the prisoners had chosen to take their own lives, unlike the casualties of republican 
violence. The newspapers frequently called for these ‘forgotten victims of Ulster to be remembered’, 
affording significant coverage to civilians and members of the security forces killed during this period.41 
The Daily Mirror and the Sun often combined reportage of victims with coverage of the hunger strikes, 
making explicit the link between the prisoners’ protests and the bloodshed carried out by the 
organisations they represented. 
 The Daily Mirror’s coverage of the funeral of Francis Hughes was twinned with that of 
fourteen-year-old Julie Livingstone. Livingstone had been killed by a plastic bullet fired by British 
soldiers attempting to disperse anti-H Block demonstrators in Belfast on 12 May 1981. An article 
published under the headline ‘Two faces of Ulster’ described both funerals. By juxtaposing the stories, 
the paper suggested that in creating an atmosphere of violence, the republican movement was culpable 
of Livingstone’s death. Livingstone and her grieving school friends are contrasted with the ‘killers in 
masks’ that attended Hughes’ funeral.42 Their youth enhancing the poignancy of Livingstone’s tragic 
death, throwing into greater relief the disparity between herself and Hughes. 
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 Similarly, the Sun integrated details of the funeral of Police Constable Gary Martin with 
coverage of Bobby Sands. Martin had been killed on 27 April 1981 by a booby trap bomb left on a 
hijacked vehicle by the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA).43 The paper focused on the grief of 
mothers Rosaleen Sands and Rhoda Martin. It reported that Rosaleen had left the Maze in tears after 
her son had informed her that he would see his hunger strike through to death. Then, the paper described 
how Rhoda Martin had cried at the graveside as she clutched her younger son for comfort. The two 
stories were linked by a subheading, which read ‘A mother’s tears flow yet again in Ulster’. This choice 
of words was designed to emphasise the connection between the two women and their grief. In equating 
the suffering of Rhoda Martin with that of Rosaleen Sands, the Sun suggests that Rosaleen was also a 
victim of republican violence.44 The paper implies that in inflicting this pain on his own mother, Sands 
was proving himself to be the callous criminal British government policy had labelled him as. That he 
could treat his mother so, begged the question what else was he capable of, and highlighted the depravity 
of Sands’ protest.  
 The newspapers were capable of adopting a more nuanced perspective of the hunger strikers, 
exploring beyond the violence, to examine the strikers’ family backgrounds, their early experiences of 
the ‘Troubles’ and their position within the IRA and INLA. The press thus provided readers with another 
dimension to the prisoners, humanising them, and offered an alternative means of understanding their 
protest, whilst asserting the illegitimacy of the IRA. Though newspapers presented the hunger strikers 
as criminals, they also viewed them as victims, puppets of an IRA leadership intent on exploiting them 
for propaganda purposes.   
 The British government frequently claimed that the prisoners were being controlled by the IRA 
Army Council. In a speech made during a visit to Northern Ireland on 28 May 1981, Thatcher stated 
that, ‘It is a tragedy that young men should be persuaded, coerced or ordered to starve themselves to 
death for a futile cause’.45 Even amongst the hunger strikers’ families there is evidence that there was 
some doubt as to the autonomy of the prisoners. In his book Ten Men Dead, Guardian journalist David 
Beresford contends that, at a meeting of relatives, Kieran Doherty’s girlfriend Geraldine Scheiss had 
burst out: ‘I don’t think decisions are being made inside the prison. I think decisions are being made by 
people present in this room’.46 More recently, Richard O’Rawe, the IRA’s public relations officer inside 
the Maze, claimed that the hunger strikes were controlled by the Army Council. He alleges that Brendan 
McFarlane (Officer Commanding in the Maze) and himself had been willing to accept a deal presented 
by the British government in July 1981 through secret backchannels which would have allowed them 
‘to end the hunger strike with honour’. They were informed by the outside leadership, however, that 
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‘more was needed’.47 This has been a point of considerable contention and it should be noted that 
McFarlane denies O’Rawe’s claims.48 
 The degree to which the IRA did coerce the strikers remains the source of some debate. The 
British press happily propagated these rumours in a bid to discredit the strikes. In an editorial published 
on 23 July 1981, for example, the Daily Telegraph described the hunger strikers as ‘pawns in the 
terrorist game’. The paper contended that McFarlane, ‘himself fortified by regular meals’, was ordering 
them to endure and speculated that threats were made against any family member suspected of 
encouraging the strikers to abandon their protest. On 10 July 1981, Patrick McGeown joined the hunger 
strike, despite previously denying that he would replace Joe McDonnell, who had become the fifth 
striker to die on 8 July 1981. The paper presented McGeown’s change of heart as damning evidence of 
IRA intimidation, reporting that, ‘on July 9 he breakfasted saying “they’ve got the wrong bloody man,” 
on the 10th he refused breakfast saying that he had been ordered to’.49 The editorial concludes: ‘There 
is, indeed, a reign of terror at the Maze; but it is maintained by the IRA’.50 
 By questioning the autonomy of the prisoners, the Telegraph undermines their claims to 
martyrdom. As Beresford has argued: 
Hunger-striking, when taken to the death, has a sublime quality 
about it; in conjunction with terrorism it offers a consummation of 
murder and self-sacrifice which in a sense can legitimize the 
violence which precedes and follows it… [But] to scream for mercy 
at the foot of the gallows- or nod at the saline drip… is to affirm that 
there is no higher value than life and none more worthy of 
condemnation than those who take it.51 
Fifty-nine days into his hunger strike, a disorientated Raymond McCreesh asked for milk to break his 
fast, then changed his mind after a visit from his family. All four newspapers covered this incident 
extensively, insinuating that the McCreesh family had put pressure on Raymond to continue his protest; 
allegations which they strenuously denied.52 Implications that the hunger strikers had been coerced 
reduced the value of their sacrifice. It suggests that the hunger strikers were themselves victims, press-
ganged into starving to death by an IRA high command intent on exploiting them for propaganda 
purposes. This perspective had the advantage of allowing British readers to sympathise with the hunger 
strikers, whilst condemning the IRA as a heinous organisation willing to sacrifice its own. As Mulcahy 
has argued, it also strengthened the government’s resolve to refuse to yield to the strikers’ demands, as 
to do so would advantage the IRA.53  
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 The Telegraph was not alone in questioning the autonomy of the prisoners or playing on the 
notion of the hunger strikers as victims. In his coverage of Sands’ funeral, the Daily Mirror’s columnist 
John Edwards observed that, ‘it was a pathetic end for a man who never played more than an average 
part in the deadly moves called by his IRA masters’. Edwards not only questioned the autonomy of the 
hunger strikers, but also that of the rank and file IRA members, remarking that ‘Nobody could remember 
what had been said at the funerals of the “volunteers” whose graves were marked unobtrusively all 
around the one prepared for Bobby Sands, MP’.54 His emphatic use of quotation marks were designed 
to suggest doubt as to the extent to which these were willing volunteers. Edwards insinuates that, like 
Sands, these men and women had been forced to die, and now lay forgotten, implying both the futility 
of their cause and the cynicism of a leadership for whom membership was an expendable resource. 
 The Guardian also viewed the hunger strikers as victims, not just of the IRA, but of the conflict 
more generally. The paper persistently presented the prisoners as products of the culture of violence in 
Northern Ireland. On 18 May 1981, the Guardian published an exposé by Paul Keel and David 
Beresford on the INLA, which outlined the organisation’s history, structure, and its relationship with 
the IRA. The Guardian tended to offer more explanation for the hunger strikes than other newspapers, 
regularly including background information in its coverage of the prison protests, exploring the rationale 
behind them and shedding light on the complexities of the conflict. The exposé included a profile of the 
INLA hunger striker Patsy O’Hara. Using the striker’s violent past to explain his criminality, it 
recounted his early involvement in the republican movement describing how he had attended civil rights 
marches with his parents from the age of thirteen, before joining the youth section of the Official IRA, 
Fianna Éireann, in 1970, where he received a bullet wound whilst manning a barricade. As the paper 
noted, O’Hara spent close to five of his teenage years in prison, ‘His offences… connected with 
explosives and firearms: things which preoccupied him as a teenager’. It also observed that O’Hara’s 
childhood home had been yards from where, on Bloody Sunday, thirteen demonstrators had been shot 
dead by British soldiers; an incident, which it implies left a significant impression on the teenager. Keel 
wrote of O’Hara ‘[he] is in every respect a child of ‘68’.55 That is, his early experiences of the conflict 
had led him to become engaged in political violence. 
During the first hunger strike, the Guardian published an interview with the parents of Tommy 
McKearney by Beresford. The interview was intended to provide an insight into the hunger strikers’ 
psyche. It also introduced a republican perspective, giving a voice to the prisoners’ families, mostly 
absent from press coverage of the hunger strikes. This demonstrated a willingness to explore, and try to 
understand, the motivations behind republican activity. The glimpse it provided into the hunger strikers’ 
upbringing, his family and their experiences of the ‘Troubles’, also enabled readers to consider the 
extent to which growing up amidst conflict had predetermined the prisoners’ involvement in 
paramilitarism.56 Beresford remarked that McKearney would not be the first in his family to die for the 
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republican cause. His younger brother, Sean, had been killed when a bomb he was transporting exploded 
prematurely in May 1974. He also notes that Tommy’s brother Pádraig was awaiting trial on arms 
charges, whilst his sister, dubbed by the press ‘the most dangerous woman terrorist in Britain’, was 
wanted on explosive charges in connection with a series of bombings in Southampton in 1975.57 Despite 
these extensive republican credentials, Beresford observed that, ‘The apparent fanaticism of the 
McKearney children is not reflected in the persona of their parents, nor particularly in their ancestry’. 
It followed therefore, that their paramilitarism resulted from their environment. Beresford states that, 
‘Mr and Mrs McKearney say they would have expected Tommy, with nine O-levels and two A-levels- 
in ancient and modern history- to go on to university and become a teacher, but for the “troubles”’.58 
He argues that the violence endemic in Northern Ireland had robbed McKearney, and his fellow 
prisoners, of their future, presenting them as victims of an upbringing dictated by conflict.59 
 By portraying the hunger strikers as victims, whether of the IRA or the conflict generally, the 
British press offered an alternative perspective on the prison issue to that of the government. It also had 
the effect of shifting blame for the hunger strikes from the British government to the IRA, vindicating 
the former’s refusal to compromise. This multidimensional approach far from exonerated paramilitary 
prisoners, rather it emphasised the cost of political violence. The press expressed concern that this cycle 
of violence would continue, as recruitment to the IRA was enhanced by the prison protests. The 
Guardian warned that as a result of the hunger strikes: ‘a new generation of martyrs will succeed in 
setting back the peaceful evolution of the province and of Ireland by yet another decade’.60 Similarly, 
the Daily Mirror acknowledged the toxicity of the wider environment and its role in breeding violence, 
claiming that Sands’ fast had ‘already recruited acid-throwing teenagers to the junior ranks of the IRA’, 
whilst the Sun noted a ‘new breed of tiny terrorists’ stalk the streets of Belfast.61 
 The hunger strikes also succeeded in promoting republican sentiment amongst moderates 
within Northern Ireland’s nationalist community, belying the claims which British politicians had for a 
long time espoused that militant republicanism had little support amongst the general public. This was 
evidenced by the Anti-H Block’s electoral successes. On 9 April 1981, Bobby Sands won the 
Fermanagh and South Tyrone by-election. The election of a hunger striker to Westminster rekindled 
flagging media interest in the prison protests. The Daily Mirror’s coverage was limited to a perfunctory 
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article featured below the front-page lead, reporting the failed launch of Space Shuttle Columbia, but 
this was the exception, most newspapers gave prominent coverage to the by-election.62 
 The Daily Telegraph sought to downplay the extent of popular support for the hunger strikers, 
and therefore minimise the serious challenge the H-Block victory posed to British policy. The paper 
argued that the by-election had been determined by ‘the almost automatic operation of traditional 
allegiances’, rather than support for the hunger strikes.63 Even after Bobby Sands’ campaign manager, 
Owen Carron, won the seat on 20 August the paper insisted that this did not imply popular support for 
the republican cause. It argued: ‘What it does mean is that when Irishmen are martyring themselves in 
a British prison, Catholic nationalists in Ulster feel the pull of tribal loyalty and are not likely to resist 
it if the only means of doing so is to ensure the return of a Unionist’.64 
 The Sun shared a similar view, in the aftermath of Sands’ election, columnist Paul Johnson 
argued that ‘Elections in this part of Ulster are a macabre game. The results bear no relation to the 
quality of the candidate or what he stands for’. Johnson argued that Sands should be expelled from the 
Commons and a writ issued to prevent serving prisoners from standing for election in future.65 Whilst 
the two papers dismissed any suggestion that the election results signified widespread republican 
backing, they did express concern about the repercussions that might result from Sands’ election. Both 
papers voiced fear that his victory would lead to an escalation of violence in the province. 
 The Guardian on the other hand, observed that Sands’ victory had exploded the British 
government’s repeated claims that the hunger strikes, and by extension the IRA, lacked popular support: 
‘Years of myth-making go out the window with the election of Bobby Sands as MP for Fermanagh and 
South Tyrone. And the biggest myth is that the IRA in its violent phase represents only a tiny minority 
of the population’.66 Similarly the Times, as Mulcahy shows, indicated high levels of support for 
republicanism, whilst focusing on how the British government would react to Sands’ victory.67 Though 
the Guardian acknowledged that many had voted on humanitarian grounds, or because they opposed 
any candidate who would support the union, it argued that the vote showed ‘beyond all question… that 
a majority of people in Fermanagh and South Tyrone are deeply opposed to the political climate in 
which they have to live their lives’.68 The election of Carron it concluded, was irrefutable evidence that 
the hunger strikers enjoyed widespread support in the province. The paper pointed out that, unlike in 
April when Sands had stood unopposed except by UUP candidate, Harry West, this time the electorate 
had the option of voting for other nationalists. That voters had chosen to back the H-Block candidate, 
showed the prevailing view was that ‘the men inside the gaol are justified in their gruesome campaign’. 
The paper reiterated that the ‘vote signals the utter disaffection of a majority in the constituency from 
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the policies of the British Government, not only in the Maze prison but in the province as a whole’. It 
suggested that only through joint action on the part of the British and Irish governments could this 
disaffection be addressed.69 
 The varied interpretations evident in the newspapers’ response to the Anti-H Block elections 
illustrates that there existed a range of approaches within the press towards reporting events in Northern 
Ireland; contrary to the reductive view of numerous scholars and activists. The Guardian’s coverage 
complicated the official narrative, by demonstrating that there was a portion of British newspapers 
willing to challenge the assumption embedded in the government’s criminalisation policy that the 
prisoners, and by extension the paramilitary organisations they represented, enjoyed little popular 
support from the majority of the nationalist population in Northern Ireland. Even so, as Mulcahy has 
argued, in their coverage of the elections newspapers tended to focus on the political consequences for 
the British government, rather than the support they lent to the hunger strikers’ claims to legitimacy.70  
 Of particular concern to the newspapers was the implication that the election results could have 
on Britain’s international standing. The election of Sands to Westminster revived international interest 
in the prison protests and Northern Ireland generally. Criticism was heaped on Britain for allowing 
prisoners to starve themselves, rather than let them ‘wear their own trousers’, and increased pressure 
brought to bear on the government to pursue a compromise with the hunger strikers.71 Following Sands’ 
death, demonstrations and vigils were held across Ireland, in the US, Reykjavik, Paris, Manila, Oslo, 
Milan and Lisbon. In India, the hunger striker was compared to Gandhi, and opposition MPs in the 
Upper House held a minute’s silence to honour Sands. The Iranian government, renamed the street 
where the British Embassy was situated in Tehran after Sands, and an emissary was sent to the hunger 
striker’s funeral. 72  As the Sunday Times’ correspondent Keith Richardson summarised, ‘general 
European impression ranges from pig-headed Thatcher obstinacy, through scandalous misgovernment, 
to outright genocide. In other words, it could not be worse’. On 31 May, the Sunday Times published a 
survey of the international media coverage of the hunger strikes. The paper had interviewed the editors 
of sixty-four newspapers across twenty-five countries and found that thirty-six were of the opinion 
Britain should withdraw from Northern Ireland.73 
 British newspapers responded to the outcry with derision. In an editorial published following 
the death of Francis Hughes, the Daily Telegraph dismissed calls for British pliancy as the ‘automatic 
response’ of the Irish lobby in the USA, the Soviet Union and ‘a miscellaneous horde of Marxist and 
Trotskyite organisations in other countries’.74 The paper argued that Russia’s criticism was self-serving, 
made to discredit the British government, which had been vocal in challenging the Soviet Union’s 
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human rights record, whilst opposition in the US was largely the result of ignorance and romanticism. 
The Sun too, argued that Britain’s critics were using the hunger strikes for their own purposes. Visiting 
New York in June 1981, Prince Charles had met with anti-British demonstrations and had been grilled 
by the city’s mayor, Ed Koch, who had remarked that ‘the British should just get the hell out of 
Ireland’.75  The Sun’s columnist Jon Akass, sought to minimise the incident, disregarding Koch’s 
behaviour as self-serving and unrepresentative. He accused the mayor of pandering to the Irish-
American vote, and argued that ‘If it had been a crowd of Italians he would have been photographed 
eating a plate of spaghetti and quoted as demanding fair play for Frank Sinatra’.76 The Daily Mirror on 
the other hand, took a slightly different tact, downplaying Koch’s importance: ‘He has no more to do 
with Government policy in Ireland than, say, the Statue of Liberty had to do with America’s saturation 
bombing of Vietnam’. The paper argued that before criticising Britain, Americans should look at their 
country’s actions in Southeast Asia.77 The Telegraph too, sought to play down the reaction to the royal 
visit; noting the low number of demonstrators, it dismissed the idea that they ‘represented a gigantic 
tide of anti-British and pro-IRA feeling in the USA’, emphasising instead the fact that most American 
newspapers continued to express support for British policy in Northern Ireland.78 
 The Guardian on the other hand, argued that the international response, though well-intended, 
came from misinformation disseminated by the IRA propaganda machine. Along with the other 
newspapers, it contended that many people around the world believed that the hunger strikes were about 
prison conditions and not political status. In addition, the Guardian asserted that few worldwide truly 
appreciated the difficulties Britain faced in the province. The paper expressed the wish that critics 
appreciated ‘how merciless is the British dilemma in Northern Ireland. We can stay there only under a 
hail of petrol bombs and sulphuric acid. We can leave only at the risk (which the Irish Republic begs us 
not to take) of a Loyalist on-slaught against the Catholic population’.79 The use of ‘we’ suggests that 
despite reservations, the Guardian accepted itself as a part of the British establishment which was 
present in Northern Ireland. The newspapers repeatedly emphasised that the regime at the Maze was 
supposedly one of the most accommodating in the world and stressed that the true objective of the 
hunger strikes was to obtain prisoner of war status. Whilst these comments were addressed to an 
international audience, they were also intended to offer reassurance to domestic readers that the British 
government were right concerning their policy towards the hunger strikers.    
 In spite of their scornful attitude toward world opinion, all four newspapers encouraged the 
government to make efforts to defend Britain’s reputation. The press played its part in deflecting 
international criticism by going on the offensive, pointing out that other countries were struggling with 
similar terrorism problems. The newspapers accused critics of hypocrisy, arguing that any democratic 
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country would, and indeed had reacted to pressure from terrorists in much the same way. As the first 
hunger strike reached a crisis in early December 1980, the Guardian responded to the international 
outcry, noting that, ‘Several European countries with democratically elected governments, face or have 
faced terrorist attempts to subvert them. Are the killers of Mr Moro or of businessmen in Germany 
entitled to a different regime from a back street mugger?’.80 Put differently, would Italy and Germany 
be expected to offer privileges to prisoners from militant organisations, such as the Brigate Rosse or the 
Baader-Meinhof Group.81 Similarly, the Sun countered the international clamour following the death of 
Bobby Sands, by emphasising the hypocrisy of much of the criticism: ‘It is baffling that in countries 
like Italy, West Germany and Spain, which suffer far more than we do from mindless terrorism, voices 
are raised condemning Britain’s efforts to uphold the law and protect the innocent’.82  
 The Daily Telegraph, in an editorial published in late April, accused the US of hypocrisy. 
Playing on American sensibilities, the paper pointed to the assassination attempt on President Ronald 
Reagan on 30 March 1981 - another tenuous comparison - arguing that ‘America has suffered enough 
from terrorist activities, political, criminal and demented’. The paper noted ‘The United States is 
actively assisting counter-terror campaigns by several friendly governments’, insinuating that Britain 
was not extended the same courtesy because of misguided Irish republican loyalties. The Telegraph 
argued that it would be of benefit to America to support Britain against the IRA, as ‘Victories, moral or 
political, by terrorists in one corner of the world encourage extremist violence elsewhere’. The paper 
took this one step further, asking: ‘Can its leaders pass by on the other side during Ulster’s agony?’. At 
this early stage, and in line with the Telegraph’s conservatism, the paper suggested American 
involvement only as a means of bolstering the British government’s position. It did not occur to the 
Telegraph to suggest that America become a mediator, the role it would eventually adopt during the 
peace process. It is, nonetheless, significant that the paper undertook this more constructive approach, 
suggesting that America could have a role in formulating a solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland.83 
 What exactly the newspapers expected to achieve from taking such an offensive approach, 
whether they believed it would reverse the tide of world opinion, is not entirely clear. Certainly, by 
seeking to minimise and discredit the international outcry, the papers sought to both reassure their 
readers and actively promote support for the government’s policy against the hunger strikers. As the 
Guardian argued:  
The international propaganda battle matters. It matters amongst our 
Western allies, sometimes perplexed and unhappy about the slew of 
alien deaths across their screens. It matters to the Eastern block, 
where instant capital is duly welcome. And it matters, in particular, 
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along the East Coast of America, whence flow the funds that keep 
the Provos going and enable them to buy bigger and better 
weapons.84  
The paper argued that rather than ‘keeping the world at bay in Ulster’, the British government should 
harness international interest by encouraging debate, which could bring fresh perspective on tackling 
the conflict, and acidly observed the lack of innovation from the British government regarding Northern 
Ireland: ‘It is not in the nature of politics for politicians to claim they have no answers. It is not a posture 
that can be sold for year after year’.85 
 The Guardian was not alone in bemoaning a lack of initiative on the part of British politicians, 
the Daily Mirror also expressed dissatisfaction at their level of engagement in finding a solution to the 
hunger protests. Columnist Keith Waterhouse, on 1 June 1981, remarked that: 
When 30,000 voters return a dying hunger-striker to Parliament and 
Parliament’s only response is that there must be a way of stopping 
that kind of embarrassment in future, it begins to look as if we are 
trying to keep our Ulster problem under the carpet.86 
The Mirror, however, was more concerned with the toll the hunger strikes were having on soldiers in 
the province, than the impact on Britain’s international reputation. The paper’s cartoonist Keith Waite 
expressed this frustration with the lack of new ideas on how to end the prison protests in a cartoon 
published following the death of Bobby Sands (Figure 13). Waite presents a group of British soldiers 
amidst the rioting that broke out after the striker’s death. One soldier, holding a newspaper with the 
headline ‘No Political Status’, comments that ‘The politicians say it’s nothing to do with them’. Waite’s 
scepticism about the government’s claims that it had been powerless to avert the hunger strike was ill-
concealed. The cartoon infers that the mismanagement of the hunger strikes had resulted in the 
escalation of violence in the province. It attacks politicians for shirking their responsibilities, whilst 
soldiers’ lives were at risk. The Mirror’s position was that Britain should pull out of Northern Ireland 
altogether. Since the early 1970s, the paper had advocated British withdrawal from Northern Ireland, 
the only national daily to consistently do so.87 This editorial stance, however, was not motivated so 
much by the desire for a united Ireland, but rather concern for the welfare of British troops. During the 
First World War, the paper had gained a reputation as the ‘Forces’ Paper’, which it continued to cultivate 
throughout the twentieth century.88 During the ‘Troubles’ it had defended soldiers in the province 
against government policies which it believed detrimental to those serving in Northern Ireland. For the 
Mirror, the hunger strikes were another reason to leave the province. Following Sands’ death, the paper 
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renewed its calls for withdrawal, arguing that ‘Britain has been trapped in the maze too long. Its task 

















The Mirror’s disapproval of the inertia shown by politicians with regards to Northern Ireland 
suggests that newspapers were still prepared to challenge the government over its handling of the hunger 
strikes. Though the British press widely supported the government in its view that the prisoners of the 
Maze should not be entitled to political status, it was with some important reservations. The newspaper 
defended the decision not to bow to the hunger strikers’ demands, but it did not follow that they accepted 
the government’s policies towards the prison protests without criticism or raising questions.  
The Guardian in particular, offered a nuanced perspective on how the strikes were being handled. 
Though the paper asserted that ‘the Government’s hands are clean in their dealings with the Maze 
prisoners’, it questioned the advisability of continuing to refuse to concede to the prisoners’ demands, 
urging Thatcher to reconsider her position.90 The paper argued that, ‘None of these [the five demands] 
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in itself bestows political status, nor would a combination of several of them, especially if applied 
throughout the prison regime’. 91  This view was put more forcefully by the paper’s Political 
Commentator and Policy Editor, Peter Jenkins in his column, published as the first hunger strike reached 
a crisis point on 17 December 1980: 
They may deserve to be so treated [like all other criminals] - or 
worse; but what we are having to do in order to uphold the point that 
they are common criminals and not, as they would have it, prisoners 
of war, is so degrading to ourselves, so disgusting to behold and 
difficult to explain to others, that we may wonder whether it is wise 
or prudent to persist.   
He suggested that paramilitary prisoners should be differentiated from other criminals, as the severity 
of their actions set them apart.92As the second hunger strike intensified in April 1981 Jenkins voiced 
these arguments once more. In his column, published on 15 April, he criticised the British government’s 
intransigence following the first hunger strike, arguing that ‘it has handed the IRA the greater 
propaganda victory’. Quoting his earlier article verbatim, he argued again that the repercussions of 
allowing the strikers to continue their protest, potentially to the death, outweighed the value of 
upholding the principle that the prisoners were common criminals. He also repeated his earlier argument 
that paramilitary prisoners should be categorised not as ordinary criminals but as terrorists. Jenkins 
contended that in light of the election of Sands to Westminster, it would be wise for the government to 
relax uniform regulations and allow greater freedom of association within the prison.93 Though the 
government refused to make any concessions to the prisoners, the paper nonetheless tacitly supported 
its policy towards the hunger strikes. 
 Whilst sympathetic towards the government’s position, the Guardian was critical of how it 
handled the effort to resolve the protests. Reporting on Sands’ death, it remarked that: ‘Her [Thatcher’s] 
policy has been correct, but her posture has been disdainful’. In particular, the paper condemned the 
treatment of Irish TDs, Síle de Valera, Neil Blaney and John O’Connell, who had visited the prison and 
met with Sands on 20 April. The three had also requested a meeting with Thatcher but were rebuffed. 
The Prime Minister told journalists that: ‘It is not my habit or custom to meet MPs from a foreign 
country about a citizen of the UK, resident in the UK’.94 The Guardian censured Thatcher for insulting 
the three Irish representatives, and voiced fears that the snub could undermine on-going Anglo-Irish 
talks. The paper believed that the only way of ending the hunger strikes, and the violence in Northern 
Ireland generally, was through close cooperation between the British and Irish governments. 
 As the hunger strikes persisted, the Guardian increasingly questioned the government’s 
handling of the protest. On 3 June 1981, the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace (ICJP), a lay 
organisation made up from the Catholic hierarchy, released a statement proposing that by granting 
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reforms across the Northern Ireland prison system on clothing regulations, freedom of association and 
prison work the hunger strikes might be brought to an end. The situation in Northern Ireland had 
intensified, as hunger striker, Joe McDonnell, reached a crisis point, bringing increased pressure to bear 
on the British government to resolve the protests. Reacting to the ICJP initiative, Humphrey Atkins 
released a statement reaffirming the government’s position that whilst they were willing to review 
changes to the prison regime, as long as the hunger strikes continued this process could not proceed. In 
response, the prisoners released a statement saying that the British government were mistaken in the 
belief that they were looking for differential treatment and that they would welcome the introduction of 
the five demands to all prisoners. This marked a fundamental shift in position. In stating that the five 
demands could be applied to all, the protestors had effectively abandoned their claim to special status. 
That afternoon, the ICJP were admitted to see the hunger strikers and relay to them that if they brought 
the protest to an end the government would be ‘morally obliged to move forward’ on the issue of 
clothing, free association and prison work. The prisoners, appeared to accept this deal, but requested a 
guarantor from the NIO be sent to confirm the government’s exact position.95 
 The Guardian greeted the ICJP initiative with enthusiasm, praising it as the ‘first serious hope 
of ending the deadlock at the Maze’.96 The paper encouraged the government to respond to the prisoners’ 
concession on political status with flexibility, especially on ‘inessentials’ such as clothing.97 Progress 
towards a settlement based on the Commission’s proposals, however, was complicated, for as historian 
Thomas Hennessey has put it, the ICJP ‘was not the only show in town’.98 After the prisoners had issued 
their statement conceding political status, the government had reopened the backchannel with the IRA’s 
external leadership. On the evening of 6 July, it was communicated to the IRA that on condition that it 
would lead to an immediate end to the hunger strikes, the British government was prepared to allow all 
prisoners in Northern Ireland the right to wear their own clothes, additionally parcels, visits and letters 
would be made available, whilst the definition of prison work would be extended to include domestic 
tasks, as well as educational and constructive work, such as the building of a prison chapel. The 
government also made a vague offer to restore a proportion of remissions lost because of the protest but 
restated that there could be no movement on association. This went considerably further than the deal 
the ICJP had negotiated. According to O’Rawe, the prisoners believed the offer to be acceptable, 
nevertheless, the IRA dismissed it, arguing that the exclusion of the right to unsupervised association, 
along with ambiguity over what constituted prison work made the deal unacceptable.99 Despite several 
attempts in the weeks that followed by the British to persuade the IRA to accept their deal no further 
advances were achieved through these means.100 
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 Unaware of the secret talks being carried out with the IRA, when no settlement was 
forthcoming the Guardian held the British government solely responsible. In an editorial, published on 
15 July 1981, the paper argued that ‘failure to settle the hunger-strikes at the Maze prison has shifted 
from the prisoners to the British Government’. It called on Thatcher to ‘make good’ the gains achieved 
by the ICJP by ratifying concessions on clothing, free association and prison work. The Guardian 
believed that a final agreement had not been reached because the prisoners would only accept a deal 
from a government official, and that the government had refused to send one, lest they be seen to be 
negotiating with terrorists. The Guardian denounced this behaviour as ‘too petty a principle on which 
to allow more lives - outside the prison as well as inside - to depend’.101 The paper expressed frustration 
at the rigidity of the government. Its response to the negotiations shows a capacity within the press to 
challenge and offer criticism of the British government’s policy on the hunger strikes, without having 
to express support for the prisoners.     
 A senior NIO official eventually visited the Maze on 8 July, after Joe McDonnell had passed 
away. The same day, the prisoners released a statement which argued that McDonnell ‘need not have 
died’. They stated that they had offered ‘a principled and practical solution for all concerned’, but that 
the government had refused again and again to talk directly with them. The prisoners concluded that 
even if they wanted to end their protests it was too late.102 The hunger protest continued, resulting in the 
deaths of Martin Hurson, Kevin Lynch, Kieran Doherty, Thomas McElwee and Michael Devine. As the 
strike progressed, however, the impact of each death diminished, as did the amount of attention it was 
afforded by the media. On 3 October 1981, the hunger strikes collapsed. Three days later the government 
announced measures to improve the Northern Ireland prison service, effectively granting the five 
demands.  
  The limited scholarship covering the media’s reporting of the ‘Troubles’ during the 1980s 
mostly portrays the British media in one-dimensional terms, as puppets of the British government 
mobilised in its defence. This view had greatly influenced popular conceptions of the hunger strikes and 
events in Northern Ireland generally, originating from an extremely restricted examination of the media 
coverage generated by events in the province in the early 1980s. As this chapter has shown, a detailed 
analysis of a broader range of newspaper sources demonstrates that the British press, far from parroting 
the government line, offered nuanced and complex coverage on Northern Ireland throughout this period.  
 During the early 1980s, the press engaged constructively with events in Northern Ireland, 
challenging the government on policy, exploring different perspectives and attempting to offer solutions 
to the intensifying conflict. Whilst all four newspapers broadly echoed the official line that ‘a crime is 
a crime’, their coverage went beyond this simplistic view. The papers aided in the construction of 
paramilitary prisoners as ordinary criminals, but they presented them as victims both of a cynical IRA 
 
101 'The Maze can be settled now’, The Guardian, 15 July 1981. 
102 TNA FCO 87/1262 Northern Ireland Office Protests and Second Hunger Strike- Weekly Bulletin. No. 20 09.00 hours 
Thursday 9 July- 0900 hours Thursday 16 July, quoted by Hennessey, Hunger Strike, 334-5. 
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leadership and of the conflict itself. They raised important questions about the British government’s 
criminalisation policy and showed a willingness to challenge the official narrative. 
 The early 1980s were a significant and transitional moment for Northern Ireland and 
newspapers were of vital importance to how events came to be interpreted in Britain. Although, still 
predominantly perpetuating the narrative set by the government, careful examination of the press reports 
from this time reveals that they increasingly departed from the official line and showed a readiness to 







Chapter Four: Television coverage of the early 1980s. 
The death of Bobby Sands, MP for Fermanagh and South Tyrone, propelled Northern Ireland back onto 
television screens across the world. The slow starvation of men in the Maze generated unprecedented 
levels of media coverage. As each hunger striker grew weaker, international calls for a solution to the 
prison protest, and the ‘Troubles’ generally, reached a new pitch. The government’s apparent lack of 
response meant that Britain increasingly appeared to observers to be intransigent and inflexible. Faced 
with such condemnation the British government sought to pressure domestic broadcasters into 
promoting the official view of the hunger strikers as criminals.1 Restricted access to information, as 
well as legal, political and financial pressures greatly influenced how programme-makers presented 
events unfolding in Northern Ireland during the early 1980s. Nonetheless, broadcasters from both the 
BBC and ITV resisted attempts to control their narrative producing detailed and nuanced programmes 
on the hunger strikes and events in Northern Ireland.   
As observed in the previous chapter, despite its importance for interpreting the strike, little 
scholarship has been carried out on either the press or broadcast media’s coverage of the prison protests 
or Northern Ireland in the early 1980s. Liz Curtis has argued that both broadcasting bodies supported 
the government line on the hunger strikes, censoring their journalists in order not to invoke Thatcher’s 
wrath.2 Curtis’ analysis, however, is based on a very limited sample of the vast number of programmes 
produced on the hunger strikes. As social scientist Howard Smith has shown, television coverage of the 
prison protest was far from uncritical of the British government. He argues that the BBC offered detailed 
analysis of the hunger strikes, placing them in their historic context and exploring the response of the 
nationalist community. 3  Whilst Smith provides a comprehensive account of the content of BBC 
programmes on the hunger strikes, he fails to develop his analysis to its full conclusion. The lack of any 
further research into the content of current affairs programmes on the hunger strikes has led to a 
tendency for Curtis’ views to dictate the way in which the media’s coverage during this period has been 
understood. In reality, the BBC and ITV provided a far more multi-faceted portrait of the conflict during 
the early 1980s. 
 This chapter focuses on a sample of twenty-two programmes, broadcast by the BBC and the 
ITV in 1980 and 1981. By focusing on these, it will explore key themes which characterised current 
affairs coverage during this period. The chapter explores the growing pressure placed on broadcasters 
by the Thatcher administration to starve terrorists of the ‘oxygen of publicity’. It acknowledges that 
both broadcasting bodies found it increasingly difficult to provide impartial and independent coverage 
of Northern Ireland, which at times resulted in journalists and producers voluntarily censoring 
programmes by omitting material, avoiding reporting on contentious subjects, and looking for the safe 
 
1 Savage, The BBC’s Irish troubles, 234-249. 
2 Curtis, Ireland The Propaganda War, 202-6. 
3 Howard Smith, ‘BBC Current Affairs Coverage of the 1981 Hunger Strike’, in The Northern Irish Question in British 
Politics, (eds.) Peter Catterall and Sean McDougall (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996), 174-181. 
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angle. Nevertheless, it will also show how programme makers looked for ways to subvert restrictions, 
pushing the boundaries to challenge the government’s position.  
 The 1980 and 1981 hunger strikes are one of the key focuses of this chapter, which argues that 
despite restricted access to the Maze prison, broadcasters provided compelling and vivid coverage of 
the hunger strikes. Analysing programme content demonstrates how programme producers 
contextualised the strikes in terms of the long history of the hunger protests in Northern Ireland and 
explored the support given to the hunger strikes by the nationalist community. It argues that the BBC 
and ITV endeavoured to present a full range of opinion on the hunger strikes especially from the 
Catholic community. The chapter then, explores the impact of events in Northern Ireland on the 
Republic of Ireland. It observes how current affairs programmes focused on the possible implications 
republicanism in the South might have for Anglo-Irish relations. They downplay the extent of support 
for the hunger strikers in order to offer a reassuring narrative that Dublin would continue to engage in 
talks with the British government aimed at bringing about a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Finally, 
the chapter investigates coverage of the increase in loyalist activity in response to the Maze protests and 
the Anglo-Irish talks. Although it recognises that the broadcast media frequently stereotyped loyalism, 
the chapter argues that current affairs coverage went beyond the notion of loyalist bigotry to examine 
the motives behind loyalist attitudes.   
Table 2: List of Television Programmes, 1980-1981 
Programme Series Channel Date Shown Number of 
Viewers (in 
millions)4 





Newsweek BBC 10 April 1980 0.6 
What School Did 
You Go To? 





Newsweek BBC 25 April 1980 0.4 
Last Stand at 
Lisburn 
World in Action ITV (Granada) 14 July 1980 4.2 
 
4 BBC WAC, ‘Series R9: TV Viewing Barometers/BARB TV Audience Figures’, 1980-1981. Unfortunately, the BBC 




Island: Time to 
Think Again 





H-Block Fuse World in Action ITV (Granada) 24 November 
1980 
3.6 




Ireland: Dawn of 
a New Era? 





Ulster: A War for 
the Eighties 







TV Eye ITV (Thames 
Television) 
9 April 1981 1.7 
The Waiting 
Time 
TV Eye ITV (Thames 
Television) 
30 April 1981 2.7 
‘No Title’ Newsnight BBC 7 May 1981 Part 1: 1.4 
Part 2: 1.1 




Weekend World ITV (London 
Weekend 
Television) 
17 May 1981 0.6 
South of the 
Border 
TV Eye ITV (Thames 
Television) 
18 June 1981 1.3 
A Time for 
Compromise 
Panorama BBC 20 July 1981 2.2 
‘No Title’ Nationwide BBC 17 September 
1981 
N/A 
The Provos’ Last 
Card? 
Panorama BBC 21 September 
1981 
N/A 
‘No Title’ Nationwide BBC 16 November 
1981 
N/A 




5 Only nineteen and a half minutes of this footage was available to the author, however, this was enough to gain a good 
sense of the programme and its content.   
6 This special episode on the local elections in England and Wales included a segment of the funeral of Bobby Sands, 
based on the chronology of the programme. Whilst I believe that Part Two relates to the segment on Sands, I cannot be 
completely certain. 
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The Preacher and 
the Peacemaker 











 The 1980s were to be a challenging time for British broadcasters covering Northern Ireland. 
Relations between the state and broadcast media, strained throughout the 1970s, deteriorated further 
under the premiership of Margaret Thatcher. From her election in 1959 as MP for Finchley, Thatcher 
had strong views concerning the failings of British broadcasting, especially the BBC, and consistently 
called broadcasters to account over what she perceived to be partisan coverage.7 Thatcher believed the 
BBC to be out of control and politically biased. The very concept of a public service body funded by an 
annual licence fee ran counter to Thatcher’s ideological position, which championed deregulation and 
free market competition.8 As she wrote in her memoirs: 
Broadcasting was one of those areas- the professions such as 
teaching, medicine and the law were others- in which special 
pleading by powerful interest groups was disguised as high-minded 
commitment to some greater good… The idea that a small clique of 
professional broadcasters always knew what was best and that they 
should be more or less immune from criticism or competition was 
not one which I could accept.9 
Thatcher’s general antipathy toward the broadcast media increased throughout the 1980s. Television’s 
impartial approach, for example to the Falklands War, the miners’ strikes, and the Brixton riots, 
contributed to worsening relations between broadcasters and the government. As BBC2 Controller 
Brian Wenham observed: ‘It was usually Ireland, it was usually the BBC, it was usually a row bigger, 
with more heads rolling, than you’d ever think possible’.10    
Early in her premiership two incidents consolidated Thatcher’s opinion of the BBC. On 5 July 
1979, the Tonight programme broadcast an interview with the INLA.11 The programme was intended 
as an in-depth review of the decade since the Army was deployed in Northern Ireland. In an effort to 
shed new light on the conflict, programme producers had interviewed the INLA, which had come to 
prominence after killing Airey Neave, Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and a close friend 
of Margaret Thatcher. His assassination, at Westminster, the symbolic heart of the British establishment 
had a powerful resonance and piqued British interests in the ‘Troubles’. In the interview, the INLA 
representative described in detail how the group had carried out the attack, declaring that Neave was a 
‘militarist, [an] advocate of torture in Ireland… and [an] advocate of capital punishment for Irish 
 
7 Jean Seaton, Pinkoes and Traitors: The BBC and the nation, 1974-1987 (London: Profile Books Ltd, 2015), 23-34. 
8 Curran and Seaton, Power without Responsibility, 209-10. 
9 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, (London: HarperCollinsPublishers, 1993), 634. 
10 Institute of Contemporary British History, ‘Witness Seminar’, Real Lives (February 1995), quoted in Curran and 
Seaton, Power without Responsibility, 212. 
11 It should be noted that at the time of recording the INLA had yet to be proscribed. On 2 July 1979 the INLA were 
added to the list of organisations in Britain and Northern Ireland outlawed by the PTA.  
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freedom fighters’, therefore a ‘legitimate target’: comments that were bound to provoke a reaction.12 
Journalist David Lomax forcefully countered these accusations, arguing that Neave, a Second World 
War ‘hero’, who had suffered at the hands of the Nazis as a prisoner of war was well known for his 
opposition to the use of torture.13 Shortly before his death Neave had promised SDLP leader Gerry Fitt 
an investigation into allegations of the mistreatment of suspects in Northern Ireland, stating that ‘those 
responsible will bear the full brunt of my wrath because I myself was interrogated by the Gestapo and, 
Gerry it leaves its mark on you’.14  
 The initial public response to the programme was relatively muted, given that it attracted an 
estimated one million viewers. The BBC received eighty-seven phone calls, which as its Director of 
News and Current Affairs (DNCA), Richard Francis, observed was no more than would have been 
expected had the word ‘fuck’ been broadcast. 15  On 11 July, however, a letter from Lady Neave, 
addressed to the Director-General of the BBC, Ian Trethowan, expressing outrage at the appearance of 
her husband’s killers on television, was published in the Daily Telegraph. Showing a distinct lack of 
sensitivity, the BBC had failed to warn Diana Neave of the forthcoming interview. The Tonight staff 
had managed to contact the Neave family, but they had decided not to inform her, believing that she 
would not be watching television that night.16 In her letter, Lady Neave wrote that ‘the decision to 
transmit the interview betrayed the traditional standards of British broadcasting’.17 As the grieving 
widow, Diana Neave claimed the moral authority to mourn without the affront of seeing the INLA on 
television and given scope to justify their actions.18 The BBC’s disregard for her feelings triggered 
protests from the press and politicians of all parties. Thatcher was furious. Addressing the House of 
Commons the following day, she stated: ‘I am appalled it was ever transmitted and I believe it reflects 
gravely on the judgement of the BBC and those responsible’.19 The Attorney-General, Michael Havers, 
was ordered to review the programme and advise on what legal action could be taken against the BBC. 
Reflecting on the INLA interview following the implementation of the broadcasting ban in 1988, 
Sunday Telegraph journalist Andrew Dickinson noted the extent of Thatcher’s anger at Tonight: ‘A 
 
12 BBC WAC, N12/127/1, Northern Ireland Advisory Committee, extract from Tonight, broadcast 5 July 1979, 4, cited 
in Savage, The BBC’s Irish troubles, 204. 
13 Paul Routledge, Public Servant, Secret Agent: The elusive life and violent death of Airey Neave (London: Fourth 
Estate, 2002); Savage, The BBC’s Irish troubles, 204. 
14 Anne McHardy, ‘A brave man who sought the Ulster challenge’, The Guardian, 31 March 1979. 
15 In the face of widespread criticism, the BBC’s Audience Research Department carried out a survey to determine how 
the public viewed the Tonight programme. The 207 respondents were shown the programme and then asked to read a 
sample of the criticism levelled against it. Eighty per cent of participants in the study thought it was right to transmit the 
programme, despite the fact that half of them had participated in the survey a few days after the assassination of Lord 
Mountbatten. The survey also showed that after seeing the interview audiences tended to exhibit a more hostile attitude 
towards the terrorists and a more favourable view of the Army and Airey Neave. BBC WAC, R78/1189/1, Northern 
Ireland Civil Disturbances 1980-1983, Extracts from the Minutes of a News and Current Affairs Meeting, 9 September 
1980; BBC WAC, R78/1189/1, Northern Ireland Civil Disturbances 1980-1983, Extracts from the Minutes of a News 
and Current Affairs Meeting, 5 February 1980; Richard Francis, ‘Speech to the Broadcasting Press Guild on 12 July’, 
The Listener, 19 July 1979; Richard Clutterbuck, The Media and Political Violence, (London: Macmillan Press, 1983), 
112.  
16 Savage, The BBC’s Irish troubles, 205. 
17 Daily Telegraph, 11 July 1979 cited in Curtis, Ireland The Propaganda War, 164; Savage, The BBC’s Irish troubles, 
205. 
18 Savage, The BBC’s Irish troubles, 205. 
19 Daily Telegraph, 12 July 1979 cited in Curtis, Ireland The Propaganda War, 164. 
98 
colleague of Mrs Thatcher remembers her repeating over and over again the words, ‘I will never forgive 
them’. She meant the broadcasters not the terrorists’.20 
Three months after the INLA controversy, the BBC’s Panorama team began work developing 
a programme on the evolution of Irish republicanism and the current make-up of the Provisional IRA, 
its aims and tactics.21 Whilst in Ireland they took the opportunity to film an IRA roadblock outside the 
village of Carrickmore, County Tyrone.22 In accordance with editorial guidelines, the incident was 
reported to the RUC, as well as senior management at the BBC, however, the team failed to inform 
Northern Ireland Controller, James Hawthorne. Hawthorne learnt of the incident a week later at a dinner 
with civil servants. This oversight was used as ammunition by the government to argue that the 
Corporation was dysfunctional and had lost control of its journalists.23 In reality, neither the government 
nor the security forces wanted broadcasters digging too deeply into goings-on in Northern Ireland. 
Whilst it put pressure on the BBC to exclude the footage from the programme, the government was 
anxious not to draw public attention to the incident. Carrickmore was just eleven miles from a British 
army base and six miles from a RUC/ UDR barracks. The fact that the IRA were able to make a show 
of force under the nose of the security forces was highly embarrassing.24  
In early November, journalist Ed Moloney, however, had accidentally stumbled across the 
story. Writing in the Dublin magazine, Hibernia, on 8 November he described Panorama’s visit as ‘one 
of the IRA’s most spectacular propaganda coups to date’.25 In London, the Financial Times quickly 
took up the story. The reaction was one of outrage. Newspapers accused the BBC of being duped and 
described the incident as ‘treason’. Labour leader, James Callaghan, alleged that the BBC had stage-
managed the event, conspiring with the IRA in order to manufacture a more sensational news story.26 
When the Prime Minister heard about the incident according to one senior official, she went ‘scatty’. In 
an address to the Commons, she called for the BBC to ‘put its house in order’.27 Once again, the matter 
was referred to the Attorney-General and an inquiry into the BBC’s conduct launched. Special Branch 
obtained a warrant to search the Corporation’s Lime Grove premises, on suspicion that the Director-
General had articles, which could be evidence of offences under the PTA. During the search, police 
found and confiscated the raw film taken at Carrickmore. This was the first time in its history that the 
BBC had been forced to turn over untransmitted film; a serious breach of the Corporation’s 
independence.28  
 
20 Andrew Dickson, ‘Mrs Thatcher’s Revenge’, The Sunday Telegraph, 23 October 1988 cited in Edgerton, ‘Quelling 
the “Oxygen of Publicity”’, 116. 
21 When the programme had originally proposed to develop the programme, it had been rejected because of the 
assassination of Lord Mountbatten, as well as the Warrenpoint attack in which eighteen British soldiers had been killed 
on 27 August. (Savage, The BBC’s Irish troubles, 215). 
22 Ibid., 216-234. 
23 Ibid., 220. 
24 Curtis, Ireland The Propaganda War, 165-7. 
25 Hibernia, 8 November 1979 cited in Curtis, Ireland The Propaganda War, 166. 
26 ‘Fury over IRA ‘TV stunt’’, Daily Express, 9 November 1979. 
27 Hansard, House of Commons debates, 8 November 1979, Vol. 973, col. 607 quoted in Savage, The BBC’s Irish 
troubles, 222. 
28 BBC WAC, R104/234/1, Evening Standard, 13 November 1979, cited in Savage, The BBC’s Irish troubles, 224. 
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To bring the BBC to heel, Thatcher used her influence over appointments to stack its Board of 
Governors, traditionally a bi-partisan body, in her favour, establishing greater political control over the 
Corporation. In 1980, she appointed George Howard as Chairman, and then in 1983 Stuart Young, 
brother of one of her favourite ministers. Peter Goodwin has argued, however, that both Howard and 
Young went ‘native’, proving themselves supportive of the Corporation’s traditions, therefore it was 
not until 1986 and the appointment of Marmaduke Hussey as Chairman that the effects of Thatcher’s 
interference resulted in any substantial change in the BBC’s practices. 29  Even so, the INLA and 
Carrickmore affairs undermined the trust that had existed between the Board of Governors and BBC 
Management. The Governors tried more and more to intervene in programme making.30  
This level of governmental interference was exacerbated by the BBC’s financial problems. 
Thatcher used the licence fee as a threat to try and tame the BBC. By the early 1980s, a decline in 
‘natural’ revenue (money generated through an increase in television ownership, the shift to colour 
licences etc.), combined with rising production costs and increased competition from commercial 
networks meant that the BBC was struggling with rising debts.31 An increase in the licence fee needed 
the support of Thatcher’s government, which was ideologically opposed to the idea of a publicly funded 
body.32 The government had already broached the possibility of introducing advertising in order to 
offset public expenditure.33 The parlous state of the BBC’s finances was a convincing argument against 
unnecessarily antagonising Thatcher’s government.  
The Attorney-General eventually decided not to prosecute the BBC over the INLA and 
Carrickmore affairs. Nonetheless in a letter to the Chairman, Michael Swann, he warned that ‘I should 
like to make clear that I regard conduct of the nature which took place as constituting, in principle, 
offences under section 11, as well as abhorrent, and unworthy of the high standards the public expects 
of the BBC’.34 Senior management dismissed the warning as nothing more than a ‘finger-wagging 
exercise’, although the Panorama programme was shelved and the Director-General, Ian Trethowan, 
refused permission for the film to be included in any other programme.35 Responding to a request in 
January 1980 from Panorama producer Roger Bolton to use the footage, he stated that ‘I am afraid for 
us to do so would be seen as a political gesture which is a luxury we must deny ourselves’.36 Richard 
 
29 Peter Goodwin, Television under the Tories: Broadcasting Policy 1979-1997 (London: British Film Institute, 1998), 
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33 Savage, The BBC’s Irish troubles, 226. 
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Francis surmised, whilst the practical situation had not changed, the atmosphere has become ‘much 
more clouded’.37  
The INLA and Carrickmore controversies served as reminders of the real possibility that 
journalists could be prosecuted under the PTA, inducing broadcasters to be increasingly cautious about 
reporting on paramilitary activities. This served only to further the self-censorship already practiced by 
the BBC and ITV. Both broadcasting bodies reasserted and tightened their guidelines regarding 
coverage of Northern Ireland. At the BBC, staff were instructed that the Northern Ireland Controller 
must be consulted on all programmes on Northern Ireland and the Republic.38 The result was the stifling 
of innovative and creative journalism about the province, whilst interviews with republicans became a 
thing of the past. The INLA interview was the last time any representative of a republican paramilitary 
organisation appeared on British television until the early 1990s. Political, financial and legal 
circumstances combined to influence programme producers to comply with the government’s demands. 
Despite this unpromising state of affairs, an analysis of current affairs programmes from the early 1980s, 
particularly those covering the hunger strikes, shows that broadcasters continued to produce searching 
and insightful coverage of events in Northern Ireland.  
The 1980 and 1981 hunger strikes were to pose new challenges for the British media. The 
prison protests internationalised the conflict, attracting media attention worldwide. Unsurprisingly, the 
government were anxious to control the narrative as presented on television and so renewed pressure 
on domestic broadcasters to follow the government line and present the hunger strikers as criminals 
rather than political actors. Senior management at the BBC and ITV cautioned their staff to exercise the 
utmost care when reporting on events in Northern Ireland. Both broadcasting bodies warned that all 
programme items about the hunger strikes were to be set in context. This not only meant highlighting 
the crimes the protesters had been convicted of, but drawing attention to the IRA’s continued campaign 
against the security forces, and its fatal consequences.39 Programme-makers from both broadcasting 
bodies took note, producing programmes which emphasised the strikers’ violent pasts, but which also 
explored their motives and examined grassroots support for the prisoners, giving voice to a spectrum of 
opinions on the protests.  
One key example is Granada’s World in Action ‘The H-Block Fuse’, broadcast on 24 
November 1980.40 The programme explored the motivations behind, and reactions to, the hunger strikes. 
Comprising of a series of interviews with politicians and public figures, including SDLP leader Gerry 
Fitt, Minister of State for Northern Ireland Michael Alison, and Deputy Commander of the UDA John 
McMichael, it sought to represent the full range of perspectives on what was happening in the Maze 
 
37 BBC WAC, Extracts from the Minutes of a News and Current Affairs Meeting, 5 August 1980. 
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prison. The programme notes the widespread support amongst the nationalist community for the hunger 
strikers, showing footage of Anti H-Block demonstrations. What is most notable about this footage is 
the diversity: men, women and children from across the socio-economic spectrum participated in these 
marches. Such images seemed to convey a sense of Catholic unity, something the Republican movement 
vigorously promoted; however, the programme’s interview with Gerry Fitt showed that the reality was 
far more complicated. Despite his nationalist politics, Fitt opposed the hunger strikes; drawing attention 
to victims of republican violence, he argued that granting Special Category Status would only provide 
justification for further violence. Loyalist reactions were more predictable, narrator Chris Kelly 
describes how the hunger strikes had resurrected a deep-rooted fear amongst Protestants of resurgent 
republicanism. These fears had resulted in an increase in loyalist paramilitary activity. John McMichael 
warned World in Action that the UDA was prepared for a ‘final confrontation’. Asked what this meant, 
he remarked ominously: ‘If the hunger strikes lead to a breakdown of law and order, the Protestant 
paramilitary organisations will have to go into the Republican areas and take out their leadership’.41 
The programme’s showpiece, however, was an exclusive interview with hunger striker, 
Raymond McCartney; the only one of its kind to have taken place. The voices of the hunger strikers 
were usually absent from coverage of the prison protests, their motives and ideology interpreted by a 
third party, because access to the prison was limited. World in Action had been given special permission 
to film the prison and prisoners by the NIO in an attempt to defuse tension and debunk any accusations 
of ill-treatment.42 The programme offers a rare view inside the Maze prison and unique footage of the 
hunger strikers and blanketmen.  
At the behest of the NIO, the interview was restricted to a single question: ‘You and your 
colleagues have been convicted of murders and bombings, why should you have any special treatment?’. 
Nevertheless, it gave McCartney the opportunity to explain the prisoners’ motives and political 
philosophy:      
The whole system in Northern Ireland both special arrest, special 
court system without jury, has proved to us beyond all doubt that 
these courts are set to convince people that we are criminals, which 
we are not. We are a product of a political trouble in Northern 
Ireland and the reason why we went on hunger strike is because after 
four years of long protesting in which we embarked on the dirty 
protest, after long talks between Cardinal Ó Fiaich and Bishop 
Edward Daly, we felt that our position had to be highlighted and the 
only way we felt [this could be done] is by hunger strike. I, and my 
six comrades, are prepared to go through with this and we are 
prepared to die to prove that we are special prisoners and our five 
basic demands are just.43 
In defiance of the limitations imposed by the NIO, additional notes written by McCartney were 
smuggled from the prison and read out on the programme. These described his early experience of the 
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‘Troubles’, his recruitment to the republican movement and time in prison. Their inclusion demonstrates 
the creative ways in which broadcaster circumvented the authorities’ efforts to dominate the narrative 
forwarded by the media.  
In providing a voice for the hunger strikers ‘The H-Block Fuse’ offered a republican 
perspective, which challenged official narratives seeking to present the hunger strikes in criminal rather 
than political terms. The prisoners’ view of themselves as political players was at the centre of their 
protest, and by stressing their political motivations they sought to claim legitimacy for themselves and 
the republican movement as a whole.44 Though the intention of the programme producers was to 
improve the audiences’ understanding of the reasons behind the protest, the McCartney interview 
provided a platform for the hunger strikers to put forward their position. The footage of McCartney and 
the blanketmen gave the protest a human face. The artist Richard Hamilton, whose diptych painting The 
Citizen (1981-3) depicts the blanket protests, observed, that the footage of men on the blanket offered 
‘a strange image of human dignity in the midst of self-created squalor’. Hamilton also notes how the 
prisoners’ long hair, beards and bare chests adorned with the crucifix, conjured up ideas of Christian 
martyrdom, which did not match the ‘oft declared British view of the IRA as thugs and hooligans’.45 
The prisoners’ use of their own naked bodies in their protest emphasised their humanity. This created 
the potential for the viewer to feel empathetic towards the protesters. The view of the hunger strikers as 
human contrasted with the government’s presentation of them as heartless criminals and made it harder 
for audiences to accept the possibility that the government would allow them to die. By promoting these 
images, the programme offered a more complicated perspective on the prison protests, raising serious 
questions about the morality of the British government’s policy towards the hunger strikes. 
 This is not to suggest, however, that Granada sympathised with prisoners convicted of acts of 
violence. In fact, ‘The H-Block Fuse’ went to considerable lengths to emphasise the hunger strikers’ 
violent pasts. In their assessment of the Granada programme, the BBC’s Board of Management noted 
‘for a ‘World in Action’ this has been unusually carefully balanced’.46 By way of introducing the 
McCartney interview, narrator Chris Kelly listed all the hunger strikers, their crimes and sentences. He 
then gave an exhaustive account of McCartney’s criminal history, describing in detail McCartney’s 
involvement in the fatal shooting of Derry businessman, Jeffrey Agate.47 In their coverage of the hunger 
strikes both ITV and the BBC gave particular attention to the suffering of the victims of republican 
violence to balance their coverage of the protests and forestall accusations that they were providing the 
IRA with a propaganda platform.48 ‘The H-Block Fuse’ also drew attention to members of the prison 
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services killed by the IRA in an assassination campaign which ran alongside the prison protests.49 In 
one scene, the camera pans over the photographs of eighteen prison officers killed over the course of 
the four-year protest, before cutting to footage of blanketmen laughing and shouting pro-IRA slogans. 
The juxtaposition of these images served to remind the audience that the protesters were members of an 
organisation that not only sanctioned murder but was able to make light of it.  
 The programme’s coverage, however, provided some explanation for McCartney’s violent past 
by examining his family background and early experiences of the conflict. It implies that McCartney’s 
involvement with the IRA was a consequence of his early exposure to the ‘Troubles’. In his smuggled 
note, the hunger striker describes how his grandfather, who had been a member of the IRA in the 1920s, 
had instilled in him militant republican values. McCartney wrote: ‘From an early age my grandfather… 
used to tell us little folklore stories and that someday Ireland would be a beautiful country, but this could 
not be until it was free’. McCartney goes on to describe his adolescence, growing up amidst the violence 
that marked the early days of the ‘Troubles’. When he was fourteen, he experienced first-hand the 
August 1969 riots, which in Derry, resulted in a three-day siege of Catholic areas, as nationalists fought 
the RUC and B-Specials in what became known as the Battle of the Bogside. In January 1972, 
McCartney’s cousin, James Wray, was shot dead by British soldiers on Bloody Sunday. The programme 
draws a direct link between these early experiences and McCartney’s engagement in paramilitary 
activities, noting that it was immediately following Bloody Sunday that eighteen-year-old McCartney 
enlisted in the IRA. In October 1972, he was arrested and sentenced to six months imprisonment for 
possession of ammunition. McCartney’s parents told World in Action of their surprise: ‘I was shocked 
because he was at college, he’d come home at 4 o’clock, and he was studying until about 8 or 9 o’clock 
at night’.50 
  The programme zeroed in on the impact of the hunger strike on McCartney’s parents, 
particularly his mother. Switching emphasis to the effects on the prisoner’s families, allowed 
broadcasters to highlight the human cost of events unfolding in the Maze. It also allowed for a degree 
of empathy towards the prisoners’ families whom the programme presented as victims. Mrs McCartney 
seemed reconciled with her son’s decision, telling the interviewer: ‘I must abide by my son’s wishes 
and if he thinks he can do good for the rest of the boys sitting on the protest, well then I must accept it’. 
Asked whether her son’s death would achieve anything, however, Mrs McCartney remarks: ‘That 
remains to be seen’.51 This suggestion of doubt indicates that the McCartneys were not wholly at ease 
with the republican party line. Its inclusion in the programme was designed to raise questions amongst 
viewers as to the validity of the protest. ‘The H-Block Fuse’ was not alone in suggesting the dichotomy 
between the political and the personal aspects of the strike. As observed in the previous chapter, The 
Guardian also provided details of the hunger strikers’ families and their experiences of the ‘Troubles’. 
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By offering glimpses into their upbringing, both the press and television created the impression that the 
hunger strikers’ violent pasts were a consequence of their childhood experiences.52 Both the press and 
broadcast media hypothesised that the strikers would not have committed these crimes but for the 
political environment in which they had grown up. Neither contemplated that the strikers had become 
involved in violence of their own volition. By denying the prisoners’ agency the media avoided 
scrutinising the motives of individual paramilitaries and therefore what role Britain might have in 
leading them to violence. Instead they offered a view of the hunger strikers as much victims as 
perpetrators; which ran counter to the government’s portrayal of them as violent criminals solely 
responsible for the ‘Troubles’.  
 Responses to ‘The H-Block Fuse’ were mixed. True to form, the McCartney interview caused 
outcry amongst politicians. The leader of the UUP, James Molyneaux implored the Prime Minister to 
ban the programme remarking that: ‘There is great indignation in Northern Ireland at this potential 
further publicity to be given by the media to these hunger strikers’.53 John McMichael’s threats to 
‘eliminate’ the IRA leadership also attracted criticism.54 John Cousins, spokesperson for the Alliance 
party, accused the UDA of ‘making a public declaration of war against the Catholic population’, though 
he praised World in Action for ‘the first serious attempt by television to explain the problems of Northern 
Ireland in a balanced way’.55 In this instance, anger was directed at the NIO for having allowed the 
McCartney interview in the first place. Once again, the BBC’s Board of Management observed that the 
NIO had ‘been kicked by the Prime Minister for its pains’.56 As the protests persisted and a second 
hunger strike commenced, the BBC and ITV continued to report from the Maze. The World in Action 
team, however, were the last journalists, let alone television crew, officially allowed into the prison. 
 The criticism levelled at ‘The H-Block Fuse’ was far from atypical. Throughout the early 1980s 
broadcasters came under constant fire as a result of reports on the hunger strikes. The most common 
accusation directed against the BBC and ITV was that they concentrated on the prison protests at the 
expense of covering other news stories.57 Despite the abundance of detailed coverage on the hunger 
strikes, there is evidence that British audiences felt increasingly disengaged with events in Northern 
Ireland. In the week preceding, and five weeks following, the death of Bobby Sands, for example, the 
BBC Management Unit in London reported that they alone had received 118 letters, fifty of which were 
complaining that there had been too much coverage of Sands, whilst fifty-eight complained that there 
was too much coverage of Northern Ireland generally.58 Director-General, Ian Trethowan, observed in 
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May 1981: ‘There existed on the mainland a deep sense of frustration and hostility towards the Irish 
situation’.59 Nonetheless, broadcasters contended that so long as Sands’ story remained newsworthy 
they had a duty to cover it.60  
 Many republicans on the other hand, argued that the broadcast media intentionally downplayed 
the prison protests, a view which has also been advanced by Curtis. Echoing the republican stance, she 
argues that the British media ‘treated the Hunger Strikes as if it had been concocted out of thin air by 
the IRA: as if there were no real feeling behind either the prisoners’ actions or the support given them 
by the nationalist community’. She contends that the media repeatedly invoked the concept of IRA 
propaganda to explain away events and cast the protest in a light flattering to the British government.61 
To support her arguments, Curtis references ‘The Politics of Suicide’, broadcast by Panorama on 27 
April 1981, in which reporter Philip Tibenham argued that the hunger striker Bobby Sands’ ‘impending 
death has been seen for what it is- a potentially tragic end to a skilful piece of exploitation and 
propaganda’. 62 Curtis fails, however, to mention the rest of the programme’s content, or to take into 
consideration any of the other numerous television programmes on the hunger strikes. Tibenham’s view 
that the IRA leadership was merely exploiting the hunger strikers for propaganda purposes was one 
widely held and propagated by the British media. As discussed in chapter three, the press presented the 
hunger strikes primarily as a publicity stunt. Broadcasters also questioned the validity of the strike and 
the autonomy of its participants. ‘The Provos’ Last Card?’, broadcast by Panorama on 21 September 
1981, presented an IRA document which explicitly stated that volunteers were forbidden to undertake 
hunger strikes without ‘the express sanction of General Headquarters’. The programme also featured an 
interview with Gerry Adams, in which reporter Peter Taylor challenged claims made by the Vice-
President of Sinn Féin that the hunger strikes were a prison-led initiative, arguing that in their support 
for the prisoners’ actions the IRA had sanctioned the protests.63 Nonetheless, current affairs coverage 
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also looked beyond the IRA’s involvement, scrutinising both the motives for, and reactions to, the prison 
protests, presenting a much more complicated view of the hunger strikers than as mere puppets.  
 Far from suggesting that the IRA had concocted the strikes from nothing, current affairs 
programmes often provided a history of the prison protests, as well as Irish hunger protests generally, 
offering audiences clear evidence that the hunger strikes were the culmination of a long-running 
dispute.64 That Curtis should claim that the British media presented the hunger strikes as lacking support, 
however, is particularly misleading. On the contrary, it could be argued that, unable to access the prison, 
television programmes paid a disproportionate amount of attention to the nationalist communities’ 
response to the protests. By restricting access, the NIO had sought to control the flow of information 
out of the Maze and render the strikers invisible, thereby limiting the scope for alternative perspectives 
on the protests. Broadcasters, however, rose to the challenge, supplementing official press releases with 
images, witness accounts and material artefacts to construct their own narrative of the protests.65  
A key source of information was the prisoners’ families. Their accounts offered an insight into 
the trauma of the hunger strikes and provided a republican perspective. ‘The Waiting Time’, broadcast 
by TV Eye on 30 April 1981, for example, featured an interview with Oliver Hughes, brother of hunger 
striker Francis Hughes, in which he describes his brother’s condition:  
I sat on the bed and you know I put my hand along his body and 
he’s just nothing, only bones and whenever he looks at me, he sees 
six of me. He has a lot of headaches. If he drinks water, he 
automatically vomits it up again. I suppose no man can put a time 
on any man’s life, but seven/ eight days perhaps. We’re sad, but 
we’re proud that we have a brother and a son who’s prepared to die 
for his country.66 
In so doing, he bore witness to his brother’s suffering, and allowed audiences to visualise the effects of 
starvation on the men lying in the Maze.67 More than this, by expressing his families’ pride in Francis’ 
willingness ‘to die for his country’, Hughes valorised his brother’s actions with language of sacrifice 
and patriotism. The family also utilised the opportunity to reinforce the strikers’ message that they were 
willing to die for the republican cause.   
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 As Erika Hanna has argued, however, lacking footage from the prison the media largely 
presented the 1981 hunger strikes in terms of their impact on the streets of Belfast and Derry.68 News 
reports about them were commonly accompanied by images of riots and demonstrations. As a result, 
current affairs coverage gave considerable thought to the depth of popular support for the prison protests 
within the nationalist community. ‘The Waiting Time’ goes on to explore the likely response to the 
death of Sands and the other hunger strikers.69 Reporting from Belfast, journalist Peter Gill asked 
whether events in Derry the week before, where troops had been attacked with Molotov cocktails and 
acid bombs, were ‘A foretaste perhaps of more trouble to come’.70 The potential seriousness of the 
situation was illustrated by footage of the effects of the previous week’s violence. Moreover, the 
programme presented the reaction of moderate Catholics as of equal concern. It featured footage of an 
Anti H-Block rally led by Marcella Sands and Bernadette Devlin. The camera pans over the crowd 
showing the extent of popular support for the strikers. Notable is the number of women and children 
amongst the demonstrators, their presence in direct contradiction of the government’s assertions that 
the IRA was supported only by a radical fringe within the nationalist community, as the British 
government had often claimed.71 
 On 7 May 1981, the BBC’s Newsnight programme featured a special segment covering the 
funeral of Bobby Sands.72 The programme followed Catholics from Sands’ constituency as they made 
‘the republican pilgrimage’ to Belfast. Through a series of interviews with those travelling to the funeral, 
the programme captured the strength of grassroots nationalist support for the hunger striker, especially 
amongst young people in Northern Ireland. One fifteen-year-old girl told reporter Brian Walker that she 
had played truant in order to attend. Walker observed that ‘the hunger strike is breeding a whole new 
generation of militant republicans’.73 Fear that young people, angered by the deaths of the hunger 
strikers, were being recruited into the IRA was a recurring theme in press and broadcast media’s 
coverage of the early 1980s. Both expressed concern that the government’s handling of the hunger 
strikes had helped bolster the IRA by alienating young Catholics. 
 Footage of the crowds at Sands’ funeral underlined the extent of nationalist feeling further. In 
the interest of balance, Newsnight juxtaposed images of the much smaller counter-commemoration for 
those killed by IRA violence, held outside Belfast City Hall. The programme followed widow Alice 
Smith, whose son had been killed by republican paramilitaries two months earlier, as she attended the 
memorial, laying a wreath at the cenotaph. This personal touch served to remind audiences that Sands 
had represented a murderous organisation. By contrast, the unionist commemoration also demonstrated 
the strength of support for the hunger strikers. As Walker remarked: ‘Whatever distractions offered by 
Mr Paisley, they could have made no impact in West Belfast as the coffin reached the spot where 
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republicans made their last demonstration for Bobby Sands’. Newsnight filmed the full ‘display of 
republican pomp’, a bold choice given the pressure on broadcasters to refrain from allowing the IRA 
airtime. Particularly striking are the images of the IRA gun salute over the coffin. Walker remarked 
disapprovingly that this public show of illegal IRA activity had gone unchallenged. He argued that the 
IRA had staged this display in the street ‘as a bolder show of strength and an act of greater defiance of 
the authorities’. Aware that they would be televised worldwide, the IRA carefully choreographed the 
funerals to emphasise their influence, and to show the Catholic community united in support of the 
hunger strikers.74 Given the tone of the programme, Walker concludes by unexpectedly casting doubt 
on this notion of Catholic unity: ‘there remains the Catholic community divided within itself, as sharply 
alienated from the Protestants and the British as at any time in twelve long years’.75 
 Taken at face value, images of these set-piece funerals might be misconstrued as providing a 
one-dimensional view of the effects of the protest, giving the impression that the Catholic community 
was unanimous in its response to the hunger strikes. Reactions to the prison protests amongst Northern 
Ireland’s Catholics were actually varied and motivated as much by humanitarian concerns as republican 
sentiment. The British broadcast media was keen to demonstrate that alternative viewpoints existed. 
This is best illustrated in ‘The Provos’ Last Card?’. Broadcast following the death of Michael Devine 
on 21 August 1981, it explored the effects of the hunger strikes on the body politic in Northern Ireland, 
paying particular attention to their impact on the Catholic community.76 The programme reveals a range 
of feeling concerning the hunger strikes amongst Northern Irish Catholics. It argues that Britain’s 
handling of the strikes had ‘turned muted support into violent hostility’.77 Recruitment to the IRA, Peter 
Taylor disclosed, had doubled in the months since the start of the second hunger strike, a boost he 
warned that could sustain their campaign for a further ten years. Moreover, the strikes had intensified 
republican feeling amongst moderates, as evidenced in the elections of H-Block candidates to 
Westminster. ‘The Provos’ Last Card?’ argued that the election had secured them ‘political credibility 
undreamt of before the hunger strikes began’.78  
 The programme however, sought to dig deeper, dissecting the nature of support for the hunger 
strikers. It contended that sympathy for the strikers amongst moderate Catholics, did not automatically 
mean sympathy for the IRA. Rather, much of the electorate had voted for H-Block candidates because 
they did not wish to witness them die. The programme claimed that though many moderate Catholics 
empathised with the hunger strikers’ plight, they openly condemned the IRA’s campaign, and the riots 
which followed the death of each hunger striker. Taylor pointed out that many were unwilling to 
participate in Anti H-Block marches and demonstrations, because they believed them to be futile and 
dangerous. Increased violence had led to outright opposition to the hunger strikes from some sections 
of the Catholic community. On 21 September 1981, the SDLP openly condemned the strike, calling for 
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the nationalist community to ‘unite with one voice behind one just demand… stop the murder’.79 The 
‘Provos Last Card?’ explored the extent to which this criticism reflected the views of the wider Catholic 
community. It features an interview with a resident of the Creggan estate (Derry) who described the 
misery the upsurge in IRA violence had caused:    
It’s really been the worse time I remember… the last six months 
people really lost heart completely, they’ve really been down, 
couldn’t see an end to the rioting, hunger strikers were dying, and 
they could see no light at all at the end of the tunnel.  
The programme hides the identity of the interviewee, who argued that many who shared her views were 
too scared to vocalise their opposition. The necessity of disguising their source served to impress upon 
the viewer the seriousness of the IRA threat. ‘The Provos’ Last Card?’ drew attention to the negative 
effects of violence on nationalist support, demonstrating a range of views held by Northern Irish 
Catholics with regards to the hunger strikes. The programme’s title was an ironic challenge to 
Thatcher’s assertion that the hunger strikes were the Provisionals’ ‘last card’. Instead it emphasised the 
strength of Catholic nationalist support for the protesters in the Maze, giving voice to fears that the 
hunger strikes had recruited a new generation to the IRA. On the other hand, the programme 
demonstrated that Catholic attitudes towards the hunger protests were far more nuanced than they might 
appear at first glance. The programme underlined the fact that most moderate Catholics remained 
opposed to the violence, and in some cases the strikes themselves. By highlighting differences of 
opinion within the Catholic community, audiences were offered hope that the boost to IRA prestige was 
limited.80   
Support for the hunger strikers extended far beyond Northern Ireland. Current affairs 
programmes focused on support in the Republic of Ireland and explored the possible implications for 
Anglo-Irish relations. By the early 1980s, the British government had come to recognise the necessity 
of Irish involvement in a Northern Ireland settlement.81 Through a series of summits held in 1980 and 
1981, both countries looked to develop a stronger relationship with the aim of resolving the ‘Troubles’, 
resulting in the establishment of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council in November 1981, and in 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985).82 Britain had much at stake in a successful outcome of these talks, 
which was strongly dependent on the political climate within the Republic. Naturally, therefore, 
broadcasters gave considerable attention to contemporary Irish politics in current affairs coverage, 
recognising that the extent to which the Irish government had to pay lip service to republican sentiment 
would determine the spirit in which talks could continue.  
The tension caused by the hunger strikes contributed substantially to uncertainty surrounding 
the talks. The prison protests attracted renewed sympathy from the Irish public, who had been broadly 
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apathetic to the Northern Irish situation.83 As historian Stephen Kelly has argued, ‘for the first time in a 
generation’ the Republic’s population was compelled ‘to consider their attitude to continued British 
presence in Northern Ireland and the Irish government’s perceived inability to influence London’s 
modus operandi in relation to the ongoing ‘Troubles’’.84 Brian Hanley, however, warns against over-
exaggerating the extent of popular support, arguing that though the prison protests undoubtedly 
generated sympathy their political appeal was limited.85 With the death of each hunger striker, support 
in the Republic became increasingly active. On the evening of Sands’ death, a thousand people gathered 
outside the General Post Office in Dublin for a vigil, before marching to Leinster House to demand the 
expulsion of the British ambassador. The demonstrators, by this stage approximately three thousand-
strong, then marched to Parnell Square, where a breakaway group of about two hundred began rioting, 
throwing stones at the Garda and smashing windows. Following Francis Hughes’ death, demonstrators 
attacked the British Embassy causing the Garda to mount a baton charge against them.86 ‘A Time for 
Compromise’, broadcast on 20 July 1981, includes striking footage of violent clashes between H-Block 
demonstrators and Gardaí which took place on 18 July. In one shocking scene, the camera zooms in on 
an old woman as she tries to escape the crowd, whilst around her baton-wielding Gardaí attacked 
protesters.87 The programme suggests that the fact that Dublin was now experiencing this level of social 
unrest was an indication of how difficult the situation in Northern Ireland had become. There was also 
the implication that if the Republic of Ireland could suffer from this degree of violence as a result of the 
actions of an organisation whose principal aim was for a united Ireland, then the ‘Troubles’ in the North 
could not be wholly attributable to mismanagement by the British government.   
Rather than explore the motives behind the Anti H-Block demonstrations, however, current 
affairs coverage concentrated solely on the implications the protests might have for Anglo-Irish relations. 
Broadcasters expressed fear that the spread of violence would force Irish politicians to adopt an anti-
British stance in order to appease republican sentiments, scuppering the new spirit of co-operation 
between London and Dublin and, with it, hope of a solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland. As 
Jeremy Paxman summarised in ‘The Time for Compromise’:  
Smouldering resentment in the Irish Republic has turned to outright 
hostility. For the Irish government not only does this jeopardise 
relations with London, it also threatens to undermine the stability of 
the Irish Republic itself… The government most fear that if 
established politicians can’t get a solution to the hunger strikes then 
people may increasingly turn to paramilitary politicians.88  
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Paxman feared that the Republic could succumb to militant republicanism, resulting in a breakdown of 
law and order, turning it into a haven for paramilitaries and making combatting the IRA in the North 
almost impossible. Similarly, commenting on the footage of 18 July, which also featured in ‘The Provos’ 
Last Card?’, Peter Taylor focused on the potential consequences of the strikes for the Republic’s 
political stability: 
this is what Irish politicians fear, behind the hunger strike and Sinn 
Féin lie violent emotions… in July the Republic tasted the street 
violence, which the border has usually confined to the North… This 
is the destabilisation the Republic fears if the hunger strike is not 
resolved.89 
At the same time, the British broadcast media sought to downplay the extent of support for the 
hunger strikers in the Republic. On 11 June 1981, hunger striker Kieran O’Doherty and blanketman 
Paddy Agnew were elected to the Dáil. Northern Irish politician and leader of the SDLP, John Hume, 
argued that the result proved that Northern Ireland was a serious matter in the minds of Southern 
voters.90 In contrast, broadcasters made light of the H-Block’s electoral success. ‘South of the Border’, 
broadcast on 18 June 1981, analysed the impact of the H-Block victory on Irish politics and explored 
the views of politicians and the public in the South on the hunger strikes and the issue of Northern 
Ireland in general. It argued that whilst the hunger strikes had forced the issue of Northern Ireland onto 
the Irish political agenda, unemployment and inflation took precedence for most voters. The programme 
endeavoured to explained away the election of O’Doherty and Agnew as a humanitarian, rather than a 
political response by the electorate. This is illustrated by the inclusion of footage of Goretti McDonnell, 
the wife of hunger striker and election candidate Joe McDonnell, canvassing with her children. Goretti 
argued that voting for the hunger strikers could save their lives and stressed the personal impact that 
McDonnell’s death would have on his family by introducing potential voters to her children. As Tuohy 
argued, the H-Block’s campaign purposely ‘appeal[ed] to humanitarian values and family feeling’.91  
Hume, also interviewed on the programme, noted that the H-Block campaign had targeted the 
border areas of Louth, Cavan and Monaghan, where traditional support for the IRA allied to proximity, 
meant that voters tended to be more engaged with events in the North. The programme sought to imply 
that the vote was not representative of wider attitudes in the Republic; a view given credence by voters 
on the streets of Dublin who, asked by Tuohy how Northern Ireland had influenced the way they had 
voted, were unanimous in their belief that it was none of their concern. By minimising the significance 
of republican electoral successes, the programme sought to further undermine the strikers’ claim to 
widespread popularity. It also offered reassurance that Irish politicians would not need to cater to 
republican demands for a united Ireland and would continue to engage in talks with the British 
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government. The programme also offered a nuanced perspective on the Republic of Ireland, challenging 
the notion that all Irish people were hard line republicans, sympathetic to the IRA.92  
In actuality, the H-Block victory was to have a significant impact on Irish politics, at least in 
the short term. The election of the two prisoners caused Fianna Fáil to lose their majority, resulting in a 
hung parliament. Fine Gael eventually succeeded in forming a coalition with the Labour party, but its 
precarious majority meant that a by-election resulting from the death or resignation of the Anti H-Block 
candidates would upset the balance of power in the Republic. Current affairs programmes followed the 
election carefully, because, as Denis Tuohy noted: ‘for Britain and Ireland, the attitude and political 
strength of Ireland’s next Taoiseach will be vital elements in the next round of Anglo-Irish talks on the 
question of Northern Ireland’.93 ‘South of the Border’ closely analysed the Fine Gael leader, Garret 
Fitzgerald’s Northern agenda for insight into how the potential new Taoiseach would approach the issue 
of Northern Ireland and the Anglo-Irish initiative.94 The programme interviewed John Kelly, who 
became Minister for Trade, Commerce and Tourism, looking for reassurances that Fitzgerald would 
continue talks. Kelly argued that, unlike their predecessors, Fine Gael believed the solution to Northern 
Ireland lay with persuading the Protestant majority to accept a united Ireland, rather than searching for 
a solution from Margaret Thatcher.95 Nonetheless, Fitzgerald, in a speech featured on the programme, 
promised that he was committed to continuing talks with London, despite declaring his intention to 
‘convey to Mrs Thatcher that her present attitude risked alienating an entire community in Northern 
Ireland’.96 ‘South of the Border’ expressed optimism that whatever the outcome of the Republic’s 
political stalemate, the next Taoiseach would continue to co-operate closely with the British government.  
Similarly, ‘Thatcher’s Other Island’, broadcast on 23 November 1980 by Weekend World, had 
scrutinised Fitzgerald’s predecessor, Charles Haughey’s stance on Northern Ireland.97 The programme, 
transmitted in the run up to the Dublin Summit, explored the Conservative government’s policy on 
Northern Ireland and the influences which had shaped it, particularly the pressure which had been 
brought to bear by Haughey and his government. Fianna Fáil had recently won a by-election in Donegal 
by appealing to the republican sentiments of the electorate. Reporter Mary Holland explained, the 
‘Troubles’ had more immediacy for people in the border constituency, who often worked, did their 
shopping and so forth in Northern Ireland. Many of them had voted for Fianna Fáil in the belief that it 
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programme also presented the border constituency as unrepresentative of the wider electorate in the 
Republic. It explores the extent to which republican posturing by Fianna Fáil during the Donegal by-
election, reflected their broader policies, and how this might influence the upcoming Summit. The 
programme argued that the Taoiseach had focused on the Northern Ireland question in a bid to distract 
voters from the party’s poor record on unemployment and inflation and predicted that the issue of 
Northern Ireland would be used in the same way during the forthcoming general election. The 
programme’s expectation was that further pressure would be brought to bear on Britain to rethink 
Northern Ireland’s constitutional status in order to placate Irish voters, however, it was confident that 
Britain would not withdraw its guarantee that Northern Ireland would remain a part of the UK unless 
the majority chose otherwise. 98  Though the programme acknowledged Haughey’s republican 
credentials, including his alleged involvement in the Arms Crisis of the late 1960s and early 1970s, it 
also presented Haughey as a political opportunist, questioning the degree of political conviction behind 
his republicanism.99 By suggesting that there was a strong element of expediency in Haughey’s politics, 
the programmes argued that the Taoiseach would set aside traditional republican aspirations in order to 
fully engage with the Anglo-Irish talks.  
‘Thatcher’s Other Island’ was not alone in suggesting that support for a united Ireland in the 
Republic amounted to little more than verbal republicanism. On 10 April 1980, BBC’s Newsweek series 
broadcast a programme on the strength of the Irish republican tradition, particularly in the Republic of 
Ireland.100 The programme was the first in a two-part series which also explored the strength and roots 
of Loyalism.101  The series is yet another example of current affairs programmes endeavouring to 
provide background to the conflict. The first programme traced the history of Irish republicanism from 
the 1798 rebellion to the present day, before turning to examine the current make-up of the republican 
movement, its’ aims and its’ visions for the future. It argued that in the past it had been easy for Irish 
politicians to vocalise support for a united Ireland as they could not do anything about it whilst 
sovereignty remained with Britain. The violence in Northern Ireland, and Dublin’s increased 
involvement in the search for a solution, however, had forced politicians to take a more definite stance. 
As Hanley has argued, whilst sympathy for Catholics in the North was a given, ‘faced with the reality 
of war, the Republic seemed to recoil’.102 As a result, the programme argued, many Irish politicians, 
whilst they continued to call for a united Ireland, prioritised peaceful and political methods to establish 
a settlement. The programme’s scepticism that few people in the Republic were willing to actively 
pursue a united Ireland was echoed by republicans in Northern Ireland. This was illustrated in the 
programme by the inclusion of an interview with prominent Northern Irish political activist Eamonn 
McCann in which he remarked: ‘Fianna Fáil leaders make militant speeches about Northern Ireland and 
the only people who believe it are the Loyalists’. By casting doubt on the extent of solidarity with 
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republicans in the North, the programme provided a reassuring narrative that Dublin would work with 
Britain towards a solution to the Northern Ireland conflict.103 
Predictably, the Anglo-Irish talks excited considerable alarm amongst the loyalist population 
in Northern Ireland who objected to any involvement by Dublin in the province. These fears, 
exacerbated further by the mobilisation of the Catholic community in support of the hunger strikes, 
resulted in an upsurge in loyalist paramilitary activity during the early 1980s. Savage has argued, that 
in an effort to counter-balance the extensive coverage of the hunger strikes the BBC produced several 
programmes about the threat of militant loyalism, but that the hunger strikes monopolised airtime.104 It 
is nevertheless important not to undervalue the significant amount of coverage afforded to the increase 
in loyalist activity. As the number of programmes in this sample that concentrate exclusively on 
loyalism suggest, broadcasters viewed this subject as worthy of serious investigation. In the early 1980s, 
both the BBC and ITV produced a range of programmes, which explored loyalism in Northern Ireland, 
with specific emphasis on loyalist opposition to the Anglo-Irish talks.  
Historian Alan Parkinson has argued that throughout the ‘Troubles’, television coverage of the 
loyalist perspective focused on the negative associations of loyalism with bigotry, intransigence, and 
recalcitrance, at the expense of analysis into the loyalist psyche.105 There is much in the programmes of 
the early 1980s to support Parkinson’s arguments. Current affairs coverage during this period 
concentrated on assessing the extent of the loyalist threat and what it might mean for the Anglo-Irish 
talks. By drawing heavily on stereotyped, negative images of loyalism, broadcasters sought to underline 
their dissension to the joint initiative between the two governments. Whilst this could be interpreted as 
oversimplistic, programmes also looked beyond the usual stereotypes to the motives behind loyalist 
activity. These detailed programmes on loyalism provided audiences with a more rounded picture of 
the animosity and ideologies which fuelled the conflict and demonstrated that the British media was 
capable of providing a sophisticated overview of the ‘Troubles’.  
In contrast to the coverage of the hunger strikes, however, broadcasters during the early 1980s 
paid little attention to grassroots loyalism. Coverage of the loyalist perspective primarily focused on the 
extreme attitudes of unionist political leaders. 106  Ian Paisley in particular, received considerable 
attention. ‘Thatcher’s Loyal Rebels’, broadcast on 9 April 1981 by TV Eye, examined the Protestant 
majority’s opposition to the Dublin Summit and assessed the likelihood of an increase in loyalist 
violence if Thatcher continued to pursue closer relations with Dublin.107 The programme explained that 
many Protestants feared that these talks represented a conspiracy to force Northern Ireland into a united 
Ireland. It argued, moreover, that some Unionist leaders were exploiting Protestant fears for political 
gain. In particular, ‘Thatcher’s Loyal Rebels’ accused Paisley of stirring up Protestant opinion against 
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the British government in a bid to become the dominant political force in Northern Ireland: ‘Paisley 
hopes to gain the undisputed leadership of Protestant Ulster’, and warned that he might employ other, 
more violent, strategies if the Anglo-Irish talks continued. The programme featured footage of the 
Carson Trail, organised by Paisley to show loyalist strength and impress upon the British and Irish 
governments that if Northern Ireland’s constitutional status was compromised, loyalists could, and 
would, defend their right to remain in the United Kingdom.108 The film included a short clip, which 
showed Paisley and his supporters marching on Hillsborough Castle where Margaret Thatcher was 
staying in March 1981. The segment was cut short, however, because as reporter Peter Gill explains 
‘the less genteel of Dr Paisley’s supporters knocked our lights out, not for the last time that night’. The 
presence of these unsavoury characters amongst Paisley’s entourage is presented as evidence of his 
militant loyalism.109 It also featured footage of Paisley’s final rally outside Stormont, at which he 
threatened an escalation of loyalist militancy, alluding to his plans for a volunteer militia, the Third 
Force. The programme vocalised fears that Paisley’s campaign would ultimately result in confrontation 
with the British security forces.110 
Though ‘Thatcher’s Loyal Rebels’ evoked the loyalist threat, the programme questioned the 
true extent of Paisley’s appeal, noting the low turnout at rallies. In Paisley’s hometown of Ballymena, 
where the DUP had expected eight to ten thousand people to attend, Gill observed that at most there 
had been three thousand. The programme was particularly anxious to mitigate any fears that Paisley had 
won over moderate Protestant opinion. It interviewed Rev. Houston McKelvey, editor of the Church of 
Ireland Gazette, which was vocal in its opposition to Paisley’s campaign. The programme presented 
McKelvey as representative of a moderate Protestantism in Northern Ireland rarely heard outside the 
province and sought reassurance in his dismissal of the suggestion that Paisley had come to represent 
broader Protestant feeling. The programme also featured an interview with James Molyneaux, the leader 
of the UUP, who likewise rejected the possibility that his party’s moderate brand of unionism was being 
eclipsed by Paisley. Despite Molyneaux’s threats to sabotage government efforts to involve Dublin in 
Northern Ireland, the programme presented the UUP as the lesser threat. It chronicles the party’s efforts 
to combat Paisley’s popularity, exemplifying Parkinson’s argument that ‘hopes that the ‘sensible 
majority’ would eventually replace the existing stubborn leadership was a constant theme in British 
media analysis of the loyalist position’.111 By endeavouring to navigate the subtle variances in the 
response of the DUP and the UUP to the talks, the programme shows an appreciation of the nuances 
within the unionist political perspective. 
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Much of the coverage from this period played down the threat posed by militant loyalism, in 
order to protect the potential provided by the Anglo-Irish talks. Not satisfied with merely dismissing 
Paisley’s popularity, the producers of ‘Thatcher’s Loyal Rebels’ actively sought to repudiate his 
campaign, ridiculing him and his supporters with the use of traditional stereotypes associated with 
loyalism, such as overzealous religious fervour. For example, Gill describes DUP stronghold, and 
Paisley’s native town of Ballymena as a dour place where council workers chain up the swings on 
Sundays, ‘so that children can’t defile the Sabbath by enjoying themselves’.112 The accompanying 
image of a dejected boy still trying to play on the immobilised swing lent support to these arguments. 
By associating Paisley with these images, the programme dismisses him as the voice of unreason, 
thereby limiting his capacity for disruption.       
These scenes also highlight the confused relationship between loyalists and their British 
identity. Gill implies by his tone that such puritanism was incomprehensible to most British viewers, 
contributing to a sense that Northern Ireland was ‘a place apart’. As discussed in chapter two, throughout 
the ‘Troubles’ the broadcast media propagated the view of Northern Ireland as politically and culturally 
different from the rest of the UK. This allowed the conflict to be presented as specific to the province 
rather than Britain.113 Loyalist bigotry, and intransigence were presented by broadcasters as in direct 
contrast with British values of fair play and tolerance. Despite loyalist insistence on their Britishness, 
by emphasising the un-Britishness of their attitudes the programme’s producers disassociated loyalists 
from what it meant to be British. The irony in the programme’s title, ‘Thatcher’s Loyal Rebels’ drew 
attention to the contradictory nature of the loyalists’ identification with Britain and its government. This 
sense of dissociation presented in the programme fed the notion of Northern Ireland as alien. Again, it 
can be argued that this emphasis on difference reveals more about what programme-makers considered 
it meant to be British, than what they understood by Northern Irish loyalism.114   
In the vein of ‘Thatcher’s Loyal Rebels’, ‘Prior Commitment’, another TV Eye presentation 
broadcast on 26 November 1981, portrayed Paisley as ambitious and self-serving. The programme 
reports on the funeral of the UUP MP Robert Bradford, who had been assassinated on 14 November, 
one in a wave of IRA killings, that had provoked fear amongst Protestants. The programme, however, 
argued that Paisley was again exploiting these fears, hijacking the funeral to hold an impromptu press 
conference to publicise his agenda. As reporter Llew Gardiner wryly observed: ‘Here mourning and 
propaganda walk together to the graveyard’. ‘Prior Commitment’, also raised the spectre of Loyalist 
violence, featuring footage of Paisley’s ‘Day of Action’ (23 November 1981), organised to protest the 
Anglo-Irish talks and pressurise the British government to take a harder line against the IRA. The 
programme included shots of the first full demonstration of strength by the Third Force which took 
place in Newtownards that night. Once again, TV Eye sought to undermine Paisley by not taking him 
and his supporters entirely seriously. Gardiner poked fun at ‘the militia’ describing them as ‘a cross 
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between a football crowd and the Ulster division of Dad’s Army’.115 Behind the levity, however, there 
was a more serious purpose; through ridicule the programme’s makers sought to use their platform to 
undermine these opponents of the Anglo-Irish talks. There was a genuine concern that despite the 
posturing, Paisley was a significant factor in creating an atmosphere, which others could exploit to 
promote a view that political violence was an acceptable option.     
Many within the loyalist community were similarly dismissive of Paisley. In an interview 
featured in ‘The Preacher and the Peacemaker’, broadcast on 23 November 1981, Andy Tyrie, the 
Commander of Northern Ireland’s largest loyalist paramilitary organisation, the UDA, accused Paisley 
of having a loud mouth and a siege mentality: 
He creates the impression right around the world that every 
Protestant living here looks like Dr Paisley, and that’s the sad thing 
on our part because we’re not like that, we’re understanding people, 
we’re not bigots, we’re trying to work out a system that suits all the 
community.116      
Tyrie’s comments reflect the increased cynicism felt by the UDA towards unionist politicians, 
particularly the DUP leader, following the humiliation of Paisley’s failed strike in 1977, and an 
inclination to engage in more moderate politics to solve the conflict. They also demonstrate an 
awareness that the media was propagating negative stereotypes of Unionists and show that Tyrie was 
concerned that Loyalists were losing the propaganda war, in large part due to Paisley. By connecting 
Paisley alone to these stereotypes, Tyrie sought to disassociate himself from them, presenting the UDA 
as a reasonable organisation intent on peace. The programme failed to highlight the UDA’s record of 
violence and bigotry. The focus of ‘The Preacher and the Peacemaker’ was Taoiseach Garret 
Fitzgerald’s peace plan and Paisley’s opposition to it. Tyrie praised Fitzgerald for his conciliatory 
approach to Northern Ireland, which had included relinquishing the Republic’s territorial claim on the 
North and challenging some of the Republic’s laws to make them more acceptable to Northern 
Protestants, such as those restricting access to contraception. Paisley dismissed Fitzgerald’s initiative 
as a ‘devious plan of treachery’, whilst Tyrie commended his bravery, voicing support for better 
relations between the North and the Republic. Programmers were quick to accentuate the UDA’s low 
opinion of Paisley, in a bid to further soothe any fears that he commanded the support of all Protestants.  
 Tyrie and the UDA’s derision of Paisley and the DUP were indicative of deep divisions within 
loyalist ranks. Throughout the ‘Troubles’, animosity between Unionists was subject to considerable 
television scrutiny.117 ‘Unionist Disunity’, broadcast by the BBC’s Nationwide on 23 November 1981 
explored different loyalist factions and their rival approaches to the war against the IRA. The 
programme argued that Loyalist groups were divided not over what they were fighting for, but what 
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form the fight should take. Although Nationwide profiled all five loyalist paramilitary groups, it focused 
primarily on the UDA and the newly formed Third Force. It featured interviews with both Paisley and 
John McMichael, who explained their different strategies for dealing with the IRA. The programme 
noted that the UDA had boycotted the ‘Day of Action’, staging their own separate show of strength, 
and asks why the organisation did not support Paisley. McMichael argued that Paisley was merely sabre-
rattling, remarking scathingly that: ‘People like Ian Paisley shouldn’t march people up and down hills 
and when they get to the top refuse to fight and walk away. People who wave firearms certificates and 
bandoliers at the end of the day will not do the fighting’.118 He contends that the only way to defeat the 
republican paramilitaries was to seek out individual members of the IRA and assassinate them.  
 The programme does not allow McMichael’s comments to go unchallenged, documenting 
UDA violence and in particular, its activities during the UWC strike of 1974, which displayed a 
ruthlessness capable of being extended towards its own members. The programme observed that 
Loyalist paramilitaries were responsible for at least 600 of the 2500 deaths resulting from the conflict. 
It reports that astonishingly, though the UDA was responsible for most of these murders, it had not been 
proscribed. Liz Curtis has argued that the British media suffered from selective amnesia when it came 
to loyalism, downplaying loyalist violence and implicating the IRA in attacks carried out by loyalist 
paramilitaries. 119  Certainly, some programmes failed to satisfactorily tackle the issue of loyalist 
violence, however, not all. ‘Unionist Disunity’ for example, faithfully documents the part that loyalists 
played in the conflict. Similarly, ‘The Waiting Time’, broadcast by TV Eye on 30 April 1981, 
highlighted the threat of loyalist paramilitary violence, featuring footage of the UDA staging a trial 
mobilisation on the sectarian divide in West Belfast. The programme implied that this behaviour had in 
turn led to an increase in IRA activity, as ordinary Catholics looked to paramilitaries for protection. To 
support this argument, it featured footage of a Sinn Féin meeting called to organise contingency plans 
in an event of a Loyalist attack. The film had included footage of two IRA men calling for those present 
at the meeting to ‘mobilise in the face of ominous threat from certain paramilitaries who are 
sympathetically regarded by the sectarian RUC and backed up by the British war machine’. The scene 
was removed before transmission at the IBA’s insistence. Rather than what this threat meant for the 
people of Northern Ireland, both programmes focused on the impact an escalation in the violence would 
have on the British government and security forces. Peter Gill in ‘The Waiting Time’ remarked that 
‘Any clash between the Republican and Loyalist communities will leave Britain in the middle, 
attempting to separate the two’. He presented the two communities as feeding the conflict through their 
tit-for-tat responses, and the British as caught between them, neglecting to acknowledge Britain’s role 
in exacerbating tensions for example through its handling of the hunger strikes. 120  Similarly, in 
‘Unionist Disunity’, the producer’s primary concern was how far both the UDA and the DUP’s Third 
Force would risk a direct confrontation with the British security forces. It concludes that despite their 
differences ‘the Protestant Army could fight; all it would need would be the right issue for it to unite 
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and mobilise’. The programme considered whether the uncertainty generated by the Anglo-Irish talks 
and the recent upsurge in IRA violence would be enough to unite Loyalist factions.121   
 ‘Unionist Disunity’ also attempted to probe deeper into the Loyalist psyche, in an effort to 
explain the appeal of loyalist paramilitary groups. It features an in-depth interview with Acker Gillespie, 
a forty-five-year-old Protestant from North Belfast and a member of the UDA, seeking to understand 
why he was prepared to bear arms for the right to remain British. Acker argued that under Catholic rule, 
Northern Irish Protestants would be denied religious freedom and civil liberties. He explained that he 
was British, his children were British, and he would take up arms to defend his right to remain British. 
Interestingly, the programme alludes to a link between Acker’s unemployment and his membership of 
the UDA. This provides further evidence of journalists engaging with the broader socio-economic 
factors behind the conflict; although admittedly the programme fails to fully explore the influence of 
unemployment on paramilitary recruitment. By featuring Acker’s story, the programme provides clear 
insight into the motives that inspired rank and file members of the loyalist paramilitary, aiding audiences’ 
in their understanding of this aspect of the conflict.122  
 Throughout the 1980s, the BBC and ITV continued in their efforts to produce innovative 
programmes, which examined the ‘Troubles’ often in the face of widespread political disapproval. One 
notable example is the BBC’s Real Lives documentary ‘At the Edge of Union’, scheduled for broadcast 
on 7 August 1985, which profiled DUP politician Gregory Campbell, and Sinn Féin MP Martin 
McGuinness. The programme explored the two politician’s daily lives, filming them both at home and 
carrying out constituency business.123 The appearance of McGuinness, who was at the time believed to 
be the IRA’s Chief of Staff, was considered highly provocative by the British government. Home 
Secretary, Leon Brittan, immediately moved to prohibit the broadcast, stating that it gave ‘an immensely 
valuable platform to those who have evinced an ability, readiness and intention to murder 
indiscriminately its own viewers’.124 As David Miller has argued, the BBC’s greatest sin had been to 
film McGuinness at home with his children. In doing so, the programme served to humanise 
McGuinness, presenting him as a legitimate politician rather than hardened terrorist.125 Ignoring the 
recommendations of senior staff, the BBC Board of Governors voted to ban the film, attracting 
widespread criticism for submitting to government pressure. Consequently, more than 2,000 BBC 
journalists and staff staged a 24-hour strike on 7 August. Under pressure, the Board of Governors agreed 
to lift the ban, and the programme was broadcast on 16 October with the addition of a 20-second 
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sequence showing the victims of Bloody Friday.126 The programme was to attract an audience of 4.8 
million.127  
 The 1980s proved an extremely difficult time for broadcasters attempting to provide impartial 
and informative coverage of the Northern Ireland conflict. Despite clamorous threats from the 
government, however, programme-makers found creative ways to circumvent restrictions imposed by 
the authorities and produce footage which illustrated a spectrum of opinions on events in Northern 
Ireland.  
 The 1980 and 1981 hunger strikes added weight to the pressure brought to bear on broadcasters. 
The British government, facing mounting international outrage, placed renewed pressure on the BBC 
and ITV to support their assertions that the hunger strikers were no more than criminals. Broadcasters, 
whilst ensuring that the prison protests were set in the context of the IRA’s continuing campaign of 
violence, produced numerous programmes, that critically explored the role of all sides in the prison 
protests. This gave voice to alternative perspectives which challenged the official line and raised serious 
questions about the government’s policy with regards to the hunger strikes. The BBC and ITV have 
been criticised in republican circles for downplaying the support garnered by the hunger strikers, 
whereas in actuality, both broadcasting bodies diligently focused their attentions towards the effect of 
the protests on the streets of Northern Ireland. This was in part forced on them by the difficulty in 
accessing the Maze prison, although as a result current affairs programmes encapsulated the divergent 
attitudes within the nationalist community towards the hunger strikers.  
 This was also true of their reportage of the loyalist reactions not just to the hunger strikes but 
developments in Anglo-Irish relations during 1980 and 1981. Current affairs programmes produced by 
both the BBC and ITV demonstrated a range of opinions and divisions within the loyalist community. 
Although, broadcasters frequently drew on long-standing stereotypes of loyalist bigotry and 
intransigence, they also explored the motives behind the activities of key unionist politicians and 
paramilitaries, providing a much-needed insight into the loyalist psyche.  
 Throughout the early 1980s, both broadcasting bodies strove against the limited interpretation 
of events that the government wished them to disseminate, instead they offered a nuanced and complex 
coverage of the ‘Troubles’. They not only provided British audiences with detailed analysis of key 
developments within the conflict, but also examined the historical background and sought to establish 
the broader context to events in Northern Ireland, providing an additional dimension by examining the 
effects of the conflict on the Republic. 
 The events unfolding in Northern Ireland during the early 1980s, including the hunger strikes 
and the Carson trails, were first and foremost media events. Television programmes were therefore 
understood to be of vital importance as to how they were interpreted around the world. The BBC and 
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ITV continued to produce cutting-edge, critical current affairs programmes, presenting the views of all 
sides in the conflict including those of the terrorists despite the government’s best efforts to silence 
them. It is testament to the fact that they were largely successful that the Thatcher administration was 


















Chapter Five: The Irish in Britain during the 1970s and 1980s. 
The spread of IRA violence to English cities during the early 1970s was met with widespread public 
outrage, the difficulty in identifying the bombers caused hostility which was directed at the Irish 
population living in Britain. The Irish as a whole came to be associated with the IRA, and as a result 
were often the subject of suspicion, abuse and surveillance. This was to affect the way in which many 
Irish people interacted with the British population and how Irishness was displayed within British 
society. Through its coverage of the conflict, the media played a significant role in constructing a link 
in the public mind between the Irish in Britain and the IRA. Many Irish people were aware of the part 
played by the media in the surge of anti-Irish feeling. Irish activist organisations which emerged in the 
early 1980s, as a response campaigned extensively against perceived anti-Irish sentiment by the press 
and broadcast media. For these activists, the media routinely distorted coverage of events in Northern 
Ireland inflaming prejudice towards the Irish in Britain.  
 There has been a significant amount of research carried out on the experiences of Irish people 
living in Britain during the later twentieth century. The majority of this has focused on anti-Irish 
prejudice and the extent to which it can be considered in similar terms to other forms of racism. 
Sociologist Mary Hickman has argued that the Irish were presumed to have assimilated into British 
society and that the discrimination they experienced has been discounted as a result of their ‘whiteness’. 
She contends that ‘the dominant paradigm for understanding racism in Britain has been constructed on 
the basis of a black-white dichotomy’; and so despite considerable evidence that the Irish in Britain 
suffered disproportionately from ill-health, bad housing, unemployment and other exclusionary 
practices, the assumption that race is determined by skin colour means that the Irish have been denied 
recognition for the discrimination they may have suffered.1 In a similar vein, Máirtín Mac an Ghaill has 
argued that racial theorists had tended to ‘over-racialis[e]’ non-white ethnicities, denying the possibility 
of white groups being considered as racialised minorities. He argued that a multi-faceted understanding 
of the racialisation of Britain’s Irish population could help develop a British sociology of racism and 
ethnicity, providing an opportunity to consider the processes of including or excluding ethnic minorities, 
as well as providing a means to explore interconnections between class, religion, gender, sexuality and 
race.2 It was within the context of this belief that Irish activist organisations campaigned for recognition 
as a separate ethnic minority. Scholars have since focused on bringing together empirical evidence of 
institutional and individual discrimination against the Irish, examining the experiences and responses 
of both first- and second-generation Irish in a wide range of areas. 
 In particular, scholars have focused on the effects of the ‘Troubles’ on the daily lives of 
Britain’s Irish population. Paddy Hillyard, Seán Sorohan, Sarah O’Brien, Barry Hazley, Breda Gray 
and Graham Dawson et al., have sought to examine the experiences of those Irish living in Britain 
 
1 Hickman, ‘Reconstructing deconstructing ‘race’’, 289; 298-9. See also Hickman and Walter, ‘Deconstructing 
Whiteness’, 5-19. 
2 Mac an Ghaill, ‘The Irish in Britain’, 137-47. 
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throughout the conflict and who as a consequence have been subject to hostility and surveillance.3 Most 
recently, Gavin Schaffer and Saima Nasar have returned to the debate surrounding anti-Irish prejudice 
by examining Irish experiences of hostility after the Birmingham bombings in 1974, and in this context 
have considered the extent to which Irish migrants were victims of racism. They argue that, especially 
during times of crisis, white groups in Britain were drawn into hierarchies of race. Though racism 
experienced by the Irish differed markedly from that experienced by black and Asian migrant 
communities, owing in large part to the Irish’s lack of visibility, Schaffer and Nasar observe that the 
‘Troubles’ prompted a rise in anti-Irish racism which homogenised the diverse Irish population into 
‘one troublesome mass’.4 
 Much of the work carried out on the Irish in Britain during the Northern Ireland conflict 
includes reference to the British media and its role in fuelling or amplifying anti-Irish racism. John 
Nagle, for example, in his study of the London-Irish remarked that with IRA violence in English cities, 
‘anti-Irish sentiment flourished, filtered by a complicit media only too willing to portray crude 
stereotypes and jokes of the “stupid and violent Irish”’.5 This simplistic view is symptomatic of a 
general failure amongst academics to complicate the way in which the media portrayed the conflict in 
Northern Ireland. Only by examining a broader spectrum of the media’s coverage of the ‘Troubles’ is 
it possible to fully understand how the violence was represented and how that impacted on the Irish 
living in Britain.  
 Sociologists Nickels et al., have made some progress in examining the media’s influence on 
the hostility experienced by the Irish as a result of the Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’. They argue that both 
the Irish and Muslim communities have been associated with terrorism and have therefore been 
constructed as ‘suspect’ by the British press. They assert that newspapers placed an onus on the Irish 
and Muslim communities to stand up against extremism and defend ‘British values’, positioning them 
simultaneously inside and outside of Britishness. 6 In order to assert what part both the press and 
broadcast media played in encouraging hostility and suspicion towards the Irish during the ‘Troubles’ 
a wider sample of the media’s coverage is required. An examination of the way in which Irish people 
responded to the media, and the hostility that was directed against them following IRA attacks in 
England, is also necessary in order to establish the scale of influence that the media had on the lived 
experiences of the Irish in Britain. 
This chapter will therefore seek to investigate how British media representations of the conflict 
in Northern Ireland, and the IRA’s bombing campaign in England, influenced the daily lives of Irish 
 
3 Hillyard, Suspect Community; Paddy Hillyard, ‘Irish People and the British Criminal Justice System’, Journal of Law 
and Society, 21, 1 (1994), 39-56; Seán Sorohan, Irish London during the Troubles (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2012); 
O’Brien, ‘Negotiations of Irish identity in the wake of terrorism’, 372-394; Hazley, ‘Re/negotiating “suspicion”’, 326-
341; Gray, ‘From ‘Ethnicity’ to ‘Diaspora’’, 65-88; Dawson, Dover and Hopkins, The Northern Ireland Troubles in 
Britain. 
4 Schaffer and Nasar, ‘The white essential subject’, 209-230. 
5 John Nagle, ‘Multiculturalism’s double bind: Creating inclusivity, difference and cross-community alliances with the 
London-Irish’, Ethnicities, 8, 2 (2008), 182. 
6 Nickels, Thomas, Hickman and Silvestri, ‘Constructing ‘suspect’ communities and Britishness’, 135-151; Nickels, 
Thomas, Hickman and Silvestri, ‘De/Constructing “Suspect” Communities’, 340-355. 
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people residing in Britain. It will draw on the extensive literature produced by Irish organisations, as 
well as interviews, carried out by Hickman and Walter, Sorohan, O’Brien and Scully with Irish people 
who lived in Britain during the 1970s and 1980s. The chapter begins by examining the resurgence of 
anti-Irish feeling in response to the IRA bombing campaign. It will argue that by constructing and 
propagating ideas of the Irish as ‘suspect’ the media contributed to the hostility and discrimination 
experienced by much of Britain’s Irish population in the early 1970s. The chapter then explores the rise 
in Irish political and cultural activism during the 1980s. It argues that a collective narrative of the Irish 
experience in Britain emerged, which has consequently informed how many individuals interpret their 
personal experiences. Part of this narrative was that the media was responsible for sustaining anti-Irish 
hostility within British society through the use of crude stereotypes and by distorting coverage of events 
in Northern Ireland. Finally, the chapter argues that the media’s perceived failings not only influenced 
Irish people’s attitudes towards the media, but has since been accepted without question by scholars, 
resulting in an over-simplified appraisal of the British media’s coverage of the conflict.   
  Throughout the twentieth century, Britain was the chosen destination for migrants leaving 
Ireland, both North and South. In 1971, the total number of Irish-born living in Britain peaked at 
approximately 957,000, a further 1,303,450 people in Britain had at least one Irish parent.7 The 1981 
census recorded 849,820 Irish people in Britain, by 1991 this figure had fallen to 837,464.8 Despite this 
slight decline, the Irish remained the largest migrant group throughout the late twentieth century.9 The 
Irish population was diverse, originating from across Ireland and including men and women from a 
wide range of religious, social and economic backgrounds.10 To treat the Irish in Britain as a single 
homogenous community as the media often has elides significant differences which existed within this 
population. 
 Nonetheless, as social scientist Breda Gray has argued, by the early 1970s the establishment 
of a number of Irish activist and cultural groups, including the Irish Post founded in 1970 and the 
Federation of Irish Societies (FIS) founded in 1973, prompted the growth of ‘a more self-conscious and 
coordinated Irish identity in Britain’.11 In contrast with the discrimination experienced by Irish migrants 
in the nineteenth century, by the mid-twentieth century, it appeared that the Irish, though still not fully 
accepted, were becoming a more integrated part of British society. The exclusion of the Irish from the 
1948 Nationality Act, which distinguished British subjects from Commonwealth citizens is often 
interpreted as representative of this growing tolerance. Even after the Republic of Ireland withdrew 
 
7 It should be noted that this last figure omits people whose parents were from Northern Ireland and includes people in 
Northern Ireland with parents born in the Republic of Ireland. Enda Delaney, Demography, State and Society: Irish 
migration to Britain, 1921-1971 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000), 264; Enda Delaney, ‘Directions in 
historiography Our island story? Towards as transnational history of late modern Ireland’, Irish Historical Studies, 
xxxvii, 148 (2011), 601. Hickman and Walter, Discrimination and the Irish Community in Britain, 19; Bronwen Walter, 
‘The Irish Community in Britain- Diversity, Disadvantage and Discrimination’, Runnymede Trust, 
https://www.runnymedetrust.org/bgIrishCommunity.html [accessed 24 July 2019]. 
8 Hickman and Walter, Discrimination and the Irish Community in Britain, 18. 
9 Enda Delaney, The Irish in Post-War Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 2. 
10 Hickman and Walter, Discrimination and the Irish Community in Britain, 31-5. 
11 The FIS was an umbrella organisation designed to provide cohesion between the different Irish societies in Britain; as 
such it was intended to be both non-sectarian and non-political. (Gray, ‘From ‘Ethnicity’ to ‘Diaspora’’, 71). 
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from the Commonwealth, the Act ensured Irish people in Britain continued to enjoy the rights of British 
citizens.12 During the 1960s, St Patrick’s Day parades had become a part of public life in numerous 
British cities, whilst Irish organisations and individuals showed an increased willingness to participate 
in British culture.13 Linguist Sarah O’Brien has argued that this emerging Irishness distanced itself from 
republican politics, prioritising instead Irish culture in an effort to challenge the historic association of 
the Irish with disorder and violence. 14  The reality was more complex than this, republican and 
nationalist politics were still practiced publicly in Britain. On 25 February 1972 for example, the Anti-
Internment League held a mass demonstration to protest against Bloody Sunday, by marching on 
Downing Street carrying coffins to represent the thirteen dead.15 As a rule, however, Irish organisations 
eschewed politics, fearful of attracting unwanted attention. This speaks to an awareness of the fragility 
of the ‘acceptance’ which the Irish had enjoyed. Although, high levels of Caribbean and South Asian 
immigration following the Second World War had drawn attention away from Irish migrants, the 
prejudice experienced by the Irish in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries remained close to the 
surface as became apparent with the onset of IRA violence. 
 IRA bombs in English cities in the early 1970s led to a resurgence of anti-Irish feeling in 
Britain. As one man observed: ‘the Irish get it both ways. We get the backlash and we’re in as much 
danger from the bombs as the English’.16 Speaking to the Sunday Times, he was referring to the physical 
and verbal abuse directed at the city’s Irish in the wake of the Birmingham pub bombings. The Irish 
living in Britain had experienced hostility in the aftermath of earlier incidents, but owing to the severity 
of the attack, the Birmingham bombings marked a turning point after which anti-Irish discrimination 
reached new levels. Despite calls from the police and politicians to refrain from striking out, in the 
immediate aftermath violence erupted targeted at the Irish. Petrol bombs were thrown at Irish pubs and 
shops in both London and Birmingham, whilst in Birmingham Irish factory workers were attacked by 
colleagues. The work force at over thirty factories across the Midlands went out on strike to protest 
against the IRA, Irish products were boycotted, and aircrew refused to handle flights to and from 
Ireland.17 Six Irishmen were arrested and charged with the bombings. Beaten into confessing and 
implicated by questionable forensic evidence, they were wrongly convicted in 1975 and spent sixteen 
years in prison before their sentences were overturned in 1991. This was just one of the miscarriages of 
justice which occurred in connection to the IRA’s bombing campaign in England.18 
 
12 Hickman, ‘Reconstructing deconstructing ‘race’’, 293-6; 303. 
13 Marc Scully, ‘Whose Day Is It Anyway? St. Patrick’s Day as a Contested Performance of National and Diasporic 
Irishness’, Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 12, 1 (2012), 120; O’Brien, ‘Negotiations of Irish identity in the wake 
of terrorism’, 379. 
14 O’Brien, ‘Negotiations of Irish identity in the wake of terrorism’, 378-9. 
15 Peter Wilby, ’91 injured in battle of Whitehall’, The Guardian, 6 February 1972; Sorohan, Irish London during the 
Troubles, 61. 
16 ‘Why the Provos brought their terror war to Britain’s cities’, The Sunday Times, 24 November 1974, quoted in 
McGladdery, The Provisional IRA in England, 94. 
17 ‘‘Revenge’ fire bomb hits a pub’, Daily Mirror, 23 November 1974; William Daniels, Paul Connew and Frank 
Palmer, ‘Backlash Fury at the Factories’, Daily Mirror, 23 November 1974. 
18 The Guildford Four, Maguire Seven and Judith Ward were all wrongfully imprisoned for terrorist offences.  
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 Similar hostility was directed against the Irish in the wake of other bomb attacks. Interviewees 
have highlighted the animosity towards the Irish in Britain following the assassination of Lord 
Mountbatten and the Brighton bombing. The Queen’s cousin was killed on 27 August 1979, along with 
his grandson and two others, when his boat was blown up off the coast of County Sligo. Five years later, 
in October 1984, the IRA targeted the Grand Brighton Hotel where the Conservative Party conference 
was taking place, killing five people.19 Interviewed in 1987, Father Owen O’Neill, a priest in Leicester, 
remarked that ‘the only time I can truthfully say I found any kind of opposition to the Irish… was after 
the Birmingham bombing and also [after] Lord Mountbatten was so brutally murdered’.20 Similarly, in 
an interview conducted by Hickman and Walter in 1995, one woman noted that: ‘Mountbatten, Hunger 
Strikes and Brighton, I could feel the anti-Irish hostility. Someone said, “They should go to Ireland and 
‘blow the lot up’”. I have had someone labelling me an IRA supporter because I am a Catholic’.21 
 For the most part, the backlash manifested itself in low-level hostility, which went unreported. 
Numerous interviews carried out by Hickman, Walter, O’Brien and other scholars describe how in the 
aftermath of an IRA attack participants found themselves social pariahs because of their ethnicity.22 
Frequently, anti-Irish feeling was expressed through social ostracism, which, as O’Brien observes, was 
difficult to quantify or articulate.23 Irish people were also to experience physical and verbal abuse. One 
woman, interviewed by Hickman and Walter, recalled being threatened and intimidated because she 
was Irish:  
This was a terrible time. All the Irish community was in shock and 
people reacted to them. I took my children to school and an English 
woman gave us verbal abuse. She said, ‘Why don’t you fucking go 
back?’.24  
The aggression this woman experienced exemplifies the way in which elements within British society 
viewed all Irish people as in some way responsible for the bombings and not belonging fully in Britain. 
The recollection of having been associated with IRA terrorism is a common theme that repeatedly 
surfaces in interviews with Irish people about their experiences of living in Britain during the 1970s. In 
another interview carried out by Hickman and Walter, a woman described how after the Birmingham 
bombings her neighbours had threatened to put a brick through her window: ‘If there is trouble, you are 
all tarred with the same brush’.25 Similarly, interviewed in 2006 by Gudrun Limbrick, Angela Gilraine, 
a second-generation Irish woman from Birmingham, recalled that ‘We got beaten up after the 
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bombings… All the kids were told not to speak to us… It’s like that with 9/11 now - it wasn’t all Muslim 
people who did that but it’s all Muslim people who get blamed for it’.26 The close association made 
between the IRA and the Irish in Britain meant that they became scapegoats on whom the public could 
focus their fear and anger. 
 As discussed in chapter one, the press, in particular, played an important role in constructing a 
link in the public mind between the IRA and the Irish in Britain. Newspapers presented the Irish 
population as harbourers of terrorists, either by intent or by their mere existence providing cover to IRA 
terrorists operating in England. The press emphasised the fact that many of the bombers had been 
established members of the Irish migrant population. The ambiguity over which elements supported the 
IRA, however, allowed blame to be applied to all. Accordingly, the Irish as a whole were reimagined 
as a potential threat. By propagating this association, newspapers stoked feelings of suspicion and 
therefore of hostility towards the Irish. 
 Many of those interviewed about their experiences of living in Britain during the ‘Troubles’ 
attribute the rise in anti-Irish feeling, at least in part, to the media. Interviewees frequently observed the 
negative way in which Irish people and issues were represented, particularly by the tabloid press:  
Some of them like the Sun newspaper and the News of the World 
of course they blackened all the Irish people at the time, as far back 
as I can remember, they tarred everybody, all of us, with the same 
brush. The more sensible newspapers had a lot better things to say 
about us. But it did, certainly, make us conscious of being Irish and 
people associating us with the violence that was going on.27   
This quote is from a conversation the author had in 2011 with an Irishman in Manchester and 
demonstrates an awareness of the role newspapers played in conflating the Irish with the IRA. The 
interviewee directly links the way in which the Irish were portrayed by the tabloids to the surge of anti-
Irish feeling as a result of the IRA bombings. Similarly, in an interview recorded by Hickman and 
Walter, the respondent observed that the tabloids had inflamed hostilities towards the Irish: ‘Well, you 
get a certain amount of anti-Irish feeling about, stirred up by gutter rags like the Sun. [I w]onder how 
Irish people can read the Sun’.28 Another remarked on how coverage of the Brighton bombing in 1984 
had presented all Irish people in a negative light: ‘After the Brighton bombing, in the press. I know 
there are things in the press, the tabloid papers - not exactly a correct image of Irish people’.29 
 Elements within the British media were aware of the hostility experienced by many Irish 
people in Britain following IRA attacks and the role they could play in moderating, rather than 
aggravating, this. Archival research undertaken at the BBC shows that at a meeting of the Corporation’s 
Board of Governors on 21 November 1974, Board member, Stella Clarke, highlighted the need ‘to guard 
against the building of public resentment against the Irish community in Britain’, observing that she 
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knew of three incidents in Bristol, where she was a City Councillor, when Irish people had been 
threatened.30 She expressed concern that the BBC regional news programme for the West of England, 
Point West, had been too soft-touch in interviewing a number of Irish suspects following an IRA bomb 
attack on the Embassy Gift Exchange on 29 July 1974 and argued that some suspects had been allowed 
to ‘make traitorous statements’, which had inflamed anti-Irish feeling generally. 31  The Board of 
Governors’ Vice-Chairman suggested that by increasing the number of Irish people on programmes 
talking about things other than the ‘Troubles’, the BBC might be able to show that not all people with 
Irish accents were IRA supporters.32 Following the Birmingham bombings, the BBC’s Editor of News 
and Current Affairs, Desmond Taylor, suggested that they address the backlash against the Irish in 
Britain by producing a story reflecting on what it meant ‘to be an Irishman in Birmingham at the present 
time’.33 Their concern was, to some extent born of a desire to tell all sides of the story, but it also 
reflected the belief within the BBC that it had a responsibility to use its platform to tackle discrimination 
and ignorance as part of its public service remit. It is not clear whether this show was ever produced, 
but its consideration indicates that the BBC was capable of sensitivity towards the welfare of the Irish. 
It also challenges the view which, as will be discussed, prevailed amongst Irish people in Britain that 
the media was anti-Irish.  
 The extent to which newspapers recognised the backlash against the Irish, however, varied. 
The Daily Telegraph, initially praised the public for its forbearance, erroneously reporting that ‘the 
explosions have not provoked any upsurge of feeling against the Irish community in Britain. Quite 
rightly, the public has drawn a clear distinction between the ordinary respectable Irish immigrant and 
the nationalist psychopaths responsible for mindless destruction’.34 After the Birmingham bombings, 
the paper repeated calls made by police and politicians to refrain from retaliation, but did little to defend 
the Irish or deter the hostility directed towards them.35 As previously observed, assertions made by the 
Telegraph and other newspapers that the majority of Irish people living in Britain were ‘innocent’ only 
underlined the fact that there was a deadly minority who were not, and augmented the notion that all 
were therefore potentially suspect. 
 In a cartoon published by the Daily Mirror on 24 June 1974, Ed McLachlan alluded to the 
discriminate targeting of the Irish by police. The paper’s front-page lead that day reported that Special 
Branch officers had established a connection between men working on important building sites across 
Britain and the IRA. As a result, detectives would be screening labourers at Sandhurst and Windsor 
Castle.36 The article is yet another example of how newspapers perpetuated the idea that the IRA had 
infiltrated Britain through the Irish population and contributed to the construction of all Irish people as 
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possible paramilitaries. McLachlan satirises this short-sightedness by depicting Foreign Secretary 
James Callaghan’s ‘arrest’; the arresting officer remarks ‘When you said your name was Callaghan, I 
thought ‘Hullo, hullo, hullo, that’s an IRISH name!’. Surnames, like accents, were a means by which 
the Irish, who otherwise were not visible, could be identified. An Irish surname therefore became 
imagined as a signifier of both Irishness and potential IRA membership. Consequently, it could attract 
hostility, regardless of the owner’s actual ethnicity. One woman recalled how after the Birmingham 
bombings English friends with Irish names had ‘received nasty letters and phone calls’.37 The cartoon 
(Figure 14) demonstrates an awareness that the police were targeting people simply because they were 
perceived to be Irish. Rather than challenge this behaviour, however, the cartoon presented it as a source 
of amusement, helping condone police’s behaviour and reinforcing the idea that all Irish people were 












Other newspapers, however, sought to shine a light on the abuse being suffered by Irish people 
living in Britain. On 1 December 1974, the Observer published an article by journalist and broadcaster 
Mary Holland, describing the hostility directed towards the Irish in London following the Birmingham 
bombings.38 Holland was of Irish descent and, as observed previously, had a reputation for being 
sympathetic to the republican cause.39 Her article demonstrates that at least part of the British press was 
concerned about the discrimination facing the Irish and that some effort, albeit minimal, was being made 
by newspapers to draw attention to it. Holland warned that if the Irish in Britain were alienated, they 
would be increasingly less inclined to co-operate and help bring the bombers to justice. Recounting how 
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one Irish publican in North London had been forced into hiding, so virulent were the threats being made 
against him, she observed how, as a result of the bombings, an identity, which was synonymous with 
republican violence, was being imposed on the Irish, the majority of whom had long since integrated 
into British society. She noted that in response many Irish people had adopted a low profile, avoiding 
going out or speaking in public. Holland recognised the detrimental effect the association with IRA 
terrorism had on the Irish population, she failed however to scrutinise the media’s culpability in 
cultivating this link. 
 More than public rancour, Holland argued, the Irish feared the potential impact of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA): ‘they do feel that the new measures isolate them as a suspect 
community’.40  Introduced in response to the Birmingham bombings in November 1974, the PTA 
extended the police’s power to arrest and detain, and gave them new powers to control the movement 
of people into Britain and Northern Ireland. It also gave the Home Secretary the power to exclude any 
person from living in any part of the UK. Whilst the Act would later be extended to tackle international 
terrorism, up until the mid-1980s it was primarily directed at dealing with Northern Ireland.41 In a letter 
to the Chief of Police in 1975, a Home Office official observed that the new exclusion orders only 
applied to those seeking to ‘influence public opinion or government policy with respect to affairs in 
Northern Ireland’, and not ‘terrorists of other persuasions’.42       
 The Irish had been subject to increasingly indiscriminate counter-terrorism tactics prior to the 
introduction of the new legislation. Following a spate of bombings in August 1973, the Sun reported 
that the police had ‘swoop[ed] on areas with large Irish communities’.43 The PTA, however, signified 
the legitimisation of the indiscriminate targeting of the Irish. As Hillyard has argued, the Act initiated 
‘one massive trawling operation’, designed to gather intelligence rather than apprehending terrorists. Of 
the 7,052 people detained under the PTA between 1975 and 1991, 86 per cent were released without 
further action being taken.44 As such, the majority of those detained under the Act were not targeted 
because they were genuinely suspected of terrorism but because of their ethnicity. People were arrested 
at ports and airports or in raids on their homes, often in the early hours, just because they were Irish. 
Once in custody they could be subject to police coercion, sleep deprivation, denied clean blankets, 
hygiene products or the right to contact lawyers and loved ones. This often had an adverse effect on 
their relationships with friends and could result in the loss of jobs.45  
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Little consideration was given to the effects of the new legislation on the Irish in Britain by the 
media, which had few reservations about the introduction of the PTA, or its potential for abuse. Even 
the Guardian, which might be expected to challenge such a breach of civil liberties, outraged by the 
bomb attack on Birmingham, adopted a hard line, arguing that: 
A liberal society cannot let its freedom, and its concern for the rights 
of the individual, be abused in order that it shall be torn to pieces. 
From now on anybody who complains that he is being harassed by 
the police bomb squad will find a less sympathetic audience. Our 
society is suffering murder and mutilation and it must protect itself. 
If this means closer surveillance of people suspected of sustaining 
the Provisional IRA in Britain then they must either act to free 
themselves of the suspicion or accept that infringement of their 
privacy is a small price to pay to prevent further terrorist outrages.46 
The assertion that people must ‘act to free themselves’ shows that the paper was aware that counter-
terrorism could bring people with no link to the IRA under scrutiny. It considered this as a minor 
inconvenience, however, when weighed against the benefits of averting further violence. An expectation 
was placed on the Irish in Britain to assert their innocence and prove themselves by publicly 
disassociating from the IRA.  
 The media, particularly the tabloid press, was in fact often complicit in the authorities’ policing 
of the Irish, newspapers frequently appealed to the public to report suspicious behaviour to the police: 
The police need every scrap of help and information that the public 
can give. 
Someone, somewhere, must have a suspicion - however tiny - that 
might give the police a lead.47   
Though they did not always specifically mention the Irish, their association with the IRA, which had 
been cultivated by the press, meant that readers would have interpreted these appeals as referring to 
them. A significant number of those detained under the PTA were brought to the authorities’ attention 
by members of the public.48 There are examples of similar appeals made in the early 1990s which 
specify that the public should be on the alert for Irish people acting suspiciously. In response to the 
attempted bombing of Canary Wharf in November 1991, for example, the Sun called on readers to 
inform the police if: ‘…you or a friend rented accommodation to someone Irish recently who had not 
returned in the past few days?’.49 Sister Sarah Clarke, an Irish-born nun who worked with Irish prisoners 
in Britain, recalled an announcement on the radio in the mid-1970s, encouraging the public to report 
anyone listening to traditional Irish music.50 These appeals reimagined Irish culture as a possible sign 
of republican militancy, and reinforced the idea that anything that could be deemed Irish was potentially 
suspect. This conflation of Irish cultural traditions and republican violence, created in part by the media, 
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meant that people were reported for singing. Father Patrick Mee, an Irish priest working in London in 
the 1970s, recalled how shortly after the introduction of the PTA, the London Irish Centre had hosted 
the County Associations dinner. Some of the guests had begun singing traditional songs and the 
neighbours had called the police, as a result ‘loads of special branch… raid[ed] the whole centre, they 
were looking for guns and bombs and all the rest of it’.51 Accordingly, many people in the 1970s 
eschewed Irish cultural activities, fearful of attracting attention to their Irishness. 
 Public demonstrations of Irish culture ceased in the face of hostility and police surveillance. 
The Birmingham St Patrick’s Day parade was immediately suspended following the pub bombings and 
was not held again until 1996, whilst in other cities celebrations were confined to ‘Irish areas’. The one 
exception was the Council of Irish Associations’ church parade, which continued in London despite 
facing considerable abuse from the public. 52  St Patrick’s Day and other forms of cultural 
associationalism continued to be celebrated behind closed doors throughout the 1970s. After 1974, even 
these private forms of cultural engagement were curtailed, in part because of an absence of spaces where 
Irishness could be expressed in a positive way. Following the bombings, the Birmingham Irish Centre 
closed, whilst other spaces were placed under police surveillance.53     
 It was not uncommon during this period for Irish people to refrain from participating in politics, 
Irish or otherwise, out of fear that they would attract the attention of the police. As one Northern 
Irishman stated: 
I think the important thing to bear in mind is the PTA, it created fear, 
and it would have affected my behaviour, I would have not done 
certain things, I wouldn’t have hung about with certain people, I did 
not want to get tarred with that brush. 
He remarked that though he had been involved in the Labour party, he’d avoided Northern Irish politics 
because he ‘didn’t want to get known as someone who was may be, in some way, connected with what 
was going on’.54 Such fears were not unfounded. Hillyard has argued that the PTA was used to deter all 
political activity; he has shown that information that a person was politically active could result in them 
being stopped under the PTA.55 Not only did the Act frighten people away from Irish politics, but it 
deterred them from becoming involved in any politics. As Father Bobby Gilmore, an Irish priest based 
in London, observed, the PTA ‘sought to prevent Irish people from expressing those opinions, which 
were of a political nature, peacefully’.56   
  The standard response by Irish people in Britain to the hostility was to ‘keep their heads down’ 
and conceal their Irishness. As one man remarked: ‘It just became second nature… that you didn’t a) 
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flaunt your Irishness or b) express any sympathies in a context that would be misunderstood’.57 In 
addition to avoiding politics and cultural activities, many Irish people sought to disguise their accents 
or refrained from speaking in public altogether in order to avoid negative attention. This has long been 
a strategy used by the Irish in Britain to deflect ridicule and discrimination and was resurrected in the 
1970s to avoid hostility.58As Nancy Lyons, an Irish nurse living in London, confessed: ‘When a 
bombing or anything like that happens I say, “Thank God for supermarkets”, because you don’t have to 
speak, you don’t have to ask for a loaf of bread’.59 Instead, many Irish people retreated into the 
comparative safety of all-Irish environments.  
 Irishness had become something private, leading to the temporary erasure of expressions of 
positive Irish identities from British society. At the same time as it discouraged people from 
participating in Irish activities, however, the hostility many experienced during the 1970s accelerated 
the formation of a revitalised, coherent Irish identity in Britain. As Schaffer and Nasar have argued, 
demonstrations of anti-Irish feeling in response to IRA bomb attacks ‘sharpened ethnic focus’. 60 
Confronted with their own ethnicity, people were compelled to reflect on what being Irish meant to 
them. The fact that many then took refuge amongst other Irish people, and Irish associational life, 
reinforced and reshaped ideas of Irish identity in Britain. This growing awareness of their Irishness 
would serve as a foundation for community activism in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which sought to 
assert the Irish as a recognised ethnic minority, and fight discrimination in housing, employment, 
education and the media. 
*** 
 The 1980s saw a resurgence in Irish political and cultural activism in Britain. Whilst many 
continued to ‘keep their heads down’, there emerged a growing number of Irish people willing to 
challenge their status within British society, and generate a more positive narrative of Irish identity, 
than one proscribed by association with IRA violence. A plethora of new organisations and groups were 
established to address the political, social and cultural needs of the Irish in Britain. These included the 
London Irish Women’s Centre, established in 1980; the Irish in Britain History Group, established in 
1981; the Action Group for Irish Youth, established in 1984; and the Irish in Britain Representation 
Group (IBRG) also established in 1981. Arguably the most pre-eminent of these new organisations, the 
IBRG was born out of widespread frustration at the lack of an effective Irish voice in Britain during the 
hunger strikes. Intended to represent the political interests of the Irish, by 1984 it consisted of over forty 
branches nationwide, campaigning on issues of education, welfare, gender equality and racism.61 At the 
same time, pre-existing groups became increasingly politically vocal. Having been severely criticised 
for its inaction regarding the prison protests, the FIS, which had determinedly avoided politics in the 
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past, announced at its annual congress in 1980 a resolution calling for the repeal of the PTA.62 Their 
campaign was launched the following year, after a series of IRA attacks in London led to a further spike 
in arrests of Irish people. In November 1981, the Chairman of the Federation, Michael Hogan, wrote to 
the Home Secretary William Whitelaw, protesting against the ‘unnecessary hardship and distress’ 
experienced by innocent people arrested under the Act.63  
 This new assertiveness emerged despite hostility which continued to be directed against the 
Irish as a result of the IRA’s campaign; if anything, the hostility galvanised activists into vocalising 
their opposition to the act. In a letter to the Irish Foreign Affairs Department, dated 12 February 1982, 
Gerrard Corr (First Secretary of the Irish Embassy in London) observed that: ‘In many ways, the overt 
opposition of the organised Irish Community is related to the degree of intensity with which the PTA is 
operating’.64  
The renaissance of Irish politics and culture was driven, in part, by the changing composition 
of the Irish migrant population. In the 1980s, a new wave of young, well-educated migrants arrived 
from Ireland, many to take up professional and managerial positions. The ‘Ryanair generation’, as they 
were dubbed by the Irish media, had left an Ireland which was beginning to view itself with new 
confidence as a modern nation, and this was reflected in the mentality of its diaspora.65 At the same 
time, the children of Irish migrants who had come to Britain in the 1950s and 1960s were coming of 
age, and becoming increasingly more politically and culturally aware. Activism offered the second-
generation Irish in Britain a means of asserting an Irish identity, which was frequently called into 
question not only by British people, but also by those Irish recently-arrived in the 1980s, who derisively 
referred to the second-generation as ‘Plastic Paddies’.66 
 Events in Northern Ireland, in particular the hunger strikes, also inspired a greater engagement 
in Irish politics. The hunger strikes signified a different approach by the republican movement to the 
conflict in Northern Ireland, one of passive resistance rather than violence. Men starving themselves to 
death gained support in both Ireland and Britain, where violence had previously failed, drawing Irish 
people in Britain together, encouraging them to speak out for a common cause. Interviewed by Channel 
Four in 1983, Steve Brennan (Vice-Chairman of the IBRG’s National Executive Committee and a 
member of the Greater London Council’s (GLC) Ethnic Minorities Unit) remarked: ‘I think the death 
of the hunger strikers have really changed, certainly for the better, the Irish people’s attitude to politics, 
the Irish people living here [in Britain] anyhow’.67 Mary Lennon et al., observed that, ‘The time had 
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come, for some, including many second generation Irish, to take a stand’.68 The hunger strikes played a 
particularly significant role in the second-generation Irish becoming politically conscious of their 
ethnicity. Brian Dooley, for example, reflected how ‘On the weekend of my eighteenth birthday, Bobby 
Sands began his hunger strike, and I chose an Irish passport’.69 In Britain, the Hunger Strike Action 
Committee organised public meetings, leafleting campaigns and rallies to show support for the 
strikers.70 On 7 December 1980, the Committee organised a march through London, attended (according 
to police) by just under 2,000 people.71 Though the turnout was low, it nonetheless signified a growing 
willingness amongst some Irish people to ‘put their head above the parapet’.72   
 It was initiatives to promote multiculturalism on the part of local authorities, however, which 
provided the main impetus for increased activism by the Irish in Britain. Calls for racial equality from 
Asian and black migrants in the late 1970s initiated the development of multicultural and anti-racist 
policies in Britain. During 1980-1, unrest and rioting by black youths in English cities in response to 
institutionalised racism within the police and other agencies, consolidated these practices and generated 
widespread discussion about the position of ethnic minorities within British society.73 It was within this 
context that Irish political and cultural activism emerged. An increased focus on ethnic recognition 
allowed the Irish to conceive of themselves as a distinct ethnic minority. When interviewed by 
psychologist Marc Scully, Kate, who was second-generation London-Irish reflected that the GLC’s 
multicultural initiatives had led to ‘people being much more open about talking about ethnicity and 
identity and nationality’.74 Confirming their status as a separate ethnic group, and with it recognition of 
the discrimination the Irish experienced became the primary objective of this activism. These processes 
also meant that at least at a local government level the Irish were recognised as an ethnic minority. This 
greatly bolstered the emergence of Irish politics and culture in Britain, not least because it meant that 
Irish organisations were able to access resources and financial aid.  
 The GLC was of paramount importance in the establishment of the Irish as a distinct ethnic 
minority. By advocating a multicultural agenda, which included the Irish, the GLC was the first 
governmental body to recognise their minority status. In a policy report on the Irish community, 
published in 1984, the GLC stated:  
The overall picture of London’s Irish community in this report 
indicates a community poorly housed, and suffering from a 
disproportionately high incidence of mental illness in relation to its 
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size. It is a community baited by the media, suffering constant 
attacks on its cultural and social identity and deterred from political 
mobilisation by the threat of imprisonment and exile under the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act. The root of these problems lies in 
racism against the Irish, a factor yet to be acknowledged as a major 
problem in British society.75    
The report singles out the role of the media in exacerbating the disadvantages experienced by the Irish 
in Britain. It argued that stereotyped representations of the Irish in the press and on television ‘had a 
noticeably negative affect on relations between the Irish community and other Londoners’. It was 
particularly concerned that media reporting on Northern Ireland ‘recreates and reinforces negative racial 
stereotyping of the Irish as irrational, reckless and naturally predisposed to violence’.76 It is important 
that the GLC attributed the discrimination experienced by the Irish to racism. To establish themselves 
as an ethnic minority activists allied the Irish experiences with those of other minority groups; and as 
such enabled the discrimination that they experienced to be redefined as racism.77 As discussed in 
chapter one, the extent to which anti-Irish hostility can be considered racism has been the subject of 
much academic debate. The view that they were racially discriminated against, however, was widely 
acknowledged and disseminated by the Irish themselves in the 1980s. Until it was dissolved in 1986, 
the GLC worked closely with Irish groups to produce policy aimed at tackling this problem, appointing 
the first local government Irish Liaison Officer in 1983.78  
The Council also provided Irish organisations with considerable support and financial aid with 
the aim of encouraging ‘community’ projects. In 1983, for example, the Hillingdon Irish Society was 
granted £40,000 by the GLC to convert a former youth club into a cultural, welfare and social centre 
for the Irish.79 In 1984, Newham Council and the GLC provided £110,000 to set up an Irish cultural 
centre in the borough, much to the disapproval of the local press which ridiculed the notion of the Irish 
‘as a bonafide ethnic minority’.80 Similar criticism was directed against the GLC’s other Irish initiatives 
by the tabloid press, which dismissed the idea that the Irish could be victims of racism. Regardless, 
between 1983 and 1985, the GLC provided in the region of £3,000,000 to fund Irish ‘community’ 
projects. This investment allowed Irish organisations and agencies to flourish, as a result by the end of 
1985, there was approximately thirty Irish welfare and cultural services in London alone.81 
Though these organisations had different focuses and agendas, the majority were committed, 
principally, to gaining recognition as an ethnic group and raising awareness of anti-Irish discrimination 
at a national level. Rather than reflect the full diversity of views to be found within Britain’s Irish 
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population, these organisations, tended to be run by a small core group of politically like-minded people 
who shared the same priorities. To achieve their aims, it was essential for Irish activists to gain the 
endorsement of the CRE. Between 1984 and 1993 Irish activists petitioned the CRE on numerous 
occasions to include the Irish within its multicultural framework with limited success. Although, the 
CRE agreed to the establishment of an Irish Research Advisory Group to investigate anti-Irish racism 
in 1991, the Commission ultimately concluded that ‘the paucity of evidence on discrimination against 
the Irish was still a bar to accepting’. 82  The CRE’s eventual acknowledgement of the Irish as a 
discriminated-against minority in the mid-1990s was the result of a radical restructuring, which brought 
about a new, more sympathetic regime. In order to qualify for consideration within the multicultural 
frameworks which were being promoted by organisations such as the CRE, it was necessary for Irish 
activists to give witness of the discrimination they suffered. This is apparent in the reports of welfare 
organisations and committees, as well as the literature of activist groups such as the IBRG, which made 
a point of framing Irish issues and grievances in the context of victimisation and racism.  
 From these efforts to secure the recognition of a separate Irish ethnicity in Britain, a particular 
Irish identity was formulated which emphasised a Catholic, nationalist Irishness and had the potential 
to exclude many sections of the Irish population, such as Protestants, the middle class and LGBTQ+. 
Some of these groups did seek to assert alternative Irish identities by establishing their own societies. 
In London during the late 1980s, for example, several middle-class Irish organisations were established 
including the London Irish Network and the London Irish Society. These organisations supported and 
promoted a range of social and cultural activities, including organising Christmas and St Patrick’s Day 
parties to raise money for Irish charities in Britain. They also strove to make significant and valuable 
contributions to British society.83 Despite their efforts to assert alternative Irish identities, the tendency 
was for a Catholic, nationalist, largely working-class profile of the Irish in Britain to dominate.84 The 
pre-eminence of this identity resulted in the creation of a narrative of Irish experience in Britain based 
on assumptions of racism. This discourse, as Hazley has observed, offered a subject-position from which 
other Irish people could understand and contextualise their personal experiences.85 It also coloured 
many Irish people’s perceptions of their interactions with the host society, leading them to automatically 
read racism into exchanges. In particular, it manifested itself in a suspicion of the British media which 
was considered to be hugely influential in shaping anti-Irish attitudes through its reliance on stereotypes 
and its failure to report the complexities of the conflict in Northern Ireland.  
 Many Irish organisations felt, with good reason, that the principal culprit in sustaining anti-
Irish racism was the media. For this reason, they focused their energies on challenging what they saw 
as ingrained prejudice in the media’s portrayal of the Irish and Irish affairs. Accordingly, one of the 
stated objectives of the IBRG was its pledge to challenge ‘censorship, propaganda and anti-Irish racism 
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in the media’.86 The IBRG considered media representations of the Irish as perpetuating long-standing 
negative stereotypes and argued that this discouraged the Irish in Britain, especially second-generation, 
from engaging positively with their roots. In an article featured in Irish Studies in Britain (established 
in 1981 as part of efforts to encourage interest in Irish history and culture), the organisation explained 
the adverse effects of anti-Irish racism:  
When an Irish accent immediately turns a person into a figure of fun: 
when the racist stereotype of the drunken, whimsical, “thick Paddy” 
is so widely believed: when the very word “Irish” has become a 
synonym for “stupidity”- how can we expect people to hold their 
heads up and say they are Irish?87 
  The IBRG believed that coverage of events in Northern Ireland had particularly inflamed the 
hostility and prejudice experienced by many Irish people living in Britain through the ‘Troubles’. The 
organisation accused the British media of myopia, producing over-simplified, biased coverage, which 
‘routinely distorted’ the facts about Northern Ireland; a view that has often been repeated by scholars.88 
It claimed that the tendency to report violence without context, and as the exclusive preserve of the IRA, 
sustained a view of the conflict as an irrational battle between two warring factions in which the British 
Army was an altruistic, peace-keeping force. This had reinforced anti-Irish prejudice and provoked 
public anger towards the Irish in Britain. Speaking at a conference on ‘Irish Perspectives on British 
Education’ (organised by the IBRG in October 1990), Elinor Kelly, who had led the Macdonald Enquiry 
into racism and racial violence in Manchester’s schools, highlighted the link between coverage of the 
‘Troubles’ and the discrimination experienced by many Irish people in Britain.89 She referred to a survey 
carried out in 1984 by the University of Nottingham where 800 schoolchildren were asked to identify 
characteristics they associated with different ethnic minorities. It found that the Irish were perceived to 
be ‘dull’ and ‘violent’. One schoolteacher also told researchers that ‘in the school there is a feeling that 
anything to do with Ireland is backwards or stupid and the Irish children would be ashamed of wearing 
the shamrock’. Kelly asked: 
Is this surprising? Since 1969 when the British troops were sent into 
Northern Ireland, there has been a barrage of media coverage 
portraying the barbarous behaviour of Irish nationalists and the 
restraint of the Army against intolerable provocation. If the children 
did not have an alternative version of current affairs and had not 
been taught about the positive and creative contributions of Irish 
people, then how could they fail to dislike the Irish- mock their 
accents, joke about paddies?90   
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The certainty amongst Irish activists that the media was biased and racially discriminatory in its 
approach to the Irish people developed into a key element of their narrative of the Irish experience in 
Britain.  
 The IBRG also alleged that biased reporting was a contributing factor towards the continuing 
violence in Northern Ireland. Their members questioned how a solution to the ‘Troubles’ could be found 
if the British public were not provided with a comprehensive explanation of the political motivations 
behind the violence, and were instead assailed by prejudiced and sensationalised news stories.91 The 
organisation believed that persistent anti-Irish stereotyping, particularly by the press had been 
detrimental to the cultivation of Anglo-Irish relations and therefore a hindrance to efforts to resolve the 
conflict. In an article featured in the organisation’s newsletter An Pobal Éirithe, published in 1989, Pat 
Reynolds (the IBRG’s Public Relations Officer) accused the British media of ‘misus[ing] dirty 
propaganda and censorship… deliberately mislead[ing] the British public into stereotyping the Irish 
people and believing myths about Ireland’.92 Similarly, in a lecture given to the Irish in Britain History 
Group in 1986, Liz Curtis, who was  active in various Irish organisations, argued that the use of anti-
Irish stereotypes and jokes by the media ‘blunt[ed] the sensibilities of British people’ leading them to 
presume that the ‘Troubles’ were a result of Irish irrationality rather than British policy. 93  Curtis 
contended that by desensitising the public, the media prevented people from challenging the British 
presence in Northern Ireland, thereby prolonging the conflict.94 
 The IBRG monitored media output at both a national and local level, setting up a Fleet Street 
branch in 1983 dedicated to tackling discriminatory material in the national press.95 The organisation 
endeavoured to spotlight and challenge racism in the media. One particularly high-profile, and oft-cited 
case was against a cartoon published by Jak (Raymond Jackson) in the London Evening Standard on 29 
October 1982. The cartoon (Figure 15) shows a fictitious film poster, advertising ‘The Irish: The 
Ultimate in Psychopathic Horror’, featuring ‘the IRA, INLA, UDF, PFF, UDA, etc. etc.’ and illustrated 
with grotesque figures reminiscent of the nineteenth-century simian, monstrous Paddy.96 Produced three 
months following the Hyde and Regent’s Park bombings (20 July 1982), in which eleven people were 
killed, the cartoon reflects heightened public anger towards the Irish, and is clear evidence of 
discrimination and stereotyping by the media. Curiously, Jak’s mother was from Ireland; nonetheless 
his cartoons were filled with Irish and other racial stereotypes, leading journalist Duncan Campbell to 
criticise the latitude that Standard editor Charles Wintour allowed Jak ‘to picture all black medics as 
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primitive witch-doctors and all Irishmen as dumb navvies’. 97 An interesting parallel can be made 
between Jak and the nineteenth-century cartoonists featured in Punch, many of whom, including Robert 
Hamerton and John Leech, prominent traducers of the ape-like Paddy, were Irish or of Irish descent. 
Foster has suggested that their exclusion from mainstream Englishness led these cartoonists to ‘define 
the concept all the more emphatically; it seems that some of the transplanted Irish entered into the 
process of psychological compensation with an almost unholy gusto’.98  
The IBRG denounced the Jak cartoon, as extremely offensive, and yet another example of anti-
Irish racism in the media.99 It brought its objections to the GLC’s Ethnic Minorities Unit, which 
immediately withdrew advertising from the Standard and reported the case to the CRE, the Attorney-
General and the Press Council, on the grounds that the cartoon was racially inflammatory. In its 
complaint to the Press Council, the GLC explained that:  
The Council considers that the Jak cartoon was likely to be upsetting 
and cause concern to the Irish community in London. Although the 
initials of terrorist organisations were included in the cartoon, it is 
considered that the featuring of the bold words ‘The Irish’ was so 
placed as to cast aspersions on the Irish people generally.100 
Expressing his regret if ‘Irishmen with no sympathy for such organisations or such violent 
activities were to feel they had been included in Jak’s condemnations’, the Standard’s Editor, Louis 
Kirby, dismissed the GLC’s allegations, arguing that Jak ‘clearly mentioned ‘IRA, INLA, UDF, UDA 
etc.’ as its specific targets’. In a letter to the Director-General of the GLC he explained that the cartoon 
had been a reaction to the mounting violence in Northern Ireland.101 The Attorney-General told the GLC 
that he would not prosecute, arguing that any jury would see the cartoon as aimed at terrorists and not 
the Irish as a whole. The CRE decided against prosecuting the Standard on the same grounds and also 
withdrew its complaint to the Press Council.102 The Press Council rejected the case out of hand anyhow, 
accusing the GLC of ‘using the power of its purse’ to influence the newspapers’ content and ‘coerce the 
editor’.103 
 In November 1984, the Irish Media Group (IMG) brought a similar case to the attention of the 
GLC, this time against the Sunday Express’s editor John Junor regarding his comments in the wake of 
the Brighton bombing:  
But surely the saddest, sickest thing of all is that along the Falls 
Road and in the Republican homes in Crossmaglen and elsewhere, 
glasses have been raised and no doubt still are being raised in 
exultation at what the Brighton assassins achieved in the name of 
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Ireland. With compatriots like these, wouldn’t you rather admit to 
being a pig than to being Irish?.104  
Junor had caused offence earlier that year, stating, in reference to President Ronald Reagan’s upcoming 
trip to Ireland, ‘Ah well, every man to his own taste. For my own part, I would infinitely prefer to spend 
three days in June looking for worms in a dung heap’.105 In a letter to Paul Boateng (Vice-Chairman of 
the GLC’s Ethnic Minorities Committee), the IMG urged the Council to withdraw advertising from the 
Express group, explaining that on this occasion they would not be taking their complaint to the Press 
Council as ‘past experience has shown it to be slow moving, biased and because of its lack of power, 
irrelevant’.106 Despite the IMG’s disinclination to report the incident, Junor’s comments did eventually 
come to the attention of the Press Council who admonished the Express editor, forcing him to issue an 
apology.    
 Junor’s slurs made a lasting impression, as one Irish woman from London, interviewed by 
Hickman and Walter in 1995, observed, ‘A few remarks on TV and in the papers that I don’t like. In 
the Express John Junor said the Irish were pigs and rolling in muck. There are others. I can’t think of 
their names. It’s very degrading and I don’t agree with it’. 107 As this shows derogatory comments of 
this nature were, understandably, experienced as a personal affront by some Irish people. Moreover, it 
demonstrates how instances of anti-Irish racism in the media entered the collective memory of the Irish. 
Such prejudicial comments were frequently presented as evidence of the pervasiveness of 
discrimination and became part of a narrative of Irish experiences in Britain, which generalised the 
media as racist, seemingly unconscious of the individual merits of the wide variety of articles and 
programmes on the Irish and Irish affairs. This had resulted in a one-dimensional understanding of the 
British media in the 1970s and 1980s both amongst the Irish in Britain but also within the scholarship. 
As well as tackling racism through official channels, the IMG, and other like-minded 
organisations, encouraged the Irish living in Britain to boycott offending publications. Figure 16, for 
example, is part of a series of posters and leaflets issued by the Irish Campaign against Racism in the 
Media (ICARM) to raise awareness of the anti-Irish leanings of newspapers such as the Standard and 
the Sunday Express.108 The poster lists publications which regularly published discriminatory material, 
calling not only on the Irish, but the public in general, to boycott them. 
 ICARM was launched in 1984 and was one of several groups dedicated to raising awareness 
of anti-Irish sentiment in the press and broadcast media. An important component of its campaign, and 
that of similar organisations, notably Information on Ireland founded in 1978 by Liz Curtis, was 
providing ‘accurate’ information on the Irish and Irish affairs to compensate for the perceived failure of 
the established media to do so. As Curtis explained: 
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The main function of protests, if made publicly, is probably to 
develop among viewers (and readers) a collective ‘crap-detector’ so 
that we are better able to assess the information we receive and to 
some extent immunise ourselves against its habitual biases.  
Developing an awareness of the shortcomings of the media does not 
itself fill the gap in the coverage. For that, it is necessary to turn to 
alternative sources of information. In the case of Ireland there are 
plenty: newspapers, magazines from a variety of perspectives, 
publications from concerned organisations, as well as videos and 
films.109 
Far from providing ‘a variety of perspectives’, these publications were for the most part produced by a 
small group of activist organisations with distinctly nationalist agendas, and so carry their own biases. 
Curtis’ book Nothing but the Same Old Story (1984), which chronicles the history of anti-Irish racism 
in Britain (paying particular attention to the media’s role in perpetuating prejudice), was published by 
Information on Ireland, with financial assistance from the GLC, as part of these efforts.110 Information 
on Ireland and the IMG also petitioned the BBC and ITV for the provision of Irish television and radio 
programmes.111 The IBRG on the other hand, advocated the establishment of an Irish community media, 
in addition to the Irish Post, which offered extensive coverage of the situation in Northern Ireland and 
other news stories from Ireland.112 To this end, it set up its own newsletter An Pobal Éirithe, published 
quarterly, intended to communicate relevant issues to Irish people in Britain, promote Irish culture and 
foster a positive identity. The IBRG also endorsed independent film projects, organising screenings 
aimed at providing the public with alternative information on Ireland; though it seems likely that these 
screenings would have attracted a largely Irish audience.113  
 Irish activists sought to alert the public to the insufficiency of the media’s coverage of Northern 
Ireland in particular. In 1979, Information on Ireland produced a pamphlet entitled ‘The British Media 
and Ireland’, as part of its Campaign for Free Speech on Ireland, consisting of quotations, newspaper 
clippings, speeches and academic articles analysing the media’s coverage of the conflict in Northern 
Ireland. The pamphlet was assembled to show that the British media routinely distorted, misrepresented 
and suppressed news about the situation in the province. It argued that the press and broadcast media 
parroted the views of the British government, presenting the conflict in simplistic terms as between two 
irrational factions prevented from descending into all-out civil war by the ministrations of the British 
Army, whose own role in perpetuating the violence was minimised or ignored. The pamphlet’s message 
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is clearly stated on the opening page: ‘If you don’t know what is happening in Northern Ireland, you 
must have been watching British television, listening to British radio and reading the British press’.114 
To support these claims, it includes contributions from scholars Philip Schlesinger, Liz Curtis 
and Philip Elliott, who argued that the media produced one-dimensional, stereotyped coverage of the 
conflict. The pamphlet also includes articles and comments from prominent journalists, such as Peter 
Taylor and Jonathan Dimbleby. In an article, which first appeared in Index on Censorship (1978), Taylor 
acknowledged the increased pressure brought to bear on broadcasters to uphold British policy in 
Northern Ireland. He recounts how several programmes he had worked on had come under fire after 
deviating from official narratives of the conflict. Though critical of the broadcasting authorities’ failure 
to stand up to government pressure, Taylor emphasised the efforts of individual journalists to produce 
challenging coverage of the conflict.115 Jonathan Dimbleby, in a speech made to the inaugural meeting 
of the Campaign for Free Speech on Ireland in March 1977, observed the important role journalists 
played in shaping public attitudes to Northern Ireland and the responsibility they had to ensure that 
‘Northern Ireland is put in context, the events there are explained, the possible future analysed. 
Otherwise we will continue to deny the British public the political issue that any government has had 
to face’. 116  The contributions of academics, but more particularly journalists, vocalising their 
dissatisfaction with how Northern Ireland was reported, gave considerable weight to the argument that 
the British media’s coverage of the ‘Troubles’ was at best superficial and at worst outright lies. 
Undeniably, the media came under increased pressure from the government, which at times resulted in 
journalists voluntarily censoring themselves, omitting material or avoiding contentious issues. The very 
fact that these journalists were vocalising their concerns and raising awareness of the restrictions 
imposed upon them, however, indicates that attitudes in the media towards Northern Ireland were much 
more complex than Irish activists suggested and that there was a willingness to produce more searching 
coverage and push back against censorship.         
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Figure 15: Jak, 'The Irish', London Evening Standard, 29 October 1982. 
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The British media exacerbated the hostility directed against the Irish as a result of the 
‘Troubles’. The press in particular played an important role in constructing the Irish in Britain as 
‘suspect’. By propagating the idea that the IRA were hidden within the Irish migrant population 
newspapers encouraged readers to regard all Irish people with suspicion. This not only fuelled anti-Irish 
hostility but served to legitimise surveillance of the Irish population under the PTA. The resurrection of 
nineteenth-century caricatures, by the tabloid press in particular, reinforced long-standing stereotypes, 
including that of the Irish as inherently and innately violent. Though the British media could be guilty 
on occasion of being over-simplistic, in reality its coverage of events in Northern Ireland was 
considerably more complex. As we have seen both the press and the broadcast media could also produce 
extensive, detailed and nuanced analysis of the conflict. In these cases, journalists sought to profile 
different perspectives, offering background to the conflict and exploring the motivations behind the 
violence, producing complex and engaging coverage. Whilst views advocated by the media sometimes 
aligned with those of the government, the press and broadcast media regularly challenged British policy 
in Northern Ireland; albeit not always in a way that would gain the approval of groups such as the IBRG. 
Some sections of the media for example believed that the government was too lenient in Northern 
Ireland and encouraged more authoritarian action. In reality, newspapers and television programmes 
held a wide range of different, often opposing and contradictory views, as the British media was not a 
monolithic entity.    
 Nonetheless, the view put forward by the IBRG and other Irish activists that the media 
coverage of Northern Ireland was biased and one-dimensional became an integral part of the narrative 
of the Irish experience in Britain. The heightened awareness this discourse engendered, could result in 
people reading discrimination by default into something that they may have otherwise interpreted 
differently. This predisposition has also informed much of the literature on the Irish in Britain, and the 
literature on the ‘Troubles’. Scholars often take it at face value that the media acted as a puppet of the 
British government, providing coverage of events in Northern Ireland that was one-sided and 
oversimplified. They frequently cite Curtis unquestioningly, rarely considering the influence her 
involvement in groups like Information on Ireland might have had on her writing. This tendency by 
scholars to dismiss all media coverage of Northern Ireland as distorted and stereotyped is in part because 
the literature of activist groups such as the IBRG dominates the archives and so has had a 
disproportionate influence on the historiography. In addition to Curtis, several academics who have 
contributed considerably to scholarship on the ‘Troubles’ and the Irish in Britain were involved in Irish 
politics and cultural activism during the 1980s. Sociologist Mary Hickman, for example, who has 
carried out valuable research into the experiences of Irish-born and second-generation Irish during the 
late twentieth century, served as the secretary for the IBRG Paddington branch and was involved in 
various initiatives to develop Irish Studies in Britain.117 Whilst her political and cultural activism by no 
mean invalidates her findings, they inevitably have a bearing on her emphasis. It is therefore 
 




unsurprising that the conclusions reached by Hickman and others align with those of the IBRG. It could 
be argued that the prevalence of this critical approach towards the media espoused by Irish activists in 
the 1980s has prevented many scholars from exploring more nuanced examples of the media’s coverage 
of Northern Ireland. 
 Irish organisations in the 1980s denounced the British media for producing simplistic, biased 
coverage of the Northern Ireland conflict, which inflamed hostility towards the Irish living in Britain 
during the ‘Troubles’. Undoubtedly, the press and broadcast media played a significant role in the 
construction of the Irish as suspect. The close association of the Irish with IRA terrorism, propagated 
by the tabloid press in particular, meant that the Irish living in Britain became the focus of public anger. 
IRA bomb attacks on English cities gave rise to violence and abuse targeted at the Irish, who also came 
under surveillance as part of new anti-terrorism legislation. Many Irish people responded by keeping a 
low profile, eschewing Irish cultural and political activities, even disguising their accents so as not to 
attract unwanted attention. As a result, by the mid-1970s Irishness had become something largely 
practiced in private and positive Irish identities were temporarily erased from British society. 
The early 1980s, however, witnessed a resurgence of Irish political and cultural activism, the 
primary objective of which was to gain recognition for the Irish as a separate ethnic minority group. 
Newly emerged Irish organisations sought to challenge their status in British society and generate a 
narrative of Irish identity other than one proscribed by association with the IRA.  They campaigned on 
a wide range of issues, but most particular anti-Irish racism. It was widely believed amongst the Irish 
that the British media, especially its coverage of events in Northern Ireland, was in large part culpable 
for the heighten prejudice towards them. Organisations such as the IBRG exerted considerable energy 
to challenge ingrained anti-Irish prejudice and what it perceived as one-sided coverage of the situation 
in Northern Ireland.  
The certainty amongst Irish activists that the media was biased and racially discriminatory in 
its approach to the Irish and Irish affairs developed into an essential element of their narrative of the 
Irish experience in Britain. The prevalence of these groups, despite only representing a section of the 
diverse Irish population in Britain, has resulted in the view that the media’s coverage was one-
dimensional often being repeated verbatim in academic literature. In reality the situation was much more 
complex, as this thesis shows, the British press and broadcast media were capable of providing 
challenging and multifaceted coverage, offering detailed analysis of a variety of perspectives on the 
conflict. To date, the failure to problematise this simplistic view of the media has prevented a full 
understanding of the nuances of its coverage of Northern Ireland, and therefore how the conflict was 








Chapter Six: Newspaper coverage of the mid-1990s. 
On 31 August 1994, the IRA announced that: ‘in order to enhance the democratic peace process and 
underline our definitive commitment to its success, the leadership of the IRA have decided that as of 
midnight… there will be a complete cessation of military operations’.1 The response to the ceasefire 
ranged from jubilant celebrations to distrust and apprehension. This spectrum of emotions was reflected 
in the press; reporting on the ceasefire the Sun newspaper warned that ‘There must be no appeasement, 
no surrender, no sell-out’, whilst the Guardian heralded ‘The promise of peace’ and declared that ‘An 
historic resolution of Northern Ireland’s bloody Troubles began to emerge last night after the IRA took 
the dramatic step of ending its 25-year campaign of violence’.2 Over the next four years, British 
newspapers were to report on the advances, obstacles and impasses that characterised the fraught 
negotiations. For the most part, the press promoted the Northern Ireland peace process as an effective 
political process, but newspapers naturally varied in their opinion of how negotiations should be handled. 
Throughout the mid-1990s, the press raised questions and challenged the actions of participants in the 
process, often presenting different, sometimes opposing, views. By taking an active and diverse 
approach to reporting the peace process, newspapers offered their readers varied and critical coverage 
during this last phase in the Northern Ireland conflict. 
 Though much has been said on various aspects of the peace process by both academics and 
participants, examination of the media’s coverage of the negotiations has been limited. Political scientist 
Gadi Wolfsfeld argues that academics, like journalists themselves, tend to be drawn to the drama of 
terrorism and violence, and so the study of peace processes is frequently relegated to the corner as the 
‘poor stepsisters of the field’. Peace journalism, however, is often more subtle and complex than 
coverage of violence and therefore offers a valuable insight into how news and information is 
disseminated through the media.3 This said, social scientists have begun to investigate the role the media 
played in reporting the peace process. Their scholarship offers a valuable picture of how the media 
promoted, then choreographed the peace process.  
Graham Spencer has argued that journalists, particularly broadcasters were ‘full and active 
participants’ in negotiations. He contends that by broadcasting ‘the contestations between parties, 
carrying dialogue and communications, and publicizing the dynamic and direction of talks, the news 
media became a political participant in the peace process and produced expectations and pressures 
which were absorbed into negotiations’.4 Kirsten Sparre similarly argues that newspapers and television 
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provided an important channel through which participants could communicate. She asserts that by using 
the media to float new ideas, provide clarification, issue threats and hint at concessions participants 
were able to move negotiations forward. She has also shown how some journalists, recognising the 
potential role the media could play in the process, took it upon themselves to use their platforms to 
advance peace talks, publishing articles and interviews with key actors in that process.5 
 David Miller and Greg McLaughlin, have also argued that ‘all sides have attempted to use the 
news media in the negotiations process, and this has meant that the media have themselves been key 
players in the unfolding drama’.6 They claim, however, that television in particular was slow to adjust 
to Sinn Féin’s new status as a legitimate political party and argued that its coverage was largely ‘an 
unreflective parroting of [the] government propaganda line’, that journalists rarely questioned or 
pointed out contradictions in the negotiations. 7  Whilst Miller and McLaughlin present numerous 
examples from the BBC and ITN news, demonstrating a reliance on government briefings, they fail to 
examine the coverage provided by more open formats such as current affairs programmes, which have 
the space to explore a range of perspectives. Their work also focuses on a limited time period, beginning 
with the publication of the Hume-Adams initiative in August 1993 and ending with the Downing Street 
Declaration in December of the same year.8 The negotiations that took place during this period were for 
the most part carried out behind closed doors. To cover these talks at all, journalists were forced to rely 
on official briefings more than usual, which inevitably limited the scope for engaging with alternative 
perspectives. 
 Much of the scholarship to date has tended to concentrate on television coverage, whilst the 
role of the press has yet to be thoroughly investigated. Greg McLaughlin and Stephen Barker have gone 
some way to addressing this in their examination of the media’s role in conflict resolution. By examining 
a wide variety of media formats, including newspapers, film, television drama and situation comedy, 
they found that the media constructed a ‘peace process “consensus”’, which ‘pre-empted the need or 
desire to question, re-imagine or propose alternatives’.9 They argued that different media platforms 
communicated very similar narratives which closely followed the official line that there was no 
alternative to the peace process if it should fail. This allowed little room for competing perspectives and 
limited political discourse in the province. Whilst their investigation benefits from examining other 
forms of media and cultural expression, it limits itself by concentrating exclusively on local television 
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and newspapers. The national press and broadcast media also played an important part in promoting 
peace, especially amongst audiences in the rest of the UK. Though the British media rarely deviated 
from the pro-peace line, it did provide a critical voice, questioning the priorities and strategies of 
participants, especially the British government.      
 This chapter offers a more historical perspective, locating the coverage of the peace process 
within the wider context of the conflict. This approach allows for the consideration of a range of factors 
and issues that influenced negotiations. It ensures that due attention is given to the process by which 
participants reached the negotiating table, and the atmosphere in which they sat down to talks, rather 
than simply concentrating on the events themselves. Most of the current scholarship focuses either on 
the 1994 IRA ceasefire or the negotiations immediately before the signing of the Good Friday Peace 
Agreement in 1998. This chapter will concentrate on the years 1995 and 1996, when many key 
developments took place which influenced the spirit of multi-party talks. These include the publication 
of the Framework Documents, the Mitchell Report, and President Clinton’s visit to Belfast. By 
examining how these events were reported in the press, it will contribute to a more complete 
understanding of the peace process, and how the British media engaged with it. 
 The dispute surrounding the critical issue of decommissioning will be a key focus. The chapter 
will argue that newspapers not only provided critical but varied commentary, challenging the 
government over its management of the decommissioning issue, and offering opinions on how it should 
be handled. The chapter then explores press attitudes towards American involvement. It argues that 
most newspapers were wary of American intervention, distrusting the pro-republican tendencies of the 
Clinton administration. This changed following Clinton’s visit to Belfast in November 1995. 
Increasingly the press was inclined to accept the necessity of America playing a role in negotiations. 
The chapter also explores press attitudes towards Sinn Féin, arguing that newspapers brought pressure 
to bear on the British and Irish governments to involve the republican party in talks. Finally, the chapter 
will investigate the collapse of the ceasefire and the resumption in 1996 of the IRA’s campaign of 
violence in England. It argues that newspapers were more tempered in their manner of reporting bomb 
attacks, that rather than simply covering the violence they made efforts to understand the motivations 
behind the paramilitaries’ actions.    
 From the outset, the peace process was plagued by disputes over the sincerity of the IRA’s 
ceasefire. Sceptical as to the motives of the republicans, the British government insisted on the prior 
decommissioning of paramilitary weapons before Sinn Féin was allowed entry into all-party talks. 
Speaking in Washington on 7 March 1995, Northern Ireland Secretary of State Sir Patrick Mayhew 
stated that Sinn Féin would not be allowed into negotiations unless there was a tangible beginning to 
the disarmament process. The IRA, however, refused to give up its weapons, arguing that to do so would 
effectively be surrender.10 The press followed this dispute closely, frustrated by the slow pace of 
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negotiations. Journalists condemned the failure to convene all-party talks, fearing that delays were 
fuelling suspicion on all sides and putting the peace process at risk. Their criticism tended to be largely 
directed at the British government’s stand on decommissioning, but although most newspapers 
questioned the government’s approach to disarmament, they had very different ideas on how this 
obstacle should be managed.  
 The Guardian was particularly vocal in its criticism. Echoing the nationalist viewpoint, it 
argued that the government was creating unnecessary hurdles on the road to peace. Though the paper 
stressed that it was important that the IRA make a show of good faith through a symbolic 
decommissioning of arms, it believed it unreasonable to expect the paramilitaries to hand over all 
weapons before talks began. The Guardian argued that a timely concession by the republicans could 
help unionists to commit to the peace process:    
the key to surer progress would be significant steps towards 
decommissioning the IRA’s arsenal of weapons. No single action 
would do more to encourage the atmosphere within which the 
politicians are now working.11   
At the same time, the Guardian contended that the government was mishandling the issue, accusing 
ministers of ‘digging a trench full of pre-conditions’. The paper argued that the only way the government 
would succeed in persuading the paramilitaries to disarm was to engage in direct talks with the IRA and 
its political wing, Sinn Féin.12 
 In marked contrast, the Sun criticised the government for being too willing to give way to the 
IRA, arguing that under no circumstances should Sinn Féin be allowed to participate in talks until the 
IRA handed over all weapons. In an editorial marking the first anniversary of the IRA ceasefire, the Sun 
remarked that:  
John Major said it would make his stomach turn to have to talk to 
terrorists. But the day is not far away when Sinn Fein, mouthpiece 
of the IRA, WILL have a seat at the peace table. 
To most people it will seem incredible that political respectability 
will have been gained by the use of the bullet not the ballot, with 
not one gun, grenade or bomb being given up.13  
The Sun resigned itself to the early release of paramilitary prisoners but demanded that this ‘must be 
the last concession until something is given in return’.14 
 Norman Tebbit, columnist and prominent right-wing politician, was particularly outspoken in 
his opposition to concessions. His uncompromising position is unsurprising, as the former Conservative 
Cabinet minister had been injured, and his wife left paralysed, by an IRA bomb attack on the Grand 
Hotel in Brighton on 12 October 1984. He had also been the Chairman of the Conservative Party and 
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had held senior governmental positions under Margaret Thatcher, whose hardball negotiating strategy 
stood in marked contrast with Major’s willingness to pursue a political settlement. For the Sun’s readers, 
Tebbit’s personal experience at the hands of the IRA, lent him a certain moral authority and his 
comments on events in Northern Ireland often featured in the paper. The erstwhile politician was 
extremely critical of what he perceived as the government kowtowing to the IRA over decommissioning. 
Commenting on Mayhew’s Washington speech, Tebbit was clear that he believed the government had 
shown itself to be weak. Echoing arguments made elsewhere, he asserted that by pandering to the IRA 
the government were sending the message that violence pays:  
There was a time when there would be no talks with Sinn Fein, the 
IRA’s representatives, until they promised a permanent ceasefire.  
… Then there was no question of talking to Sinn Fein until they 
handed over their guns and bombs. Then the weapons had only to 
be decommissioned. Then not all of them had to be decommissioned 
at once but there had to be ‘substantial progress’. 
Now there is no need for ‘substantial progress’ 
… The secretary of State Sir Patrick Mayhew, might as well cut 
down the Union Jack and get out the white flag from the cupboard.15 
 The Daily Telegraph offered a more nuanced perspective. Though critical of concessions made 
to Sinn Féin, the paper was sympathetic to the difficult balancing act the government faced in trying to 
maintain peace and advance towards all-party talks, whilst keeping both sides on board. On 25 August 
1995, the Telegraph’s editorial remarked on the fact that Mayhew was expected to announce an increase 
in the remission of sentences for all prisoners convicted of terrorism in Northern Ireland:  
Whatever ministers may say, only the most ingenuous will fail to 
discern here a link between decommissioning weapons and the early 
release of prisoners. Many, including this newspaper will find such 
a notion repugnant. Yet faced with the risk that the peace process 
would otherwise run into the sand, we can sympathise with Sir 
Patrick’s anxiety to break the impasse.   
The paper accused Mayhew of using prisoners as a bargaining chip to induce the IRA to hand over 
weapons. Whilst its disapproval is evident, the piece also underlined the complexity of the task facing 
Mayhew. It goes on to acknowledge that the prisoner issue was dear to republican hearts and so it was 
possible that by conceding ground on their early release, the IRA could be coaxed into disarmament. 
The editorial however, also noted that the government had ‘fudged its earlier requirements that the 
republicans should permanently renounce violence’ to no avail, and warned that ‘Only if ministers are 
now prepared to adhere rigorously to their insistence on decommissioning as a pre-condition for talks, 
can these new moves to placate Sinn Fein be justified’.16  
 The Telegraph cast doubt on the integrity of the ceasefire, arguing that the IRA had no intention 
of ending its violent campaign before achieving its goal of a united Ireland. The paper’s scepticism is 
 
15 Norman Tebbit, ‘IRA peace talks are hard to swallow’, The Sun, 9 March 1995.  
16 ‘A year of peace in Ulster’, Daily Telegraph, 25 August 1995.  
154 
indicated by the frequent use of scare quotes whenever it referred to the peace process, expressing doubt 
not only on the validity of the peace, but also the viability of the process itself. The paper pointed to the 
continuation of punishment beatings as evidence that the IRA had far from renounced violence. On 6 
September 1995, it noted that the punishment shootings and attacks, ‘show all too clearly that the 
republicans have not lost their old appetite for violence and intimidation’.17 The Telegraph recognised 
that much of this was associated with the drugs trade, in which the IRA and other paramilitary groups 
had a vested interest, however, the paper argued that it was ‘intended for a wider audience as well’.18 In 
an editorial, published in late December, it argued that the paramilitaries were using punishment 
beatings to ‘signal that republicans will return to fully fledged terrorism if Sinn Fein is not rapidly 
admitted to all-party talks’.19 
  The only paper not to criticise how the problem of disarmament was being handled was the 
Daily Mirror. This was not because the paper supported the government’s strategies, rather it was 
because it expressed so few opinions on the peace process, reporting key developments in the 
negotiations, but offering little substantive comment. Compared with the other three newspapers the 
Mirror’s political content regarding the peace process was scant. The paper’s coverage in the mid-1990s 
tended to concentrate on ‘human interest’ stories from Northern Ireland or reports of violence. It could 
be argued that this focus was commercially driven, as conflict rather than peace sells. The relative lack 
of drama surrounding peace politics was undoubtedly a significant reason for the paper’s neglect.  
Except for the Mirror, the newspapers were all outspoken in their criticism of the British 
government. The variety of attitudes evident in newspaper coverage of decommissioning shows once 
again, that the media was capable of diverse approaches towards reporting on Northern Ireland. Despite 
differing opinions, the newspapers were eager to engage with the peace process and held the government 
to account for its responsibility in delivering a settlement.  
 To break the deadlock, in November 1995, the British and Irish governments announced their 
twin-track initiative, whereby disarmament would take place alongside all-party talks. The two 
governments also promised an international body to provide an independent assessment of the 
decommissioning issue. This was to be chaired by former US Senator George Mitchell, who was later 
to play an important role as the chair of multi-party talks in June 1996. The Mitchell Commission 
published its report on 24 January 1996, endorsing the twin-track approach and offering clear steps by 
which disarmament could be achieved. It also recommended all participants sign up to six principles of 
democracy and non-violence. The British government, however, insisted that before all-party talks 
commenced, there needed to be elections to reinforce the democratic mandate of participants. As with 
many issues raised by the peace process, newspapers were divided in their response to the report. The 
Guardian was extremely enthusiastic in its praise, applauding the Commission for having ‘got the 
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deadlocked parties off the decommissioning hook they have been on for so long’.20 The paper was 
dismayed by the government’s response to the report, declaring that ‘Mitchell provided a golden 
opportunity to get off the hook on decommissioning. Now it seems to have hung itself on a new one 
over the elections’.21 The Daily Telegraph on the other hand, asserted that ‘on the vexed question of 
decommissioning, [the report] was as vague as any Irish nationalist could have wished’, and argued that 
‘in the absence of a credible step towards decommissioning [elections…] would at least establish the 
democratic mandate of those who will debate, and hopefully settle, a new political dispensation for the 
province’.22 The Sun simply declared the Mitchell report a ‘cop-out’. It argued that ‘Mitchell’s findings 
prove that ever since the IRA ceasefire, we’ve been losing the propaganda war to Sinn Fein, Dublin and 
America’s Irish lobby’.23 The paper’s comments highlight its reservations concerning the neutrality of 
Mitchell, and therefore the fitness of the Americans to be involved in the peace process.  
 The press paid considerable attention to American responses to events in Northern Ireland. 
From an early stage, the influence of the Clinton administration had played an important role in 
promoting peace, especially within the republican movement.24 American support made it more difficult 
for Sinn Féin and the IRA to reject the peace process. Their involvement also countered any accusations 
that the republicans were surrendering to the British and unionists.25 Another benefit of American 
interest was that it brought pressure to bear on the British and Irish governments to move the peace 
process forward. The imminent US Presidential visit to Belfast in November 1995, had led to panicky 
efforts to resolve the stalemate over decommissioning and the announcement of the twin-track initiative. 
According to Mitchell the British were ‘most worried about offending President Clinton’. 26 
Washington’s role in accelerating the decision to commit to a twin-track approach was not lost on the 
press. In an editorial published on 29 November 1995, the Guardian argued that ‘It is indisputable that 
the new initiative would not have been agreed in the way that it has without the pressure of President 
Clinton’s visit to the British Isles’.27 American mediation came, however, largely at the behest of the 
British and Irish governments and both worked closely with the Clinton administration on the peace 
process. 
 Newspapers were on the whole wary of American interference in British affairs. They believed 
that American interest in the peace process was borne out of a compulsive need to meddle in the business 
of other states. This attitude is illustrated in a humorous manner by Figure 17, which shows the Queen 
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declining Clinton’s help with Diana and Charles’ martial problems. On the table in front of her are the 
papers listing his peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, the Middle East and Ulster. The cartoon, published 
by the Sun just a few days before Clinton visited Northern Ireland, jests that Clinton suffered from a 
superhero complex, which led him to force America’s attentions upon the world’s trouble spots. Despite 
this gentle prodding, the piece acknowledges that Clinton had a positive impact on the international 
crisis. A framed copy of the cartoon was presented to Clinton by the Sun during his visit and was 
received with good humour.28 Accusations of American interference in British affairs, nonetheless, 
appears in a more solemn form elsewhere in the newspaper. The Sun frequently put forward the view 
that Clinton, in order to boost his failing image at home, had involved himself in the Middle East, Bosnia, 
Haiti and now Northern Ireland. It argued that Clinton hoped that a show of support for republicanism 
would enhance his support amongst Irish-Americans.29 
 Throughout the conflict considerable space had been accorded to America’s reactions to events 
in Northern Ireland by newspapers. The focus of much of this attention was on what was perceived to 
be the detrimental effect of the pro-Irish lobby on US policy towards Northern Ireland. The prevailing 
view was that America was susceptible to IRA propaganda. In their reportage of the peace process, 
newspapers continued to emphasise America’s supposed predilection towards republican sentiments. 
For example, in an editorial on 2 March 1996, the Daily Telegraph called for more to be done to counter 
IRA propaganda: ‘The British Embassy and information services, not to mention Ulster Unionists, 
should redouble their efforts to educate the American public about the IRA’s anti-democratic ideology 
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and links with anti-western regimes’.30 The press feared that the US would favour the republicans, 
hindering attempts to persuade the IRA to concede ground and at worse legitimising terrorism. As both 
Adrian Guelke and Alan Parkinson have argued, fear that Britain had lost its standing in Washington 
accounts, at least in part, for the strength of the press’s opposition to American involvement.31 It might 
also be argued that the press’s reactions reflected anxiety about Britain’s decline, and the US dominance, 
in global affairs more generally. 
 In March 1995, these fears seemed to be vindicated, Clinton granted Gerry Adams a second 
visa that allowed the Sinn Féin leader to raise funds in the US.32 Whilst in the States, Adams was also 
invited to attend the White House’s St Patrick’s Day reception. The British press was outraged. The Sun 
in particular, slammed the US President for ‘gladhand[ing the] Sinn Féin leaders’.33 The paper saw 
Clinton’s actions as lending legitimacy to IRA terrorism by according Adams the same treatment due 
any other political leader. It argued that Clinton had betrayed Britain, destroying the ‘special 
relationship’ between the two countries, for the Irish-American vote. Similarly, the Daily Telegraph 
accused Clinton of stabbing Britain in the back by feting Adams. In a cartoon, published on 16 March, 
the Telegraph’s political cartoonist Nicholas Garland presented Clinton as Brutus, hurrying Adams 
away from the dead body of the ‘special relationship’ (Figure 18). The caption cites the prophecy 
received by Julius Caesar, ‘beware the ides of March’, an allusion to the paper’s frequent warnings 
about America’s susceptibility to republican propaganda. The cartoon gives credence to Guelke and 
Parkinson’s arguments that fear of losing influence in Washington was a significant factor in explaining 
Britain’s apprehension towards American involvement in the peace process. 34  Guelke has argued, 
however, that the British press overstated the seriousness of the visit.35 Despite his anger at Clinton’s 
decision to act as Adams’ host, Major continued to work closely with the US President on the peace 
process and the ‘special relationship’ remained relatively intact.  
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 Some newspapers were quick to capitalise on American outrage a month later, in the wake of 
the Oklahoma City bombing by domestic terrorists on 19 April 1995. The Sun noted the hypocrisy of 
Clinton and the American public’s condemnation of the bombers, when they were happy to support the 
IRA. The paper expressed the hope that America would now re-evaluate its relationship with Irish 
republicanism: 
Perhaps when they emerge from their grief, Americans will realise 
that their dollars helped the IRA inflict on the United Kingdom the 
kind of carnage the U.S. has now suffered? 
Perhaps they will understand how queasy we feel when we see 
President Clinton condemn the Oklahoma bombers as ‘evil cowards’ 
so soon after he shook hands at the White House with Gerry 
Adams.36  
Similarly, the Telegraph asked, ‘Was this national leader, who spoke with such anger and passion about 
the wickedness of criminals who murder innocent civilians in pursuit of political objectives, the same 
man who last month clasped the hand of Gerry Adams at the White House?.37 The Guardian on the 
other hand, argued that ‘this is not an appropriate moment to score cheap debating points’.38     
 The Guardian provided a slightly more measured view of the American initiative. In an 
editorial, published on 13 March 1995, the paper chastised British politicians for ‘huffing and puffing’ 
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over Adams’ US visit, and argued that they should be concentrating instead on recruiting Clinton’s help 
to further the peace process.39 Even so, the paper called for America to do more to persuade the Sinn 
Féin leader to accept the need to disarm: 
… the lionising of Gerry Adams by American politicians has got to 
stop. By all means meet Mr Adams- like the Irish government has, 
like the British government should. But cut the crap. Give him a 
hard time as well as a handshake.40 
 Under pressure from the British government, at a late stage Clinton did use the visit to 
encourage Adams to begin serious discussions about decommissioning, redeeming himself in the eyes 
of at least some newspapers. In an editorial, published on 18 March, the Daily Mirror noted that:  
Throughout the dark years of bloodshed in Northern Ireland, 
America played a significant role. And it was not for the good… 
The omen was not hopeful when President Clinton invited Gerry 
Adams to Washington and said he could raise funds for Sinn Fein. 
But yesterday the President did exactly what was required. 
He left Mr Adams in no doubt about the next step towards a 
permanent peace.’41 
The important role America could play in the peace process was conceded, but also the need for Clinton 
to continue to pressure the republicans to give up their weapons. The Sun, on the other hand, argued 
that Clinton had talked around the subject, failing to tackle the issue of decommissioning head on.42 
 Following Clinton’s visit to Belfast in November 1995, where he was received with enthusiasm 
by Northern Ireland’s two communities, all four newspapers were forced to re-evaluate their attitude to 
both the President and America’s involvement in the peace process. Even the Sun, no friend of the 
American government, had to accept that ‘Clinton courageously did his part by warning the IRA their 
day is done and urging them to surrender their guns’.43 The Daily Telegraph praised the President’s 
sensitivity to both unionist and nationalist sensibilities and argued that Clinton’s visit had, at least in the 
short term, made a return to terrorism more difficult. The paper, also urged caution, warning against 
pinning too much hope on American intervention. It argued that the US was still inclined to favour the 
republican position, as it did not have to deal with the fallout from their violence, and reminded readers 
that: 
If the IRA returns to violence, Mr Clinton will not be seen nipping 
in and out of Belfast shops: he will be far away, across thousands of 
miles of water. It is our Government that will be left with the 
consequences, and the people of Northern Ireland who will live with 
them.44   
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When multi-party talks finally began in June 1996, the Telegraph criticised the appointment of Mitchell 
as chairman, arguing that ‘Given the close affinity between America and Irish nationalism, it was 
anyway unwise of London to allow these talks to be chaired by an American’.45 The Mirror also 
questioned the degree to which the United States should be allowed to contribute to negotiations 
remarking that: ‘Although Mr Clinton has done much to encourage the peace process, there has always 
been a suspicion that the Americans do not properly understand Northern Ireland’.46 As the peace 
process developed, the newspapers became more inclined to support the US’s increased involvement, 
recognising the influence it could bring to bear over the IRA, whilst remaining cautious of America’s 
pro-republican tendencies. 
 This wariness related to the press’s broader concern that the republican movement was 
dictating the agenda at the expense of unionists. Unsurprisingly given its conservatism, the Daily 
Telegraph frequently observed the need for the British and Irish governments to take greater heed of 
unionist sensitivities. It emphasised the importance of ensuring that unionists, as well as Sinn Féin, 
remained a part of the peace process. This neglect, the Telegraph argued, was particularly apparent in 
the nationalist tone of the Framework Documents. On 22 February 1995, the British and Irish 
governments published a blueprint for the future governance of Northern Ireland and its relationship 
with both Britain and the Republic.47 The documents were distinctly green in hue, and included plans 
for a series of North-South bodies, which would have ‘executive, harmonising and consultative 
functions’ and would promote cooperation between the people of the island of Ireland, whilst 
recognising and reconciling the rights, identities and aspirations of both the unionist and republican 
traditions. 48  Though the Telegraph supported the Framework Documents, it criticised a lack of 
provision for unionists, arguing that ‘After 25 years of chiefly Nationalist violence, Dublin’s fingers 
seem to us to reach further into this pie than Northern Ireland’s Unionists should be expected to 
tolerate’. 49  In an editorial, published on 10 March 1995, the paper argued that the Documents 
‘emphasises the extent to which the Unionists have so far been left outside the tent’, and that ‘To date, 
the peace process has encompassed everyone except the Unionists’. The editorial, however, pointed out 
that the ‘remedies also lie in their hands’ and encouraged unionist politicians to talk to Dublin:   
The peace process is in danger of becoming a one-way affair. It is 
time the Unionists made their voice heard more effectively, both to 
stiffen the resolve of British ministers and to extract concessions of 
their own from Dublin.50  
It is worth noting that the other three newspapers did not subscribe to the Telegraph’s criticisms. The 
Guardian praised the Framework Documents as ‘neither republican ramp nor sell-out to unionism’, 
reminding unionist objectors that ‘it is exactly what it says it is a framework for an agreement, not a 
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final take-it-or-leave-it solution’.51 Similarly, the Daily Mirror heralded the documents as a symbol of 
hope, dismissing those who opposed it as ‘intransigent in their position’. 52  The Sun too, though 
acknowledging the validity of unionist fears, warned that ‘standing still will not work. They [the 
unionists] have to take another big step along the road to a lasting peace’.53 
 Despite the conservative leanings of the Telegraph, it should not be taken as given that the 
paper would automatically support the unionist cause. Like much of the right-wing British press, the 
Telegraph often sought to distance itself from unionist politics, which it viewed as anachronistic and 
uncompromising. As early as 1969, Max Hastings, the paper’s editor between 1986 and 1995, had 
remarked that the ugly way in which the unionist establishment had acted overrode his conservatism, 
and as a result he had found himself siding with the Catholics: 
As the weeks went by and personal experience broadened a 
detectable feeling for the Catholics crept more and more into 
everything I wrote, coupled with a dislike for the Protestants, the 
Unionists, and much of what they stood for.54  
Under Hastings, the Telegraph had pursed a particularly liberal line on Northern Ireland, much to the 
disquietude of the paper’s proprietor Conrad Black. In 1989, Black had expressed concern about the 
Telegraph’s ‘flirtation with incorrect thinking about Ulster’. Under pressure to adopt a more 
Conservative view, on 29 September 1995 Hastings quit the Telegraph to be replaced by Charles Moore, 
who was more right-wing.55 Despite his conservatism, Moore also remained cautious of lending outright 
support to the unionists. Throughout this period, even on occasions when the paper expressed support 
for unionism, it remained critical of its’ inflexibility and reactionary tendencies. 
 Nonetheless, the Telegraph repeatedly urged unionists to assert themselves in the peace 
process. The paper felt that they were frequently side-lined in favour of securing republican participation 
in negotiations. Following the election of David Trimble as leader of the UUP in September 1995, the 
paper commented that ‘A strong unionist voice is badly needed to redress the imbalance that has been 
allowed to develop within the peace process’.56 Interestingly, the Guardian, which was traditionally 
unsympathetic to the unionist cause, agreed. It celebrated Trimble’s uncompromising honesty and his 
willingness to engage with the Irish government, arguing that ‘unionism needed to acknowledge the 
peace process and the peace process needed to acknowledge unionism’.57 Both papers sought to impress 
upon their readers that a settlement would not be possible without the input of unionists.  
 The British press fêted David Trimble for his broad-minded attitude. It hoped he would move 
the UUP away from Orangeism and inject a strong moderate unionist voice into the peace process. This 
contrasted with the initial apprehension the press had voiced at the appointment of an Orange hard-liner. 
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In a cartoon featured in the Guardian (Figure 19), Martin Rowson had likened Trimble to the extreme 
loyalist leader Ian Paisley. The cartoon shows Orangemen measuring the strength of Trimble’s bellow, 
pronouncing it four feet short of Paisley’s, implying that Trimble was only marginally less obstinate 
than the DUP leader.58 The Telegraph observed however, that Trimble had been swift to allay concerns 
that he was ‘a wild Orangeman’, proving instead to be a ‘flexible as well as intelligent politician’.59 
Similar sentiments were echoed by the Daily Mirror. In February 1996, the paper nervously reported a 
rift between Ulster Unionist MPs and John Major, after the former voted against the government on the 
Scott Report into arms sales to Iraq by British companies in the 1980s. The Mirror voiced concern about 
what this could mean for Northern Ireland, but took comfort in Trimble’s level-headed attitude to peace, 
arguing that:  
Trimble has shown in the short time he has been their leader that he 
is an honourable and thoughtful man.  
He will not wish to interfere with the advance made yesterday over 
all-party talks.60  
The Daily Telegraph, however, warned both the British and Irish governments that whilst Trimble had 
proven himself open-minded and willing to engage with Dublin and London in order to establish a 
lasting peace, a ‘fudge’ especially over the issue of disarmament ‘could all too easily force both him 
and his followers back into the traditional Unionist laager’.61 
 It is worth noting that press support for the unionists did not extend to the more militant DUP. 
The Telegraph cautioned the UUP that if they did not make their voices heard not only would 
republicans dominate the process, but the hard-line loyalist parties would unduly influence negotiations: 
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The groundswell for peace is as strong among Unionists as 
nationalists. If the Unionist leaders try to retreat into their tribal 
bunker they will just lose yet more ground to their nationalist 
adversaries on the one hand and to Ian Paisley’s Democratic 
Unionists and the fringe loyalist parties on the other.62   
The paper believed that the best chance of the peace process succeeding was through close co-operation 
between moderates on both sides. It feared that if Paisley were to gain the upper hand, unionism would 
fall back on the traditional sectarian intransigency. Paisley continued to be presented as the epitome of 
the extremes of loyalist obstinacy and his popularity viewed as a real threat to the peace process. The 
Guardian noted its effect on the UUP’s willingness to be flexible; in an editorial published on 24 
February 1995, the paper commented that: ‘the ghost of Mr Paisley-past and Mr Paisley-future looms 
over all Protestant politics. The more pragmatic Ulster Unionists have rightly allowed the peace process 
to develop, where Mr Paisley tried to stop it. But they are afraid of embracing it too wholeheartedly for 
fear of the DUP’s power to wreak electoral nemesis’.63 
 Newspapers continued to associate the unionist leadership with traditional negative stereotypes 
of loyalism, including inflexibility, bigotry and intransigence.64 Despite the Telegraph’s sympathy for 
the unionist position, its journalists were not blind to their shortcomings. The paper was critical of the 
unionist tendency to respond to any political initiative that seemed favourable to the republicans in a 
knee-jerk fashion. It frequently warned the British and Irish governments not to underestimate the ire 
of unionist politicians: ‘Their capacity to say no is legendary’. 65  The Telegraph was particularly 
concerned that if provoked unionists could destabilise Major’s government which relied on their support 
to maintain its slim parliamentary majority. A few weeks before they were officially released, a partial 
draft of the Framework Documents was leaked to the Times. The Daily Telegraph was particularly 
critical of the way in which unionist politicians responded. The paper’s political columnist Noel 
Malcolm dismissed claims that they were being ‘sold down the river’.66 He argued that the unionists 
were ‘protesting too much’ and impatiently suggested that they were being overdramatic: ‘the term 
“treachery” must be said to be inappropriate here. Betrayals take place behind their victims’ back, in 
acts of secrecy and duplicity’.67  The Telegraph implored the unionist leadership not to reject the 
Framework Documents out of hand:  
And the Unionists should beware of destroying the best opportunity 
for peace that Northern Ireland has seen in a generation, when they 
still hold so many cards in their hand. This is not the time for gesture 
politics.68  
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 The paper, however, took heart from what they perceived as the unionist public’s willingness 
to accept compromise. It noted that the reaction to the Framework Documents amongst ordinary 
Protestants had been ‘notably milder than among their leaders’. The paper argued that by capitalising 
on the desire for peace amongst the unionist and republican communities, politicians on both sides could 
be pressured into compromise: ‘there is a palpable yearning for peace throughout both communities in 
Northern Ireland. Therein lies the hope for success’.69 Similarly, the Guardian, in an editorial covering 
Clinton’s visit to Belfast in November 1995, argued that ‘the way to peace in Northern Ireland lies 
through the people as much as through the politicians’. British and Irish ministers were encouraged to 
emulate Clinton, engaging more positively with the hopes and fears of the ordinary people of Northern 
Ireland to win their support.70 The press viewed politicians of Northern Ireland and their intransigent 
attitudes as being part of the problem, and the people as the solution. In his column, published on 23 
February 1995, Noel Malcolm argued that: ‘In order to ensure a future for the “peace process”, it is 
necessary to go over the heads (or under the feet) of the Northern Ireland politicians, appealing directly 
to the people themselves’.71 
 Reference to the ‘people of Northern Ireland’ was commonly used by both the press and 
broadcast media in an effort to exert moral pressure on politicians to engage constructively with the 
peace process. All four newspapers consistently sought to remind them of how life had transformed in 
the province since the cessation of violence. In an editorial marking the first anniversary of the IRA 
ceasefire, the Daily Mirror outlined the changes in the province, drawing attention to the dramatic 
improvements to the well-being of ordinary people: 
Businesses have thrived and tourists have returned in large numbers 
promising a new prosperity. But it is the effect on the ordinary 
people which has been the most remarkable change. They have 
discovered what it is like to live free from fear and horror.72 
The paper warned that ‘anyone who threatens to destroy the peace will never be forgiven’.73 The Sun 
produced a similar article describing the positive effects of the ceasefire and warned that, ‘The people 
of Belfast have enjoyed the fruits of peace too much to tolerate anyone who puts their new-found 
prosperity and security at risk’.74 The Sun, however, also emphasised the responsibility of the people of 
Northern Ireland to be pro-active in demanding peace. In an editorial printed after the publication of the 
Framework Documents, the Sun remarked that, ‘The prize is peace if the people of Northern Ireland 
want to take it. Their destiny rests firmly in their own hands’.75 Implicit in this is the suggestion that the 
Northern Irish might not want peace, an allusion to the stereotype of the Irish as irrational, violent people 
spoiling for a fight. The Daily Telegraph also used the trope of the people of Northern Ireland to pressure 
politicians on specific issues relating to the peace process. For example, columnist Noel Malcom evoked 
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it to pressure unionists into giving the Framework Documents a chance: ‘The people of Northern 
Ireland… will not forgive any politician who lightly or carelessly bring these halcyon days to an end’.76  
 By highlighting the impact of the ceasefire on the Northern Irish, newspapers, like television 
current affairs programmes, sought to promote peace to the public, especially to readers in the rest of 
the UK. Interest in Northern Ireland’s problems amongst the British public, which had begun to flag as 
early as the 1970s, went into steep decline during the peace process as people became weary of the 
circular conversations about decommissioning, prisoner release and so forth. Securing support was 
important to ensure that the government could engage fully with the process without fear of public 
opposition. As Miller and McLaughlin have observed, however, the government had long ignored the 
public’s calls for withdrawal. They contend that ‘altogether it is clear that certain opinion constituencies 
are regarded as important, public opinion still seems to have little impact on policy’.77 It could be argued 
therefore that the media sought to canvass public support in order to bring pressure to bear on the 
government to push forward with the peace process. Journalists, by emphasising the benefits for the 
everyday lives of people in Northern Ireland, endeavoured to illustrate what was at stake if it should 
fail. As Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam remarked in an article published 
by the Daily Mirror on 31 August 1995: ‘In Britain, without the bombs on our streets or horrific pictures 
on our TV screens, our memories fade. We don’t feel that palpable sense of relief’.78  The press 
undertook to remind readers of the violence by focusing on what it meant for individuals in the province. 
Through ‘human interest’ stories, the press strove to give its readers some relief from the tedium of the 
political process, and by providing the human face of events, they hoped to revive interest and 
engagement in the talks.  
 Frustrated by the lack of progress, on 9 February 1996 the IRA ended its ceasefire by exploding 
a bomb in the Docklands area of London, killing two people and injuring forty others.79 In marked 
contrast with their coverage of IRA bombs in the 1970s, newspapers sought to place the attack within a 
Northern Ireland context. They saw the return to violence in England as potentially detrimental to the 
future of the peace process.  The Daily Mirror featured the responses of ordinary people in Northern 
Ireland to illustrate the full effect of the bomb attack. Through interviews with young people in Belfast, 
journalist Ted Oliver sought to convey the anger and upset felt in the province at the news of the bomb: 
‘One young Belfast woman recalled… “I was in my kitchen making a cup of tea. I’ll tell you what I 
was doing - sitting at the table crying my eyes out”…’. The article also recounted the story of a young 
couple, Mary and John. Mary was a Catholic nurse from the Falls Road and John a Protestant from East 
Belfast. Oliver, a Protestant originally from Bangor (Co. Down), had himself married a Catholic and 
had written extensively on mixed marriages.80 As he asserted, an ecumenical relationship such as John 
and Mary’s had been near-impossible before the ceasefire. In the light of the news that it had ended, the 
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couple had postponed plans to visit her parents out of fear that John might be attacked: ‘People have 
been murdered before just for daring to go out with someone with a different religion’. John explained 
how the peace process had made their relationship possible: 
Having somewhere safe to meet, being able to get home late without 
worrying and not looking over your shoulder in case somebody 
from your area is in the pub - those things are important.81     
Both Mary and John, however, expressed their determination not to allow the return to violence to break 
up their relationship. Oliver reiterated these sentiments repeatedly throughout the article, underlining 
its key message that the ordinary people of Northern Ireland refused to be beaten. In this, one detects 
an echo of the trope of the British as a stoic people in the face of IRA violence, which was prevalent in 
the newspaper coverage of the early 1970s. This was despite differentiations regarding the extent to 
which the communities of Northern Ireland considered themselves to be British, and the media’s 
repeated depiction of the province as a place ‘apart’. 
 The personal touch, which Oliver employed in covering the Docklands bombings, was 
intended to impress upon readers the realities of violence in Northern Ireland and therefore the 
importance of the peace process. By emphasising the danger inherent in everyday activities taken for 
granted elsewhere in the UK, it sought to elicit a sense of empathy from the reader. Oliver’s emphasis 
on youth was also deliberately designed to drive home the trauma of the bomb attacks:    
The time and the date - 7.01pm on Friday February 9, 1996 - etched 
into the minds of a new generation in Northern Ireland… They were 
the precious moments when the hopes of the young for a bright 
future seemed to have been dashed.82    
He used phrases such as ‘precious moments’, ‘hopes of the young’ and ‘bright future’, contrasting with 
the abrupt ‘dashed’, to underscore the heinous nature of the IRA’s actions. The article argued that the 
end of the ceasefire had the potential to rob the young people of Northern Ireland of their future, and so 
sought to put pressure on participants in the peace process to ensure that this did not happen.  
 All four newspapers were, naturally, outraged by the IRA’s return to violence and expressed 
fear that the bomb would, as the Sun put it ‘light the fuse of another war in Northern Ireland’.83 Evident 
in their coverage is also a strong sense of fatigue borne out of frustration not only with the government’s 
failure to push the peace process forward, but also the insincerity and intransigency of the IRA. Their 
coverage of the bombings was muted, however, when compared to the coverage of similar incidents in 
the 1970s and 1980s. It might be that this was a deliberate editorial policy, to avoid exacerbating public 
outrage, which could lead to demands for immediate withdrawal and place the peace process at risk. In 
the wake of the Docklands bombing, the Daily Mirror noted that ‘We are united in revulsion at it. But 
we must also be united in our determination that peace can and will be restored. And that it will last 
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forever’.84 Similarly, the Guardian argued that ‘The case for restarting the peace process is stronger 
than ever for it has to be faced that Friday’s IRA bombing had reminded many people of what is at 
stake’.85 Both papers hoped that the bomb attacks would provide renewed impetus for peace.  
 Following the Manchester bomb on 15 June 1996, in which 206 people were injured, even the 
Guardian was forced to revise its thinking. In an editorial published on 17 June, the paper asked ‘how, 
even trying to put all indignation aside, are we to interpret this… as anything other than the deliberate 
burial of the 1993-96 Northern Ireland peace process’. It argued that whilst earlier bombs might be 
understood as a reaction to the government’s ‘mishandl[ing]’ of the Mitchell report, the start of multi-
party talks five day previously meant there could be no justification for the Manchester bomb. In marked 
contrast with its previous argument that the government should promote talks with the IRA free from 
prerequisites, the paper now argued that the Manchester bomb showed that ‘the republican movement 
had not renounced the use of violence and never will’, and even if the IRA renewed its ceasefire, this 
would ‘no longer be enough to allow Sinn Fein immediate entry into talks’.86 Nonetheless, the Guardian 
continued to support negotiations and encourage the government in its efforts to secure a second 
ceasefire.      
 The return of IRA violence simply confirmed the Telegraph in its belief that the paramilitaries 
had no intention of upholding any ceasefire. For the Telegraph the Docklands bomb had destroyed the 
hope of peace and it dismissed efforts to salvage negotiations as delusional. This was reflected in this 
pessimistic message:  
The clocks [in the office, blown off the wall by the bomb] had 
stopped at 7.02 pm. They are worth preserving as the most vivid 
memento of the precise moment when the “peace process” came to 
an end.87    
Reporting on the Prime Minister’s address to the Commons in the aftermath of the bomb, the Telegraph 
commented that ‘It is now clear that the Government believes that the “peace process” is still alive’. 
The choice of phrasing suggested the paper’s scepticism that negotiations could survive the return to 
violence. The paper voices concern that rather than standing firm against the IRA, the government 
would yield to the terrorists in order to safeguard peace at any cost. It warned that ‘there is a danger 
now, spurred by an understandable nostalgia for those months of peace, of ministers turning their backs 
on reality and pretending that nothing has changed’.88 
 Their muted response to the bombings allowed newspapers space with which to examine the 
IRA from new and varied angles. It enabled the press to see beyond the IRA as a monolithic body and 
examine the power-structures within. Six days after the Docklands bombing, a second incident proved 
that it had not been a one-off attack. On 18 February, a bomb exploded prematurely on a bus travelling 
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through Aldwych in London killing IRA volunteer 21-year-old Edward O’Brien and injuring a further 
eight people.89 Unsurprisingly, the attack elicited an extremely angry response from the press; in an 
editorial published on 20 February, the Sun declared that, ‘The IRA is one man short today… Don’t 
expect anyone to shed a tear for him or his wounded pal who is under guard in hospital. Decent people 
will cheer the IRA’s loss’.90 Curiously, the next day, the Sun had modified its opinion, displaying some 
sympathy towards the young bomber: 
… the cowardly godfathers who trapped him in their web of murder 
will shed no tears. They’ll claim Ed’s life was sacrificed to their 
“cause”, and blame John Major. Then they’ll risk other young lives 
while they stay in the shadows.91     
The paper contended that O’Brien was a victim of the IRA leadership. It argued that they had viewed 
him as an expendable resource, brainwashing him in order to exploit his youth and naivety. By 
insinuating that O’Brien had been duped, the Sun implied that young volunteers did not join the IRA on 
the basis of any political rationale, rather they were conditioned. The paper refused to consider the 
possibility that any young person might choose to join the IRA of his or her own volition. The Sun 
focused on O’Brien’s youth, ‘At 21, Ed O’Brien should have had everything to live for’, impressing on 
the reader the tragedy of his demise at the hands of the IRA ‘godfathers’.92 Tom Johnston’s cartoon 
(Figure 20) published in the Sun on 22 February makes a similar point. The image, which depicted an 
IRA recruitment stand outside a school, asserted that such was the immorality of the IRA leadership 
that they were actively enlisting and exploiting young people. Parallels can be drawn between press 
representations of O’Brien and the hunger strikers in 1981, also presented as victims of the IRA 
leadership. Just as the press coverage had sought to demonise IRA leaders in the early 1980s, the Sun 
sought to discredit the republican paramilitaries in 1996. 
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 The empathy evident in the Sun’s coverage of the bus bombing owed much to O’Brien’s 
parents’ reactions. Miley and Margaret O’Brien had denounced the IRA and banned them from 
attending their son’s funeral, stating that: ‘We don’t want any of them playing soldiers while we bury 
our son’.93 The paper reported approvingly that when an IRA ‘welfare officer’ had visited the grieving 
couple at their home in County Wexford, ‘The front door of the family’s tidy, grey, terraced council 
house was slammed firmly in his face’.94 The connection between Miley and Margaret O’Brien’s 
condemnation of the IRA and the sympathy the tabloid afforded their son is particularly apparent in 
Norman Tebbit’s column from the 22 February. Usually resolute in his condemnation of the IRA, Tebbit 
wrote, ‘It is hard to weep many tears for any bomber, but one had to feel half sorry for one so young 
and immature suckered into the sick world of terrorism’. He underscored his point by voicing his 
sympathy and admiration for Miley and Margaret: ‘And who would not share the grief of his parents, 
nor admire the courage they have shown in condemning the crime committed by their son’.95  In 
foregrounding the grief and defiance shown by his parents, the narrative shifts away from O’Brien’s 
IRA activities and focused instead on its catastrophic consequences for his family. In doing so, the 
tabloid press presented Miley and Margaret as victims of the IRA. Television presenter, Anne Robinson, 
also writing for the Sun, argued that ‘most of all, to me, he represents a loss of another poor mother’. 
Controversially, she compared Margaret O’Brien to the family of Angela Gallagher, an 18-month-old 
girl killed by an IRA sniper in 1972 and asks whether the IRA leadership would dismiss O’Brien’s death 
as ‘an unfortunate accident, a hazard of guerrilla warfare’, as they had Angela’s.96  
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 The tabloids were outraged when, in defiance of the family’s wishes representatives of the IRA 
attended O’Brien’s funeral. The Mirror gave voice to its anger at the hypocrisy implicit in the IRA’s 
callous conduct: ‘Grinning IRA godfathers hijacked boy bomber Ed O’Brien’s funeral yesterday 
laughing and joking on the day Downing Street offered fresh hopes of peace’.97 The paper attributed 
added significance to their behaviour as it coincided with the British and Irish government’s 
announcement that they intended to begin all-party talks on 10 June 1996. The implication is that the 
IRA, through their presence at the funeral, were mocking the British government. Though the demand 
for prior decommissioning was dropped, both governments agreed that Sinn Féin would not be admitted 
unless the IRA reinstated its ceasefire. The press was sceptical that the paramilitaries could be persuaded 
to give up violence. The Mirror’s coverage of O’Brien funeral emphasised the lack of sensitivity 
betrayed by the IRA’s actions and drew the conclusion therefore that the IRA did not want peace. The 
Telegraph was also cynical about the IRA’s integrity, arguing that having broken one ceasefire, there 
was nothing to force them to honour a second: ‘As for the renewed demand that Sinn Fein once again 
forswear violence, well that did not prove so difficult last time round, did it?’.98 It wasn’t until 19 July 
1997 that the IRA finally announced the renewal of the ceasefire and Sinn Féin was finally allowed a 
seat at the negotiating table.    
 Nonetheless, on 10 June 1996, talks finally began, though at this stage Sinn Féin was excluded. 
Progress, however, continued to be impeded by the spectre of paramilitary violence. Just five days after 
multi-party talks commenced, the IRA exploded a bomb in Manchester city centre, injuring 206 
people.99 Encouragingly, however, Labour won the general election in May 1997, thereby breaking the 
unionist stranglehold on the British government. Prime Minister Tony Blair renewed efforts to bring 
the republican movement into the process, repeating the offer to include Sinn Féin in talks on the proviso 
that the IRA restore its ceasefire, and talks were scheduled to reconvene on 15 September 1997. Under 
increased pressure from the British, Irish and American governments, on 19 July 1997 the republican 
movement announced the re-establishment of the IRA ceasefire. Despite numerous setbacks, the 
admittance of Sinn Féin into negotiations accelerated progress, which finally resulted in the signing of 
the Good Friday Peace Agreement on 10 April 1998.  
 The British press throughout the peace process followed a qualified pro-peace line. Most 
newspapers sought to encourage the talks, providing critical coverage, which challenged participants 
over intransigency and pushed for a successful end to negotiations. Though striving for a common aim, 
there was little consensus between papers regarding the correct strategy to bring this about, they 
therefore presented a variety of different, sometimes opposing views, which reflected their wider 
editorial positions. The multifarious nature of the press coverage was apparent in reports on the 
decommissioning dispute. Newspapers were critical of the government’s position on the issue, but 
deeply divided over how it should be handled. The Guardian was of the view that the British 
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government was hindering progress by insisting on unrealistic preconditions, whilst at the other end of 
the spectrum the Sun and Daily Telegraph believed the government was pandering to the IRA and 
demanded complete disarmament.  
Newspapers were also at odds in their views concerning the desirability or otherwise of 
American involvement in the peace process. Wary of US interference, some newspapers believed the 
Americans were susceptible to republican propaganda and were therefore reluctant to allow them a role 
in the negotiations. Elements within the press were concerned that republican sensibilities were dictating 
the agenda of the peace process. Both the Telegraph and Guardian sought to stress how critical it was 
that unionists remained a part of the peace negotiations. They encouraged the UUP to assert their 
interests by engaging in direct talks with Dublin, and celebrated the appointment of David Trimble as 
leader, hoping that he would ensure a strong but moderate unionist voice in the peace process. 
 The end of the IRA ceasefire posed the greatest threat to establishing a peaceful settlement. 
Though outraged by the resurgent violence, the press deliberately tempered its coverage so as not to 
stoke public demands for withdrawal. Papers used the bombings as an inspiration towards peace, putting 
moral pressure on participants to push forward with negotiations. 
 Just as the press had offered nuanced, detailed analysis of the conflict in the 1970s and 1980s, 
newspapers produced critical commentary on the Northern Ireland peace process, which helped explain 
the complexities of the negotiations. At the same time, the press provided a platform upon which a 
diverse range of views were expressed, and the priorities and strategies of all participants scrutinised. 
As multi-party talks progressed the British press continued to provide this analytical voice, chronicling 
















Chapter Seven: Television coverage of the mid-1990s.  
On the evening of 10 April 1998, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Irish Taoiseach Bertie Ahern 
emerged from Stormont Castle to inaugurate the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. Just as television 
cameras had chronicled the violent history of the thirty-year conflict, they also captured this final 
episode. Throughout years of negotiations, the broadcast media had relayed each new development and 
setback of the peace process to audiences across the world. In Britain, this coverage was for most people 
the primary source of information about events in the province. Broadcasters reporting on the talks had 
significant potential therefore to shape public understandings of the process. Programmes sought to 
provide audiences with an appreciation of the intricacies of the peace process and the motivations of all 
parties involved. The broadcast media, moreover, played an active role in the process, facilitating and 
promoting negotiations. Throughout the 1990s, programme-makers at the BBC, ITV and Channel 4 
used their unique position to challenge intransigence on the part of key players and remind them of their 
responsibilities to that process. As television had lent a critical voice to the coverage of the violence in 
the 1970s and 1980s, it now provided analytical coverage of the developing peace.   
 This chapter will analyse current affairs coverage during the last decade of the ‘Troubles’. It 
will begin by exploring the implications of the broadcasting ban, and argue that despite restrictions, 
broadcasters continued to cover the conflict in a detailed and nuanced manner. The chapter then 
investigates coverage of the peace process focusing on the years 1995 and 1996. It argues that 
broadcasters produced in-depth reports, which sought to promote peace and allow audiences a better 
understanding of the complexities involved in the negotiations. The chapter examines the broadcast 
media’s role in the transformation of Sinn Féin into a legitimate political party. It notes that television, 
like the press, served as an alternative conduit for dialogue, and explores how some broadcasters 
endeavoured to use their programmes to promote peace. It will argue that current affairs coverage 
critically examined the actions of all participants, challenging the inflexibility of republicans, unionists 
and the British government alike. It contends however, that programmes rarely engaged with more than 
the mechanics of the peace process, making little effort to examine the substantive debates which lay at 
the heart of the conflict, such as how the two communities could co-exist, and what role the British and 
Irish governments would have in the province. 
 Restricted access to archival material from the 1990s has prevented a detailed examination of 
policy and editorial strategy in this chapter. Consequently, the following is based solely on a close 
analysis of the content of current affairs programmes produced in the years leading up to the Good 
Friday Agreement. All the same, by carrying out a comprehensive survey of television programmes, 
this chapter provides a clear indication of how news and information was presented by the broadcast 
media in the latter years of the conflict. It will concentrate on programmes broadcast by the BBC, ITV 
and Channel 4 between 1995 and 1996, covering many of the key developments in the peace process. 
These programmes demonstrate the way in which all three broadcasting bodies endeavoured to present 
a range of perspectives, in order to offer a critical commentary on the peace process.   
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Table 3: List of Television Programmes, 1995-1996 
Programme Series Channel Date Shown Number of 
Viewers (in 
millions) 
The Man We 
Hate To Love 
Panorama BBC 30 January 1995 2.9 







12 March 1995 1.2 
No Title  A Week in 
Politics 
Channel 4 18 March 1995 0.8 
Beating Crime Public Eye BBC 6 June 1995 0.9 
More than a 
Sacrifice 
 Channel 4 29 August 1995 0.5 
Ceasefire Special Newsnight BBC 31 August 1995 0.6 
David Trimble 





28 January 1996 1.1 




11 February 1996 1.7 
The End of the 
IRA Ceasefire 
Panorama BBC 12 February 1996 3.5 
Gerry Adams World in Action ITV (Granada) 12 February 1996 4.6 
The Peace Prize Dispatches Channel 4 24 April 1996 0.7 
No Title Frontline Channel 4 1 June 1996 0.7 
Dealing with 
Terror 
World in Action ITV (Granada) 24 June 1996 3.7 
Drumcree: The 
Aftermath 
Panorama BBC 15 July 1996 4.4 
Men with Nine 
Lives 




 The broadcast media’s ability to maintain a level of nuance in its coverage of Northern Ireland 
met with its biggest challenge in the late 1980s. The efforts of successive British governments to censor 
the way in which broadcasters reported on Northern Ireland culminated in the introduction of the 
broadcasting ban on 19 October 1988, prohibiting the broadcast of direct statements by representatives 
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of any organisation proscribed in Northern Ireland and Great Britain, and of Sinn Féin.1 Principally, the 
ban was directed at Sinn Féin, whose support had grown significantly since the hunger strikes. By 1988 
the republican party boasted an MP and more than sixty local council seats. Its status as a legal political 
party had made it difficult to keep them off the screen without compromising British democratic values. 
Media historian Jean Seaton contends, that the broadcasting ban was a means of curtailing interviews 
with members of Sinn Féin without seeming to undermine Parliament’s commitment to upholding 
freedom of political expression.2  
 The ban was introduced following several programmes, which had ignited government anger 
and contributed further to the deterioration of the poor relationship between broadcasters and Thatcher’s 
government. The most notable of these was ‘Death on the Rock’, broadcast by This Week on 28 April 
1988, which explored the shooting of three members of the IRA on Gibraltar on 6 March.3 Initial reports 
stated that Sean Savage, Daniel McCann and Mairéad Farrell had been shot by the SAS after planting a 
car bomb on the peninsula. It was reported that the three had been armed and that a gun battle had 
ensued.4 The next day, Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe told the Commons that: 
On their way towards the border, they were challenged by the 
security forces. When challenged they made movements which led 
the military personnel operating in support of the Gibraltar police to 
conclude that their own lives and the lives of others were under 
threat. In the light of this response, they were shot. 
Howe was forced to concede, however, that the three had been unarmed and that there had been no 
bomb.5 The programme caused widespread controversy by presenting new evidence that brought into 
question this official version of events. Eyewitnesses featured on the programme alleged that the 
security forces had not verbally challenged the IRA volunteers, and far from making threatening 
movements the three had raised their hands as though to surrender.6 This raised serious allegations that 
the security forces were operating a shoot-to-kill policy with regards to suspected terrorists. Similar 
allegations regarding the use of lethal force had been made against the British Army and the RUC on 
several occasions during the 1970s and 1980s. The issue had become a high-profile news story in 1984, 
after Deputy Chief Constable John Stalker was appointed to investigate the shooting of six men by the 
RUC and the possibility that the security forces were engaging in shoot-to-kill strategies. Before the 
inquiry was completed, Stalker was removed from the investigation following false allegations that he 
had associated with criminals, and his findings were never made public. Stalker later claimed that he 
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had been dismissed to prevent his findings from being made public.7 Unsurprisingly, ‘Death on the 
Rock’ which once again raised the spectre of a shoot-to-kill was not welcomed by the government or 
security forces.   
 During the production process, the government had been kept informed of This Week’s 
intentions.8 Two days before transmission, however, Howe phoned the Chairman of the IBA, Lord 
Thomson, to express concern that the programme would prejudice the coroner’s inquest into the killings 
and requested it be postponed. Thomson promised to look into the matter but concluded that there was 
no good reason to withhold transmission.9 The IBA expressed some concern that the programme had 
been too strong in its suggestion that the coroner’s inquest would be unable to establish the truth and 
that evidence supplied by the Gibraltar police was unreliable. The Authority also expressed concern 
about the programme’s suggestion the Prime Minister had prior knowledge that the IRA unit had 
travelled to Spain. This Week editor Roger Bolton successfully persuaded them, however, that on this 
point his evidence was impeachable.10 The programme was broadcast as planned, attracting widespread 
criticism from politicians and the right-wing press. Both the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland argued that the programme amounted to ‘trial by television’; whilst Thatcher told 
journalists that it went ‘deeper than that’: ‘Trial by television or guilt by association is the day that 
freedom dies’.11 The IBA, however, argued that ‘to postpone the programme until after an inquest which 
is apparently a long time away would give the IRA more “oxygen of publicity” and would certainly not 
prevent it being shown elsewhere’.12 An inquiry into the programme in September 1988 concluded that 
This Week had acted in good faith.  ‘Death on the Rock’ was awarded a BAFTA and the Broadway 
Press Guild Award for best documentary.13 The government, however, had its ‘revenge’, refusing to 
renew Thames Television’s franchise in October 1991, which was widely interpreted to be retribution 
for the company’s insubordination.14 
 ‘Death on the Rock’ demonstrated once again broadcasters continued determination to lend a 
critical voice to coverage of the ‘Troubles’. Crucially, it showed that if the broadcasting authorities 
remained resolute in their decision to transmit a given programme, there was little the government could 
do to prevent them. As David Miller argues, ‘Death on the Rock’ had revealed the limit the government 
was able to go to without resorting to direct censorship and therefore it introduced the broadcasting 
ban.15 It is important, however, to acknowledge that Northern Ireland was not the only news story 
responsible for the introduction of direct censorship. Broadcasters’ coverage of topics, such as the 
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miners’ strikes or the Brixton riots, had also contributed to their deteriorating relationship with the 
government.16 In particular, even-handed television reports of the Falklands War had reinforced the 
government’s determination to establish control over broadcasting. Thatcher regarded the BBC’s 
coverage, particularly its insistence on referring to ‘the British troops’ rather than ‘our troops’, as 
traitorous.17 
 From the outset, broadcasters sought ways to circumvent and undermine the broadcasting ban. 
The BBC’s Director-General, Mike Checkland, had immediately instructed his Controller of Editorial 
Policy, Johnny Wilson, to ‘test what we can do with it, push them, but make your own mind up- and I 
will back you up’.18 The ban’s vague wording meant that whilst the voices of Sinn Féin and the IRA 
could not be broadcast, their words could. Broadcasters reported statements by Sinn Féin and IRA 
representatives, initially by using subtitles; later actors, including Stephen Rea, an ardent republican, 
dubbed the voices of spokespeople, arguably intentionally out of sync, to draw attention to the fact that 
broadcasters were being forced to censor material. Sinn Féin representatives were also allowed to appear 
on television uncensored if in a non-party capacity. In the same programme therefore, viewers might 
hear Gerry Adams talking about Westminster, and then in a dubbed voice discussing Sinn Féin.19 As 
Seaton has argued, it was through these strategies that the BBC and ITV regained some of their freedom 
as broadcasters and communicated to audiences the absurdity of the ban.20 By subverting the restrictions 
placed upon them, programme-makers showed an active opposition to this assault on their freedom, and 
underlined their commitment to independent coverage. As media studies scholar Max Pettigrew has 
shown, the ban was interpreted in the press as farcical.21 Although newspapers protested that the ban 
was undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties, there was little appetite for an active campaign to have 
it lifted. The right-wing press blamed broadcasters for having made a farce of it. The Daily Mail argued 
that broadcasters enjoyed ‘thumbing their noses at the Government by using lip synchronisation and 
dubbing’. Pettigrew argues that the presentation of the ban undermined its seriousness; critics fixated 
on the techniques used to circumvent it and failed to consider the enormous threat it posed to media 
freedom.22  
 Broadcasters were equally determined not to allow the ban to stop them from producing 
valuable current affairs programmes on Northern Ireland. Immediately after it was announced, the 
Deputy Director-General of the BBC, John Birt met with veteran Northern Ireland correspondent Peter 
Taylor to request ‘something big on Northern Ireland, dig deep’.23 Accordingly, during the late 1980s 
 
16 Ibid., 35. 
17 Curran and Seaton, Power without Responsibility, 212; Edgerton, ‘Quelling the “Oxygen of Publicity”’, 120; Seaton, 
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18 Jean Seaton interview with John Wilson cited in Seaton, ‘The BBC and the ‘Hidden Wiring’ of the British 
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19 Ibid., 470. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Max Pettigrew, ‘The Oxygen of Publicity and the Suffocation of Censorship: British newspaper representations of the 
broadcasting ban (1988-1994)’ (PhD thesis, Cardiff University, 2011), 130-137. 
22 Ibid., 135.  
23 Jean Seaton interview with Peter Taylor cited in Seaton, ‘The BBC and the ‘Hidden Wiring’ of the British 
Constitution’, 470. 
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and early 1990s numerous important and challenging programmes were produced on the ‘Troubles’. 
One key example is the docudrama ‘Who Bombed Birmingham?’, produced by World in Action and 
broadcast on 28 March 1990.24 The programme, based on research undertaken by journalist-turned-MP, 
Chris Mullin, examined the Birmingham bombings in 1974 and the case against the six accused of 
carrying them out.25 It cast serious doubts on the safety of the convictions, revealing flaws in the 
evidence as presented at trial, particularly the forensics. Controversially the programme also alleged 
that the police had known the real identity of those responsible for the attack since 1975. The programme 
ended by naming four of the five IRA men believed to have planted the bombs.  
 The resultant outcry focused entirely on the decision to broadcast the four names. World in 
Action was accused, by the press and politicians from across the political spectrum, of carrying out a 
trial by television; Granada’s assertion that, ‘in order to demonstrate the innocence of the six, they 
needed to identify those they alleged were the real murderers’ was widely disputed.26 Arguably, the 
inclusion of the four names was also motivated by what would make good television, and a dramatic 
reveal made for good television. In a letter to the Director-General of the IBA, Labour MP Tony Benn, 
condemned the decision:  
what GRANADA intends to do could almost be compared to the 
late Khomeini’s ‘death sentence’ on Salman Rushdie since those 
whom they name on this programme might well themselves be 
killed - without any trial - by anyone who having seen the broadcast 
had become convinced they were simply carrying out an approved 
execution.27 
Chris Mullin also objected to the names being made public and asked to be removed from the credits.28 
By contrast, media analyst J. Mallory Wober found that 63 per cent of those who watched the 
programme agreed with the statement ‘The programme was right to name the “new five”’.29 The IBA 
defended Granada’s decision to broadcast the names, arguing that the men were all members of the IRA 
with serious criminal records who were known to any potential assassins. It also refuted claims that the 
programme could jeopardise future legal proceedings, arguing that the names had been known to the 
 
24 ‘Who Bombed Birmingham?’, World in Action, Granada, 28 March 1990. ‘Who Bombed Birmingham?’ was actually 
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authorities since 1975, yet no efforts had been made to extradite them, nor were any plans for a trial in 
prospect.30  
 The programme attracted an audience of nearly ten million, helped no doubt by the 
controversy.31 As journalist Mary Holland observed, ‘This […was] done in a context where the general 
British reaction to any television programme about Northern Ireland is to reach for the remote control 
gadget to switch channels’.32 Its effect on public opinion was considerable, Wober found that 51 per 
cent of those who watched the programme agreed with the statement ‘the six men in prison for the crime 
of bombing the pubs, seemed to be telling the truth about being innocent’.33 In August 1990, the case 
of the Birmingham Six was once again referred to the Court of Appeal as a result of fresh evidence 
provided by the programme and Mullin. On 14 March 1991, the Birmingham Six were released after 
sixteen years false imprisonment. ‘Who Bombed Birmingham?’ is indicative of the powerful role 
television current affairs can have in actualising positive change.   
 ‘Shoot to Kill’ is another example of the valuable and challenging coverage produced on 
Northern Ireland during the broadcasting ban.34 Made by Yorkshire Television and broadcast on 3 and 
4 June 1990, the two-part docu-drama examined the death of six unarmed men, suspected of carrying 
out the Kinnego embankment explosion by the RUC in 1982, which had led to the Stalker Inquiry.35 
Drawing on new information provided by Stalker’s deputy, John Thorburn, Yorkshire Television 
reconstructed the shootings, and the subsequent investigation into allegations that the RUC had been 
exercising a shoot-to-kill policy.36 The programme raised serious questions about the rectitude and 
competency of both the police and government. It argued that not only had the RUC unlawfully killed 
the six, but that they had attempted to cover it up by fabricating evidence. The programme also 
insinuated that Stalker had been dismissed from the inquiry to prevent him revealing that the British 
government had sanctioned shoot-to-kill operations in Northern Ireland. Social scientist Jane Roscoe, 
in her investigation of audience reactions to ‘Shoot to Kill’, found that the programme succeeded in 
challenging viewers’ preconceptions of terrorism. She argues that the programme created a space for 
discussion, which allowed for alternative readings of what constitutes a terrorist, with some viewers 
describing the RUC as state terrorists. Certainly, ‘Shoot to Kill’ raised significant questions about the 
legitimacy of state-sponsored violence, however, as Roscoe acknowledged, the extent to which the 
programme reversed existing perceptions of the RUC was limited. She notes that most viewers when 
asked ‘who are the “terrorists” within the programme?’, observed that the RUC had acted like terrorists, 
but that they believed that the police could not be considered terrorists.37  
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180 
 Yorkshire Television drew attention once more to the alleged shoot-to-kill policy, attracting 
widespread criticism particularly from Conservative politicians. Their outrage was further exacerbated 
by the decision to screen the programme to schedule, despite the murders of two British officers by the 
IRA days previously. Ivor Stanbrook (MP for Orpington) condemned the programme as ‘pure 
propaganda for the IRA. It is diabolical that it should be allowed to go ahead’.38 The programme was 
also accused of inaccuracies and misrepresentations. The Chairman for the Conservative’s backbench 
Northern Ireland committee, Ian Gow (assassinated by the IRA a month later) and UUP politician (soon-
to-be leader) David Trimble claimed that the film had both lied and misled viewers by giving them the 
impression that a ‘shoot to kill’ policy had existed.39 Defending Yorkshire Television, the IBA remarked: 
‘Shoot to Kill is a serious programme that explores the difficulties in countering IRA terrorism. It is a 
legitimate subject for television, and regrettably there are few periods in which its transmission would 
not coincide with IRA or other terrorist activities’.40 Amongst the public, ‘Shoot to Kill’ was well 
received winning the Royal Television Society and the Broadcasting Press Guild awards for best drama. 
The Daily Mail described the programme as ‘simply superb television’, whilst the Guardian stated that: 
‘it was a brilliant programme… Seductively watchable, beautifully filmed, spaciously elaborate in its 
slow build-up of the characters and evidence on each side of the argument’.41  
 Both ‘Shoot to Kill’ and ‘Who Bombed Birmingham?’ are testament to the powerful role 
television played in challenging the authorities’ actions regarding Northern Ireland. In doing so, they 
had a direct and positive role in redressing high-profile injustices. Despite legal restrictions, they 
provided new information, and represented aspects of the conflict which would otherwise not have come 
to the public’s attention, adding to the complex picture of events in the province produced by the media 
throughout the ‘Troubles’. Both demonstrate broadcasters’ commitment to producing nuanced current 
affairs coverage, which offered alternative perspectives, despite the best efforts of the broadcasting ban. 
This dedication to providing probing and stimulating coverage, apparent in the 1970s and 1980s, was 
to continue to be a hallmark of current affairs programming throughout the rest of the conflict and the 
peace process. 
 In the early 1990s, a shift in Britain’s political landscape occurred with the resignation of 
Margaret Thatcher and the appointment of the more moderate John Major. Within this context, the 
Northern Ireland peace process began in earnest when on 31 August 1994 the IRA announced a 
complete cessation of violence, marking a new phase in the journey to peace. In the months that 
followed loyalist paramilitaries declared a reciprocal ceasefire and preliminary dialogue began between 
the political parties of Northern Ireland, the British and the Irish governments. The establishment of all-
party talks, however, were obstructed due to disagreement over the terms of Sinn Féin’s entry into them. 
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Britain’s insistence that the IRA decommission its weapons before Sinn Féin could be allowed a seat at 
the negotiating table, delayed talks and ultimately resulted in the collapse of the IRA ceasefire in 
February 1995.  
 Following on the heels of the ceasefire came the decision to end the broadcasting ban and the 
return of Sinn Féin and the IRA to television screens. Under the ban, the number of appearances on 
television by representatives of Sinn Féin had fallen by 63 per cent.42 The party’s central role in the 
peace process, however, necessitated that broadcasters interview its representatives. Following the first 
of the Hume-Adams statements in August 1993, there was a significant increase in the number of 
television appearances by republicans. Social scientist, Rita Lago, found that between September 1993 
and December 1994, representatives of Sinn Féin were formally interviewed on the BBC, ITV and 
Channel 4 144 times; compared to only 34 interviews conducted during the first year of the ban.43 Lago, 
and David Miller, both note a change in the tone of interviews, their duration and location; not only 
were the interviews conducted post-1993 considerably longer and less hostile, but they tended to be 
carried out in the studio rather than on the street.44 Lago argues that this more formal setting conferred 
a sense of legitimacy and status onto those interviewed, which would have provoked outrage before the 
peace process began.45  
The peace process saw the evolution of Sinn Féin from terrorists into politicians, and television 
was instrumental in facilitating this reinvention. Access to television gave Sinn Féin a forum to 
articulate their position for the benefit of British and crucially unionist audiences.46 Additionally, it 
allowed them to communicate to the nationalist community and to curry support for the new strategy of 
‘unarmed struggle’.47 That they were afforded this space enabled them to be considered as legitimate 
players in the negotiations. Television also allowed for dialogue between Sinn Féin and other 
participants away from the negotiating table. This was especially important whilst Sinn Féin was 
excluded from ‘all-party’ talks. It was only through the medium of television that republicans and 
unionists had any direct dialogue prior to September 1997 when Sinn Féin was finally admitted into 
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negotiations.48 On 12 August 1997, the BBC’s Newsnight hosted the first live televised debate of the 
peace process between Ulster Unionist MP Ken Maginnis and Sinn Féin’s chief negotiator Martin 
McGuinness.49 As the BBC’s Ireland correspondent, Denis Murray explained, this was a monumental 
step forward, as it was the first time a unionist politician had engaged in a face-to-face debate with a 
member of Sinn Féin: 
To see a republican and unionist talking in the same studio was a 
considerable step. It wasn’t so much what they said, the fact that it 
was disagreeable was understandable, but it was the symbolism of 
the two sides meeting. That really was a sign of movement.50 
 Television also provided an alternative space where participants could negotiate without 
making face-to-face contact. Participants practiced what has been termed ‘megaphone diplomacy’, 
using television and newspapers to put forward new ideas, offer clarification, issue threats and most 
importantly hint at concessions.51 As media scholar, Kirsten Sparre, has argued ‘the news media can 
serve as a notice board where it is possible to post messages to the other side’.52 This ‘notice board’ 
became an important channel of communication between the different parties and by these means key 
issues were worked out. For example, Stephen Grimason (former Northern Ireland political editor for 
the BBC) highlighted the role television played in negotiating the issue of prisoner release:  
One week Paul Murphy [Minister of State for Northern Ireland] 
would appear with his view about what would happen vis-à-vis the 
prisoners and the next Sinn Féin would respond. Sinn Féin would 
not have made a deal had they not got something in terms of the 
amnesty that evolved from the process for their prisoners and about 
several months before it all came together there were a number of 
interviews by the government to send the signal that they were 
engaged and realized how important this was.53 
 Broadcasters and journalists were not merely the passive tools of those involved in peace talks. 
There was considerable support for the process amongst British and Irish journalists, with many using 
their programmes or publications to help promote peace. Irish Times journalist Ed Moloney has claimed 
that several of his colleagues would drop stories that had the potential to undermine talks, recalling how 
journalists who attempted to scrutinise the peace process too closely were labelled ‘unhelpful’. One 
Irish Times reporter even coined the name Journalists Against the Peace Process (JAPPS).54 Similarly, 
on Channel 4’s Frontline programme broadcast on 1 June 1996, Irish commentator Eoghan Harris noted 
that to criticise the peace process in Britain and Ireland was ‘neither popular nor profitable’.55 Sparre 
has shown how some journalists, especially those working on Irish and Northern Irish newspapers, 
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consciously endeavoured to facilitate negotiations, publishing articles by, or carrying out high-profile 
interviews with, key actors in the process.56 Other journalists used their platforms to challenge the 
behaviour of participants. By asking the right questions or persistently bringing up uncomfortable issues, 
journalists sought to engineer small adjustments in a party’s standpoint with the potential to create 
forward momentum within the peace process. Sparre highlights, as an example, the activities of Tom 
Collins, editor of the Belfast-based nationalist daily, the Irish News. In 1995, the newspaper won three 
News Focus Awards for its coverage of the negotiations, and Collins was personally commended on his 
‘thoughtful comments and cross-community initiatives’. Guardian journalist Roy Greenslade remarked 
that ‘The paper has played a significant part in the peace process, never disguising its nationalist 
sympathies but always ready to be impartial and balanced’.57 Collins himself, described how during the 
clarification debate, frustrated at Sinn Féin’s refusal to accept the explanations offered by the British 
government, he had republished the Downing Street Declaration, annotated with additional information 
and clarifications that had been released by the two governments, in the hope that ‘we might achieve a 
breakthrough’.58  
Television presenter Jonathan Dimbleby’s eponymous programme on 12 March 1995, 
featuring Martin McGuinness, is one of numerous examples of how Sinn Féin’s new relationship with 
the media played out on television.59 The programme explored decommissioning as a precondition for 
Sinn Féin’s entry into talks. The issue had emerged publicly five days earlier when Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland Patrick Mayhew had made his Washington speech, stating that there needed to be 
a tangible beginning to the decommissioning process before Sinn Féin could be allowed to participate. 
This would come to be a major stumbling block to progress. Current affairs programmes tended to 
support the view that Sinn Féin needed to be included in all-party talks, even if the IRA continued 
refusing to disarm. At the same time, broadcasters were still capable of challenging Sinn Féin on the 
republicans’ failure to decommission.    
Dimbleby invited McGuinness to respond to Mayhew’s demands, affording him the respect 
due to a legitimate politician. That Dimbleby was willing to make the effort to accommodate 
McGuinness’s views is evidence of a significant shift in approach to that of a political commentator 
critically questioning a credible politician. Accordingly, Lago and Miller have both argued that after 
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1993, broadcast journalists were less hostile when interviewing members of Sinn Féin.60 This is not to 
say, that where appropriate individual journalists were reluctant to challenge republicans such as 
McGuinness or Adams. 
McGuinness argued that whilst his party was committed to lasting peace, it was not in a 
position to effect disarmament. He insisted that at no point during private negotiations with the British 
government had the issue of prior decommissioning been alluded to, and declared that he had no 
intention to sacrifice his party’s unique position of influence by coming into conflict with the IRA over 
its weapons: ‘It is not realistic or sensible to expect in the present peace process that Sinn Féin should 
go to the IRA and demand that the IRA decommission its weapons before Sinn Féin goes into talks with 
British Ministers’.61 Jonathan Dimbleby facilitated the presentation by McGuinness of the republican 
perspective concerning decommissioning, not only clarifying Sinn Féin’s standpoint for the benefit of 
the other participants, but providing audiences with a better understanding of the complexities of the 
debate surrounding disarmament and the reasons why republicans were reluctant to give up their 
weapons. Dimbleby, a seasoned current affairs presenter with extensive experience covering Northern 
Ireland, however, pushed McGuinness further asking him to justify Sinn Féin’s unwillingness to 
endorse decommissioning.62 He questioned republican’s commitment to peace, asking if they would 
risk the collapse of negotiations, homing in on McGuinness’s argument that Sinn Féin would support 
universal disarmament, if it included an equal commitment from the British Army:   
Let’s stay in the world we are now in, let us say that the British 
government is prepared to discuss in their terms all those things you 
have just put in your terms. What the Secretary of State will want to 
know is are you willing or are you not willing to say… we will 
discuss the ways in which not only in principle we can achieve total 
disarmament but work out the ways that would practically bring that 
into effect.63 
Though Dimbleby demonstrates a degree of respect towards McGuinness and a willingness to listen to 
the republican point of view, he also suggests that McGuinness was being unrealistic in his demands. 
The presenter grasps at the opportunity to coax the Sinn Féin representative into conceding ground. 
Using his programme, Dimbleby attempts to extract from McGuinness a further commitment to 
disarmament given certain conditions. 
 Similar themes are present in television coverage of, and interviews with, Gerry Adams. 
Arguably, no one person represented the republican rebranding better than the President of Sinn Féin, 
who became the focus of much television attention. On 30 January 1995, the BBC’s Panorama series 
profiled Adams. ‘The Man We Hate To Love’ explored his transformation from ‘hardened terrorist to 
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peacemaker’.64 The programme tracked Adams’ role in bringing about the IRA ceasefire in 1994. 
Reporter John Ware contended that it was ‘Gerry Adams that led the IRA to take the first critical step 
to stop shooting so they could start talking and be listened to’. Ware emphasised the immensity of trying 
to persuade the paramilitaries to move forward with Adams, especially as the peace that was being 
proposed fell far short of the organisation’s ambition for a united Ireland. The programme argued that 
Adams had been tasked with carrying out a near impossible balancing act and asked whether the 
government was doing enough to help keep IRA hardliners on side.65  
 ‘The Man We Hate To Love’ presented a particularly positive view of Adams. 66  Ware 
describes him as ‘courteous, even gentle’ and ‘the best hope for peace since Ireland was divided’.67 A 
further manifestation of the shift towards treating members of Sinn Féin as legitimate political actors, 
this portrayal was in marked contrast with John Ware’s earlier description of Adams, in ‘The 
Honourable Member for West Belfast’ broadcast on 19 December 1983, as ‘the man whose following 
is set to crush any chance of reconciliation in Northern Ireland’.68 As Miller has argued the reporter’s 
change in attitude is ‘real evidence of the process of “Mandelization” in which Adams was transformed 
in the manner of Nelson Mandela from “terrorist godfather” to “legitimate peace-making politician”’.69 
Arguably the extent to which Adams succeeded in shrugging off his association with terrorism, however 
was limited.  
The lifting of the broadcasting ban allowed journalists to interview members of Sinn Féin and 
present them in a positive light without fear of evoking the government’s wrath. This new-found respect 
shown to Sinn Féin representatives by Ware and others, however, was in large part a result of that 
party’s central role in the peace process. As Channel 4 news anchor, Jon Snow explained on Right to 
Reply in March 1995: 
We’re now in a completely different circumstance from the one 
under which the ban operated. Then he [Adams] was linked with 
active terrorism, now he’s part of a peace process… Gerry Adams 
is amongst a number of people who have made a difference in 
Northern Ireland… That’s inescapable.70  
 This more receptive attitude towards Sinn Féin did not dissipate following the collapse of the 
IRA ceasefire in February 1996. In the aftermath of the Docklands bombing, World in Action broadcast 
a special episode featuring an interview with Gerry Adams, once again hosted by Jonathan Dimbleby, 
exploring the reasons behind the IRA’s return to violence and its implications for the future of the peace 
process.71 As Dimbleby remarked, the end of the ceasefire ‘put Gerry Adams in the dock’. The bomb, 
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and Adams’ refusal to condemn it, raised serious questions concerning both the Sinn Féin leader’s 
continued ability to influence the IRA and his commitment to peace. The programme offered Adams 
the opportunity to convince audiences that ‘he really was a man of peace and not just an apologist for 
terrorism’. Dimbleby approached the interview with characteristic toughness, endeavouring to force 
Adams to revile the bombers. Unsatisfied by his insistence that the government’s failure to engage in 
substantive talks was to blame, Dimbleby accused Adams of ‘ducking and weaving’ his questions, 
reminding him of his accountability to the peace process: 
Let me suggest to you that a great many British people watching, 
here in Northern Ireland and on the mainland, and many people 
beyond who may be watching this programme, will say his failure 
to condemn this atrocity is in practice to condone it.72 
Evoking international and domestic demands for peace, Dimbleby emphasised the importance of 
republican transparency if the process was to advance. Adams was forced to admit that he had not been 
warned about the bomb and was unable to confirm whether this was the beginning of a new campaign 
in England. This prompted Dimbleby to question the extent to which Adams had it within his power to 
contribute to the peace process: 
And meanwhile, you as leader of Sinn Féin cannot deliver a 
ceasefire, cannot guarantee that the IRA won’t start bombing in a 
great campaign all over again, cannot deliver anything required to 
get the talks back on track nothing.  
Dimbleby’s tone indicates his frustration at the lack of accountability shown by Sinn Féin and the IRA 
for their part in maintaining the developing peace. He accused the IRA of having failed to make any 
conciliatory gesture in order to forward negotiations. Despite these criticisms, the tone of the interview 
remained that of a reporter grilling a politician. Dimbleby allowed Adams a voice and the space to put 
across the republican position and so engage in the peace talks. Had an interview of this nature been 
broadcast during the 1970s or 1980s, Granada would have been vilified for allowing the terrorists a 
propaganda platform. By the mid-1990s, the World in Action interview attracted little negative attention. 
The absence of any backlash from the Adams interview is testament to the transformation of Sinn Féin 
and suggests a shift in public perceptions too.     
 As current affairs coverage of McGuinness and Adams shows, the broadcast media created a 
space in which Sinn Féin could come to be viewed as legitimate actors within the process and a forum 
which enabled them to engage in ongoing talks. It also demonstrates how individual journalists used 
programmes in order to maintain the developing peace. Social scientist Graham Spencer has argued that 
television journalists were ‘full and active participants’ in the peace talks. He contends that by 
broadcasting ‘the contestations between parties, carrying dialogue and communications, and publicizing 
the dynamic and direction of talks, the news media became a political participant in the peace process 
and produced expectations and pressures which were absorbed into negotiations’. 73  Miller and 
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McLaughlin also contend that ‘all sides have attempted to use the news media in the negotiations 
process, and this has meant that the media have themselves been key players in the unfolding drama’.74 
Certainly analysis has shown that television’s current affairs coverage played a role in facilitating and 
helping to advance negotiations over the mechanics behind the peace process. Media coverage, however, 
rarely explored beyond the processes of the talks, to scrutinise the core issues that would ultimately 
form part of the Good Friday Agreement. Few programmes tackled ideas of national and ethnic 
identities or what role the British and Irish governments would have in the province. Likewise, there 
was no discussion as to how the issue of a united Ireland could be reconciled. As Gadi Wolsfeld argues, 
the news media was ‘an important tool for promoting the peace process’, but for this reason it would be 
wise to exercise caution as to the extent to which the media can be viewed as political participants in 
the negotiations. 
   Not content with interviewing Sinn Féin, the lifting of the broadcasting ban meant that the 
IRA appeared once more on television screens. On 20 December 1994, ITV’s Network First broadcast 
a series of interviews with IRA volunteers, exploring the motivations and experiences of the IRA foot 
soldier.75 This was the first-time republican paramilitaries had been interviewed on British television 
since 1979. Over the course of the peace process, broadcasters produced several current affairs 
programmes featuring interviews with IRA and ex-IRA volunteers, as well as the Ulster Volunteer Force 
(UVF) and other Loyalist paramilitaries. These programmes sought to explore the mind-set of the rank 
and file, with the aim of better understanding the impetus behind paramilitarism, especially that of the 
IRA, and demonstrating the importance of involving all parties in the peace process.  
 ‘Dealing with Terror’, broadcast by World in Action on 24 June 1996, interviewed former IRA 
bomber Shane Paul O’Doherty and ex-UVF assassin Billy Hutchinson about the rationale behind 
terrorist actions and what it might take to persuade paramilitaries on both sides to abandon their armed 
campaigns.76 The programme described O’Doherty and Hutchinson as ‘the most dangerous men ever 
to be convicted of terrorism in this country’. O’Doherty had been convicted in 1976 of thirty-one counts 
of attempted murder for his part in a London letter bombing campaign, whilst Hutchinson was 
imprisoned in 1975 for the murder of two Catholics. Both men, however, had renounced violence whilst 
in prison, and since his release Hutchinson had become an advisor to the Progressive Unionist Party 
(PUP). O’Doherty and Hutchinson explored their beliefs as young men and their eventual realisation 
that terrorism was not the way to achieve their goals. As O’Doherty states ‘it is vitally important that 
you know how I felt then, because there are still people in Britain who feel this way and who are working 
with explosives, and bombs’. 77  In giving both men a voice, the programme helped audiences to 
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contextualise the conflict. It sought to provide viewers with a better understanding of the violence, 
instead of presenting it as a random manifestation. Explaining the motivations behind the paramilitaries’ 
activities, allowed the programme to offer a more complex perspective to one of the conflict as an 
irrational battle between two violent tribes. The programme showed, once again that the broadcast 
media were capable of presenting a more nuanced view of the ‘Troubles’ than they have been credited 
with.  
 The programme’s rationale was that only by understanding the motives which lay behind the 
violence, could the peace process advance. O’Doherty described how engaging with Labour politicians 
Philip Whitehead and Andrew Bennett, who had visited him regularly in prison and had listened to his 
grievances without preconditions, had led him to rethink his hard-line republican views. Hutchinson on 
the other hand, explained how talking with republican prisoners had taught him that he shared many of 
the same values and experiences as his so-called enemies. Both men argued that if the British and Irish 
governments engaged with extremists without prerequisites and began to establish common ground 
between paramilitaries on both sides, they might move away from violence completely. The programme 
observed, however, that this advice had been disregarded by the British government who continued to 
refuse to talk to Sinn Féin whilst the IRA held onto their weapons. It voiced fear that following the 
Manchester bombing on 15 June 1996 prospects of talks with Sinn Féin were even more remote. The 
programme concluded with comments from both Hutchinson and O’Doherty who condemn the failure 
to move forward towards all-party talks.78  These closing scenes imply criticism of all those who 
opposed the entry of Sinn Féin into the peace negotiations, and especially the British government. 
 Broadcasters tended to be critical of the government’s handling of the peace process, especially 
concerning the issue of decommissioning. Most programmes presented the view that for the peace 
process to be successful Sinn Féin needed to be included. Some even went so far as to suggest that the 
British government’s intransigence over the terms of Sinn Féin’s entry into negotiations was 
endangering the peace process. Three days after the Docklands bombing, Panorama broadcast a review 
of the previous eighteen-months of peace and asked what lessons could be learnt moving forward.79 The 
programme, hosted by David Dimbleby, featured an extended report on Northern Ireland by Peter 
Taylor exploring nationalist and republican frustration with the speed of the process. Taylor argued that 
the government’s inflexibility was at the root of the current setbacks: ‘the crisis we face today can be 
traced back to frustrated expectations to what the IRA had been led to believe it would get from the 
ceasefire’. He remarked that ‘from the beginning the British government insisted on conditions which 
it maintained were essential if ever the Unionists were to be brought to the negotiating table’. The 
programme explained that the government had first insisted that the IRA declare its ceasefire to be 
permanent, then decommission its weapons, now it was insisting that elections be held before talks. 
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Taylor’s choice of words and intonation served to indicate that he did not agree with the government’s 
view that such measures were necessary to ensure unionist cooperation. Instead, he points out, that by 
fixating on decommissioning the government risked alienating the nationalists: ‘To nationalists and 
republicans and increasingly the Dublin government these conditions seemed hurdles on the road to 
peace’. Taylor concluded, with some pessimism, that all participants in the process, including Britain, 
needed to make the necessary compromises in order to prevent further violence and establish all-party 
talks.    
Taylor’s cynicism was shared by Dimbleby, as is evident from the host’s interview with 
Minister of State Michael Ancram. Dimbleby echoed republicans in accusing the government of 
‘dragging its feet’, and put to Ancram that ‘every time you looked as though you were about to get to 
the negotiating table, there seemed to be some other hurdle’. He questioned the logic behind Major’s 
insistence on elections, asking Ancram how this would resolve decommissioning. Dimbleby implied 
that, if holding an election would allow Sinn Féin entry into all-party talks, then the IRA’s failure to 
disarm could not have been as big a stumbling block as the government had claimed. He also challenged 
Ancram on why the government could not accept Mitchell’s recommendations without the precondition 
of elections. Ancram argued that only an election could establish the confidence in the republican 
movement, necessary to ensure the unionists would agree to sit around the negotiating table, at which 
point Dimbleby questioned whether the government had been tough enough, insinuating that they were 
allowing unionists to dictate negotiations, and in the process risking the collapse of the peace process.80 
What the viewer witnessed was a hard line of questioning, by constantly pushing the agenda, Dimbleby, 
like Taylor, sought to hold the British government accountable, raising questions regarding its 
culpability with respect to the end of the ceasefire and its potential future role in bringing about a 
successful conclusion to negotiations.          
Panorama produced several other programmes during this period which challenged the British 
government’s actions concerning Northern Ireland. In July 1996, trouble erupted in Portadown (Co. 
Armagh) after police attempted to re-route the Orange Order’s annual Drumcree parade in response to 
demonstrations by Catholic residents. After the RUC reversed its decision to disallow the parade from 
marching its traditional route down the Garvaghy Road, loyalist violence gave way to rioting in 
nationalist areas. Panorama criticised the government for failing to take action over the standoff and 
questioned the extent to which they had allowed themselves to be cowed by the unionists. In a special 
edition, broadcast on 15 July, the programme investigated the extent to which the government was 
responsible for the march going ahead.81 The Chief Constable of the RUC, Hugh Annesley, in an 
interview featured on the programme, insisted that he had made all decisions regarding the handling of 
the crisis independently. John Major, also interviewed on the programme, likewise denied that his 
government had played any part in allowing the Drumcree parade to progress. 
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Both Taylor and Dimbleby cast doubt on these claims, arguing that given the political 
implications it seemed inconceivable that the government had no influence on the decision to allow the 
Order down the Garvaghy Road. In an interview, Dimbleby put it to the Prime Minister that given the 
sensitive nature of the march, and its potential implications for peace talks, the government should have 
been directly involved in resolving the crisis. He argued that this degree of conflict within a part of the 
United Kingdom warranted they play a part alongside the Chief Constable to find a peaceful solution. 
He also suggests that even if Major was to be believed, that the British government had played no role 
at Drumcree, by virtue of doing nothing they must own their part in the violence and this potential threat 
to the peace process. Dimbleby argued that to nationalists it appeared that unionists had once again got 
their own way, undermining their confidence in receiving fair treatment in the peace process and leaving 
them to question the point of engaging constructively with negotiations. Once again, Dimbleby used his 
position to hold the British government to account, challenging them over their handling of events in 
Northern Ireland. 
Dimbleby also put it to Major that the loyalists had prevailed through violence and sheer force 
of numbers and asked if unionists could flaunt the law with impunity because of Major’s dependency 
on the UUP for his parliamentary majority. Major’s slim majority, exacerbated by deep divisions within 
the Conservative Party, had given unionist MPs a pivotal role in British politics. 82 In 1995, John 
Redwood’s bid for the Party’s leadership had further underscored the precariousness of Major’s position. 
Fear of losing the UUP’s support was certainly a factor in the way in which the government approached 
the peace process, although the extent to which Major was held hostage by the Ulster Unionists requires 
further scholarly investigation.83 Dimbleby raises the possibility that Major, fearful of antagonising the 
UUP, was soft on unionists, not only at Drumcree but in the peace process. Dimbleby took a hard line, 
scrutinising the government’s motives and pressing Major to account for its part in the violence. His 
tough stance attracted comment; writing in the Sun, columnist and former Conservative Cabinet minister, 
Norman Tebbit, usually an outspoken critic of Major, applauded his ‘self-control, discipline and 
determination’ in the face of Dimbleby’s questions, which he accused of being ‘downright offensive’.84 
It is clear that Dimbleby demonstrated a willingness within the British media to critically examine the 
government’s actions in Northern Ireland.  
 At the same time, the programme criticised the Orange Order’s part in the dispute. The 
programme argued that the trouble was rooted in displays of triumphalism when, the year before, the 
marchers had been permitted to pass down the Garvaghy Road. It refuted unionist claims that these 
allegations were the invention of Sinn Féin and the IRA to ‘whip-up feeling’ showing footage of David 
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Trimble and Ian Paisley on the 1995 march holding their hands aloft in a gesture of triumph as they 
reached the end of the Garvaghy Road. Taylor noted that these scenes were being repeated and predicted 
that this would continue to have damaging consequences in the future. Rather than simply condemn the 
unionists, however, the programme offered an explanation as to their rationale. Attempting to 
communicate the importance of the march for the loyalist community, Taylor explained that ‘the issue 
was not simply about marching down a road; it was a matter of survival, as if their whole lives, future 
and culture was at stake’. Trimble, interviewed on the programme, noted that unionist fears of being 
manipulated out of the UK, had been aggravated by what his community saw as constant concessions 
by the British government in its dealings with militant nationalism. By which he meant yielding to 
republican pressure over issues such as prior decommissioning. The programme argued that for many 
unionists ‘Drumcree was heralded as Ulster’s last stand’. In doing so Panorama demonstrated a capacity 
to look beyond the violence to better understand the loyalist psyche.    
 Even so, Panorama condemned the Order’s actions during the standoff, presenting them as 
stereotypically intransigent. Taking an equally tough stance to that adopted by Dimbleby towards Major, 
Taylor confronted Trimble, questioning his refusal to meet with the Garvaghy Road residents. Taylor 
accused the Orange Order of turning away from an opportunity to resolve the crisis. In 1982, the leader 
of the Garvaghy Road residents, Breandán Mac Cionnaith, had been jailed for his part in an IRA bomb 
attack on Portadown’s British Legion Hall. Taylor remarked: ‘if the loyalists had been looking for an 
excuse not to compromise then Mr Mac Cionnaith’s record was ready and waiting’. His choice of words 
implies that Mac Cionnaith’s criminal record would be just that, an excuse, and that the unionists had 
no intention of coming to a compromise with the residents’ association. Indeed, Trimble insisted that 
the association was a front for Sinn Féin and that the Order would not engage with militant republicans.85 
The programme sought to hold unionists, as it had the British government, responsible for their part in 
the conflict and to bring pressure to bear on them to find a compromise.   
The irony was not lost on Taylor that though Trimble refused to talk to Mac Cionnaith, he was 
willing to engage in talks with loyalist paramilitaries. The reporter recounted how he had been sitting 
in Drumcree Church Hall at the height of the crisis when Trimble had arrived for a secret meeting with 
representatives of the outlawed loyalist paramilitary group, the UVF, including former prisoner Billy 
Wright. The programme then featured a brief interview with Wright who denied involvement in the 
standoff. Taylor challenged Trimble on the issue of loyalist paramilitary involvement, questioning 
whether he had done enough to prevent them from aggravating an already volatile situation. Special 
Branch sources had suggested that paramilitaries on both sides had stepped in to prevent a deal being 
brokered. Taylor points out the hypocrisy of talking to the UVF, and not Sinn Féin or the IRA, 
encouraging the viewer to examine why unionists refused to negotiate with Sinn Féin directly in the 
peace process. Taylor recognised that the unionists were using the Orange march to underline their 
dominance and challenged it head-on. He gave voice to a widespread frustration at the lack of 
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accountability and unwillingness to compromise shown by unionist politicians both at Drumcree and in 
the peace process.86 Panorama succeeded in presenting the Drumcree standoff in a nuanced manner by 
helping to explain the importance of the marching season, and nationalist objections to it.   
 It is worth noting that the Drumcree special also addressed the issue of violence perpetrated by 
the RUC when instructed to clear Garvaghy Road residents who were peacefully protesting. Its footage 
of baton-wielding police officers attacking protestors is hauntingly reminiscent of that filmed during 
the Civil Rights marches in 1968. Contrary to Miller’s claim that ‘television news journalists are with 
the police’, and in marked contrast with the way in which violence carried out by the security forces 
was reported during the early days of the ‘Troubles’, Panorama was candid about police brutality.87 
The programme presented footage of residents, being interviewed by Taylor, showing the cameras the 
injuries inflicted on them by the RUC. With the help of this footage, the programme sought to 
demonstrate not only the physical damage caused by these attacks but also the damage done to 
nationalist confidence that the peace process had brought about change and that they would no longer 
be subject to discrimination. This was epitomised in a shot of one female resident, who shouts at the 
cameras filming the clearance: ‘This is outrageous what’s happening in Portadown. What are we to 
make of this? The implication of this is that the greater threat has won’. Put differently, the Orange 
Order had been allowed to triumph by a police force which retained a bias against the nationalist 
community; her words lend support to Dimbleby’s argument that nationalists believed that the unionists 
always got their way. The programme vocalises fears that nationalist anger at the RUC would endanger 
the peace process. 
   Panorama was not alone in questioning the unionist commitment to the peace process and 
their willingness to compromise. Much of the broadcast media’s coverage in the mid-1990s presented 
the unionists as an impediment to progress, rather than engaged participants in the process. In an episode 
of Dispatches entitled ‘The Peace Prize’, broadcast by Channel 4 on 24 April 1996, reporter Eamonn 
Mallie went so far as to remark that ‘The unionists were never players in this peace process’. His 
comments were supported by images of Trimble and Paisley walking with their hands raised 
triumphantly down the Garvaghy Road. Mallie’s observation, juxtaposed with these striking scenes, 
suggested not only that unionists were unwilling to compromise but questioned whether they were 
serious about participating in negotiations at all if the absolute preservation of the Union and the 
protection of unionist traditions could not be guaranteed. 88  Expectations of a unionist backlash 
preoccupied broadcasters, who nervously monitored their behaviour for any sign that presaged them 
pulling out. The cumulative effect of programmes such as ‘The Peace Prize’ and ‘Drumcree: The 
Aftermath’ reinforced long-standing stereotypes of the ‘No Surrender’ faction within the unionist 
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community. The editorial lens through which these programmes interpreted unionism viewed its lack 
of engagement in, and resistance to, the peace negotiations as evidence of ingrained recalcitrance and a 
siege mentality.  
 This was a view widely shared throughout the rest of the UK. On 1 February 1996, Newsnight 
dedicated its programme to examining the implications of the leaked Framework documents on the 
peace process.89 The reaction of unionist politicians to the documents was one of outrage, fearing that 
they would open the door to a united Ireland. The programme asked whether unionists still had faith in 
the British government, or believed that they had ‘been sold down Belfast Lough’. Taking part in a 
panel discussion featured on the programme, Michael Mates (former Northern Ireland minister) 
described Paisley and the Deputy Leader of the UUP, John Taylor, as ‘two Unionist bulls…looking for 
red rags because they want to create a row’. Paisley lent credence to Mates’ observations shortly 
afterwards by storming off set. His temper tantrum served to reinforce impressions that unionists were 
petty, negative and liable to respond in a ‘knee-jerk’ fashion to the slightest provocation. It should be 
noted, however, that not all unionist politicians appeared in such a negative light; also interviewed on 
the programme was UUP Councillor Chris McGimpsey. He urged fellow unionists to reserve judgement 
until the Framework Documents had been published in full, but called for John Major to initiate all-
party talks immediately, as ‘the rumour mills in Belfast are certainly grinding very quickly’. This level-
headed attitude prompted Mates to praise his ‘calm and sensible words’. The inclusion of McGimpsey 
on the programme injected a refreshingly moderate unionist voice into the television discussion of the 
peace process. Broadcasters for the most part, however, presented the view that unionist political leaders 
were responsible for stirring up deep-seated fears of absorption into the Republic of Ireland amongst 
the Protestant community; hindering negotiations, rather than looking for viable and constructive 
alternatives for peace. It might also be suggested that the tendency to present unionism at its most 
extreme served to provide viewers with dramatic television viewing.  
 Current affairs coverage in the mid-1990s centred on interviews and panel discussions. This 
was in part because of the broadcast media’s emphasis on facilitating peace discussions. The danger of 
this format was that it could result in the presentation of an over-simplistic and detached view of the 
peace process. As Spencer has argued, current affairs coverage often ‘reduce[d] the complexities and 
details of political change to a battle of wills’ between members of the dominant parties, the British and 
the Irish governments.90 Broadcasters, for example, had a tendency to ignore the smaller parties, such 
as the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition and the Alliance Party, both of whom played an important 
role in the process, despite failing to provide the dramatics of a John Hume, Ian Paisley, Gerry Adams 
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or David Trimble.91 This emphasis on the big players, served to flatten some of the more subtle nuances 
of the peace process, presenting it as ‘a contestation between two opposing voices’.92 Their rankling 
could also make for dry television, which often disengaged British audiences, already inclined to change 
the channel when programmes about Northern Ireland were featured.      
Programme-makers attempted to explore the human implications of the peace process, 
investigating its effect on everyday life in Northern Ireland. Programmes often included audience 
discussions, live from Belfast with participants representing a broad section of Northern Irish society, 
or interviews with people on the streets of Belfast and Derry who explained how their everyday life had 
been transformed by the cessation of violence, and shared their hopes for the peace process. All the 
Jonathan Dimbleby programmes included a live discussion with a local audience made up of 
representatives of both communities.93 This contributed to a growing Northern Irish voice on television. 
It also provided viewers with an insight into the range of public opinion in Northern Ireland on key 
issues, such as decommissioning or police reforms, which, in turn, offered a greater appreciation of the 
difficulty of the task at hand and the complex requirements that negotiators needed to take into account 
in order to achieve a lasting peace. By emphasising the positive impact of the ceasefire, and the demand 
for peace from ordinary people in Northern Ireland current affairs coverage promoted the peace process 
to the British public. By attempting to generate widespread popular support for the process in Britain, 
the media sought to bring pressure to bear on the government to act more decisively and push forward 
with talks.  
 Following the Docklands bombing and the end of the IRA ceasefire, broadcasters used 
interviews with people on the streets of Northern Ireland to demonstrate the broader implications of the 
bomb attack for the province. The interviews illustrated not only the disbelief and desperation of people 
in Northern Ireland, but also their frustration with participants in the peace negotiations, particularly the 
British government, for failing to advance all-party talks. The Docklands bombing served as a reminder 
of the turmoil which would follow if the peace process collapsed. This was to be the broadcaster’s focus, 
drawing attention to the reaction of members of the public in Northern Ireland, to provide renewed 
impetus to the peace process.94 ‘The End of the IRA Ceasefire’, broadcast by Panorama on 12 February 
1996, for example, opened with a short montage of interviews with people in Belfast giving their 
 
91 In this sample, Newsnight was the only series to include interviews with representatives from any organisation other 
than the four main political parties, and even then, they were given limited airtime. On 1 February 1995, the leader of 
the Alliance Party Dr John Alderdice was among the numerous politicians interviewed about the Framework 
Documents. He criticised the British and Irish governments for not having published the documents earlier, arguing that 
the secrecy had aggravated fears among Unionists that the two governments’ planned to sell them down the river. 
Similarly, in Newsnight’s Ceasefire Special, the deputy leader of the Alliance Party, Seamus Close, was one of many 
politicians to take part in a live audience discussion about the peace negotiations (‘No Title’, 1 February 1995; 
‘Ceasefire Special’, Newsnight, BBC, 31 August 1995). 
92 Spencer, The Media and peace, 136-9. 
93 Martin McGuinness, 12 March 1995; David Trimble and John Hume, Jonathan Dimbleby, London Weekend World, 
28 January 1996; ‘No Title’, Jonathan Dimbleby, London Weekend World, 11 February 1996. 
94 Gadi Wolsfeld has shown that there was a similar reaction to the Omagh bombing in August 1998. See Wolsfeld, The 
News Media and Peace Processes, 34-5.  
195 
 
reaction to the Docklands bombing. All of those interviewed expressed their dismay at the end of the 
ceasefire and their fear that violence would return to the streets of Northern Ireland:   
Interview A: I just couldn’t believe it you know, I thought we were 
getting somewhere with the peace process, and I just couldn’t 
believe what had happened.  
Interview B: My reaction was one of anger. Anger, that we had an 
opportunity for the last eighteen-months of resolving this problem 
and the British government with unionism has squandered an 
opportunity. 
Interview C: My immediate thoughts were with the people in 
London, and then of course I started to think about us here. All of 
us who have worked and believe that it had come, that peace was 
with us. That we were in this, normal society and suddenly it was 
just grabbed from under us again.95 
 
 Channel 4 dedicated whole programmes to the experiences and reactions of the people of 
Northern Ireland during the mid-1990s, as a way of demonstrating its support for the peace process. The 
Slot, a series in which politicians, political activists and members of the public were invited to discuss 
topical issues, produced several programmes featuring young people from Northern Ireland discussing 
the peace process and their hopes and fears for the future.96 To mark the first anniversary of the IRA 
ceasefire Channel 4 produced a two-part series, ‘More than a Sacrifice’ and ‘The Troubles with Peace’. 
The two programmes, broadcast on 29 and 30 August 1995 respectively, investigated the impact of the 
eighteen-month ceasefire on both communities in Northern Ireland.97 ‘More than a Sacrifice’ focused 
on four republicans, Gary Fleming, Raymond McCartney, Maureen Shiels and Donna Bradley, 
shadowing them through its first year.98 All four described the relief and optimism with which their 
community had greeted the ceasefire. Though they remark on how daily life had improved they note 
that change had remained limited. One scene, for example, featured Maureen Shiels and her young 
children as they celebrated Halloween. The frivolity is somewhat tempered, however, by the RUC and 
tank presence at the celebrations, a reminder that the conflict could easily begin again. By emphasising 
the fragility of the peace, the programme sought to impress upon the viewer the importance of successful 
peace talks. All four participants, also expressed their frustration at the lack of progress and their fears 
that if all-party talks did not begin soon the conflict might reignite.   
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 ‘More than a Sacrifice’ placed particular emphasis on the experiences of children, and the 
opportunities the peace process had afforded them for normal childhood experiences. The programme 
showed footage of Donna Bradley’s son getting his 11-plus results, Maureen Shiels’ children enjoying 
Christmas and Gerry Fleming as he prepared to attend his youngest son’s first communion; all 
recognisable milestones for most of the audience. 99  By foregrounding ordinary family life, the 
programme presented Northern Ireland in a manner that was accessible, which would promote a sense 
of empathy in the viewer and underline the importance of peace if such scenes were to survive. The 
programme borders on emotional blackmail by suggesting that the failure to compromise and secure a 
lasting peace, on the part of those involved in the negotiations had the potential to rob these children of 
a future.100 Similarly, following the end of the ceasefire World in Action visited the maternity wing of 
Mater hospital (Belfast) and interviewed parents who talked about their desire for a peaceful future for 
their new-borns and their fear of what implications the Docklands bomb could have for Northern Ireland. 
The programme’s presenter Jonathan Dimbleby remarked: ‘they should symbolise hope but these babies 
were born after the ceasefire had broken down’.101 By focusing on new-borns the broadcast media set 
out its hopes for a peaceful future.  
 By concentrating on the everyday experiences of the people of Northern Ireland, programmes 
such as ‘More than a Sacrifice’ illustrated what was at stake if the peace process failed. Emphasising 
the human dimension of their story, they attempted to promote an understanding of the importance of 
acquiring peace amongst British audiences. In doing so, they hoped to generate public support for the 
peace process in Britain, which would put pressure on the government to act decisively in that direction.  
 Free from the restrictions of the broadcasting ban, broadcasters were once again able to 
interview republicans on television. Sinn Féin’s return to television screens saw them transformed from 
terrorists into legitimate politicians. Current affairs programmes played a significant role in this 
metamorphosis by providing a forum for their representatives to articulate their political objectives and 
participate in peace discussions. Whilst most programmes supported the view that Sinn Féin needed to 
be involved in all-party talks, if necessary without IRA disarmament, broadcasters proved themselves 
equally capable of challenging the republican stance on decommissioning and other key issues.  
 The broadcast media played an active role in the peace process by creating an alternative space 
not only for Sinn Féin, but for all sides in the peace process to engage in dialogue. Use of the ‘notice 
board’ model, by the news media allowed participants to articulate their position, put pressure on other 
players in the process and hint at potential concessions. Individual broadcasters and journalists were 
active participants, using their programmes to promote negotiations. By featuring interviews with key 
players such as John Major, Gerry Adams or David Trimble, broadcasters helped move the dialogue 
forward. They achieved this by asking challenging questions of unionists, republicans and the British 
government alike, holding them to account if they appeared to be obstructing the road to a lasting peace 
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settlement. On occasion, a tough interviewing technique could engineer small changes in a party’s 
standpoint.  
 Scholars such as Graham Spencer, David Miller and Greg McLaughlin have emphasised 
television’s function in the peace talks, arguing that broadcasters were political players in their own 
right.102 This chapter has shown that television current affairs programmes proved to be a valuable tool 
in promoting peace. In addition to acting as a conduit for negotiations, many programme-makers 
mobilised popular support for the process by focusing on the lived experiences of the people of Northern 
Ireland in order to highlight what was at stake if politicians failed to reach an agreement. The current 
affairs coverage, however, did not seek to address the issues at the core of the conflict, including the 
role of the British and Irish governments in the province and the reconciliation of opposing ethnic and 
national identities. To this extent the media limited its participation in the peace process, seeing 
themselves primarily as facilitators of that process. 
 In the same manner as their coverage in the 1970s and 1980s had demonstrated, the BBC, ITV 
and Channel 4 continued to critically examine all aspects of the negotiations, producing nuanced 
coverage, which helped explain the complexities of the negotiations and the motivations of the key 
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Chapter Eight: The Irish in Britain during the 1990s. 
In the early 1990s a new wave of IRA bomb attacks on English cities gave rise to widespread anger 
across Britain. The Irish predictably became scapegoats once more. The backlash against those Irish 
people living in Britain, however, was more restrained than it had been in previous decades. The 
growing popularity of Irish culture had resulted in a shift in British attitudes towards the Irish. By the 
mid-1990s Irishness was becoming something to be celebrated and the Irish were increasingly accepted 
in British society despite the on-going violence. Nevertheless, Irish people continued to come under 
suspicion, especially as fears grew that active IRA units were operating within Britain itself. Once more 
the media’s coverage of IRA activity helped perpetuate a link in the public’s imagination between the 
Irish in Britain and the IRA. 
 As discussed in previous chapters, there is a wealth of research on the lived experiences of 
Irish migrants residing in Britain during the twentieth century. This scholarship, however, tends to 
concentrate on the 1970s and 1980s, or focuses on the period following the collapse of the Celtic Tiger. 
Few scholars have examined the Irish in Britain during the 1990s. This is perhaps because it was a 
period of relative calm compared with the hostility of the 1970s and 1980s. It was this decade, however, 
that witnessed a significant transformation in British perceptions of the Irish, who had become 
increasingly accepted as a valued constituent of British society. A comprehensive examination of the 
1990s is essential therefore to fully understanding both the contemporary status of the Irish in Britain 
and their experiences throughout the twentieth century.  
 Scholars have begun to address this period, but further investigation is needed in order to 
provide a fuller picture. Psychologist Marc Scully has explored the revival of Irish culture in the 1990s 
and its effect on perception of Irishness in Britain. He argues that whilst Irishness was becoming 
fashionable, this did not necessarily mean an end to anti-Irish prejudice. Scully notes that the British 
media played a role in initiating this transformation by depicting the Irish in a more positive light.1 He 
does not, however, carry out any analysis of the media’s coverage during this period and as this chapter 
will show, the reality was more complex. Whilst the media did present the Irish more positively, tabloid 
newspapers in particular were also capable of reverting to the use of traditional derogatory stereotypes 
and continued to present the Irish in Britain as potential terrorists. Further analysis of how the press and 
broadcast media portrayed the Irish in the 1990s is therefore necessary in order to understand the true 
extent of the shift in British attitudes at the end of the twentieth century.      
 Other scholars have examined Irish experiences of hostility (or lack thereof) after the 
Manchester and Warrington bombings in 1993 and 1996 respectively. Barry Hazley has used the 
Manchester bomb to explore how Irish migrants negotiated their memories of IRA bomb attacks and 
the relationship between ‘suspicion’ and the formation of different Irish subjectivities. He argues that 
discourse about discrimination, invisibility and suspicion experienced by the Irish, which entered 
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mainstream culture in the 1990s curtesy of activist groups such as the IBRG, were, and continue to be, 
appropriated by individuals to reconstruct their personal experiences of this period.2 Lesley Lelourec, 
on the other hand, has examined the response to the Warrington bombing and argues that rather than 
direct its anger at the town’s Irish, the local community sought to respond constructively to the bomb, 
engaging in projects which attempted to help foster a closer relationship between Britain and Ireland.3   
 This chapter will build on the existing scholarship, examining the renascence of Irish culture 
and the response to IRA activity in Britain in the 1990s. It will first explore the reconfiguration of 
traditional Irish music and dance to incorporate modern trends, arguing that this gave rise to a 
reassessment of British attitudes towards the Irish. By providing alternative versions of Irishness to that 
associated with IRA violence, popular Irish culture helped transform being Irish into something to be 
celebrated rather than feared or dismissed. The Irish continued to be subject to hostility but on a lesser 
scale than in the 1970s and 1980s. The chapter examines the nature of the backlash experienced by the 
Irish following high-profile IRA attacks in English cities in the mid-1990s. It acknowledges the restraint 
shown by the public in the aftermath of bomb attacks, but nonetheless argues that the Irish in Britain 
continued to be considered as a suspect community. The chapter explores the press’s role in reinforcing 
this belief, in particular its preoccupation with the presence of IRA sleeper cells, which ensured that the 
Irish in Britain continued to be imagined as an internal threat. It argues that whilst the status of the Irish 
had improved, whatever acceptance they enjoyed remained precarious.   
 By the mid-1990s, a significant shift in British perceptions of the Irish had occurred. After 
being viewed primarily with hostility and suspicion throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Irish in Britain 
found themselves increasingly ‘cool’. As Kathleen, an Irish woman living in Milton Keynes, told Marc 
Scully, ‘Irish is flavour of the month’.4 This change can be attributed, at least in part, to the IRA 
ceasefire and the Northern Ireland peace process, which prompted a decline, though by no means an 
end, to anti-Irish hostility resulting from IRA bomb attacks in English cities.  
Economic prosperity in Ireland during the Celtic Tiger years was also a factor in bringing about 
this transformation. Scully has argued that the success of the Irish economy, and the consequent 
association of Ireland with progress and modernity, defused the power of anti-Irish stereotypes and 
jokes.5 The improved economy created a new sense of confidence, encouraging a revival in Irish culture 
on a global scale. It also prompted a shift in the composition of the Irish migrant population. An increase 
in return migration, especially amongst Irish people working in manual labour, attracted home by the 
boom in Ireland’s construction industry, meant that those who remained were increasingly middle-class 
professionals who could not be as easily labelled with stereotypes, such as the thick, violent Paddy. 
Interestingly, this would suggest that there was a class dynamic to the hostility experienced by many 
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Irish people during the ‘Troubles’.6 The fact that anti-Irish sentiment declined with the falling numbers 
of Irish working class in Britain indicates that the discrimination experienced by many Irish people 
during this period was influenced at least in some part by class prejudice. This had certainly been the 
case during the nineteenth century, when stereotypes of the working class as drunken, dirty and lazy 
had informed attitudes towards poor Irish migrants. As Michael de Nie argues, concerns of class, 
religion and race converged to inform British attitudes towards the Irish.7   
The main impetus behind the improved status of the Irish in Britain, however, was the growing 
popularity of Irish culture. In the 1980s and 1990s, the success of musicians both from Ireland, and from 
within the Irish diaspora was instrumental in raising the profile of the Irish, not only in Britain, but 
globally. These included artists and bands such as U2, The Pogues, The Smiths, Dexy’s Midnight 
Runners and Oasis. Music rooted in traditional Irish folk found audiences in Britain. In 1982, Clannad, 
an Irish folk rock band, made number five in the UK singles chart with the theme from the ‘Troubles’ 
television drama Harry’s Game. It was the first time musicians had sung in Irish on Top of the Pops.8 
The appeal of the Irish music produced in the 1980s and 1990s was not just that it reclaimed Irish 
traditions, these bands signified a reconfiguration of traditional culture to incorporate modern trends to 
popular effect. Groups like Planxty and Moving Hearts married Irish folk with rock and jazz, whilst 
second-generation London-Irish group The Pogues fused folk and punk.9 
 Emerging during the 1980s, a period when ‘it was neither popular nor fashionable to be Irish’, 
The Pogues in particular offered a very different construction of Irishness to the one proscribed by 
association with IRA violence.10 Rather, as media studies scholar Sean Campbell has argued, the image 
that they conveyed was of ‘an Irishness that was confidently cosmopolitan and contemporary’.11 This 
was in spite of the band’s association with alcohol and pub culture which reinforced the traditional 
stereotypes of the drunken Irish. The band’s popular appeal made it possible to claim back a sense of 
pride in being Irish at a time when anti-Irish hostility had been intensified by the IRA bombing of 
English cities. The Pogues, and musicians like them, rejected the inclination to conceal their Irishness 
in the face of prejudice and in fact used their platform to address some of the issues facing the Irish in 
Britain. The song ‘Streets of Sorrow/ Birmingham Six’, released in 1988, for example, protested the 
mistreatment of Irish migrants under the British judicial system, criticising the conviction of the 
Guildford Four and Birmingham Six, wrongfully imprisoned for the pub bombings in 1974. The song 
was censored by the IBA, who argued that the lyrics ‘indicate a general disagreement with the way in 
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which the British Government responds to, and the courts deal with, the terrorist threat in the UK’, and 
consequently might invite support for proscribed organisations.12 
 Crucially, The Pogues provided the Irish, especially the second-generation, with a voice and 
the ability to take pride in their ethnicity. The majority of the band had been brought up in London by 
Irish parents and were the first to identify themselves as unapologetically ‘London-Irish’. Their 
unrepentant attitude was instrumental in giving other second-generation people the confidence to 
articulate their Irish identities. The band offered ‘focus’ and ‘pride’ for an ethnicity often denied them 
by the Irish on the one hand, who dismissed them as English, and the British on the other, who sneered 
at them for being Irish.13 The Pogues’ bassist, Cait O’Riordan explained that the band showed the 
second-generation that ‘there was a way to be who you were and proud of who you were and proud of 
your cultural background’. She argued that their concerts provided catharsis for fans to voice their 
experiences and show that Irish migrants were not simply ‘thugs and weirdos’.14 The appeal of The 
Pogues was not restricted, however, to Britain’s Irish population, as journalist Ann Scalon observed the 
band’s audience had a ‘cross-cultural identity of its own: from punks, football supporters, psychobillies, 
students and folk fans to anyone with green tinted blood’.15 It was the ability of The Pogues, and bands 
like them, to transcend ethnic boundaries and present another face to Irishness that helped facilitate the 
shift in British attitudes towards the Irish. 
 The success of Riverdance also played an important part in the growing popularity of Irish 
culture, and consequently the shift in British perceptions. Conceived as an interval piece for the 1994 
Eurovision Song Contest, principal dancers Michael Flatley and Jean Butler updated traditional Irish 
dancing by incorporating flamenco and Russian folk dance, adding showbiz glamour and sex appeal.16 
Their energy and skill attracted audiences worldwide. Riverdance-the Show became the top-selling 
British video of the summer, and in 1995 the company was invited to perform at the Royal Variety 
Show and the Royal Gala VE Day celebrations.17 Riverdance presented an alternative, progressive and 
modern image of what it meant to be Irish. The prowess of the dancers worked to undermine stereotypes 
of the Irish as lazy, hard-drinking and backward.18 As sports scientist Joyce Sherlock has argued such 
displays of talent added to the growing confidence of the Irish: ‘the precision, power and virtuosity 
create a feeling of belonging legitimating a sense of no longer needing to succumb to the subordinate 
social location often implied by Irish’. 19  Most importantly, by emphasising cultural traditions 
Riverdance and Irish musicians commodified a non-threatening Irish identity, which contrasted with 
the violence of the IRA. It is interesting to note that Riverdance, like the music of The Pogues and other 
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prominent Irish acts, was deeply rooted in the diaspora. Most of the dancers were Irish-American, and 
the show itself is a narrative of emigration. It might be argued that a degree of separation represented 
by the second-generation allowed them the distance to reflect critically on Irish culture, and thereby 
contribute to its revitalisation.  
 The renascence of Irishness was best illustrated by the resurrection of St Patrick’s Day parades 
in British cities during the 1990s and early 2000s. In 1996, the Birmingham St Patrick’s Day parade 
took place for the first time since the pub bombings in 1974. This was in spite of the Docklands and 
Aldwych bomb attacks in February of that year. The parade attracted over five thousand people and was 
heralded a success. Father Joe Taaffe, who was instrumental in its organisation, declared the parade ‘a 
resurrection of the Irish in Birmingham’.20 Councillor Tony Kennedy, interviewed by local historian 
Gudrun Limbrick, described how the parade had allowed the Irish to reassert themselves in the public 
space of the city, after decades of being treated with suspicion and hostility: 
I felt very strongly that the Irish community needed to come out 
from under its cover it had been under since the pub bombings… It 
was a great deal of work… to bring the idea of the parade to reality 
in 1996, but I feel a personal pride for being part of getting it going 
again, and [in] the establishment of a modern Irish identity in the 
city.21 
Over the following years the event grew and by the end of the 1990s the parade had become part of a 
week-long celebration attended by an estimated 80,000 people.22 The Manchester St Patrick’s Day 
celebrations were also reinstated in 1996 as part of the city’s first Irish Festival, and in 2002 the London 
parade was routed through the city centre for the first time.  
 For many Irish people the St Patrick’s Day parades symbolised their acceptance as an integral 
and valued part of these cities, moreover, they signified recognition of the Irish contribution to British 
society.23 Addressing revellers in 2001, London Mayor Ken Livingstone remarked that ‘St Patrick’s 
Day will mark the enormous contribution which Irish people have made, and continue to make, to the 
economic, social and cultural life of this city’.24 The celebrations offered a safe space, not only to present 
Irishness, but to celebrate it. This was especially the case for those second- and third-generation Irish 
whose ethnicity was so often challenged. The parades contributed to improving the status of the Irish in 
Britain by offering a positive representation of Irishness. The fact that these were celebrations of culture, 
and so essentially non-threatening or political in nature enabled the public to view the Irishness on show 
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as something distinctly separate from IRA violence. Marc Scully and John Nagle, however, have both 
argued that the Irishness promoted on St Patrick’s Day is often an essentialised form of Irish, 
characterised as ‘Craic, céilís and Celticism’ - one might also add Catholicism - which can obscure 
more nuanced individual expressions of identity.25 This has the potential to silence alternative Irish 
voices; in particular the association of St Patrick’s Day with Catholicism and nationalism has tended to 
exclude Protestant Irish identities. Even amongst those Irish people from a Catholic nationalist 
background, there are those who resent ‘the green foam hats and wall-to-wall Guinness coverage’, 
feeling that it fails to reflect an authentic Irish ethnicity.26 As Scully concludes, however, for most the 
form of Irishness being performed mattered less than the fact that some positive form of Irishness was 
being performed at all.27 In interviews carried out with Irish people in the 1990s, it is apparent that many 
were aware that there were limits to the acceptance that they were beginning to enjoy. As one Irish 
woman remarked, ‘it’s actually… cool to be Irish… but we can remember the days when it certainly 
wasn’t cool to be Irish’.28           
 Despite the revival of Irish culture, a wave of IRA bomb attacks on English cities in the 1990s 
gave rise to an anger which was once again directed at the Irish living in Britain. Following the 
Manchester bombing on 15 June 1996, for example, the Irish World Heritage Centre received in excess 
of forty abusive phone calls and in Middleton an Irish-themed pub was violently vandalised, whilst 
many Irish people once again experienced verbal abuse and social ostracisation.29 As Mike Harding, a 
local radio DJ who was widely known to be second-generation Irish, remarked to the Manchester 
Evening News (MEN): 
This is not, I suppose, a fashionable time to mention Ireland or the 
Irish in Manchester- in fact, judging from one extremely abusive 
letter I had from a deranged pensioner in Cheetham Hill this week 
it isn’t even a safe time to have any Irish connections at all.30 
 Manchester’s community and civic leaders, many of whom were of Irish descent, called for 
public restraint, and on the night of the attack, the leaders of the city’s council, Richard Leese and 
Martin Pagel visited the Irish Centre to offer their support.31 They condemned the attacks, reminding 
the public that the Irish in Manchester were also victims of the bomb. The Manchester-Irish, sought to 
disassociate from the IRA by presenting themselves as victims, like other Mancunians. In the 
aforementioned MEN article, Mike Harding remarked that ‘The Irish in the city are as saddened and 
sickened at the Manchester bomb as anybody else and look on it with the same feeling of despair and 
fear that the peace process might well be ended’.32 Similarly, Mike Forde, chairman of the Irish Centre, 
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reflecting on the contributions the Irish had made to Manchester, told the paper that the IRA ‘were 
bombing their own. This is an Irish city… This horror, that has been done in the name of the Irish people, 
has sickened the Irish people everywhere, and not least in Manchester’. 33  By emphasising Irish 
opposition to the bomb, and their contributions to the city, both men sought to lay claim to a sense of 
belonging for the city’s Irish whilst asserting their innocence.34     
 Compared with previous high-profile IRA bombings in England, the backlash on this occasion 
was relatively constrained. The fact that there had been no deaths in the Manchester bombing goes some 
way to explaining this. Even after the Warrington bombing on 20 March 1993, however, in which two 
young boys - Jonathan Ball and Tim Parry - died, public hostility towards the Irish was comparatively 
subdued. The Irish club was vandalised and an outbuilding set alight, but otherwise the backlash was 
minimal.35 Instead, as Lelourec has discussed, the local community initiated a series of projects aimed 
at building bridges between the people of Britain and Ireland, and in promoting peace. In October 1993, 
the Warrington Project, an educational programme designed to bring together schoolchildren from 
across Britain and Ireland was launched by Irish President Mary Robinson and Prince Charles. Efforts 
were also made to celebrate the town’s Irish heritage, and on the second anniversary of the bombing its 
first Irish festival was held. Prominent amongst those involved in these initiatives were the parents of 
Tim Parry. They played a key conciliatory role, which was instrumental in maintaining a lasting and 
positive response in the aftermath of the bomb.36 This spirit of reconciliation was also influenced by the 
outcry in the Republic of Ireland. On 28 March, a 20,000-strong protest calling for an end to republican 
violence took place in Dublin, organised by Susan McHugh as part of the Peace ’93 campaign.37 
Taken as a whole, the calibrated response can be seen as indicative of a shift in attitudes 
towards the Irish in Britain, and a growing inclination to accept that the IRA did not represent all Irish 
people. Certainly, the Independent newspaper attributed the restraint evidenced following the 
Manchester bombing to the new-found popularity of the Irish in Britain: ‘Manchester had not taken its 
anger out on the Irish community. Perhaps this is understandable: 20 per cent of the population had Irish 
roots… But an important reason may be a huge change in perceptions. Suddenly, Irishness is hip’. The 
paper went on to describe the vibrant scenes to be found in O’Shea’s, a city-centre Irish pub: 
‘The Rocky Road to Dublin’ is belting out at a fierce pace. Behind 
the bar, the Irish Post, Longford Leader and Sligo Champion are on 
sale… drink is flowing. Denis Keegan, Guinness in hand is waxing 
on about how proud he is to be Irish…A few years ago, such a pub 
would probably not have existed. If it did, the publican would have 
boarded it up for fear of a backlash. But old attitudes have been 
transformed.38  
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The newspaper’s presentation of these jovial pub scenes as evidence of the city’s defiance speaks to this 
shift in attitude. A similar article in the 1970s would have in all likelihood represented such blatant 
expressions of Irishness as evidence of approval on the part of the Irish patrons. In spite of the bombing, 
the Manchester Irish Festival was held the next year, and acclaimed as a great success. It was to become 
an established part of the city’s civic calendar and continues to the present day. 
Though hostility towards the Irish in Britain lessened, nonetheless, they continued to be treated 
as a suspect community. There was widespread shock that the IRA had bombed Manchester at all, given 
the city’s strong ties with Ireland and its large Irish population. Following the attack, the MEN published 
an editorial entitled ‘Why us?’: ‘there are 50,000 Irish-born people living in the area … So why did the 
evil IRA terrorists choose to blast the centre of our welcoming city’.39 The paper sought to emphasis 
the internecine, callous nature of an organisation willing to endanger their ‘own’. By referring to the 
size of the Irish community in Manchester, however, the paper implicitly links the two. The MEN 
echoed the words of Councillor Leese and others, arguing that the Irish in the city were ‘as much victims 
of the outrage as anybody else’, but nonetheless the paper speculated that ‘a local active IRA cell could 
be capable of further attacks’.40   
 The press, especially the tabloids, once again played a key role in the construction of the Irish 
in Britain as potential terrorists. This is evident in the coverage of the Aldwych bus bombing on 18 
February 1996. Amongst those seriously injured in the attack was Dublin-born Brendan Woolhead. Due 
to his nationality, it was suspected that Woolhead might be a second bomber and so he was placed under 
armed guard in hospital. On this evidence alone, the tabloid press jumped to the conclusion that he was 
a terrorist; the Daily Mirror reported that Woolhead was a Provo ‘minder’, there to ‘ensure their deadly 
operation… ran smoothly’, whilst the Sun ran the headline ‘One IRA Bomber Dead, One Sadly Clings 
to Life’.41 When it became apparent that Woolhead had no connection to the IRA, the Sun did issue an 
apology, but the Mirror, though it admitted that Woolhead had been in the wrong place with the wrong 
accent, failed to acknowledge its own role in propagating suspicion.42 In their treatment of Brendan 
Woolhead, the tabloids showed that their default was to regard all Irish with misgiving. 
 Both papers cast further suspicion on the Irish in Britain by suggesting that Ed O’Brien, who 
had exploded the Aldwych bomb, had been recruited by an IRA cell in London.43 The Daily Mirror 
reported that there were five or six active service units stationed in England and Scotland.44 The Sun 
remarked that O’Brien had settled in Lewisham, so as to ‘blend in’ with its large Irish population.45 The 
paper’s assumption was that the Irish by their mere existence were guilty of harbouring terrorists. As 
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had been the case previously, by making this association the Sun and Mirror casually implicated 
hundreds of Irish people living in Britain into collusion with the IRA, and perpetuated the myth that the 
whole of Britain’s Irish population was suspect. 
 Fear that the IRA had established sleeper cells in Britain preoccupied the tabloids throughout 
the mid-1990s. The idea that the IRA was operating within Britain was nothing new, in 1975 a sleeper 
cell had carried out a sustained campaign in London’s West End. The dramatic arrest of the unit after a 
six-day siege in Balcombe Street (Marylebone, London) had been captured by the BBC and broadcast 
widely. Throughout the ‘Troubles’ the idea that the IRA was able to infiltrate Britain through its Irish 
population had contributed greatly to the construction of the Irish in Britain as a suspect community. 
Unlike the sleepers in the 1970s, however, the Sun reported that IRA cells in Britain in the mid-1990s 
were ‘a mixture of young “Lily-whites” - with English accents and clean records - and Northern Ireland 
veterans’.46 Lily whites were young recruits with no known republican links and therefore completely 
unknown to the security forces. 
 The alleged anonymity of these new IRA volunteers was of deep concern to the press. In an 
editorial published on 19 February 1996, the Daily Mirror remarked that ‘Today’s Provo killers could 
be living next door, leaving every morning in suit and tie for a respectable office job - and maybe having 
a pint beside you in the local of an evening. They may not even have an Irish accent’.47 Their anonymity 
enhanced the perceived threat, making these IRA volunteers invisible and therefore even more deadly. 
Both the Mirror and the Sun fixated on the possibility that these volunteers had English accents. As 
Bronwen Walter has argued, because the Irish in Britain were not a visible minority, their voices were 
often the prime identifier of their ethnicity.48 An Irish accent had come to be viewed as an indication of 
potential IRA membership.49 The absence of an Irish accent therefore increased the invisibility of the 
bombers, compounding suspicions that there was a hidden ‘enemy’ in Britain. Operating and recruiting 
in English cities, the IRA was seen as symbolically attacking British values. As Hickman et al., have 
argued, the press’s horror at the idea that people born in England could be implicated in paramilitary 
activities suggested that the IRA had succeeded in contaminating Britishness itself. 50 The tabloids 
viewed the enlistment of ‘English’ volunteers as evidence that through the Irish population the IRA’s 
pernicious ideology was seeping into Britain, and infecting its people. This all served to bolster the 
perceived threat of the Irish in Britain, in a similar manner to that seen in recent media coverage of 
British Muslims and Islamic terrorism. Newspapers have tended to present Muslim communities in 
opposition to the ‘West’ and therefore a threat to British civil society. By adopting this approach, the 
press has raised serious questions about the place of Islam and Muslims in Britain.51  
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     Tabloid fears were seemingly confirmed when on 23 September 1996 police raided an IRA 
cell in Hammersmith, West London. During the course of the raid, one of the suspects, Diarmuid 
O’Neill, was shot dead. O’Neill had been brought up in London by Irish parents. In their coverage of 
his death, most newspapers described O’Neill as English- or British-born, rather than as simply English 
or British. Nickels et al., have argued that the phrase ‘English-born’ implies that the subject is not 
‘wholly English’, that they had merely been born in England.52 In describing O’Neill thus, newspapers 
negate his Britishness, disassociating him from British values. This raises interesting insights into how 
the press engaged with ideas of what constituted Irish-, English-, and Britishness during the mid-1990s. 
It would suggest that rather than viewing national identity as dictated by where someone was born, 
newspapers factored in notions of heritage and allegiance. It might be argued that this was also 
indicative of a common perception of Irishness as not only defined by place of birth, but by a series of 
inherited characteristics, one of which was violence. This would suggests that the British media 
continued to perceive the Irish in terms of long-standing stereotypes. The ambiguity of a phrase such as 
‘English-born’ extended suspicion to second-generation Irish in particular.53 By asserting that the Lily-
whites were descended from Irish migrants in Britain, papers hinted once again at the corrupting 
influence of the Irish in Britain. In suggesting that second-generation Irish were now actively involved 
in the IRA, the media insinuated that their parents had not integrated into British society and therefore 
had failed to pass on British values. 
 Despite this tendency towards paranoia, there were occasions on which the press demonstrated 
a degree of caution in their assessment of the ‘Irish threat’ in Britain. The convictions against the 
Guildford Four and Birmingham Six were reversed in 1989 and 1991 respectively, after they had served 
sixteen years for the pub bombings in 1974. The media played an important role particularly in proving 
the innocence of the Birmingham Six. ‘Who Bombed Birmingham?’, broadcast by World in Action on 
28 March 1990, revealed new information which contributed to the case against the Six being over 
turned.54 More importantly, the programme influenced a real change in public opinion, as media analyst 
J. Mallory Wober demonstrated, 51 per cent of those who watched the programme agreed with the 
statement, ‘the six men in prison for the crime of bombing the pubs seemed to be telling the truth about 
being innocent’.55 These miscarriages of justice represented the extreme consequences of anti-Irish 
attitudes on the part of the police, judiciary and on occasion the media, whose prejudicial coverage had 
contributed to the convictions. Following their release, the media displayed a new-found sensitivity to 
the potentially serious implications of anti-Irish prejudice. On 2 April 1996, for example, the Daily 
Mirror, reporting on a proposal which would give the police the power to stop and search pedestrians 
in high-risk areas, raised concerns that the legislation would be used to target the Irish. The Mirror 
argued that abuse of these new powers could drive Irish people toward the IRA: ‘We must all be united 
in the fight against the IRA. So it is vital that the Irish community in Britain is not alienated. The police 
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must be sure to use their new powers with care’.56 The paper demonstrated a nuanced grasp of the 
potential effects counter-terrorism could have on the lives of the Irish in Britain, but unfortunately their 
concern tended to be sporadic and of limited scope. 
 The publication of reports such as Discrimination and the Irish Community in Britain (1997), 
funded and published by the CRE, also played a role in publicising the experiences of the Irish in 
Britain.57 As previously discussed, the report has also greatly influenced how Irish people interpreted 
their personal experiences. The report succeeded in bringing about affirmative action for tackling some 
of the disadvantages experienced by many Irish people living in Britain. Even before its publication, 
the CRE and other governmental bodies had made positive steps in this direction, including introducing 
an Irish category into its ethnic monitoring systems.58 On the strength of the report, the CRE also 
successfully petitioned the Office for National Statistics to include an Irish category to the ethnicity 
question on the 2001 census; something Irish activist groups had long campaigned for. 59  These 
successes were arguably symptomatic of an acceptance that the Irish experienced specific problems that 
needed tackling. 
 For Irish activists the necessity of such measures was illustrated by the media’s negative 
response to the report. The fact that the CRE had commissioned research into anti-Irish discrimination 
was met with incredulity, especially from the tabloids. The Sun dismissed the initiative as a ‘load of 
codswallop’, offering researchers ‘a flying start’ by publishing forty-one Irish jokes.60 This accurately 
demonstrates the limitations of the Irish’s new-found acceptance. Although elements within British 
society were becoming more open to discussing the idea of anti-Irish discrimination, the Irish continued 
to have their critics, prominent amongst whom were the tabloid press, which perpetuated prejudicial 
stereotypes.      
 The 1990s witnessed a radical transformation in perceptions of the Irish in Britain. Having 
been treated throughout the 1970s and 1980s with suspicion and hostility, with the advent of the 
Northern Ireland peace process and the Celtic Tiger economy the Irish had found themselves in vogue. 
The success of Riverdance and Irish musicians including The Pogues, U2 and Oasis had a particularly 
profound impact on reconstructing the Irish as ‘cool’. By reconfiguring traditional Irish culture to 
incorporate modern trends, artists offered an alternative, more positive view of what it meant to be Irish. 
As a result, Irishness, or at least a version of Irishness, had come to be celebrated.  
 This new-found popularity also had the benefit of cooling public hostility towards the Irish in 
Britain. Though public anger in the wake of IRA bomb attacks was more subdued, nonetheless, the Irish 
 
56 ‘Tread wearily’, Daily Mirror, 2 April 1996. 
57 Hickman and Walter, Discrimination and the Irish Community in Britain.  
58 Ibid, 5. 
59 Howard, ‘Constructing the Irish of Britain’, 115. 
60 The Sun, 22 January 1994 quoted in Hickman and Walter, ‘Deconstructing Whiteness’, 15. 
210 
continued to be negatively associated with the IRA and presented as potential terrorists. This was 
exacerbated by fears of active IRA units operating within Britain.  
 The British media, particularly the tabloid press, played a prominent role in reinforcing the 
construction of the Irish as a suspect community. Newspapers obsessed over the presence of IRA sleeper 
cells, compounding long-standing fears that the Irish in Britain were harbouring terrorists. The belief 
propagated by the tabloids that these cells were increasingly made up of young British- or English-born 
recruits added to the public’s concern and exaggerated the perceived threat of the Irish in Britain. The 
tabloids considered the Irish to be a corrupting influence, whose presence allowed IRA ideology to 
contaminate British society. 
 Although by the mid-1990s the Irish had advanced up a hierarchy of belonging, their degree 
of acceptance remained precarious. The Irish continued to be subject to surveillance and negative 
stereotyping. It was not until the turn of the century, when the threat of Islamic terrorism eclipsed that 
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The ‘Troubles’ were in many ways a media event. Newspapers and television were recognised by all 
sides as being of vital importance in the interpretation of events in Northern Ireland around the world. 
The media played an essential role in the dissemination of news and information about the conflict. In 
Britain, where for many people the press and television were the primary source of information on 
Northern Ireland, the media was crucial in the formation of public opinion and, consequently, the British 
state’s response to the escalating crisis. Participants therefore vied for influence, seeking to manipulate 
how the conflict was presented in order to gain legitimacy and support for their respective positions. 
This was a war conducted as much through the newspapers and on screen as it was on the streets of 
Belfast. As such, the press and broadcast media are essential to a full understanding of the conflict and 
to comprehending prevalent attitudes towards Northern Ireland at this time. 
 For journalists and broadcasters, covering the ‘Troubles’ proved immensely challenging. Aside 
from the inherent difficulties of reporting any conflict, the propaganda war that ensued caused much 
consternation amongst government officials in London and in Belfast. Acutely aware of the potential 
power of the media to encourage sympathy and support for the IRA and other paramilitary organisations, 
the British government sought to control how the conflict was framed, and what could and could not be 
featured in the media’s coverage (especially that of the broadcast media). Incessant wrangling between 
journalists, successive British governments and state organisation threatened to hamper efforts to 
present the British public with accurate, detailed and balanced information on what was happening in 
the province. 
The British print and broadcast media, nevertheless presented complex and multifaceted 
coverage of the conflict. However, the prevailing view has been that newspapers and television 
programmes merely regurgitated the official line, producing one-dimensional, superficial and biased 
coverage of events in Northern Ireland. This thesis, in offering a much-needed historical based 
perspective, has demonstrated that the media’s approach to reporting the ‘Troubles’ was more nuanced, 
that the press and television current affairs programmes engaged with the complexities of what was 
happening in the province, covering events in a sophisticated and detailed manner. This historical 
approach, which firmly locates the media’s coverage within its wider political and historical context, 
has uncovered valuable detail regarding how the conflict was represented. It has provided insight into 
the reasoning behind the way in which the media framed events in Northern Ireland, which allows for 
a better understanding of the significance of the media’s coverage. Most importantly, this approach has 
provided a more comprehensive picture of the media’s role in the ‘Troubles’. It has ensured that due 
attention is given to the changing social, cultural and political factors that influenced how the conflict 
played out, and how it was reported by the press and broadcast media. The use of historical methodology 
has also ensured that the conflict is considered in its entirety. This allows for the identification of 
continuities and variations within the narrative of the ‘Troubles’, which is largely absent from the work 
of the social scientists and activists who have so far dominated this field.  
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This thesis is also based on a more expansive source sample, than that of previous scholarly 
works. It not only engages with both the print and television media, but also examines the approach of 
all three British broadcasting bodies, something no other scholar has done to date. This has enabled a 
full exploration of the range of approaches and perspectives towards reporting events in Northern 
Ireland, providing detailed analysis of how different aspects of the British media covered the ‘Troubles’. 
The use of archival material to provide critical context to media content has similarly added an important 
dimension to the existing literature on this subject. In particular, it has provided valuable insight into 
the editorial strategies which informed the production of media content, contributing to our 
comprehension of the way in which the ‘Troubles’ were framed by the press and television news.    
 A thorough examination of the press reports and television current affairs coverage from across 
the course of the ‘Troubles’ challenges assumptions that the media was overly-simplistic and biased. It 
reveals instead a willingness and conviction to present more nuanced readings of the violence in 
Northern Ireland. The British media offered audiences in-depth and detailed coverage of events in the 
region, which engaged with the complexities of the conflict from a variety of angles, taking into account 
different perspectives, and challenging the actions of all participants, especially the British state.  
Admittedly, the media, and in particular the tabloid press, often prioritised IRA bomb attacks 
in England over those in Northern Ireland.1 This was especially the case at the height of the bombing 
campaign in the early 1970s. Even so, newspapers covered the violence in English cities in a far more 
complex manner than has previously been acknowledged. Outraged, journalists used established 
national symbols and memories of the Second World War to evoke a sense of national defiance in 
response to the IRA threat. The IRA were used as the ‘other’ against which the press consciously 
measured and reconstructed notions of Britishness. Specifically, newspapers elicited stereotypes of 
British fortitude to reassure readers and draw them into a sense of togetherness. This manner of 
presenting the British response to IRA violence, as with other editorial strategies concerning Northern 
Ireland, was driven in part by the commercial interests of the newspapers, although little attention has 
been given to such economic considerations, and their impact on reporting. By attempting to foster a 
national community united against an IRA threat, editors sought to increase their appeal to a national 
audience and sell more newspapers. This encourages further reflection on the role practical 
considerations, such as the media’s financial priorities, can have on the construction of national identity. 
The violence in Northern Ireland, and the IRA bombing campaign in England, seriously challenged 
traditional ideas of what it was to be British. In exploring the way in which the media dealt with this, 
the thesis also contributes to our broader understanding of constructions of British- and Irishness in a 
multinational state.  
 To underline the heinous nature of the IRA, newspapers resurrected a wide range of long-
established stereotypes of the Irish. This is particularly evident in cartoon coverage at the time. Scholars 
have observed that the violent, simian Paddy of nineteenth-century cartoons re-emerged in the early 
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1970s as a response to the ‘Troubles’.2  This thesis offers a more informed historical assessment. It has 
shown that cartoons deployed a much wider variety of disparaging motifs common to Victorian 
caricatures of the Irish. This reinforces and adds further depth to arguments made by Hickman and 
others that anti-Irish prejudice continued to inform British attitudes towards the Irish at the very least 
into the late twentieth century.3 
Hitherto, the effect of these representations on the Irish living in Britain has largely been 
ignored in surveys of the media’s coverage of the ‘Troubles’. By centring the experiences of the Irish 
in Britain, this thesis has been able to provide important context concerning the interpretation, and 
impact of media representations. The close association made by the press between the IRA and Irishness 
meant that all Irish people living in Britain were vulnerable to being cast as ‘other’. Many Irish people 
experienced verbal and physical abuse and were subject to surveillance as a result of the IRA bombing 
campaign in England. Through its coverage, the British media, especially the tabloid press, 
inadvertently aggravated this situation, associating the Irish in Britain with the IRA in the public’s 
imagination. By repeatedly pointing to the fact that many of the bombers has been established members 
of the Irish migrant population, and by conflating the term ‘Irish’ with the IRA, newspapers constructed 
all Irish people as potential terrorists. Propagating this association stoked feelings of suspicion and 
therefore of hostility towards the Irish. Even though newspapers often asserted that the majority of Irish 
people were ‘innocent’, this served to underline the fact that there were those Irish people who were not, 
perpetuating the impression that the Irish as a whole were a suspect community, and reinforcing the 
notion that their very existence in Britain provided cover for IRA bombers. In presenting the Irish in 
Britain thus, the press was capable of inflaming anti-Irish hostility. This gives some insight into how 
audiences responded to newspapers and television coverage of the conflict and contributes to our 
understanding of the influence of the media generally on public opinion.   
 By the 1990s, the increased popularity of Irish culture worldwide, and the promise of the 
Northern Ireland peace process had encouraged a positive shift in British perceptions of the Irish. 
Irishness became something to celebrate, as the resurrection of St Patrick’s Day parades in British cities 
illustrated. This growth in popularity meant the backlash against the Irish in Britain following high-
profile bomb attacks was notably more subdued. Little previous research has been carried out on the 
Irish experience during this later stage, perhaps because it was a period of relative calm compared with 
the hostility of the 1970s and 1980s. This decade, however, witnessed a significant transformation in 
British perceptions of the Irish, and is therefore significant to fully understanding the Irish experience 
in Britain. Comparisons in the treatment of the Irish across different decades allows us to properly 
appreciate the extent, and nature, of anti-Irish discrimination. The constraint shown in the 1990s, speaks 
to the way in which constructions of the Irish changed over time as they advanced up a hierarchy of 
belonging in Britain, replaced by other migrant groups, not least the Muslim community who, due to 
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the rising threat of Islamic terrorism, became the new suspect community.4 Historical analysis of the 
Irish experience therefore, provides a more complete and complex picture of both the contemporary 
status of the Irish in Britain, and their experiences throughout the twentieth century. More broadly, the 
insight it provides into how the media portrays minority groups, especially during times of crisis, have 
wider implications for how we understand other issues and incidents, not least the treatment of the 
Muslim community in the face of the current threat from Islamic terrorism or recent discussions 
surrounding the Hillsborough disaster (1989) and the media’s negative portrayal of the Liverpool 
football fans, which played a significant role in efforts to cover up what happened.  
 The thesis has also explored how such hostility affected the way in which many Irish people 
interacted with, and how Irishness was displayed within, British society. This provides further 
illuminating detail regarding the interpretations of, and responses to, the media’s coverage. Reactions 
were often varied and changed over time, so a historical approach is essential to teasing out these 
nuances. It is well-documented that in the 1970s, the common response to hostility was to keep a low 
profile: many people eschewed Irish cultural and political activities; and in certain circumstance 
disguised their accents so as not to attract unwanted attention. Less consideration has been given to Irish 
political and cultural activism, which emerged in Britain in the early 1980s. Numerous Irish 
organisations were established, the majority of which were committed, principally to challenging the 
status of the Irish in British society. These organisations, the most prevalent example of which was the 
IBRG, campaigned extensively against perceived anti-Irish prejudice, especially within the media. By 
exploring the extent to which such organisations, and their views, have come to dominate, this thesis 
has complicated the established narrative of the Irish in Britain and consequently challenged 
assumptions regarding the media’s coverage of the ‘Troubles’. These Irish organisations first put 
forward the view that the British press and broadcast media distorted and suppressed news from 
Northern Ireland, which a systematic analysis of the media coverage refutes. A critical examination of 
the composition, alignment and motivations of these groups does not exist in the current literature on 
the Irish in Britain, despite their prevalence. This prevalence, however, has meant that their views were 
absorbed into an emerging collective narrative of the Irish experience of living in Britain during the late 
twentieth century; literature produced by them also dominates the archives. As a consequence, their 
views have been accepted at face value by most of the scholarship to date, resulting in misleading 
assumptions about the British media’s role in the ‘Troubles’. The thorough historical appraisal of Irish 
activist groups and their influence, as the preceding chapters have demonstrated not only contributes to 
a better understanding of the daily lives of the Irish during the conflict, but illuminates the way in which 
stereotyped impressions of the media, posited by groups such as the IBRG, has become entrenched, and 
helps to dismantle those same stereotypes. Though Irish activists were correct in maintaining that the 
media contributed to the hostile environment experienced by many Irish people living in Britain 
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throughout the ‘Troubles’, this does not mean that the press and broadcast media failed to engage with 
the complexities of the conflict in Northern Ireland. 
 On the contrary, the media produced searching coverage, which scrutinised all aspects of the 
conflict, and actors in it, despite considerable pressure to cover events in a way that would justify the 
British state’s standpoint. Of particular note, is the effort made by the broadcast media to investigate 
and challenge the British government’s actions in Northern Ireland. This is especially apparent in their 
coverage of the hunger strikes in 1980 and 1981. Events such as the hunger strikes focused the media’s 
attention on Northern Ireland - as opposed to bomb attacks in England - and forced journalists to dig 
deeper into the motivations behind the violence. A detailed survey of the television coverage in the early 
1980s, shows that, far from merely reciting the party line of ‘a crime is a crime’, broadcasters critically 
explored the role played by all sides in the prison protests and endeavoured to give voice to a full range 
of perspectives. World in Action even succeeded in securing access to the Maze prison to interview 
1980 hunger striker Raymond McCartney.5 This unique interview provided audiences within an insight 
into the prisoners’ motives and, crucially, an alternative perspective, which challenged the official line. 
In addition to being further evidence of how the media complicated coverage of the ‘Troubles’, it also 
enriches academic understanding of the hunger strikes, providing exclusive insight into the mindset of 
the protesting prisoners. Examples like this dispute the current consensus that the media was a mere 
puppet of the British government, demonstrating instead the kind of complex narratives put forward for 
audiences. They can also serve as a useful means of examining the relationship between the state and 
media, both in the case of Northern Ireland and more generally. 
 Coverage of the hunger strikes also demonstrate that, contrary to claims made by previous 
scholars, the media acknowledged support for the republican cause. The McCartney interview was 
exceptional; in the main the NIO prohibited access to the prison and so journalists were confined to 
reporting the effects of the hunger strikes on the streets of Northern Ireland. This meant that the media 
paid considerable attention to the support given the hunger strikers by the nationalist community. 
Footage of anti-H Block demonstrations and interviews with family and supporters frequently featured 
in the media and introduced a grassroots perspective. Broadcasters, in particular endeavoured to provide 
detailed analysis on the full range of opinion within the nationalist community on events in the prison. 
Newspapers on the other hand, varied in their approach to covering the grassroots support of the protests. 
Whilst the right-wing press did play down the level of support enjoyed by the hunger strikers, even in 
the face of Bobby Sands’ election to Westminster, the Guardian criticised the government’s 
criminalisation policy and argued that the election had exploded claims that the strikers lacked support. 
Recognising such differences in approach between the press and broadcast media highlights the 
complexities within the media coverage itself, adding to our understanding of media representations of 
the ‘Troubles’.  
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 As the media represented a broad spectrum of political thought, it followed that throughout the 
‘Troubles’ it would present a range of varied opinions. The approaches chosen by reporters covering 
the conflict varied enormously. Newspapers and television programmes adopted a range of stances that 
were sometimes opposing, even contradictory. This was thrown into sharp relief by the press coverage 
of the peace process and in particular the treatment of the debates surrounding the decommissioning of 
weapons. Britain’s insistence that the IRA disarm fully before Sinn Féin be allowed entry into the peace 
negotiations delayed the start of all-party talks considerably. Newspapers were generally critical of the 
government’s position on decommissioning, but deeply divided over the correct strategy for handling 
disarmament. The Guardian, for example, was of the view that the government was hindering progress 
by insisting on unrealistic preconditions, whilst the Sun and Daily Telegraph believed that they were 
pandering to terrorists and demanded the IRA immediately surrender all weapons. By addressing the 
diversity of coverage about Northern Ireland, this thesis challenges the tendency amongst scholars (not 
just of the ‘Troubles’) to treat the media as a monolithic entity and adds further depth to discussions 
concerning coverage of conflict.  
  The media became a valuable tool in supporting and facilitating the peace process. 
Newspapers and television programmes served as an alternative channel for dialogue when face-to-face 
discussion was not possible. Through articles and interviews, participants in the process were able to 
articulate their position and hint at concessions. Broadcasters and journalists actively assisted in this 
process. Individuals sought to use their platforms to help promote negotiations, challenge participants 
on key issues, and hold them to account in the hope of engineering small shifts in position that might 
help forward the peace negotiations. The media also played an important role in promoting peace to 
audiences in the rest of the UK. By emphasising the human impact of the peace, journalists sought to 
encourage support amongst the British public in order to bring pressure to bear on the government to 
engage constructively in negotiations. In its coverage of the peace process, the press and broadcast 
media proved once again, that it was capable of a nuanced and critical approach to events in Northern 
Ireland, which had the potential to make a real difference to resolving the conflict. 
 The British media was of vital importance to how the conflict in Northern Ireland was 
interpreted. Despite efforts on all sides to influence the way in which they reported on the unfolding 
events, throughout the ‘Troubles’, the press and television journalists were determined to explore every 
possible insight placed before them, ensuring fully rounded coverage of events. Through an extensive 
and historical assessment, this thesis has demonstrated the media’s commitment to presenting the 
complex narratives of the conflict in a detailed and balanced manner, challenging the stereotyped 
presupposition that the press and television were biased and their coverage simplistic. In doing so, it 
has enriched the current literature on the media and the ‘Troubles’, furthering our understanding of the 
‘Troubles’ overall. More broadly, the thesis has indicated how the media struggles to present complex 
narratives about conflict. Its findings suggest the need for scholars to scrutinise more carefully the 
processes involved in reporting other historical and contemporary wars. The ways in which the media 
engages with and portrays outbreaks of violence, especially in a domestic setting, is never 
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straightforward. By acknowledging these difficulties, and fully investigating these processes, we can 
gain a more nuanced picture of the media’s coverage. Scrutiny of the newspaper coverage and television 
programmes during this period reveals a readiness to engage with the intricacies of the conflict. 
Throughout the ‘Troubles’, the British media succeeded in producing analytical and crucially multi-
faceted commentary, supplying British audiences with a nuanced and complex perspective on the 
conflict in Northern Ireland.       
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CHARACTERS 
The British tabloid cartoon coverage of 
the 
IRA campaign in England 
Roseanna Doughty 
On 8 March 1973, the violence of Belfast spread to the streets of London as the IRA 
launched their bombing campaign in England. This article examines the cartoon 
coverage of IRA bomb attacks on English cities published in the British press during 
the early 1970s. By investigating political cartoons from leading national 
newspapers, this article sheds new light on reactions to the violence and explores 
how this affected the lived experiences of the Irish in Britain. It highlights how 
newspapers used symbols of Britishness and WWII iconography to (re)construct an 
imagined British community in the face of the IRA threat. The cartoons also indicate 
a more ambiguous image of the Irish in Britain, one of both harbourers and victims 
of terrorists. This focus on pictorial representations reveals the complexity of press 
attitudes towards IRA bombings as the humour inherent in cartoons enables them 
to allude to ideas journalists could not. 
KEYWORDS IRA bombing campaign in England; Cartoons; Britishness; 
Second World War imagery; Irish in Britain; harbourers 
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The early 1970s saw the violence of Belfast spread to the streets of English 
cities. On 8 March 1973, two IRA bombs exploded outside the Old Bailey and the 
London Central Army Recruiting Office, killing one person and injuring a further 
265. This was the start of a campaign of violence in England, which would last 
twenty-five years, causing the death of 115 people and injuring countless others.1 
The day after the Old Bailey bombings, The Sun’s editorial cartoonist Paul Rigby 
published a cartoon featuring Lady Justice, the statue situated on the top of the 
Old Bailey, with a severed left hand holding the scales of justice (Figure 1). The 
cartoon focused on the physical impact of the bombing, suggesting that the 
attack had threatened core British values. Lady Justice’s intact sword arm 
indicated that Britain and justice would prevail and promised swift retribution in 
the face of IRA savagery. 
Scholars have long used political cartoons to shed light on the complex 
relationship between Ireland and Britain. In 1971, historian, L. Perry Curtis was 
the first to use cartoons to explore Victorian attitudes towards Ireland and the 
Irish people. Focusing on the comic art of satirical magazines Punch and Judy, 
Curtis controversially argued that nineteenthcentury caricatures reflected the 
increasingly popular view in Britain of the Irish as racially inferior.2 As Curtis 
observed, cartoons are ‘multilayered graphic texts filled with values and beliefs 
of political import’ and as a result, they offer unique insights into contemporary 
debates and opinions.3 The humour inherent in cartoons enables them to address 
ideas 





Paul Rigby, ‘Murder may pass unpunish’d For a time, But tardy Justice will o’ertake 
the crime’, The Sun, 9 March 1973, News UK, ‘British Cartoon Archive, University 
of Kent’. 
not easily expressed in written reportage, making them a valuable source for 
establishing attitudes towards contemporary events.4 
Following Curtis’ example, historians have drawn on cartoons to illuminate 
a wide range of topics relating to Ireland, particularly the ‘Troubles’. John 
Kirkaldy, Liz Curtis, John Darby, and Roy Douglas et al., have all analysed pictorial 
representations of the Northern Ireland conflict in the British press.5 Little 
attention, however, is given to the cartoon coverage of IRA attacks on English 
cities during this period, in marked contrast with contemporary media coverage. 
Throughout the ‘Troubles’, IRA bomb attacks in England dominated headlines, 
leading one IRA spokesperson to observe that ‘in publicity terms one bomb in 
Oxford Street [was] worth ten in Belfast’.6 Accordingly, an examination of the 
cartoon coverage of IRA violence in England is important if we are to obtain a 
comprehensive picture of how the British media represented the conflict. 
This article undertakes a systematic investigation of how the IRA bombing 
campaign in English cities during the early 1970s was portrayed in cartoons of the 
British tabloid press.Whilst the cartoons that appeared in broadsheets during this 
period mainly covered political developments in Northern Ireland, the tabloid 
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papers provided more detailed cartoon coverage of the bombing campaign in 
England. The tabloid press also provides a unique window onto popular culture, 
allowing us to explore how representations of the conflict were developed and 
disseminated through society.7 In particular, this article will explore how cartoons 
in two of the most popular titles, the Daily Mirror and The Sun represented the 
bombings. These papers have been selected because they offer contrasting 
political orientations: the Daily Mirror being left-of-centre, whilst The Sun has 
traditionally aligned itself with the right. By investigating the cartoon coverage of 
the bombing campaign this article will highlight how the tabloid press drew on 
British motifs and Second World War iconography to (re)construct an imagined 
British community in the face of the IRA threat. The cartoons also indicate a more 
ambiguous image of the Irish in Britain, simultaneously portraying them as both 
harbourers and victims of terrorists. 
The attitude of the Daily Mirror and The Sun towards the IRA are best 
illustrated in the way they drew comparison to the British population. 
Throughout the bombing campaign both papers consistently employed the trope 
of the ‘British’, itself an amorphous grouping, as a stoic people facing down the 
IRA threat. In doing so, they reinforced an idea of Britishness, cultivated by both 
papers in order to create, and maintain, an imagined national community of 
readers.8 The invocation of ‘Britishness’ to make news stories relevant to all 
potential readers is a traditional tool used by the press to market itself at a 
national level.9 National identity, however, is not a fixed notion and is 
continuously being renegotiated, with the press playing a leading role.10 In the 
latter half of the twentieth century, the decline of Britain as a world power and 
high levels of immigration brought into question what it now meant to be British. 
As Chris Waters argues, migrants played an influential role in the post-war 
reconfiguration of notions of national belonging.11 Black migrants in particular 
were constructed as the ‘dark strangers’ and contrasted with the white British 
population, redefining the boundaries of national belonging. During the 1970s, 
the characteristics of the IRA were contrasted with those of their victims in order 
to bolster what it meant to be British. The IRA’s association with the Irish living in 
Britain, however, meant that they too were cast once more as an internal ‘other’. 
One technique used by the Daily Mirror to (re)construct a sense of 
Britishness was through reference to a shared history.12 Since 1945, the Second 
World War has become a ‘routine trope of audience-identification’ and as a 
result, almost all national crises have been viewed through the prism of Second 
World War imagery.13 During the IRA’s bombing campaign Second World War 
memories, particularly those of the Blitz, were mobilised by the Mirror to invoke 
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in readers a similar stoicism to that associated with the response to German 
aggression in the 1940s. For example, in an editorial published after the Old 
Bailey bombings the Daily Mirror remarked that ‘The London, that took the blitz, 
and made cups of tea and joked, is not going to have its nerve shattered by 
bombs’.14 Similarly, following a spate of bomb attacks in September 1973, the 
paper remarked: ‘The terrorists will not break the nerve- or even start to break 
the nerve- of a nation that stood up to the weight of Hitler’s bombs’.15 Filtering 
the Old Bailey bombings and other IRA attacks through images of the Blitz, the 
paper harnessed the concept of a united British community fighting a common 
enemy. In doing so, it strove to both minimise the perceived IRA threat and 
reassure readers by reminding them of a period when Britain had been victorious 
against a far greater enemy. 16 
By drawing on Second World War imagery, the Daily Mirror equated the 
IRA with the Nazis. Hitler was a common feature in cartoons referring to the IRA 
attacks in England. On 21 November 1974, two bombs exploded in the ‘Tavern in 
the Town’ and ‘Mulberry Bush’ pubs in Birmingham, killing 21 and injuring 183 
people.17 In response to the bombings, the Daily Mirror’s cartoonist Keith Waite 
drew Hitler telling the IRA that ‘Bombing doesn’t work around here’. Waite 
evokes the memory of the Blitz, resurrecting associated stereotypes of the British 
as resilient in the face of adversity. It is worth noting, however, that drawing 
analogies to the Nazis was common currency during the ‘Troubles’, and used in 
reverse by the republican movement. In his account of life in Long Kesh, for 
example, Gerry Adams describes the prison as ‘Britain’s concentration camp’.18 
The reasoning behind the Nazi comparison was to reinforce the fact that 
the bombers were nothing more than brutal murderers. As Mark Connelly points 
out, after the Second World War Hitler became a touchstone by which to 
measure evil.19 In the aftermath of the Birmingham pub bombings, The Sun’s 
cartoonist Stanley Franklin took the analogy further. His cartoon showed Hitler 
making room for the IRA as Stalin, Emperor Nero, Genghis Khan and Attila the 
Hun stepped down from a podium labelled ‘The Most Odious Murderers in 
History’.20 The cartoon not only drew parallels to Hitler, but a long history of 
brutality, implying that the IRA had surpassed all five in cruelty. 
In contrast with the Daily Mirror, The Sun largely avoided referencing the 
Second 





Keith Waite, ‘Bombing doesn’t work around here- I’ve tried it’, Daily Mirror, 27 
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to create a sense of Britishness through other national motifs. Following a bomb 
attack on Westminster Hall on 17 June 1974, Franklin’s predecessor at The Sun, 
Paul Rigby, produced a cartoon depicting a monstrous creature, labelled violence, 
about to destroy two of the central pillars of British society, law and democracy 
(Figure 3). In the background, used detonators stand beside fragmented pillars, 
and this, alongside the crumbling nature of the pillars, suggested that the IRA had 
already succeeded in destabilising the foundation of British society. The two 
remaining pillars, civilisation and decency have yet to be primed: Rigby warns that 
 SEAMUSO’FAWKESANDOTHERCHARACTERS
 239 
if the IRA are allowed to continue these will soon be next. The cartoon suggested 
that the IRA had threatened the British way of life by attacking the Houses of 
Parliament, a symbol of the rule of law and other British values. On the horizon, 
however, Big Ben rises from the smoke in defiance of the IRA’s attack.21 Rigby 
uses the image of the clock tower not only to signify the bomb’s location, but to 
symbolise British resilience and courage. He draws Big Ben undamaged and 
operational indicating that despite the IRA’s efforts, the British government and 
the values it represented would endure. 
In its coverage of the Westminster bombing, the British press used the 
image of Big Ben extensively, to signify British fortitude.22 Pictorial 
representations have traditionally played a significant role in the establishment 
of a national community. In order for cartoons to be effective, the reader must 
be able to interpret the message or joke being conveyed, therefore cartoonists 
rely on easily recognised motifs and preconceptions.23 The reader’s ability to 
interpret these images helped reinforce notions of a shared identity; in much the 
same way emphasising a shared history can promote common affiliations. 
In the wake of the Tower of London bombing on 18 July 1973, The Sun drew 
on another trope of Britishness, the Beefeater. This attack caused particular 
outrage as it 
 
FIGURE 3 
Paul Rigby, ‘ … Five, four, three, two, one’, The Sun, 18 June 1974, News UK, 




Paul Rigby, ‘Satisfied?’, The Sun, 19 July 1974, News UK, ‘British Cartoon 
Archive, University of Kent’. 
was seen to have deliberately targeted children visiting the site on the first day 
of the school holidays. In his cartoon, Rigby emphasised the pointlessness and 
brutality of the bombing. Figure 4 shows a Beefeater, drawn to resemble a Marvel 
comic superhero, carrying the inert body of a young woman simply captioned 
‘Satisfied?’. The Beefeater, whose history can be traced back to the Norman 
Conquest, was intended to represent what Paul Ward has described as ‘a sense 
of “national” permanence’. 24 Rigby depicts the Beefeater as a powerful figure, 
somewhat at odds with the retired non-commissioned officers of the Tower of 
London guard, to symbolise the perceived heroism of the British people. 
The woman pictured in Rigby’s cartoon represented forty-seven-year-old 
Dorothy Household who died in the bombing. Throughout the early 1970s, both 
the Daily Mirror and The Sun frequently focused on the plight of women and 
children caught up in the bombings to emphasise the horror of the Northern 
Ireland conflict and elicit a more powerful reaction from readers. The mutilation 
or death of women and children, characterised as ‘innocent’ victims, is seen as 
especially horrifying and the perpetrators of such violence beyond contempt.25 
The tabloid press regularly employed the association between child- and female-
victims and innocence to spotlight the contemptuousness of the IRA bombers. 
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Both papers presented the IRA’s female-victims as young, beautiful and by 
implication innocent, regardless of age or physical attributes, for example Rigby’s 
depiction of Household as a significantly younger looking damsel in distress. 
In comparison, female republicans were portrayed as hideous and animal-
like. In the early 1970s, Bernadette Devlin, the MP for Mid-Ulster, frequently 
featured in cartoons on Northern Ireland portrayed in a negative light. Young and 
outspoken she had initially been popular with the British press, but with the 
outbreak of violence in Northern Ireland, she was increasingly depicted as a 
petulant child.26 The ‘Irish child’ has long been an established figure in cartoons 
commenting on Ireland and reflects the enduring stereotype that the Irish were 
politically immature and in need of guidance from Britain.27 British tabloid papers 
often rationalised the ‘Troubles’ as evidence of this lack of political maturity in 
order to justify the British presence in Northern Ireland. Devlin and other female 
republicans were also presented as monstrous harpies.28 Commenting on a 
meeting, hijacked by female supporters of the Provisional IRA in April 1972, the 
Daily Express cartoonist Michael Cummings depicted the women as vampires 
confronting the Northern Ireland Secretary, William Whitelaw. A thought bubble 
coming from Whitelaw reads ‘Maybe they should be given a sex-test to check if 
they really ARE women’.29 The cartoon presents these women as unfeminine and 
therefore, not belonging to the standard narrative that women were expected to 
fit. By distinguishing them from ‘real’ women, Cummings suggests that they were 
irrational, and subsequently their support for the IRA irrational.30 Irish 
republicans depicted as vampires and other monsters were also a common trope 
of earlier cartoons. 
In cartoons depicting IRA violence in England during the 1970s, the Daily 
Mirror and The Sun drew on a range of long-established symbols of Ireland and 
the Irish. The simian or monstrous Irishmen in particular, were resurrected by 
both papers in their coverage of IRA bomb attacks on English cities. The Daily 
Mirror’s cartoon (Figure 2) commenting on the Birmingham pub bombings for 
example, showed a simianised IRA man, recognisable by his black beret, 
sunglasses and monkey’s tail. By portraying the bomber as ape-like, cartoonist 
Keith Waite sought to highlight the inhumanity of the IRA’s actions. In a similar 
way, following the Westminster bombing The Sun’s cartoonist, Paul Rigby, 
depicted the IRA as a hunched-back Frankenstein-esq monster primed to blow up 
the British establishment (Figure 3). The simian Irish terrorist was a recurrent 
theme throughout the British tabloid press’s cartoon coverage of the ‘Troubles’. 
Michael Cummings and the Evening Standard’s cartoonist Jak in particular, 
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specialised in drawing the Irish as ape-like, violent figures that bore a strong 
resemblance to the bestial ‘Paddy’ of Victorian cartoons.31 
The tradition of drawing the ‘enemy’ as ape- or animal-like dates back to 
the late eighteenth century and continues to the present day.32 In the latter half 
of the nineteenth century, however, the simianised caricature was closely 
associated with the Irish. The Fenian movement especially, popularised the image 
of the Irish as subhuman and violent, as cartoonists sought to emphasis the 
danger of the Fenians by depicting them as ape-like monsters.33 What these 
cartoons reveal about the nature of nineteenthcentury British attitudes towards 
the Irish, however, has been the subject of much debate. As indicated, L. Perry 
Curtis’ argument that the simian ‘Paddy’ reflected an increasingly racialised view 
of the Irish has received significant criticism, most notably from Sheridan Gilley 
and Roy Foster.34 Gilley refuted Curtis’ claims that British stereotypes of the Irish 
were racial, asserting that the Irish ‘Paddy’ was as much an Irish as a British 
creation. He argues that nineteenth-century British attitudes towards the Irish 
were inconsistent and social commentators equally as likely to be pro-Irish.35 
Foster concurred, arguing that the bestial Paddy was one of a variety of ways in 
which cartoonists drew the Irish.36 Both Gilley and Foster suggested that religion, 
class and political violence played a more significant role in shaping British 
prejudices towards the Irish than ideas of race. More recently, Michael de Nie has 
argued that in the nineteenth century race was used ‘as a vehicle for expressing 
multiple anxieties and preconceptions, among them class concerns and sectarian 
prejudices’.37 
Curtis’ thesis, however, continues to be applied without question by 
scholars examining British attitudes towards the Irish since the nineteenth 
century. John Kirkaldy, for example, has argued that the resurrection of the 
simianised ‘Paddy’ in coverage of the Northern Ireland conflict during the late 
twentieth century demonstrated ‘the very depths of English anti-Irish feeling’.38 
It is worth noting that Rigby and Waite were from Australia and New Zealand 
respectively; accordingly, they were more removed from British stereotypes of 
the Irish. That said, both cartoonists would produce several drafts from which 
their editor would select the next day’s cartoon. Waite acknowledged that his 
cartoons were often rejected ‘because they did not conform with the 
newspaper’s point of view’.39 The published work of both cartoonists therefore, 
represent their respective newspaper’s editorial strategies as much as their own 
opinions and prejudices. 
The correlation between the ape-like, monstrous IRA featured in the 
cartoons of the early 1970s and those of the Fenians shows that some anti-Irish 
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stereotypes persisted into the late twentieth century. As de Nie has argued, 
however, in the nineteenth century simianised representations of the Irish were 
in the minority as many other characters were used to represent Ireland and the 
Irish people, including ‘Erin’, ‘the Irish pig’ and various Irish politicians.40 The Daily 
Mirror and The Sun’s cartoon coverage of the late twentiethcentury bombing 
campaign in England include a similarly diverse range of characters. Not only do 
these cartoons feature the ape-like ‘Paddy’ referred to by Kirkaldy, but they also 
employed other motifs common to Victorian cartoons. 
In Figure 4, for example, the image of Household being carried from the 
Tower of London is reminiscent of nineteenth-century depictions of Erin. The 
female personification of Ireland, Erin was one of the most common symbols in 
nineteenth-century cartoons commenting on the Irish Question.41 She was 
typically portrayed as a young maiden in need of saving from the violent ‘Paddy’, 
usually by Britannia or St George, both potent symbols of British- and Englishness 
respectively.42 
Keith Waite’s cartoon in the Daily Mirror the day after the Westminster 
bombing referenced Guy Fawkes.43 Throughout the nineteenth century, Fawkes 
was widely used as a satirical device and there are several Irish cartoons of this 
period that allude to the Gunpowder Plot, notably John Tenniel’s ‘The Fenian Guy 
Fawkes’.44 In his cartoon, Waite pictures children collecting pennies for a Guy 
dressed in IRA uniform from the Prime Minister Harold Wilson (Figure 5). By 
drawing parallels to the Gunpowder Plot Waite underlined the destabilising 
effect of the IRA on the British state. In focusing on the custom of burning the 
Guy he reminds his readers that Fawkes had failed in his attempts to blow up 
Parliament; Waite asserts that the IRA too had failed to bring down the state. 
The racial diversity of the children featured in the cartoon, proposes an 
inclusive image of Britain at odds with the apparent construction of black and 
Asian ethnic minorities as un-British during the post-war period.45 This disparity 
highlights the complexities of national identity and ideas of Britishness during the 
late twentieth century. Waite’s cartoon suggests that all these different people 
could buy into the concept of Britishness based on their opposition to the IRA. By 
constructing the IRA as an internal threat potentially affecting everyone, he 
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Hobsbawm argued, ‘There is no more effective way of bonding together the 
disparate sections of restless people than to unite them against outsiders’.46 By 
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generating ‘a sharpened awareness of “us” as against “them”’, this perceived IRA 
threat fostered a sense of unity, which reinforced notions of British defiance in 
the face of a common enemy.47 
The British press repeatedly drew on the theme of Guy Fawkes and the 
Gunpowder Plot in its coverage of the bombing campaign. William Jones’ (Jon) 
cartoon in the Daily Mail responding to the Westminster bombing depicted a 
policeman questioning a construction worker who identifies himself as ‘Seamus 
O’Fawkes, sorr’.48 Similarly, after the Birmingham pub bombings the Sunday 
Telegraph reproduced Tenniel’s cartoon ‘The Fenian Guy Fawkes’ superimposed 
onto a photograph of an inert body lying in the rubble caused by the bombing 
with the caption ‘A century of progress!’.49 By replicating the actual nineteenth-
century caricature, this image drew attention to the long history of republican 
aggression and in doing so reinforced the traditional stereotype that the Irish 
were inherently violent. 
The Guy Fawkes cartoons also tap into well-established anti-Catholic 
prejudices. Historically, Catholicism had been regarded as an internal threat to a 
British identity centred on Protestant values.50 The foiling of the Gunpowder Plot 
was representative of British resistance to a Catholic peril. During the latter half 
of the nineteenth century acts of perceived papal aggression led to a resurgence 
of anti-Catholicism in Britain.51 Popular opinions on Catholicism in turn reinforced 
anti-Irish attitudes in Britain and explain the popularity of the Guy Fawkes motif 
in satirical cartoons.52 Some historians have argued that the growth of secularism 
in the twentieth century meant that anti-Catholicism played a lesser role in 
hostility towards the Irish than in previous centuries.53 The Guy Fawkes in 
cartoons relating to the IRA’s bombing campaign in the early 1970s, indicate that 
such prejudices continued to inform British attitudes to Ireland and the Irish 
people. de Nie argues that during the nineteenth century ethnic, religious and 
class prejudices, informed British conceptions of Irish identities.54 The revival of 
traditional anti-Catholic prejudices in cartoons of the early 1970s would indicate 
that religious stereotypes, as well as the racial stereotypes emphasised by 
Kirkaldy, played an important role in shaping late twentieth-century British 
attitudes towards the Irish. 
The debate over the extent to which racial prejudices have influenced 
British attitudes towards the Irish, in turn raises questions as to the extent to 
which Irish migrants assimilated into British society throughout the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. Many historians have argued that by the early twentieth 
century the Irish had fully assimilated into British society, evidenced by high rates 
of social mobility and inter-marriage, amongst other factors.55 Since the 1980s, 
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this ‘assimilationist’ model has come under attack. Sociologist Mary Hickman in 
particular, argues that the Irish residing in Britain during the late twentieth 
century continued to be subject to discrimination.56 She argues that these 
experiences have been rendered invisible, however, due to the incorporation of 
the Irish into a homogenous white British race in response to increased 
immigration from the Caribbean, Africa and South Asia.57 Although there is 
evidence of greater integration by the late twentieth century, especially amongst 
the Irish middle-class, the position of Irish people in Britain remained 
precarious.58 The IRA’s campaign in the early 1970s brought about a surge of 
hostility rooted in a longer history of prejudiced behaviour directed towards the 
Irish. 
The presence of a supposedly integrated Irish population exacerbated fears 
that the IRA had infiltrated Britain.59 Two days after the Westminster bombing 
Rigby published a cartoon showing three men in IRA uniform scaling Big Ben as 
the police struggled to reach them.60 Rigby criticised the security services for 
allowing themselves to be hoodwinked by the IRA, who it was believed gained 
access to Westminster Palace disguised as construction workers. This criticism 
reflected a wider fear over the relative ease with which the attack had been 
carried out. The fact that the IRA were pictured climbing all over Big Ben, a symbol 
of the British state, pandered to fears that the bombers were operating from 
within Britain. 
The IRA were repeatedly associated with the Irish living in Britain during 
the 1970s.61 Following the funeral of James McDade, killed attempting to plant 
explosives at the Coventry telephone exchange on 14 November 1974, the Daily 
Mirror noted that ‘hundreds of Irish sympathisers in Britain are planning to give 
a “martyr’s farewell” to McDade’.62 By linking the term ‘sympathisers’ with a 
reference to the Irish the paper suggested that hundreds of Irish people living in 
Britain were involved in some way with the violence. The paper reinforced this 
notion of complicity by using the same term but prefixed with IRA in a follow-up 
article, reporting that ‘IRA sympathisers were … warn[ed] against wearing para-
military uniforms in Britain’.63 
Similarly, following the bombing of the National Defence College (12 
February 1974) the paper observed that the IRA were using safe houses ‘owned 
by IRA sympathisers who take in lodgers, including Irish labourers- and terrorists’. 
By equating Irish labourers with terrorists, the article implies that they were the 
same.64 As sociologist Paddy Hillyard noted, by sustaining this idea that the IRA 
were infiltrating Britain through the Irish population, the press ‘perpetuate[d] the 
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impression that the whole of the Irish community … [was] suspect’.65 Accordingly, 
both papers re-imagined long-established Irish residents as a potential threat. 
Many Irish people suffered from social ostracism, verbal and even physical 
abuse because of the bombings. Following the Birmingham pub bombings, Irish 
businesses were attacked, while thirty factories in Birmingham were forced to 
close in order to guarantee the safety of Irish workers.66 In addition, the Irish 
faced discrimination and harassment from the authorities. The Prevention of 
Terrorism Act (PTA), introduced in November 1974, gave the police the power to 
examine, detain and arrest without grounds for due suspicion. Many Irish people 
were wrongfully arrested, indeed of the 7052 people detained in connection with 
Northern Ireland between 1974 and 1991, 86% were released without any 
further action being taken.67 The press was complicit in encouraging the 
authorities’ policing of the Irish, calling for people to report any suspicious 
activities. For example, following attacks on Euston and King’s Cross in September 
1973, the Daily Mirror reminded readers: 
The police need every scrap of help and information that the public can give. 
Someone, somewhere, must have a suspicion- however tiny- that might give 
the police a lead. It should be passed on quickly.68 
Faced with this level of hostility many Irish people living in Britain adopted 
a low profile.69 An Irish accent was often enough to attract abuse and suspicion, 
subsequently many members of the Irish community sought to modify or hide 
their accents.70 One woman, interviewed in the late 1980s, confessed that ‘When 
a bombing or anything like that happens I say, “Thank God for supermarkets”, 
because you don’t have to speak, you don’t have to ask for a loaf of bread’.71 It 
was also common for Irish people to refrain from participating in political 
activities for fear of being identified as sympathetic to the IRA.72 
Both the Daily Mirror and The Sun, however, recognised that not all Irish 
people were IRA supporters and the Irish were victims of the bombs themselves. 
The tabloid press gave Irish victims particular attention, as they allowed them to 
advance the idea that the IRA’s campaign was internecine. Paradoxically, both 
papers presented the Irish population as harbourers of terrorists while also 
highlighting the fact that the wider Irish community in Britain did not endorse the 
attacks. In the wake of four bomb attacks on 18 December 1973, the Daily Mirror 
spotlighted Rosina Harrington who had suffered severe shrapnel wounds. 
Emphasising the fact that she was second generation Irish Catholic, the paper 
highlighted the heinous nature of the IRA who were willing to sacrifice their own 
compatriots. In a follow-up article, the paper printed well wishes sent 
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anonymously to Rosina by an Irish couple, condemning the attacks: ‘Try not to 
hate the Irish. We will never forgive the animals who did this’.73 By demonstrating 
to its’ readers that the IRA did not have the support of the majority of the Irish 
population, the newspaper conferred a sense of illegitimacy onto the group. 
Similarly, The Sun called attention to the Irish roots of brothers Desmond 
and Eugene Reilly who died in the Birmingham pub bombings, quoting their 
mother: ‘we are all from Donegal, but both my sons were born in Birmingham. 
They were youngsters. They didn’t want to know about fighting and killing in 
Northern Ireland’.74 Mrs Reilly presented her sons as apolitical and innocent, 
emphasising their age and ignorance. References to the ‘innocent’ Irish, however, 
by definition implied that there were also ‘guilty’ Irish, reinforcing the notion that 
the Irish population were harbouring terrorists.75 The ambiguity over which 
elements of the Irish population in Britain supported the IRA meant that 
perceived blame was potentially spread to any Irish person. Even those Irish 
deemed ‘innocent’ were imagined in some way as complicit in the IRA’s activities 
by not being seen to be pro-active in condemning the bombings. As Alessandro 
Portelli argues, this dynamic emerges from ‘the purely negative definition given 
of innocence’, that suggests a sense of ‘harmlessness’: ‘having done nothing 
wrong is one thing, but having done nothing against wrong is another’.76 Seán 
Sorohan observes that pressure was exerted on the Irish in Britain to publicly 
disassociate themselves from the IRA.77 
The IRA’s campaign in England was viewed as a serious threat to the British 
way of life. Not only had conflict spilt onto British soil for the first time since the 
Second World War, the enemy was difficult to distinguish from the large number 
of Irish people living in Britain. The British press responded to the IRA threat by 
re-emphasising conceptions of Britishness. The IRA were enlisted to help foster a 
sense of togetherness during a period of change resulting from heightened 
immigration, providing a common enemy against which the nation could unite. 
In both their written reportage and political cartoons, the Daily Mirror and The 
Sun evoked the stereotypes of the British as a stoic people facing down adversity 
by using memories of the Second World War and mainstream national motifs to 
symbolise British resilience and courage. It is worth noting, however, that the 
manner in which the IRA were presented was as much guided by commercial 
interests as patriotism. By fostering the concept of a national community united 
against the IRA threat, newspaper editors sought to increase their appeal to a 
wider audience. 
Anger at the bombers was transferred onto the Irish living in Britain, 
serving to reinforce perceptions of them as an internal other, whilst both papers 
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stoked feelings of suspicion by depicting the Irish in Britain as harbourers of 
terrorists. In their presentation of the IRA, the British tabloids also drew on a wide 
range of long-established stereotypes of the Irish. Kirkaldy has rightly observed, 
in the early 1970s cartoonists resurrected the simian Paddy of nineteenth-
century caricatures. Yet, this article demonstrates that the Daily Mirror and The 
Sun’s cartoon coverage of the late twentieth-century bombing campaign in 
England re-employed a variety of motifs common in Victorian cartoons. This 
highlights the complex range of well-established and enduring racial and religious 
stereotypes, which reemerged during the early-1970s in light of the terrorist 
threat, shaping British attitudes towards the Irish. 
The IRA bombing campaign in England was a transitional moment in the 
Northern Ireland conflict, determining how the ‘Troubles’ came to be interpreted 
in Britain. Cartoonists were instrumental in this process: by building on existing 
national tropes of resistance, the cartoons of the early 1970s offer an insight into 
the construction of Britishness as well as the other. Following the recent terrorist 
attacks in London and Manchester, the British media have again employed such 
methods. Not only have they reverted to seeing the crisis through the prism of 
Second World War images and other national motifs, but they also evoked 
memories of the IRA attacks in order to exult notions of British fortitude. It would 
seem that the IRA bombing campaign in England has itself become part of the 
range of stock motifs drawn upon in response to violent threats and used to 
emphasise national identity at times of uncertainty. Then as now, cartoons are 
central to shaping our understanding of national crises and issues of identity. 
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‘Pawns in the Terrorist Game’?: 
The Hunger Strikes and the British Press1 
Roseanna Doughty 
  
Ten Irishmen starving to death in the Long Kesh/Maze prison in the early 1980s 
made headlines worldwide. On 5 May 1981, Bobby Sands died following 66 days 
without food in pursuit of political status for republican prisoners in Northern 
Ireland. Over the following months, a further nine men would die in their bid to 
refute ‘the tag of criminal with which the British have attempted to label us’.2 
The hunger strikers’ passive resistance to the criminalisation of paramilitary 
prisoners drew attention to the Troubles, evoking outrage and sympathy for the 
republican cause in a way that the indiscriminate violence of the armed struggle 
never could. Much of the world’s press condemned the British government’s 
stance towards the hunger strikes.3 In Britain, the hunger strikes provided 
ammunition for large sections of the press to use against the IRA; even so, a 
significant minority of British newspapers characterised the hunger strikers as 
victims themselves.  
Journalists and other social commentators have written extensively on 
the hunger strikes, but the comparatively recent and sensitive nature of the 
protests means that few academics have studied them in isolation.4 While 
recent scholarship has turned its attention to re-evaluating the hunger strikes, 
offering new perspectives and challenging preconceptions, media 
representations of the protests have yet to be fully explored.5 As a major source 
of information on the hunger strikes for many British people, newspapers were 
central to how they were received and understood. Aogán Mulcahy’s excellent 
analysis of the strikes’ coverage in the New York Times, London Times, and Irish 
Times highlights the fact that, despite the papers’ criticism of Britain’s 
criminalisation policy, they did not present the prisoners’ demands as 
legitimate.6 However, by focusing on The Times, Mulcahy limits his investigation 
to a small section of the British press. He argues that the paper adhered to the 
British government’s account of the hunger strikes, presenting the protesters as 
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violent criminals and the strike itself as a propaganda exercise.7 This is a view 
echoed by historians, most notably Liz Curtis who asserts that most of the British 
media wholeheartedly supported the government’s policy.8 By examining a 
broader cross-section of newspapers, we are able to gain a wider and more 
nuanced perspective on the British press coverage of the protests.   
This article undertakes a systematic investigation of how the hunger 
strikes were portrayed in British newspapers. It explores how four of the most 
popular titles, the Daily Mirror, the Daily Telegraph, The Guardian and The 
Sun, reported on them. These papers have been selected because they offer 
contrasting political orientations: the Telegraph and The Sun were largely right 
wing, while The Guardian and the Mirror were left-of-centre. These 
publications also broadly represent the range of styles, readership, and 
ownership that characterised the British press during the Troubles. This article 
questions the assumption that the British press parroted the British 
government’s line that the hunger strikers were terrorists who bore sole 
responsibility for the conflict; in fact, these four newspapers provided a much 
more nuanced examination of the protest than might be assumed.   
The majority of the British press showed little compassion towards 
people who were perceived to be ‘H-Block terrorists’. 9 The newspapers all 
supported the Conservative government’s position on the status of republican 
prisoners, echoing Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s assertion that ‘a crime, 
is a crime, is a crime. It is not political’.10 In an editorial written four days before 
the death of Bobby Sands, The Sun described him as ‘a common criminal who is 
being treated better than he deserves’.11 Similarly, following an attack near hunger 
striker Raymond McCreesh’s home, in which five soldiers died (19 May 1981), 
the Daily Mirror stated that ‘a criminal is still a criminal, a murderer is still a 
murderer and a terrorist is still a terrorist’.12 Even the left-leaning Guardian 
displayed little sympathy for the hunger strikers’ demands, declaring in an 
editorial following Sands’ death that: ‘Who kills and maims for the IRA does not 
redeem the action in the smallest degree’.13  
This is not to suggest that the paper accepted the government’s handling of 
the crisis without criticism. Though The Guardian conceded that Thatcher’s 
‘policy has been correct’, it did not always condone her comportment. In 
particular, it criticised her attitude towards Irish MPs, Síle de Valera, Neil Blaney, 
and John O’Connell. In April 1981, the three politicians were granted permission 
to visit Sands; they, subsequently requested a meeting with Thatcher to discuss 
the prison dispute and called for an intervention by the European Commission 
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for Human Rights. Thatcher rebuffed them, stating that ‘It is not my habit or 
custom to meet MPs from a foreign country about a citizen of the UK, resident 
in the UK’.14 The Guardian feared that this snub would damage talks between 
Britain and Ireland. As early as May 1980, Thatcher had led a delegation to 
Dublin which aimed to develop the relationship between the United Kingdom 
and the Republic of Ireland. These talks had resulted in the two governments 
commissioning joint studies into new institutional arrangements, security 
matters, economic cooperation, and measures to encourage mutual 
understanding, and they eventually led to the establishment of the Anglo-Irish 
Intergovernmental Council in 1981. 15 The Guardian celebrated this increased 
cooperation between London and Dublin, which it argued offered the only way 
to resolve the conflict. Throughout its coverage of the hunger strikes, the paper 
consistently warned that, unless both countries continued to nurture this 
relationship, there was no hope of ending the violence in Northern Ireland. 
Following the death of Bobby Sands, the paper counselled that ‘unless Britain 
and Ireland can agree to pool their political resources they will be in no position 
to influence events in the North away from the tribal warfare of the past and 
towards an inter-tribal agreement’.16   
The Daily Mirror also used the hunger strikes to forward its long-standing 
editorial position on the Troubles. The Mirror was the only national daily to 
consistently support the withdrawal of Britain from Northern Ireland. Following 
the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement in May 1974, the paper had argued 
that ‘Britain must now face the most sombre option of all – to pull out the troops 
and abandon sovereignty over the province’.17 For the paper, the hunger strikes 
provided further support for British withdrawal. In the wake of Sands’ death, the 
Mirror reiterated that ‘Britain has been trapped in that maze too long. Its task now 
is to find the way that will lead it out altogether’.18 The paper argued that the 
people of Northern Ireland should be left to fight it out amongst themselves. Its 
view broadly reflected wider British public opinion, which polls revealed to be 
largely in favour of withdrawal, and presented the British as a long-suffering, 
altruistic presence in Northern Ireland.19 By holding the paramilitaries on both 
sides solely responsible for the conflict, the Mirror avoided scrutinising Britain’s 
role in the violence.     
For the most part, however, the papers sought to support the government 
and aid it in its attempts to criminalise the IRA and other paramilitary 
organisations. One technique used by the Daily Telegraph to delegitimise the 
protest was to outline each new hunger striker’s criminal record. These records 
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were readily supplied by the Northern Ireland Office, which produced ‘fact files’ 
on each hunger striker as part of its counter-propaganda measures.20 The 
Telegraph made it clear that Francis Hughes was an extremely dangerous 
criminal: ‘Of all the hunger strikers, Hughes was the most violent according to 
his record. At his trial, the judge said “You are a dedicated and hardened IRA 
terrorist”’.21 Hughes had been found guilty and imprisoned in 1978 on six 
counts, including the murder of a British soldier. The Telegraph’s coverage of 
Sands’ fast was similarly accompanied by a potted history of his criminal 
career.22 References to prisoners’ violent pasts was a recurring theme 
throughout the British press coverage of the hunger strikes. As Mulcahy notes, 
the Times also emphasised the criminal activities of the hunger strikers. In doing 
so, newspapers sought to ‘typify’ paramilitary prisoners as criminals rather than 
political actors.23   
Coverage of the violence that accompanied the prison protests was also 
used to undermine the hunger strikers’ claim to political status. Significant 
coverage was given to the rioting that broke out in Belfast and Derry following 
the death of each hunger striker and to the shooting of census enumerator 
Joanne Mathers, a 29-year-old woman with a young son, as she collected census 
forms in Derry on 7 April 1981. The tabloid press echoed Thatcher’s assertion 
that the hunger strikers had chosen to take their lives, while those who had died 
at the hands of the IRA had not, and called for these ‘forgotten victims of Ulster’ 
to be remembered.24 In order to remind their readers of the victims of the 
conflict, The Sun and the Daily Mirror gave considerable coverage to those 
killed in the escalating violence and often reported on their deaths in tandem 
with coverage of the hunger strikes.25 The Daily Mirror combined coverage of 
the funeral of Francis Hughes on the 16 May 1981 with that of Julie Livingstone 
under a headline that cited them as the ‘Two faces of Ulster’. Livingstone, a 14-
year-old girl, was killed by a plastic bullet fired by soldiers attempting to disperse 
pro-hunger strike demonstrators in Belfast on 12 May 1981. Although British 
soldiers were responsible for Livingstone’s death, the paper’s juxtaposition of 
these stories suggested that the republican movement, as represented by 
Hughes, was culpable. The article presented Livingstone and her grieving school 
friends as innocent victims of the conflict, markedly different from the ‘killers in 
masks’ that attended Hughes’ funeral.26 This contrast exhibits the paper’s 
contempt for the hunger strikers and the violent organisations they 
represented.27 Child casualties were frequently used by the tabloid press to 
257 
emphasise the trauma of the Troubles, but it is important to note that children 
were by no means always presented as passive onlookers.   
The Sun also combined its coverage of the hunger strikes with details 
about the funerals of other victims of the conflict. For example, on 1 May 1981, 
The Sun integrated details of the funeral of Police Constable Gary Martin, killed 
in a bomb attack, with a report detailing a conversation that Sands had had with 
relatives, in which he informed them that he must see his hunger strike through 
to death. The juxtaposed stories focused on Rhoda Martin and Rosaleen Sands 
and their grief over the deaths of their respective sons. The paper reports that 
Rosaleen Sands left her prison visit ‘in tears’, before going on to note that ‘A 
Mother’s tears flow yet again in Ulster’ in relation to Rhoda Martin’s grief. The 
headline suggests a connection between two women destined to lose their sons 
to the conflict. Rhoda Martin, the article notes, had ‘clutche[d] her nine-year-
old son Darren for comfort at yesterday’s funeral of her other son’.28 Through its 
equation of Rhoda’s suffering with that of Rosaleen, The Sun highlighted the 
depravity of Sands’ protest, which unnecessarily made his mother into a victim.29   
All four newspapers presented the hunger strikers both as cold-blooded 
terrorists and as victims. The Daily Mirror and the Daily Telegraph treated the 
hunger strikers as puppets of the IRA leadership who were being exploited for 
propaganda purposes. Reporting on Sands’ funeral, the Daily Mirror journalist 
John Edwards observed that ‘it was a pathetic end for a man who never played 
more than an average part in the deadly moves called by his IRA masters’.30 In 
an editorial published on 23 July 1981, the Daily Telegraph described the 
hunger strikers as ‘pawns in the terrorist game’.31 This view, that the prisoners 
were controlled by the IRA leadership, was widely shared by British politicians. 
In a speech made during a visit to Northern Ireland on 28 May 1981, Thatcher 
declared it ‘a tragedy that young men should be persuaded, coerced or ordered 
to starve themselves to death for a futile cause’.32 Even amongst the hunger 
strikers’ families, there were doubts over the autonomy of the prisoners. At a 
meeting of relatives organised by Sinn Féin, the political wing of the Provisional 
IRA, Geraldine Scheiss, the girlfriend of hunger striker Kieran Doherty, declared 
that, ‘I don’t think decisions are being made inside the prison. I think decisions 
are being made by people present in this room’.33  
Republican prisoners fell under the command of the IRA’s Army Council 
but, as journalist David Beresford puts it, ‘the inmates were a tail capable of 
wagging the dog’.34 Under pressure from the prisoners, the Army Council 
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reluctantly agreed to the first hunger strike in October 1980. Despite rumours 
to the contrary, the IRA maintained that both strikes remained prisoner-led 
initiatives. Speculation that the IRA leadership had manipulated the hunger 
strikers re-surfaced with the publication of Richard O’Rawe’s Blanketmen 
(2005).35 O’Rawe, who had been the prisoners’ public relations officer, alleges 
that the Army Council controlled the prisoners and that on two occasions in July 
1981 the Council turned down an offer made by the British government, moves 
that led to the continuation of the strikes and further deaths.36 Recently 
released classified documents pertaining to the hunger strikes indicate that a 
renewed offer was made. It promised prisoners access to their own clothes, 
parcels, visits, and letters; the partial restoration of remissions; and assurances 
that work would predominantly consist of domestic tasks, charity work, and 
educational activities, following the immediate termination of the strike.37 The 
extent to which the prisoners controlled the hunger strikes, however, continues 
to be the source of much debate.   
In a bid to discredit the strikes, the contemporary British press propagated 
rumours that the IRA leadership was forcing prisoners to die. In its editorial on 
23 July, the Daily Telegraph asserted that:   
  
[T]he strikers are under the command of 
the leadership of the Provisional IRA 
represented at the Maze by Brendan 
McFarlane who, himself fortified by regular 
meals, orders their behaviour. Threats, no 
doubt are freely delivered to mothers and 
sweethearts who are suspected of 
encouraging resistance to these demands. 
There is indeed a reign of terror at the 
Maze; but it is maintained by the IRA.38       
  
By questioning the autonomy of the prisoners, the paper sought to undermine 
their claims to martyrdom. The implication that the hunger strikers had been 
forced to die by the IRA leadership reduced the value of their sacrifice. The 
editorial also suggested that the hunger strikers were themselves victims and 
were being murdered by the IRA. Other newspapers echoed this view. For 
example, the Daily Express described Bobby Sands as ‘the IRA’s latest victim’.39 
Neither paper, however, was excessively sympathetic towards the strikers, and 
both reiterated that the men were still criminals. Instead, these reports served 
to further demonise the leadership and emphasise the heinous nature of a 
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movement which was willing to sacrifice its own. The papers asserted that any 
move by the British government to yield to the strikers’ demands would only 
play into the hands of the terrorists.40    
The Daily Mirror questioned the autonomy not only of the hunger strikers 
but of the rank and file membership of the IRA. In John Edwards’ coverage of 
Sands’ funeral, the journalist asserted that, ‘Nobody could remember what had 
been said at the funerals of the “volunteers” whose graves were marked 
unobtrusively all around the one prepared for Bobby Sands, MP’.41 The 
emphatic use of quotation marks suggests doubt about the extent to which 
these people were willing volunteers. Edwards insinuates that, like Sands, these 
men and women had been forced to die. The suggestion that their funerals had 
been forgotten further implies the futility of their cause, because the British 
government would not concede to the IRA’s demands; Edwards also insinuates 
the cynicism of a leadership for whom membership was an expendable 
resource. By presenting the hunger strikers as acting under coercion, the Daily 
Mirror, and to a lesser extent the Daily Telegraph, dismissed claims that the IRA 
had a valid political agenda and portrayed the organisation instead as one only 
interested in violence.   
The Guardian on the other hand, saw the hunger strikers and other 
paramilitaries as products of the conflict itself. In an exposé on the Irish National 
Liberation Army (INLA), journalist Paul Keel described hunger striker Patsy 
O’Hara as being ‘in every respect a child of ’68’, implying that O’Hara’s 
childhood experiences of the conflict had led him to engage in violence. He notes 
O’Hara’s early involvement in the republican movement – O’Hara had attended 
civil rights marches from the age of 13 – and observes that his ‘upbringing 
included Bloody Sunday – the day in 1972 when 13 demonstrators died on a 
street only yards away from his home’. 42 The article outlines the INLA’s history, 
explaining the make-up of the organisation and its relationship with the IRA. 
Unlike other newspapers, which provided little explanation for the hunger 
strikes, The Guardian frequently accompanied its coverage with background 
information on the prison protests and the rationale behind them. In doing so, 
the paper offered more than the simplistic analyses often seen as typical of 
British media coverage; instead, it worked actively to shed light on the 
complexities of the conflict. The paper also gave a voice to the prisoners’ 
relatives and supporters. These stories served to demonstrate the impact of the 
conflict on the everyday lives of republican families; they also posited the theory 
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that the prisoners would not have committed these crimes but for the political 
environment in which they had come to maturity.43 In an exclusive interview 
with the parents of 1980 hunger striker Tommy McKearney, The Guardian 
revealed that ‘they would have expected Tommy, with nine O-levels and two A-
levels – in ancient and modern history – to go on to university and become a 
teacher, but for the “troubles”’.44 By exploring further than the hunger strikers’ 
criminal credentials, The Guardian suggested that O’Hara, McKearney, and their 
fellow protestors, were victims of an upbringing dictated by violence.   
This is not to argue that The Guardian sought to vindicate the hunger 
strikers’ past behaviour. On the contrary, the paper drew attention to the effects 
of the Troubles on children precisely in order to emphasise the reprehensible 
nature of republican violence. As we have already observed, child casualties 
were used throughout the coverage of the conflict to illustrate the despicability 
of the political violence carried out by paramilitary organisations. Children also 
played a role in the violence itself, throwing stones, building barricades, and 
making petrol bombs. British papers regularly featured images and accounts of 
children fighting. For example, in Keel’s Guardian exposé, he recounts how 15-
year-old Patsy O’Hara had been ‘the recipient of a bullet wound “manning” a 
barricade’.45 As Helen Brocklehurst argues, such reports claimed that growing 
up in this violent atmosphere had robbed children of their childhood and 
innocence.46 The newspapers represented children, not only as physical victims 
of the conflict, but as people who had been deprived by violence of any kind of 
‘normal’ life. The Guardian feared that the hunger strikes were continuing this 
pattern. As the first hunger strike reached a climax in December 1980, the paper 
warned that ‘a new generation of martyrs will succeed in setting back the 
peaceful evolution of the province and of Ireland by yet another decade’.47  
These fears were also voiced by the tabloid press. For example, when 
Sands reached a crisis point, the Daily Mirror claimed that his fast had ‘already 
recruited acid-throwing teenagers to the junior ranks of the IRA’.48 Similarly, The 
Sun noted that a ‘new breed of tiny terrorists’ was now stalking the streets of 
Belfast.49 All four newspapers reported on the hunger strikes in terms of 
propaganda victories believed to have been won by the paramilitaries. They 
presented the hunger strikes primarily as a publicity stunt designed both to 
attract support for the republican movement in Northern Ireland and to 
undermine Britain’s reputation abroad.  
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For the British press, the biggest and most successful propaganda exercise 
of the protest was Bobby Sands’ parliamentary campaign. On 9 April 1981, 
when Sands was elected as a member of parliament for Fermanagh and South 
Tyrone by 30,492 votes to 29,046, the election result suggested that the hunger 
strikes had increased popular support for the republican cause. Sands’ electoral 
success demonstrated what could be achieved through the ballot box and this 
would eventually lead the republican movement to take a more political 
direction. In the aftermath of the hunger strikes, however, as Richard English 
notes, elements within the republican movement continued to see violence as 
the only means of achieving their aims.50  
The election of Sands to Westminster also succeeded in rekindling flagging 
media interest in the prison protests. The 1980 hunger strike had dominated 
headlines from the outset but, until the election, the second hunger strike had 
received little press coverage. The Daily Mirror still paid only fleeting attention 
to Sands’ election win, limiting its coverage to a perfunctory article under the 
front-page lead which focused on the failed launch of the Space Shuttle 
Columbia, but the Daily Telegraph, The Sun, and The Guardian all featured 
extensive coverage of the election.51 The Guardian described Sands’ victory as 
a ‘Poll coup for [the] IRA [and] a blow to Thatcher’ and noted that the result had 
‘dealt a serious blow to the Government’s security policy in Northern Ireland’.52  
The paper observed that the election of Sands demonstrated high levels of 
support for the hunger striker amongst voters:   
  
Years of myth-making go out of the window 
with the election of Bobby Sands . . . And 
the biggest myth is that the IRA in its violent 
phase represents only a tiny minority of the 
population.53  
  
The election results certainly challenged the axiom, cultivated by the British 
media, that the IRA lacked the backing of the wider nationalist community. Yet 
The Guardian also saw the election as an opportunity to end the strike, 
tentatively suggesting that, in carrying out his duties as MP, Sands should be 
permitted to wear his own clothes and abstain from prison work, a move that 
might have allowed the government to concede to the protesters’ demands 
without losing face.54   
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The Daily Telegraph and The Sun on the other hand played down Sands’ 
election success, arguing that it did not indicate widespread support for the IRA. 
Although the Daily  
Telegraph acknowledged that the election had been a ‘propaganda bonus’ for the 
paramilitaries, the paper dismissed the results as ‘determined by the almost 
automatic operation of traditional allegiances’.55 Similarly, The Sun argued that 
‘Elections in this part of Ulster are a macabre game. The results bear no relation 
to the quality of the candidate or what he stands for’.56 Both papers conceded 
that Sands’ election had revived international interest in Northern Ireland and 
shifted world opinion in favour of the IRA. As the Daily Telegraph observed, 
‘Sands’ victory has strongly fortified the provisional IRA campaign, particularly 
in the United States.57   
From the US to the Soviet Union, there was widespread condemnation of 
the decision to allow an elected member of the British parliament to starve 
himself to death over ‘wearing his own trousers’.58 In a survey carried out by the 
Sunday Times of 64 newspapers across 25 countries, 36 said that Britain should 
withdraw from Northern Ireland or enter immediate talks with Dublin over 
reunification: ‘Editor after editor said that the hunger strikers had improved the 
image of the IRA’.59 As the paper’s European correspondent, Keith Richardson, 
observed, ‘general European impressions ranges from pig-headed Thatcher 
obstinacy, through scandalous misgovernment to outright genocide. In other 
words, it could not be worse’.60   
The Daily Telegraph, The Guardian, and The Sun all dismissed such 
concerns as stemming from IRA propaganda. The Telegraph accused the IRA of 
attempting to ‘extort concessions from the British Government by hauling Britain 
before the court of world opinion’.61 The Guardian, however, played down 
international concern about the hunger strikes as ‘well-intended’ but ‘ill-
informed’.62 The paper believed that foreign media and politicians mistakenly 
understood the hunger strikes to be about prison reform rather than political 
status. The Guardian feared that these ‘foreign misunderstandings’ would 
jeopardise talks between London and Dublin, which it saw as the only solution 
to the crisis.63   
The Daily Telegraph, on the other hand, disregarded international 
criticism altogether as the ‘automatic response’ of the Irish-American lobby and 
‘miscellaneous hordes of Marxist and Trotskyite organisations’; it claimed that 
the majority of newspapers in the US, as well as a significant number in Europe, 
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had expressed sympathy for Britain’s position with regard to the hunger 
strikers.64 The paper argued that those who had condemned the British 
government for their treatment of the protesters were self-serving, and it 
noted, for example, that the Soviet Union used the hunger strikes as ‘a handy 
tool for accusing Britain of hypocrisy over human rights’.65 This was a view also 
expressed by The Sun in an article that responded to comments made during 
Prince Charles’ visit to New York in June 1981 by the mayor, Ed Koch. Koch 
remarked that ‘the British should just get the hell out of Ireland’; The Sun 
dismissed the incident and accused Koch of pandering to the electorate: ‘If it had 
been a crowd of Italians he would have been photographed eating a plate of 
spaghetti and quoted as demanding fair play for Frank Sinatra’.66  
Nonetheless, both papers sought to defend the British government’s 
handling of the protest. In order to offset international criticism, the Daily 
Telegraph, The Sun, and The Guardian, frequently presented their coverage of 
the hunger strikes alongside similar protests and terrorist activities worldwide.67 
The 1970s and early 1980s saw violent protests and terrorist attacks in several 
countries. These protests included activity organised by nationalist movements, 
not only in Northern Ireland but also in the Basque country and Brittany, which 
adopted violent methods, albeit on a smaller scale, in order to further their 
campaigns.68 By highlighting the similarities between the conflict in Northern 
Ireland and the problems faced by governments elsewhere, the papers 
reproached foreign powers for opposing Britain’s policy towards the hunger 
strikers. In April 1981, the Daily Telegraph admonished the American 
government for not speaking out against pro-IRA groups, observing that 
America, which had recently witnessed an assassination attempt on President 
Ronald Reagan (30 March 1981), ‘has suffered enough from terrorist activities, 
political, criminal and demented . . . Can its leaders pass by on the other side 
during Ulster’s agony?’.69 Responding to the international outcry in the wake of 
Bobby Sands’ death, The Sun remarked that ‘It is baffling that in countries like 
Italy, West Germany and Spain which suffer far more acutely than we do from 
mindless terrorism voices are raised condemning Britain’s efforts to uphold the 
law and protect the innocent’.70 Similarly, as the first hunger strike reached a 
crisis in December 1980, The Guardian observed that, ‘several European 
countries, with democratically elected governments, face or have faced terrorist 
attempts to subvert them. Are the killers of Mr Moro or of businessmen in 
Germany entitled to a different regime from a back street mugger?’.71    
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Conversely, the Daily Mirror paid little attention to international 
opinion. Following the publication of the Sunday Times’ survey of foreign press 
reaction, the paper’s columnist Keith Waterhouse acknowledged that ‘one of the 
hunger strikers’ chief aims which is to win foreign sympathy for the IRA was 
succeeding’. Waterhouse, however, did not attempt to defend the British 
government’s policy and instead criticised the lack of new solutions for tackling 
the prison protests:   
  
When 30,000 voters return a dying hunger-
striker to Parliament and Parliament’s only 
response is that there must be a way of 
stopping that kind of embarrassment in 
future, it begins to look as if we are trying 
to keep our Ulster problem under the 
carpet.72  
 
This was the only article to appear in the Daily Mirror that dealt with the 
response to the hunger strikes abroad. The paper’s lack of interest in coverage 
overseas arose in part because international pressure for Britain to withdraw 
from Northern Ireland aligned with the paper’s own views.   
Scholars such as Mulcahy and Curtis have observed that, in keeping with 
the government’s position on Northern Ireland, British newspapers continually 
characterised the hunger strikers as terrorists who were wholly responsible for 
the violence.73 Newspapers were quick to defend Britain’s position, particularly 
from international criticism, and The Guardian, the Daily Telegraph, and The 
Sun highlighted the hypocrisy of foreign commentators who failed to 
acknowledge similar problems in their own countries. Regardless of its 
defensiveness in the face of international criticism, the press was not afraid to 
challenge aspects of the government’s policy in Northern Ireland. The Daily 
Mirror, for example, presented the hunger strikes as further evidence to 
support the need for British withdrawal from the province.   
While all four papers broadly echoed the government line that ‘a crime, is 
a crime’, their coverage of the hunger strikes went beyond this one-dimensional 
view. The newspapers all depicted the hunger strikers not only as perpetrators 
of violence but also as victims of the republican movement. The Daily Telegraph 
and the Daily Mirror presented the prisoners as ‘pawns’ of the IRA leadership. 
These papers believed that the hunger strikes were a republican propaganda 
exercise and sought to discredit them on the grounds that, far from being a 
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prisonerled protest, they were a carefully orchestrated publicity campaign by 
the IRA leadership in which the strikers themselves were exploited.    
The Guardian took a different approach and attempted to represent the 
hunger strikers’ criminal pasts as stemming directly from their childhood 
experiences of violence.74 The paper theorised that the prisoners would not 
have become involved in violence but for the Troubles. The impact of the conflict 
on children was a recurring theme in the press, and newspapers regularly 
featured accounts of children either as casualties of, or active participants in, 
the conflict. The Guardian feared that the hunger strikes would recruit a new 
generation into the violence, a fear echoed by the wider British press.   
Newspapers were of vital importance in determining how the hunger 
strikes were interpreted in Britain, as the majority of the British population 
received news about the protest through media sources. The hunger strikes 
represented a significant and transitional moment in the conflict in Northern 
Ireland, and this shift can be retrospectively traced in British press coverage. 
Although, contemporary newspaper reportage did in the main perpetuate the 
government’s narrative that ‘a criminal is still a criminal, a murder is still a 
murderer and a terrorist is still a terrorist’, careful examination of coverage 
during the hunger strikes reveals increasing divergence from the official line and 
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